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Abstract
Thesis Abstract:
Do physicists ever find it difficult to get a mental picture of the physical processes 
involved in their research? What visualization techniques do physicists use to 
conceptualise & communicate physics? What are the perceived pros and cons of using 
such visualization techniques? This study explores such questions by combining qualitative 
and quantitative methods. These include, textual analysis of physics journal articles, public 
lectures, popular science books and magazine articles; an on-line survey of 225 physicists 
based primarily at universities across the UK and Ireland; follow-up e-mails with 13 
respondents to pursue key findings from the on-line questionnaire; and an historical case 
study of a prize-winning physicist-engineer who used analogy to provide insights and 
bridge conceptual divides between specialists working in sub-fields related to accelerator 
physics.
My findings show that many respondents create or use sketches, 
physical/mathematical models, analogies and computer simulations as visualisation tools. 
Interestingly, some respondents prefer to work with images generated from the underlying 
mathematics, rather than images abstracted from phenomena witnessed in the world of 
perceptions.
A majority of respondents believed that computer simulations have strengthened 
physicists’ visualization capabilities. They are particularly useful when dealing with 
unusual geometries and systems that are impossible (or extremely costly) to experiment 
upon in a ‘real-world’ laboratory.
I discovered that the forms of analogies employed by respondents were heavily 
dependent on the context of use (especially on the audience’s expertise and the tone of 
discussion). Analogies containing a hierarchy of structural relations are particularly useful 
conceptualisation and communication tools.
The findings of my research will be o f interest to practicing physicists interested in 
the conceptualisation and communication techniques used by their peers; science 
communicators interested in using ‘good’ analogies to make physics accessible to experts, 
intermediates and novices; and science educators interested in applying similar model- 
based reasoning skills in the classroom.
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Overview
0.1 Physicists’ Use of Analogy to Conceptualise & Communicate Physics
This thesis explores visualisation practices in physics, in particular, physicists’ use of 
analogies as tools of exploration and explanation. Many physicists use analogy to visualise 
and communicate things that are beyond their sense perceptions - from positron interaction 
to galaxy formation. In drawing an analogy, physicists compare their subject matter to 
something else, (something more familiar, intuitive, tangible, visualisable etc.). Their hope 
is that this comparison, though imperfect, may highlight some of the essential features that 
their subject matter possesses, thereby providing insights. When popularising science, the 
goal is to offer insights to the audience by making physics accessible and memorable. 
Analogy is a useful explanatory tool in this context. Physicists also use analogy to explore 
new research areas and explain novel ideas to colleagues. Here, the initial insights gained 
by analogous reasoning can be further pursued and refined through rigorous mathematical, 
computational and experimental methods.
Research shows the importance of analogy as a means of providing and promoting 
understanding both in scientific discovery and in the communication of science (e.g. 
Bailer-Jones, 2002; Clement, 1991, 1994; Dunbar, 1995, 1999, 2001; Gooding, 1990, 
2005; Gentner, 1983, 1989, 2005; Hesse, 1966; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Klahr, 2000; 
Miller, 2000; Nersessian, 1988, 2002, 2003). Nevertheless, further investigations are 
needed to uncover the forms of analogy used by physicists in different contexts. By forms 
I mean the sources from which physicists draw their inspiration (e.g. are they from physics, 
science, popular culture?), and the differing levels of abstractness of these analogies (are 
they mathematical, pictorial, physical or verbal?) By contexts I mean whether a physicist is 
employing analogy as (i) an exploratory tool in private conceptualisation and theory 
building, or (ii) an explanatory tool in communicating with experts, intermediates or 
novices, in formal and informal settings.
There is much evidence to suggest that playfulness and curiosity are important 
facets o f creativity in science. Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman (1997) 
emphasised this on numerous occasions. The revolutionary thinker Albert Einstein 
explained that “combinatory play” and “associative play” with “certain signs and more or 
less clear images” were essential features in his mechanism of thought (Hadamard, 
1945/1996, pp. 142-143). The developmental psychologist, Lev Vygotsky (1967) also 
believed that play was a vital component in helping children to develop the skills required 
to successfully engage in personal, professional and social activities. I wish to explore, 
among other things, the extent to which physicists employ playful analogies in private 
conceptualisation and informal discussions with colleagues to gain fresh insights. The
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scientific enterprise requires physicists to retrospectively reconstruct events to convey a 
logical, deductive approach to problem solving and experimentation. Thus, playful 
analogies are rarely published (cf. Kuhn, 1961, 1977; Gooding, 1990, pp.6-7). In fact, in 
section 5.8 I note that some journals censor the creative use of language. For example, 
Physical Review Letters’ disapproval of Prof. Sir Michael Berry’s use of two terms he 
coined: “quantum chaology ” and "diabolical points, ” despite the fact that many of his 
peers have adopted these terms.
Some scientists have discussed their creative insights in their diaries (e.g. Faraday) 
or when contributing to surveys on the issue (e.g. Einstein’s conversations regarding his 
productive thinking with Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer, beginning in 1916; and 
more recently, Wolpert & Richards’ collection of interviews with leading scientists of the 
time in their 1989 book A Passion for Science). For the most part, however, the abductive 
process, where new ideas are generated, remains in the shadows, edited out o f the texts of 
science, revealed only through in-depth cognitive-historical case studies. Yet an 
understanding of the tools of exploration and explanation used by practicing scientists has 
applications in many areas, in particular science education.
0.2 Training Students to Think Scientifically.
My research shows that practicing physicists use both systematic and playful modelling 
techniques to conceptualise and communicate physics. Analogies, for example, can be used 
systematically - the underlying mathematics for one area o f physics can be used to explore 
other areas of physics, e.g. the equations governing flow are analogous in electrical, 
mechanical, hydraulic and thermal contexts.1 Analogies can also be used playfully -  
comparing a parallel plate resonator to a cheese sandwich attached to a stereo ; or likening 
positrons fired into a lattice from a particle accelerator to chickens fired into a forest from a 
cannon.3
There are of course drawbacks in employing analogy to conceptualise & 
communicate physics, as outlined by historians, philosophers, psychologists, and 
sociologists of science over the past 40 years.4 As Hesse (1966) explains, models have 
positive analogies (e.g. the earth orbiting the sun in physical space is analogous to an 
electron orbiting the nucleus in phase space), negative analogies (e.g. the size o f the sun is 
not analogous to the size of the nucleus), and neutral analogies (where the relation is not
1 This is clearly highlighted in the table of “Interdisciplinary Analogies” in appendix 7.
2 As Phys_193 does in section 5.4.1.
3 As Prof. Paul Coleman does in his Dazed Chicken Model, presented in section 6.7.1.
4 E.g. Hesse, 1966; Larkin & McDermott, 1980; Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Nersessian 1995; 
Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Taber, 2001.
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known, e.g. the colour of the earth and the colour o f the electron). By their nature, 
analogies are incomplete. It is the mismatch between source and target that enables play. 
Imprecise, fluid thoughts can be a source of possibilities for ‘creative misunderstandings’. 
Unfortunately, less useful types of misunderstandings caused by analogy can be difficult to 
oust, as shown by Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson, and Anderson (1989) among others. The 
danger is to confuse the map with the territory: to think of analogy as an identity relation 
and mistakenly believe that the similarities between the two systems hold everywhere, on 
all levels.
The drawbacks of analogy are particularly evident in science education where 
novices fail to recognise the limitations of some analogies and consequently take concrete 
analogies too far. As Holyoak and Thagard (1995, p.204) caution: “[wjithout guidance 
from a teacher, analogy is often a trap for the unwary novice, rather than a stepping stone 
to expertise.” I have detailed the different forms of analogy used by practicing physicists 
in different contexts and have attempted to determine the features of good analogies. 
Thus, I believe that my findings will be useful to physics educators with an interest in 
training students to use model-based reasoning techniques similar to those used by 
practicing physicists. As Nersessian (1995, pp.204, 205) remarks: “we will be more 
successful at training students to think scientifically if they are taught, explicitly, how to 
engage in the modelling practices of those with expertise in physics.” I believe that a 
searchable databank of good analogies (suggested by practicing physicists with a flair for 
communicating with experts, intermediates and novices) would be extremely useful to 
science educators. In order to compile such a databank, one must first determine the 
characteristics of good analogies. This project is a first step towards that end. As discussed 
in chapter 9 ,1 hope to compile this searchable database in the future.
0.3 A word about terminology:
Considerable uncertainly surrounds the nature of mental images, representations, 
consciousness etc. (These issues are discussed in sections 1.2 & 1.3). However, my aim 
has been to explicate the visualization techniques employed by practicing physicists, not to 
answer philosophical or neurological questions. In order to carry out this empirical 
research I had to make certain simplifying assumptions. I began by assuming that the 
physicists under investigation have mental representations of the world, which differ in 
their complexity, vividness, realness, abstractness, and that these differences can be made 
accessible to investigation. For example, when considering atomic structure, one physicist 
may visualise billiard balls and another may visualise abstract mathematical structures.
3
Overview
Alternatively, an individual physicist may employ both visualisations, at different times, in 
different contexts. In order to gather information from these physicists it was necessary to 
employ words that would be meaningful to them. For example, the term ‘mental picture’ 
was employed in the initial survey to convey the idea of a visualisation or mental 
representation. As is evident from the wealth of data gathered, this approach proved 
successful: such terms were familiar enough to the physicists to be useful in eliciting 
responses, yet imprecise enough to allow for multiple interpretations. In fact, the various 
interpretations of terms such as ‘research’, ‘analogy’, ‘visualizations’, ‘computer 
simulations’, etc. revealed some interesting differences between sub-cultures of physicists, 
enabling me to refine the focus in follow-up studies.
Thus, throughout this thesis, unless specifically stated, the terms ‘visualising’, 
‘imagining’ and ‘envisioning’ are all intended to mean ‘forming a mental picture’ and are 
distinct from the terms ‘conceptualising’ and ‘conceiving o f  which are intended to mean 
‘having an idea’ (which may lack visual ‘clarity’). For example, one may be able to 
conceptualise/conceive of infinity but not be able to clearly visualise/imagine/envision 
infinity. I share Dennett’s (1990, p.299) view that, with practice, the distinction between 
conceptualising and visualising something becomes blurred, more or less vanishing when 
an individual achieves ‘conceptual fluency’ in navigating through conceptual ‘spaces’ 
constructed in the mind.5 However, I differ from Dennett in that I hold an imagistic view of 
representation. This is discussed further in section 1.2.
0.4 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches:
Broadly speaking, my theoretical stance on the cognitive processes involved in analogical 
reasoning in science is that analogical reasoning involves a type o f structure mapping or 
alignment between a source domain and a target domain. My aim is not to undermine the 
theory of analogy held by Genter (1983, 1989); Holyoak & Thagard (1995); Dunbar (1999, 
2001); Klahr (2000); Spiro et al. (1989). Rather, I shall investigate the various contexts in 
which physicists employ analogy to provide and promote understanding. My 
methodological approach has been influenced by the fine-grained historical case studies of 
Gooding (1990, 1992, 2005), Gorman (1990, 1992), Gruber (1980), Miller (1984, 2000),
5 Dennett remarks that according to Descartes, conceiving and imagining are quite distinct. What we cannot 
imagine we might well conceive. Descartes’ famous example was the ‘chiliagon’: a regular 1000-sided 
figure, indistinguishable in imagination from a regular 999-sided figure. In Dennet ‘s view: “Conceiving of 
something complex -  whether an abstract mathematical structure, a complicated physical process, or a 
system of rules or moves like chess or a grammar -  is a matter of learning your way round in a ‘space’ you 
must construct in your mind. Only by actively exploring such spaces can we become familiar with them to 
the point of conceptual fluency, which is the point at which the Cartesian illusion is engendered of an act of 
direct conception. Getting to that level of fluency can be very difficult.”(Dennett, 1990, p299)
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Nersessian (1992, 1995), and Tweney (1985); the empirical laboratory investigations of 
Dunbar (1999, 2001), Gentner (1983), and Klahr (2000); the sociological studies o f Latour 
(1987), Collins (1974), and Henderson (1995, 1991); the anthropological studies of 
Traweek (1988) and Forsythe (1993, 1994); and Myers’ (1990, 1991) textual analyses of 
scientific writings.
As discussed in section 2.0, these methodological approaches all possess strengths 
and weaknesses. In an attempt to investigate novel research questions but avoid over 
reliance on any one method of investigation, I have chosen to employ a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods in order to construct a theoretical lens through which 
to view my material on a macro and micro level of investigation. These include a textual 
analysis of physics journal articles, public lectures, popular science books and magazine 
articles to uncover the forms of analogy in use in different contexts; an on-line survey of 
225 physicists based primarily at universities across the UK and Ireland to gather empirical 
evidence from practicing physicists on issues surrounding visualization, analogy and 
computer simulations; follow-up e-mail exchanges with 13 of these questionnaire 
respondents to further explore some of the most interesting findings from the 
questionnaire; an historical case study of a prize-winning physicist-engineer (who is an 
enthusiast for analogy) in order to understand how the atmosphere in which he worked 
impacted upon the forms of analogy he used. My aim is to explore the various techniques 
employed by physicists to conceptualise and communicate in physics. My intention is not 
to offer law-like generalizations about creativity, innovation or problem solving.
0.5 Brief outline of thesis:
Chapter 1 addresses some key questions concerning mental representations. I critique some 
influential theories on the use of model-based reasoning in science and identify specific 
areas where a knowledge gap exists in the literature. Chapter 2 details the rationale behind 
the methods employed. I discuss the design and distribution of the on-line questionnaire, 
the analysis of the resulting data, and the selection o f respondents for follow-up studies. I 
also provide the rationale behind the development o f a cognitive styles framework as a tool 
with which to analyse my case study material. In Chapter 3 I focus on visualization in 
physics. Drawing on survey data and in-depth e-mail correspondence, I investigate the 
extent to which physicists report having visualization difficulties in their research and the 
reasons they give for this. I outline the many visualization techniques which this sample of 
225 physicists report using and explore the extent to which visual imagination relies on 
kinaesthetic skills. Chapter 4 focuses on the use of computer simulations as visualization
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tools, as revealed by my survey data, follow-up e-mail correspondence with 13 
questionnaire respondents and my semi-structured interview with Prof. Sir Michael Berry. 
Drawing on the same sources, in chapter 5 I explore physicists’ use of analogy in their 
research. In chapter 6 I discuss the key factors that influence physicists’ use of analogy 
when communicating with audiences of different backgrounds. Here I present survey 
data, follow-up e-mail correspondence with questionnaire respondents, as well as my 
observation of the analogies employed by Prof. Paul Coleman during his inaugural lecture 
at the University of Bath. In Chapter 7 I provide information on the educational, 
professional, social and cultural background of Dr. John Lawson, my case study 
respondent, in order to understand why he used certain forms of analogy in different 
contexts. Chapter 8 examines the means by which ‘translator-physicists’ attempt to 
bridge ‘linguistic’ divides between ‘sub-cultures’ within the physics community. Again, 
the data stem from my case study of Dr. Lawson, a retired physicist-engineer. Chapter 9 
contains a summary and discussion of the main findings, their implications, particularly 
for science education, and the scope for future work.
0.6 Summary of main findings
0.6.1 Visualization
As shown in section 3.2, initial findings indicated that two thirds of respondents have 
difficulty getting a mental picture of the various kinds of physical process involved in their 
research, somewhere between “1/never ” and “3” on a 7-point semantic differential scale 
which runs from “ 1/never” to “7/always”. Subject area was the most significant factor in 
determining the degree to which physicists experience visualization difficulties in their 
research. Factors such as (ii) innate abilities, (iii) training, and (iv) experience were less 
significant factors.
It is clear that some physicists’ still experience difficulties getting a mental picture 
of the various kinds of physical processes involved in their research, but a majority are 
successful at overcoming these difficulties through personal or communal strategies, e.g. 
by employing analogies or computer simulations or by raising the concepts to a higher 
level o f abstraction and visualising the form of equations rather than the physical processes 
which the equations are intended to represent. In section 3.8 I show that for many 
physicists, the kinaesthetic skills of drawing, modelling and reasoning by analogy are 
important aspects o f their ability to visualise their subject matter. It is unclear to what 
extent these important skills are formally taught to physicists. Some physicists appear to
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develop these skills themselves prior to or in conjunction with their formal physics 
education. In my conclusions to chapter 3, I suggest that all physics students should be 
formally taught to generate analogies, build mental and physical models and (like some 
physics students and most engineering and architectural students) learn some basic 
drawing and drafting techniques to strengthen their tacit and visual skills.
0.6.2 Computer Simulations
In section 4.1 I show that there was a skew towards using computer simulations as 
visualization tools, with 48.2% of the sample selecting between “5” and “7/all the time” 
on the 7-point scale. In fact, the largest single group, 22.7% of the total, selected “7/all the 
time”. In sections 4.2 -  4.5 I show that computer simulations are often used if the research 
involves: unusual geometries, several dimensions, numerous interacting parameters, huge 
search spaces, non-linear equations, complicated hardware/experimental design, 
microscopic or extraterrestrial systems which are impossible (or extremely costly) to 
experiment upon. Computer simulations are also particularly useful as a means of 
marketing physics: enlisting support from funding bodies, peers, and the general public by 
making good science look good. This is a less well-established function of computer 
simulations but an important facet of the scientific enterprise nevertheless. Computer 
simulations tend not to be used in areas that are easily visualised, or on the contrary, are at 
the edge of current theories -  because, in the latter case, one lacks the equations and laws 
needed to create the computer code.
In section 4.4 I show that a majority o f respondents indicated that computer simulations 
“7/definitely have” helped strengthen physicists’ visualization capabilities both in 
respondents’ own research area (51.6%) and in physics in general (52.5%). The 
minority of respondents who made selections on the negative end of the 7-point scale 
explained that computer simulations are used in numerical modelling, for example, not as a 
visualization tool, but instead to calculate outcomes. Thus, they do not necessarily 
strengthen one’s visualization capabilities. In section 4.6.4 I note that many respondents 
stressed that computer simulations must always be used in conjunction with other physical 
methods, where possible. They emphasised that computer models should constantly be 
matched with experimental data. My interview with Prof. Berry highlighted the fact that 
computer simulations are powerful discovery tools, useful in developing geometrical 
intuition. However, findings from the on-line questionnaire and interview with Prof. Berry 
underscore the fact that computer simulations must be used cautiously, informed by studies
7
Overview
of this kind that draw on practitioners’ own experiences of what works and what doesn’t 
work.
0.6.3 Analogy:
My research has shown that there are numerous and complex factors at play in physicists’ 
use of analogy in the scientific enterprise. Firstly, there was no unanimous definition of 
what constitutes analogy. As discussed in section 5.1, some physicists appeared to hold a 
narrow interpretation of analogy, which excluded formal mathematical analogies. This may 
be because the term ‘analogy’ is usually associated with textbook physics or popular 
science books. (In fact the term metaphor was specifically avoided as it had poetic 
associations for some pilot study respondents). Phys_185 explained: “[w]hat I use is often 
stronger than analogies, in that the underlying mathematical description is the same or 
similar in the first approximation. For example, harmonic waves appear all over the place 
in very different physical situations.” However, many other physicists referred to 
harmonic waves and LCR circuits as exemplary analogies. In response to a follow up e- 
mail from me seeking clarification, Phys__185 said that she may have interpreted the term 
‘analogy’ more narrowly than I had intended.
I found these results somewhat surprising, as e.g. cognitive scientists’ research on 
analogy has not emphasised this ambiguity of meaning amongst scientific experts who 
employ analogy on a daily basis. Acknowledging the ambiguity in the way expert 
physicists interpret the term ‘analogy’ may go some way towards understanding why some 
physicists are enthusiastic about the use of analogy to conceptualise and communicate 
physics while others disapprove of it. As Phys_9 remarked: “Analogies may be perceived 
as a dumbing-down, humorisation or over-simplification of a concept; therefore they need 
to be used with care if the audience is already expert or ‘stuffy’.”
The second main finding concerning analogy was on the degree to which the 
complexity o f the analogies related to the context of their use. Analogies on the simple 
end of the scale are common in (i) popularisations of science (e.g. one physicist compared 
quanta of energy in a quantum mechanical system to cents of euro in a monetary system in 
order to convey to novices the notion that energy is quantised), and (ii) playful exploration 
of new ideas (e.g. Phys_134’s mental image of a stadium helped him describe properties of 
DO-branes interactions). Analogies on the complex end of the scale are too sophisticated 
for physics novices to understand but are used by many physicists in their journal articles 
and conference talks. They are formal, mathematical analogies containing a high degree of 
isomorphism, i.e. there is a one-to-one correspondence between the structures at a certain
8
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level of abstraction (e.g. “to regard the exact renormalization group as a continuum 
analogue of blocking on a lattice.” Phys_170). In the middle o f the scale are analogies that 
combine aspects of both simple and complex analogies. They are highly idealised, have a 
certain degree of isomorphism, and have pictorial and/or physical features. They have a 
heuristic function and are used by experts and intermediates to extend existing knowledge 
into a new domain. The historical analogy between the flow of heat and the flow of 
electric charge is one such analogy. It has physical and pictorial components: both 
systems can be visualized as incompressible fluids flowing within channels. Consequently 
the mechanisms which bring about the phenomena in the analogous systems can be 
compared and contrasted. It also has a certain degree of systematicity -  as the analogy does 
not break down when taken beyond surface similarity. My research provides evidence for 
Nersessian’s assertion that: “ ... analogies are not ‘merely’ guides to thinking, with logical 
inferencing actually solving the problem, but analogies themselves do the inferential work 
and generate the problem solution.” (1992a, p.20, italics in the original)
Thirdly, my research shows that analogical reasoning is an extremely useful way of 
acquiring and providing insight. This can be: pictorial insight, i.e. creating visualizations 
o f physical phenomena or of mathematical structures; or physical insight, i.e. helping one 
to get a ‘feel’ for how a system behaves by giving it a tacit, kinaesthetic component. This 
is discussed in some detail in my case study work presented in chapters 7 and 8.
The fourth main finding on analogy, and one which I believe will be of particular 
interest to science educationalists, was on the issue o f ‘mapping’. The examples of 
original analogies offered by some respondents were similar to what Dunbar (2001) would 
call long-distance analogies, where the scientist maps from a commonplace source domain 
(a snickers bar or a cheese sandwich) to a more specialised target domain (a bar-shaped 
galaxy or a parallel plate resonator). This kind of mapping allows one to remember a key 
point in a very simple way. It acts as a scaffolding or framework within which to build 
one’s theory or explain one’s concept. I note that these kinds of playful analogies are 
particularly useful when marketing one’s research to peers, funding bodies, prospective 
students and the general public. In sections 5.7 I suggest that some branches o f physics 
may be more open to the use of physical and pictorial analogies than others, perhaps on 
account of the norms and conventions of the journals in their areas. In section 5.8 I suggest 
that some journals should be more accepting of physicists’ use of creative language as a 
way o f marketing their research to their peers and making the topic more engaging. For 
example, I believe that Physical Review Letters should re-consider its decision to censor
9
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Prof. Berry’s use of terms like “diabolical point” and “quantum chaology” because the 
terms have been intelligently constructed and are widely in use by Prof. Berry’s peers.
In section 6.7.1 I argue that physically possible but implausible analogies can be 
useful in clearly highlighting the limitations of an analogy. Thus, they can be useful tools 
of explanation when dealing with intermediates and novices. I suggest that analogies which 
contain little literal similarity but much systematicity (i.e. the analogy holds for a hierarchy 
of relations from the underlying mathematical equations to the physical picture attached to 
the components of the analogy) are less likely to be promote a naive interpretation among 
novices, when used in a structured, integrated way, because novices realise that the 
analogies should not be taken literally. This finding therefore has implications for science 
educationalists, as it suggests a new approach to the use of analogies with physics students.
Fifthly, my research has led me to conclude that good analogies tend have some of 
the following features: (i) useful heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb) in problem solving; (ii) 
generative (i.e. suggesting new avenues to pursue); (iii) easy to express (pictorially, 
verbally, symbolically), (iv) useful in different contexts (formal & informal settings; with 
experts, intermediates & novices). On this last point, I believe that that analogies which 
span the whole range of contexts (from novices to experts, in formal and informal settings) 
are more often those with esteemed origins, i.e. they have been generated by eminent 
physicists with a flair for conceptualising and communicating physics.
In conclusion, my research clearly shows that analogical reasoning is an important 
model-based reasoning technique used by many physicists in order to bridge conceptual 
divides between experts and novices, scientists from different disciplines, and even 
specialists within the physics community; and also to ‘promote’ their research, i.e. to make 
their research accessible and memorable to peers, funding bodies, prospective students, and 
the general public, thereby enlisting support.
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0.6.4 Implications of main findings:
The insights gained from my research should be of interest to practicing physicists 
interested in conceptualisation and communication techniques, and educators wishing to 
promote similar skills among physics students (particularly at secondary and tertiary levels 
o f education). Analogy can be an extremely useful exploratory tool in scientific research: 
it can be used to generate insights and investigate properties of a model. Analogy can also 
be an extremely useful explanatory tool in communicating physics to experts, 
intermediates and novices, when the analogies are properly tailored to suit the audience. I 
believe that my findings, regarding the features of a ‘good’ analogies, may be useful to 
educators when devising or evaluating the likely efficacy o f an analogy. When used in a 
structured, integrated way, analogies can provide experts, intermediates and novices with 
fresh insights that can be further developed through rigorous analytical means.
Most physicists surveyed believed that computer simulations have helped to 
strengthen physicists’ visualization capabilities in their respective research areas and in 
physics in general. However, they warned that computer simulations should never be used 
‘black boxes’ where their inner workings are unknown. If this happens, no useful insights 
can be obtained and computer simulations may actually weaken one’s innate visualisation 
capabilities. This is a particularly interesting development, with possible implications for 
the use of computer software packages in tertiary levels of physics education.
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0.7 Origin of Thesis Title:
Shall I  compare thee to a pressure wave?
Visualization, Analogy, Insight and Communication in Physics.
I share Nelson Goodman’s view the arts and sciences are similar in that they both: “ ... 
involve working with -  inventing, applying, reading, transforming, manipulating -  symbol 
systems that agree and differ in certain specific ways.” (Goodman, 1976, pp.264, 265). 
With this in mind, my thesis title is a tongue-in-cheek blending of the opening line of 
Shakespeare’s sonnet 18 with an analogy provided by a questionnaire respondent 
(Phys_77). In sonnet 18, Shakespeare searches for an appropriate analogy to highlight 
some of the essential characteristics possessed by the subject of his affections: “Shall I  
compare thee to a summer’s day? Thou art more lovely and more temperate . ..” I chose a 
Shakespearian sonnet because it has form and structure, a characteristic possessed by many 
analogies in physics, and because Shakespeare was both prolific and masterful in his use of 
metaphor & analogy in his literary works. As Spurgeon’s (1936) studies have shown, 
Shakespeare’s plays contain more than 6,000 metaphors (in the very extended sense, which 
includes analogy) and Shakespeare’s work contains some 10 metaphors per page. 
Phys_77, meanwhile, compared an optical wavefront to a pressure wave because it, 
“becomes e.g. compressed when moving to a higher index medium.” For example, a 
swimming pool looks shallower than it actually is because the optical wavefront changes 
direction (i.e. becomes refracted) on passing from air to water (i.e. its leading edge slows 
down on passing from a medium of low refractive index to a medium of higher refractive 
index). In re-formulating Shakespeare’s sonnet, I surveyed the various examples of 
analogy provided by my respondents and chose a particularly suggestive one (pressure 
connoting stress, force, power, energy, etc.) which also had the correct number of syllables 
to maintain the sonnet’s form and structure after substitution. The point I wish to make is 
that although conventionally thought of as polar opposites, physicists and poets are similar 
in at least one respect: both are creative in devising symbol systems with which to 
represent their subject matter. As Nobel Prize-winning physicist Neils Bohr6 once 
remarked, the atomic physicist and the poet are engaged in a similar enterprise, “not nearly 
so concerned with describing facts as with creating images,” because, “[w]hen it comes to 
atoms, language can only be used as in poetry.” (Quoted in Bronowski, 1973, p.340)
6 Bohr was one of the giants of modem physics who, in 1922, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics "for 





The Road Not Taken
By Robert Frost (1874-1963)
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood 
and sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveller, long I stood 
and looked down one as far as I could 
to where it bent in the undergrowth; 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
and having perhaps the better claim 
because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
though as for that, the passing there 
had worn them really about the same, 
And both that morning equally lay 
in leaves no feet had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back.
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less travelled by, 
and that has made all the difference.
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1.0 Providing a Map of the Territory
t l iExplorations into scientific thinking began in earnest in the 19 century (e.g Galton, 1874; 
Cattell, 1910). In the intervening years this seemingly infinite territory has been explored by 
historians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and science educators 
among others. Methodological and theoretical approaches have differed: these explorers have 
utilized different tools & maps, followed different streams of thought, and been guided by 
different stars. On the theoretical side, investigators have focused primarily on justification 
(e.g. hypothesis-testing), discovery (e.g. creativity, problem-solving etc.), and dissemination & 
acceptance of facts (e.g. representing novel phenomena, persuasion, education, etc.). On the 
methodological side, their investigations have ranged from sophisticated logico-philosophical 
arguments, to experimental/laboratory//^ vitro studies; naturalistic/field//« vivo studies; 
computer models o f scientific thinking; fine-grained historical case studies o f renowned 
scientists and inventors etc. Mixed methodology studies have been in the minority. (An up-to- 
date review of these approaches can be found in Gorman, Tweney, Gooding, & Kincannon 
eds, 2005).
Exploring the territory in their wake, I have found footprints and signposts offering 
direction, abandoned vehicles and derelict encampments offering warnings, and bright lights 
offering hope. It is said that, “true exploratory research is really the working out of a winding 
trail into the unknown.” (Du Vigneaud, 1952). To select novel research questions regarding 
scientific thinking, I followed a trail o f literature that began in history and philosophy of 
science, and branched off into cognitive science, sociology of science, science education, 
literary theory, and even architectural design studies. Without knowing it, I was engaging in 
what Gruber (1980, p.292) would call a “network of enterprise”. According to Gruber, this is 
where: “New lines o f endeavour are differentiated, lines converge; parallels are recognized 
and fruitful cross-fertilizations occur; the individual responds to problems sensed in the world 
around him by undertaking new enterprises.” Within the scope of this doctoral work, I could 
not pursue each path indefinitely. I kept ‘the roads not taken’ for another day, knowing that 
while way does lead on to way, I may someday come back.
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The vastness of this interdisciplinary territory and the complexity of the sub-disciplinary 
terrain make it impossible to provide a detailed and accurate map within the scope of this 
thesis. Thus, for orientation purposes, I have presented an over-view of some o f the literature 
in tabular form,7 then discussed some areas of particular interest, placing my work at the 
confluence of several ‘streams of thought’, which I believe to be a fertile yet under-explored 
region.
My literature review revisits key areas of interest from historical, philosophical and 
psychological perspectives as it progresses. I start by discussing key cases o f visual and 
kinaesthetic thinking in science from studies in the history' o f science. I then take a slight 
detour to present some philosophical and psychological views on mental representations. I 
return to visual and kinaesthetic thinking in science, exploring the specific roles o f intuition, 
visualizability, insight and tacit knowledge in physics, drawing on literature in the fields of 
history, philosophy, and sociology of science.
Next, I provide a general overview of the creation and use of analogies and models in 
science, drawing on recent research by historians o f science and cognitive scientists. I note 
that there are some excellent accounts of individual scientists’ creation and use o f models and 
analogies in science but few quantitative accounts of the extent to which contemporary 
physicists use them to conceptualise and communicate physics. Following on from this I 
suggest that it would also be useful to survey practicing physicists on whether computer 
simulations have strengthened physicists’ visualization capabilities in their respective research 
areas and in physics in general.
I return to analogy again, reviewing the way in which it is understood and classified in 
the field of cognitive science. I suggest that there is a need to survey practicing physicists in 
order to investigate the forms of analogy they use in different contexts. With a view to 
performing a case-study of one physicist who used analogy to conceptualise and communicate 
physics, I look at the part cognitive, social, and developmental processes play in scientific 
thinking.
7 The information is derived primarily from three works, which I found particularly useful for providing a concise summary o f  
the state o f  the field: (a) Gooding, D.C., (2005), (b) Feist, G.J. & Gorman, M.E., (1998); (c) Goel,V., (1995). The literature 
reviews presented in the above works were used as a starting point, then adapted, extended, updated and re-presented in a 
thematic, tabular form, as can be seen in appendix 1
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1.1 Visual and Kinaesthetic Thinking in Science: Key Cases From The 
History of Science
Francis Galton (1822-1911) investigated the thought processes of leading British scientists in 
the 1880s. Most of Galton’s interviewees reported thinking in words rather than images. 
(Galton, 1883, pp.58- 60; see also Roe, 1951, pp.495-570). Ferguson (1992, pp.44-45) 
suggests that Galton, “a member of the aristocracy which took for granted its superior 
intellectual abilities... may have been a bit humbled when he learned that the people he met on 
the unexalted level of ‘general society’ were, like him, visual thinkers.” Galton hypothesised 
that: “mechanicians, engineers, and architects possess the faculty of seeing mental images with 
remarkable clearness and precision... inventing their machines as they walk, and see[ing] 
them in height, breadth, and depth as real objects, and... in action.” (Galton, 1883, pp.58- 60). 
He maintained the social divide between thinkers and doers by concluding that, “an over-ready 
perception of sharp mental pictures is antagonistic to the acquirement of habits of highly 
generalized and abstract thought.” (ibid.) Yet, many 19 century scientists in Britain, 
including luminaries like Michael Faraday (1791-1867), Lord Kelvin (1824-1907) and James 
Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879) were undoubtedly visual and kinaesthetic thinkers, employing 
models and physical analogies extensively in their work. (cf. Kargon, 1969, pp. 423-436; 
Olson, 1975, pp.3-8).
The divide between thinkers and doers is also apparent in the remarks o f French scientist 
and historian Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) who contemptuously contrasted the “ample” minds
of English scientists with the “abstract” minds of the French. Duhem famously remarked that
£
Oliver Lodge’s book on electrostatics contained nothing but: “ ... strings which move around 
pulleys, which roll around drums, which go through pearl beads... We thought we were 
entering the tranquil and neatly ordered abode of reason, but we find ourselves in a factory.” 
(Duhem, trans. Weiner, 1962, pp.64, 70, 71). Duhem believed that these English physicists 
sought: “to create a visible and palpable image of the abstract laws,” because the 
Englishman’s “mind cannot grasp [these abstract laws] without the aid of this model.” 
(Duhem, [1914] 1954, p.74). In contrast, Duhem held the view that “only abstract and general 
principles can guide the mind in unknown regions and suggest to it the solutions of unforeseen 
difficulties.” (Duhem [1914] 1954, p.93).
8 The scientific contributions of Sir Oliver Joseph Lodge (1851-1940) earned him the Rumford Medal of the 
Royal Society in 1898, a knighthood from King Edward the VII in 1902 and, in recognition of his pioneering 
work on wireless telegraphy, the Albert Medal of the Royal Society in 1919.
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Yet recent studies in the history of science (e.g. Holton, 1978; Miller, 1984, 2000) have found 
that visual modes of thought (and for some kinaesthetic modes) also predominated amongst 
such giants of modem physics as Ludwig Boltzmann, Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Erwin 
Schrbdinger, Enrico Fermi, Abdus Salam, Steven Weinberg and Richard Feynman. According 
to Root-Bemstein (1985, p.61), “most eminent scientists agree that non-verbal forms of 
thought are much more important to their thought processes than verbal ones.”
Root-Bemstein also notes that van’t Hoff, (recipient of the first Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry in 1901) identified a correlation between the sort of science produced by a scientist 
and whether or not he/she demonstrated non-scientific forms of creativity. Having studied 
more than two hundred scientific biographies van’t Hoff concluded that the most scientifically 
imaginative scientists were almost always artists, poets, musicians, and/or writers as well. 
However, as Root-Berstein points out, any list of artist/scientists will always be incomplete, as 
some scientists, their biographers and archivists placed little emphasis on the importance of 
non-scientific aspects of a scientist’s life. For example, none of the standard biographies of 
Louis Pasteur mentions his extraordinary artistic skill.
Recent work by Gooding indicates that there is: “a widely used visual method that 
relates human cognitive abilities to imaging practices in the sciences and the arts.” (2004, p .l) 
Gooding’s examples (which compare the visual methods employed in reanimation of fossils, 
reconstructive visualization in hepatology and stereographic projection in early X-Ray 
crystallography) clearly illustrate the patterned character of visual inference.
Root-Bemstein wonders, “to what extent visual imagination is dependent or independent 
of the kinaesthetic skills of drawing or modelling.” (p.63) This issue is picked up in section 
3.7, where questionnaire respondents remark upon the means by which they ‘learned to see’. 
Neuropsychologist Richard Gregory’s (2001) work, on the design of interactive science centre 
exhibits, highlights the importance of kinaesthetic skills and active touch exploration in 
‘learning to see’. According to Gregory, the importance of active touch precedes humans: 
“There are many studies on animals showing the importance o f active touch exploration for 
learning to see...” (web ref: Gregory, 2001, p.5).
Effective scientific experimentation and demonstration depends on learning about the 
world. For example, Gooding writes that, “Faraday’s laboratory notes show him learning 
about the minutiae of electrostatic phenomena.” (Gooding, 1992b, p.284). Faraday’s success 
in learning about the world owed much to “sheer persistence and painstaking attention to the 
details o f experiment” (Gooding, 1994, p. 1042). In fact, Faraday prefaced the first edition of
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his first book “Chemical Manipulation, 1827” with Trevoux’s slogan “C ’est n ’estpas assez de 
savoir le principes, il fau t savoir MANIPULER. ” 9 (Quoted in Gooding, forthcoming in 2006, 
p. 5 o f 24). Thus, fingertip knowledge gained through sheer persistence is required to obtain 
robust empirical results.
I share Gooding’s view that, “thought experimenters must have learned enough about a 
world of one kind (through vision, touch and hearing) to access other, less familiar worlds.” 
(Gooding, 1992b, p.285). We know that Einstein’s insightful thought experiments often relied 
on visual and kinaesthetic knowledge drawn from the world of sense perceptions. For 
example, a 16 year old Albert Einstein imagined what he would see if he was riding on an 
electromagnetic wave. This thought experiment o f 1895 ultimately led to his revolutionary 
paper “On The Electrodynamics Of Moving Bodies” in 1905. Then in 1907, Einstein imagined 
what would happen if he dropped a stone at the instant he stepped off the roof o f his house. As 
Miller explains, this: “ 1907 thought experiment led to generalizing special relativity to 
measurements made in accelerating reference systems. This, in turn, required a folding 
together o f geometry and physics with such astounding predictions as the bending o f light near 
massive objects.” (Miller, 2000, p.316). Thus, these two insightful thought experiments were 
instrumental in the development of Special Relativity and General Relativity.
Einstein said, in a letter to his friend the mathematician Jacques Hadamard, that: “The 
words or the language, as they are written and spoken, do not seem to play any role in my 
mechanism of thought.” (Hadamard, 1945/1996, pp. 142-143). Conventional words and other 
mathematical signs were “sought for laboriously” by Einstein after acquiring visual and 
muscular insights through what he termed, “combinatory play” and “associative play” with 
“certain signs and more or less clear images which can be voluntarily reproduced and 
combined.” (ibid.)
Although Einstein’s highly visual thought mechanism was the cornerstone of his 
revolutionary ideas in classical physics, it prevented him from fully accepting the highly 
abstract nature of Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics in the 1920s. Both Einstein and 
Schrodinger agreed with Galileo’s assertion that the book of nature is written in mathematics, 
but preferred to use visual imagery to represent mathematical symbols. They were not alone. 
Miller (2000, p.57) tells us that: “On May 27, 1926, Lorentz wrote to Schrodinger that ‘ if  I 
had to chose between your wave mechanics and the [quantum] mechanics I would give




preference to the former, owing to its greater visualizability [Anschaulichkeit]’.” Miller 
contends that Heisenberg’s mode of thought, focusing on visualizability rather than 
visualization, “invites an adventurousness and play with visual imagery far beyond how this is 
carried out in classical physics, of which the relativity theories are essentially a part.” (ibid.) 
Interestingly, Einstein conceived of no more seminal thought experiments after 1907. I share 
Miller’s view that this may be related to the fact that:
“research in atomic physics, as well as any moves beyond general relativity, required 
thought in a direction to which [Einstein] was not disposed, namely, toward visualizability 
(visual imagery generated by scientific theories) and not visualization (visual imagery 
generated from phenomena we have witnessed in the world of perceptions).” (Miller,
2000, p.319).
It seems that Einstein did attempt to adopt a less concrete form of thought when searching in 
vain for a unified field theory in his later years. However, the physicists Richard Feynman and 
Freeman Dyson have suggested that Einstein failed to develop a unified field theory “because 
he stopped thinking in concrete physical images [in his old age] and became a manipulator of 
equations.” (Dyson, 1979, pp.75-76). Perhaps a thinker whose innate mode of thought relied 
on visual and muscular elements was conceptually blind, manipulating abstract mathematical 
equations in this way.
Feynman found a middle ground between Einstein’s preference for concrete, physical 
images and Heisenberg’s preference for abstract, mathematical formalism. Building upon 
foundations laid by Heisenberg’s play with visual imagery, Feynman fused intuition and 
imagery with his invention of Feynman Diagrams. The visual imagery of Feynman diagrams 
is not abstracted from phenomena that have been observed, but generated by the mathematics 
of quantum mechanics, (cf. Muldoon, 2002, pp.30-31). However, physicists have always 
differed on the exact meaning of Feynman diagrams. According to Tian Yu Cao:
“To Feynman himself, a diagram depicted an actual physical process in space-time, such 
as the exchange of photons that occurs when an electron and proton collide. However, he 
also saw it as a shorthand for the contributions to the amplitude of a physical process 
made by the element of the process depicted...In Dyson’s view, the diagrams were useful 
to visualize mathematical formulae, rather than the actual physical processes of real 
particles.” (Tian Yu Cao, 2006, p.36)
When ‘translated’ and championed by Freeman Dyson, the simplicity and intuitiveness of 
Feynman diagrams proved irresistible to most physicists o f the era. (cf. Miller, 1984, p. 170).
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Interestingly, some years later, Feynman’s difficulties visualizing electric fields led him to 
conclude that pictorial thinking had severe limitations. He explained:
“I have a terrible confusion between the symbols I use to describe the objects and the 
objects themselves. I cannot really make a picture that is even nearly like true waves [...]
When I talk about the electromagnetic field in space, I see some kind of superposition of 
all the diagrams which I’ve ever seen drawn about them.” (Feynman, 1964, quoted in 
Gooding, 1992, p. 144)
Gooding (1992) believes that there is confusion behind Feynman’s conclusion that his 
inability to imagine electric fields proves the limitations of pictorial thinking.
“Feynman assumes that one should be able to imagine the waves or establish their 
representational truth by comparing one’s imaginings with the real thing. This rests on the 
familiar but mistaken conception of how representations (be they images, symbols or 
words) relate to what they are supposed to be about. This conception is mistaken insofar 
as it fails to recognize that the correspondence of representations to things in the world is 
a relationship made by human agency...To be sure, the images did come to stand for 
something in the world, but this was because they were made to do so -  made, that is, 
through learning about how magnets, wires, and fields interact, how they may be 
represented, and so on.” (Gooding, 1992, pp. 144, 145) 10 
Almost forty years on, do physicists still report similar visualisation difficulties as those 
mentioned by Feynman? Have physicists overcome their visualization difficulties by some 
personal or communal strategy? For example, by externalising and disciplining visual images 
through the use of graphic notations such as Feynman diagrams? Is pre-existing kinaesthetic 
knowledge an important facet of Teaming to see’ in certain branches of physics? As discussed 
in chapter 2, these questions are explored in the large-scale survey of practicing physicists, the 
follow-up correspondence with 13 of these respondents, the interview with Prof. Sir Michael 
Berry and the case study of Dr. John Lawson. As mentioned in section 0.3 my aim has been to 
explicate the visualization techniques employed by practicing physicists, not to answer 
philosophical or neurological questions. However, I will now provide an over-view of some of 
the philosophical and psychological perspectives on ‘mental pictures’ in order to situate my
10 Gooding sums it up succinctly, in personal communication with Muldoon in October 2004, saying: “Feynman 
uses an attempt to visualize an e-m wave -  which fails -  to argue the limitations of visualization. But this is like 
arguing that, because climbing a ladder won’t get to the moon, it is impossible to reach the moon. Feynman’s 
mistake is to identify visualization with depictive mental images. But there are many kinds of images, and many 
functions other than picturing...Visualization ^ vision.”
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work within an historical context and validate the terminology I chose to employ in my 
questionnaire.
1.2 The Theatre Of The Mind: Some Philosophical & Psychological 
Perspectives
For centuries, scholars have attempted to explain how the world is represented in our head. 
Aristotle believed it was impossible to think without images. Miller (2000,p. 265) notes that, 
“Plato compared mental images to impressions made on wax tablets and stored away for
a1_
future use.” In the 15 century Leonardo da Vinci compared the eye to a camera obscura -  a 
dark box or room with a hole in one end, through which an inverted image of the world is 
projected. Two hundred years later, Johannes Kepler used his knowledge of geometry to detail 
the optics of the human eye. Kepler did not feel qualified to answer the question of how the 
image ‘is made to appear before the soul.’ (Lindberg, 1976, quoted in Blackmore, 2003, p. 
80). Rene Descartes, however, attempted to do just this through an experimental approach 
which combined anatomical dissections with geometrical drawings. The details of Descartes’ 
thesis did not stand the test of time however.
The 18th century Scottish philosopher, David Hume remarked that: “The mind is a kind 
of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearances; pass, repass, glide 
away and mingle in an infinite variety o f postures and situations.” (Hume, 1739, 1: 4: vi). 
Hume did caution against being deceived by the theatre o f the mind metaphor, however, 
warning:
“The comparison of the theatre must not misled us...They are the successive perceptions 
only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where 
these scenes are represented, nor of the material of which it is composed.” (Hume, 1739,
1:4: vi)
The ‘theatre of the mind’ metaphor continues in common usage to this day: we see with the
‘mind’s eye’, make ‘mental leaps,’ processes happen ‘outside’ of consciousness, and so on.
Many imagine that their inner selves are located somewhere inside their mind or brain; the
outside world is projected onto a ‘mental screen’ and viewed with the ‘mind’s eye’; their
senses transmit signals to an ‘inner headquarters’ where their inner self reacts to these stimuli.
The theatre of the mind metaphor is also prevalent in many psychological theories. For
example, conscious events are described by Baars (1988, p.31) as occurring “in the theatre of
consciousness” or on “the screen o f consciousness.” According to physiologist-psychologist
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Susan Blackmore (2003), what makes Baars ’ Global Workspace Theory, “more than just a 
loose metaphor is its grounding in psychology and neuroscience.” 11 (Blackmore, 2003, p. 71). 
However, some theories of consciousness do jettison the theatre of mind metaphor completely, 
opting for somewhat more reductionist approaches. Daniel Dennett (1991, p. 134) demolishes 
the theatre saying:
“When you discard Cartesian dualism, you really must discard the show that would have
gone on in the Cartesian Theatre, and the audience as well, for neither the show nor the
audience is to be found in the brain, and the brain is the only real place to look for them.”
Instead, Dennett proposes his ‘Multiple Drafts Model’. Blackmore notes that according to this
theory, “all kinds of mental activity, including perceptions, emotions and thoughts, are
accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of
sensory inputs, and they are all under continuous revision....” (Blackmore, 2003, pp. 74-76)
Thus, as Motzkin, (2002, pp.206-207) notes, there are three main stances concerning
representations: there are those who adopt a logicist conception of representation (i.e.
representations take the form of explicit statements expressible in a formal language like the
predicate calculus), those who maintain an imagistic conception of representation
(representations take the form of images), and those who reject the concept of representation 
1 0entirely. Even within these distinct camps, the existence and nature of mental representations 
remain a topic of debate (e.g. Tye, 1991; Kosslyn, 1996). In experimental studies carried out 
by Shepard in the 1970s and 1980s, subjects were presented with pairs of figures and asked to 
indicate whether the shapes mapped onto one another if  rotated through various angles, (cf. 
Metzler & Shepard, 1974). A correlation was found between the time taken to provide an 
answer and the time taken to mentally rotate the shapes. For example, shapes that had to be 
rotated by say 150 degrees took longer to elicit a reply, compared to shapes that had to be 
rotated by a few degrees. The subjects appeared to be mentally traversing an imagined
11 Blackmore (2003) explains that: “The contents of consciousness are limited to the bright spot of attention, 
while the rest of the stage corresponds to the immediate working memory (Baddeley, 2000). The interactions 
between the stage, back-stage and audience are based on the idea of a global workspace architecture, first 
developed by cognitive modelling groups and common in computational approaches to human cognition. On this 
view, the brain is structured in such a way that just a few items at a time are dealt with in a global workspace -  
similar to the 7±2 items conventionally held in short-term memory. The theatre has numerous inputs from the 
senses and from the overall context, and connections to unconscious resources such as language, autobiographical 
memory and learned skills. According to Baars, all this provides a real ‘working theatre’, with consciousness 
acting as a gateway, providing global access to any part of the nervous system.” (Blackmore, 2003, pp. 71-72)
12 According to Motzkin, (2002, pp.206-207) “... cognitive scientists have adopted a logicist conception of 
representation, psychologists have continued to maintain an imagistic conception, and Continentals, true to 
themselves, have simply accepted the dissolution of the concept of representation, since they have concluded on 
the basis of the object’s phenomenological constitution that the concept of mind is not relevant for philosophy.”
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distance. Psychologists speculated that the same areas o f the brain were used for seeing and 
imagining. These speculations have been supported by experimental evidence in recent years. 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans of the brain have shown that similar areas of the 
visual cortex are activated when looking at objects and when mentally rotating visual images, 
(cf. Kosslyn, 1988; Ganis, Thompson, and Kosslyn, 2004).
I have not gone into great detail on these philosophical and psychological views of 
mental representation because my main aim is to show that although multiple and opposing 
views of mental representations exist among philosophers and psychologists, the metaphor of 
a Cartesian theatre of the mind - the idea o f ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ on a ‘screen of 
consciousness’ - persists. Thus, as I explain in the next section, it made theoretical and 
methodological sense to adopt this Cartesian theatre of the mind stance in my enquiries into 
the visualization techniques used by practicing physicists.
1.3 What Is My Stance Concerning Mental Representations?
Like many psychologists, I hold an imagistic conception of representation but, unlike them, 
my aim is not to uncover the cognitive architecture underlying representation, i.e. how are 
visual representations processed? How does an image refer to an imaged object? How are 
perceptions encoded? How are memories retrieved? For example, as Motzkin (2002, p203) 
asks: “If  remembering is the remembering of perception, does that remembering encode 
perceptions as perceptions, does it store them as perceptions, and does it even retrieve them as 
perceptions?” Following the lead of researchers like Clement (1982, 1983, 1991), Collins 
(1974), Dunbar (1999, 2001), Galison (1996, 1997), Gooding (1990, 1992, 2005), Gorman 
(1990, 1992, 1998), Latour (1987), Nersessian (1992, 1995), Traweek (1988) and others, I am 
investigating representational practices in physics in order to uncover the visualization 
techniques employed by practicing physicists.
As mentioned in section 0 .3 ,1 maintain that internal representations may be conceptual 
and/or visual, e.g. one may be able to conceptualise/conceive o f infinity but not clearly 
visualise/imagine/envision infinity. I share Dennett’s view that with practice, the distinction 
between conceptualising and visualising something becomes blurred, more of less vanishing 
when an individual achieves ‘conceptual fluency’ in navigating through conceptual ‘spaces’ 
constructed in the mind. (Dennett, 1990, p.299). I also agree with Dennett’s assertion that,
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“There is no single act of the mind that counts as conceiving of something.” (Dennett, 1990, 
p.298)
My simplified stance assumes a type of theatre in the mind, where one’s consciousness 
(whatever that is) ‘sees’ the representations through the ‘mind’s eye’. I find this notion 
unsatisfactory on a philosophical and psychological level, but find it to be a useful practical 
alternative to assist me in my investigations into representational practices in physics. In order 
to enquire into the various representational practices employed by physicists, I needed to 
utilise terminology that they understood. The dissolution o f the very concept of representation 
would have hindered my investigations because respondents’ use o f terms like ‘m ind’s eye \ 
‘mental picture *, ‘mental representation \  ‘pictorial representation ' etc. would have been 
meaningless in this context. Thus for the purpose of communication, it was vital to make some 
simplifying assumptions concerning representations.
For the purpose of simplicity I shall impose an artificial distinction between ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’, categorising representations as either internal or external (cf. Hegarty, 2002, p.40 
for a similar categorisation). Internal representations are constructed in a ‘conceptual space’ 
in the mind; they are remembered and inferred from perceptual and conceptual experience. A 
physicist, for example, may form an internal representation of: (i) entities perceived through 
the senses (e.g. a system of pulleys and weights, a fluid flowing through a network of pipes 
etc.); (ii) entities lying beyond the senses (e.g. electron-positron interactions, colliding 
galaxies); (iii) mathematical abstractions which do not correspond to physical entities and 
could therefore never be perceived through the senses (e.g. vector space, the structure of a 
mathematical equation, etc). External representations meanwhile are physical creations, 
capable of being perceived through the (visual, auditory, tactile, etc.) senses, e.g. textual 
descriptions, verbal descriptions, diagrams, schematics, photographs, paintings, scaled down 
models, static or dynamic visual output from computer simulations, video, etc. Thus, on this 
view internal representations are converted into external representations through 
externalising them in ‘physical space-time’; external representations are converted into 
internal representations through internalising them in ‘conceptual space-time’.
Representations play an extremely important role in cognition and communication in 
science. Gooding’s (2005, p. 209) studies of representational practice in science reveal that 
images:
(i) “may be instrumental in generating new representation or in extending the use of existing ones;
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(ii) enable and may also promote analogical transfers between different lines of inquiry that make 
up a network of enterprise;
(iii) symbolize an integrated model of a process that involves many more variables than the eye or 
the mind could otherwise readily comprehend. In these two cases visualization is essential to 
the construction and use of interpretative and analytical concepts.”
As noted by Nersessian (1992b, p.30), static and/or dynamic representations “serve different 
cognitive functions.” For example, visual representations of a highly idealized and abstract 
nature may be used to simplify solutions and convey quantitative understanding; artistic 
embellishments may be used to highlight specific features of phenomena; faithful 
reproductions and photographic images may be used to provide detailed and accurate accounts 
of biological systems; 3-D models may provide tacit awareness.
Interestingly, Trickett, Fu, Schunn, and Trafton’s (2000) investigations have shown 
that, “[t]he external representations that are best for discovery are not necessarily best for 
communication of the discovery to others.” (p.959) Representational practices usually involve 
simplification, idealization and abstraction; like caricatures, they emphasise certain features 
and suppress others, depending on the area o f focus. Thus, for example, as Tversky (1999) 
remarks: “drawings reveal people's conceptions of things, not their perceptions of things.” 
(Tversky, 1999, p.2, web ref.) The difference between perception and conception is an 
important facet of my thesis because many physicists deal with the abstract domain of 
quantum mechanics. Like sleepwalkers in a cosmic maze, these physicists must abandon their 
commonsense conceptions and learn new means of navigating through this shadowland lying 
beyond their perceptual experiences. Do contemporary physicists learn their way around this 
conceptual maze by visualising mathematical structures rather than the physical entities to 
which they refer? When dealing with quantum mechanics, must physicists rely solely on 
conceptions rather than perceptions? I will address this issue in section 1.4 below.
1.4 What Role Do Intuition and Visualizabilty Play in Physics?
According to Feferman (2000), geometrical and physical intuition can be cultivated through 
training and practice: “These may accord with tacit knowledge gained through experience, but, 
equally, one may gain intuitions that help one maneuver through subject matter that is initially 
highly non-intuitive.” (p.317) Feferman emphasizes that there is no separation between 
intuitive knowledge and that obtained by systematic reasoning, saying that “they frequently go 
hand in hand, and neither is dispensable in practice.” (ibid.) To what extent do contemporary
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physicists make use of (geometrical and physical) intuition in their work? What form does it 
take? Is it a component of analogical reasoning? I will address these questions in section 4.8.
Miller notes that, “In German, the word for intuition is Anschauung, which can be 
translated equally well as ‘visualization’. To Kant, intuitions or visualizations can be 
abstractions of phenomena we have actually witnessed.” (Miller, 2000, p.45). On the other 
hand, visualizability (Anschaulichkeit) refers to the properties of an object that exist whether 
or not we observe it or take measurements on it. As Miller explains: “The step of abstracting 
lines of force to entities that fill all o f space and that are mathematically described by certain 
symbols in the equations o f electromagnetism raises them from a visualizability to a 
visualization, from an Anschaulichkeit to an Anschuung. "(ibid.) In Newtonian physics, 
visualization and visualizability are synonymous but in quantum mechanics they are not. 
Miller quotes Heisenberg as saying that the basic problems of quantum mechanics in 1926 
were rooted in the fact that one’s, “ordinary ‘intuitive view’ ” could not be extended into the 
atomic domain because, “ ‘The electron and the atom possess not any degree of physical 
reality as the objects of daily experience’.” (Miller, 2000, p.59) In order to communicate with 
one another about the quantum world, physicists had to get by with the language of the 
macroscopic world. This was severely limiting. Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics was based 
on non-visualizable particles, thereby avoiding any space and time description. According to 
Miller, “Heisenberg seemed willing to renounce visual imagery altogether and forever.” (p.62) 
Although some quantum physicists may adopt Heisenberg’s approach when 
conceptualising their work, as the best-selling popular science author Fritjof Capra (1992) 
points out, they still face problems when trying to communicate their ideas to a non-specialist 
audience:
“ ...eventually they will want to talk about their results to non-physicists and will
therefore have to express them in plain language. This means they will have to formulate a
model in ordinary language which interprets their mathematical scheme. Even for the
physicists themselves, the formulation of such a verbal model... will be a criterion of the
understanding they have reached.” (Capra, 1992, p.38)
How do physicists communicate quantum physics to intermediates and novices without
employing mathematics? Are analogies used to bridge the divide between a concrete
1 ^world of sense perceptions and an abstract world of quantum physics? I will show in




chapters 5 and 6 that physicists often avoid seeking physical and pictorial descriptions 
when dealing with quantum mechanical concepts in their research. Instead, they must 
raise the concepts to higher levels of abstraction and visualize the structure o f the 
mathematical equations governing the physics. Like Heisenberg, they opt for 
visualizability rather than visualization in their research. However, when communicating 
quantum physics to novices, many physicists do employ physical and pictorial analogies.
Thus, the forms of analogies employed are highly dependent on the context of use.
1.5 What Role Does Insight Play in Physics?
Related to ‘intuition’ and ‘visualizability’ is the notion of ‘insight’. Much of our vocabulary is 
peppered with words that equate sight with knowledge and understanding.14 The meaning of 
the term ‘insight’ varies across subdisciplines, interpretations including: “an ‘enlightening’ 
moment when one suddenly ‘sees’ the solution to a problem” (Gruber, 1995, p.397); an 
understandable relationship (Kohler, 1947, p.326); the condition of possessing knowledge as 
opposed to the moment when knowledge is attained (cf. Gruber, 1995, p.398); or in Wallace’s 
(1991) view a family of phenomena arising in creative work which includes: “problem 
finding... problem resolution, synthesis, discovering similarities, analogies, increase in 
certainty, recognizing error, the mot juste, and so on.” (Gruber, 1995, p.398).
I think of insight as analogous to thunder and lightning: in a charged atmosphere, 
intellectual sparks fly, generating an initial flash o f enlightenment. This is followed by a 
period o f intense work to clarify the idea. The new idea then explodes onto the world, 
inducing initial confusion among onlookers. The conscientious scientist must devise a means 
of explaining his/her new idea to the world, through the use of such techniques as analogy, 
simulation, thought experiment, mathematical proof, experimental demonstration etc. The 
time delay between the initial flash and subsequent explosion depends on how ‘far away’ from 
the fully formed idea the creator was when s/he had the initial flash, and what the 
‘atmosphere’ was like during the transformation from private Tittle c ’ creativity to public ‘big 
c’ Creativity. Gardner (1993) and Boden (1990) distinguish between ‘big-c’ Creativity and 
‘small-c’ creativity, where many people exhibit small-c creativity but only a few are big-c 
Creative. This notion also has associations with Csiksszentmihali two forms of creativity: (i) 
personal creativity, i.e. where an individual regards the product o f their own work as
14 Synnott (1993, p.208) provides the following litany: “insight, idea, illuminate, light, enlighten, visible, reflect, 
clarity, survey, perspective, point of view, vision, observation, show, overview, farsighted.”
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creative; (ii) social-cultural creativity, i.e. where others within the same society and culture 
regard the product of an individual’s work as creative (cf. Yu-Tung Liu, 2000, p.267-269).
Early in my investigations, it became clear that acquiring ‘insight’ was extremely 
important to many physicists in their work. For example, as detailed in chapter 4, numerous 
questionnaire respondents mentioned the importance of acquiring ‘insight’ when asked about 
the pros and cons of using computer simulations as visualization tools. Throughout his 
scientific papers and during many o f our interviews, my case study subject, Dr. Lawson, also 
frequently referred to the importance of acquiring ‘physical insight’ and ‘pictorial insight’, 
implying a distinction between the two, but finding it difficult to explicate this distinction 
during our follow-up discussions. This is discussed in chapter 8.
These early discoveries about insight prompted the following questions: How might 
physical insight differ from pictorial insight? For example, does physical insight incorporate a 
degree of tacit knowledge that may be absent in pictorial insight? What tools, techniques and 
problem solving strategies do physicists employ to acquire and promote insight? In particular, 
is analogical reasoning a useful means of acquiring and promoting insight? 15 These 
questions are explored in the case study in particular, discussed in chapters 7 and 8 .1 will now 
provide some background to the role o f tacit knowledge in conceptualisation and 
communication in science.
1.6 What Role Does Tacit Knowledge Play in Acquiring and Promoting 
Insight?
In section 1.1 I noted that many historical case-studies have shown that many influential 
natural philosophers and physicists have relied on visual and kinaesthetic skills in their work. 
The physical chemist, Michael Polanyi was one of the first to highlight the importance of tacit 
knowledge in science. In his 1966 book, The Tacit Dimension, Polanyi explained that: “a 
mathematical theory can be constructed only by relying on prior tacit knowing and can 
function as a theory only within an act of tacit knowing, which consists in our attending from  it 
to the previously established experience on which it bears.” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 21). The work 
of Gooding, Tweney, Galison, Gorman, and Clement, among others, has also revealed the 
central role tacit knowledge plays in the enterprise of science.
15 Gruber (1995, p.403) suggests that: ‘“I see!’ is not quite the right ejaculation for such analogy-seeing. We 
might better say ‘Look!’.”
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The sociologist of science Harry Collins defines tacit knowledge as: “knowledge or abilities 
that can be passed between scientists by personal contact but cannot be, or have not been, set 
out or passed on in formulae, diagrams, or verbal descriptions and instruction for action.” 
(Collins, 2001, p.2). Collins’ investigations into the role of tacit knowledge (and trust) 
amongst two groups of scientists leads him to conclude that the scientists’ failure to transfer 
tacit knowledge, (on how to make measurements of the Q of sapphire), played a significant 
part in delaying the successful repetition of measurements for some 20 years.
My case study of Dr. Lawson, (chapters 7 and 8) will explore the extent to which he 
acquired insights by incorporating culturally acquired, tacit, kinaesthetic knowledge into 
physical analogies. I will also explore the communication techniques employed by Dr. Lawson 
in his journal and conference papers to provide insights to his peers: physicists and engineers 
who were experts in different sub-branches of physics, associated with the design o f particle 
accelerators. This research question is discussed in section 1.7 below.
1.7 What techniques do physicists use to bridge ‘linguistic’ divides 
between ‘sub-cultures’ of the physics community?
As the late Diana Forsythe, (a cultural anthropologist o f science and technology, with
particular interest in the field of artificial intelligence) explained:
“Culture defines what we take for granted, including explicit, formal truths o f  the sort
embodied in scientific paradigms; the tacit values and assumptions that underlie formal
theory; and the common-sense truths that ‘everybody knows’ within a given setting or
type o f  setting.” (Forsythe, 1993, p. 448)
According to science historian, Peter Galison, “Forms of work, modes of demonstration,
ontological commitments -  all differ among the many traditions that compose physics at any
given time in the twentieth century.” (Galison, 1997, p 782). Galison defines ‘cultures’ within
the physics community as: “groups with very different systems of symbols and procedures for
their manipulation” (ibid.) Thus, different fields of physics such as microwave tube,
accelerator or plasma physics form ‘sub-cultures’ of physicists who utilise different
mathematical notations, groupings o f fundamental costants, codes (i.e. syntax and jargon) etc.
Galison asserts that, “ ...even specialities within physics cannot be considered homogeneous
communities.” (ibid.).
A humourous means o f highlighting the differing methodological appraoches, codes,
syntax, notation, jargon/’languages’ employed by ‘subcultures’ of the physics community is
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the infamous joke about, “Hunting Lions in Africa” 16. The problem in need of solution is how 
best to catch a lion in the Sahara Desert. Eleven methods are proposed, each method 
charactisitc of a different sub-culture of the physics community e.g.:
• “The thermodynamics method: We construct a semi-permeable membrane which lets 
everything but lions pass through. This we drag across the desert.”
• “The Schrodinger method: At every instant there is a non-zero probability o f  the lion 
being in the cage. Sit and wait.”
•  “The Dirac method: We assert that wild lions can ipso facto not be observed in the Sahara 
desert. Therefore, i f  there are any lions at all in the desert, they are tame. We leave catching a 
tame lion as an exercise to the reader.”
A joke like this actually works on two levels: not only does it illustrate the many sub-cultures 
within the physics community, it is itself a code. One feels included, i.e. part o f the ‘tribe’ 
when one ‘gets’ the joke, and excluded, i.e. an outsider, unfamiliar with the ‘tribe’s’ language 
and conventions, when one doesn’t ‘get’ the joke. Self-mocking creates solidarity: it identifies 
shared characteristics, shared experiences, shared world-views and shared foibles. Henderson, 
who has studied the visual culture of engineers, remarks that:
“Restricted codes, such as the syntax and jargon used within social classes or work 
groups, are generated by social structures and serve to transmit culture. Restricted codes 
are predictable, simplified and narrow, impersonal, concrete, condensed, neither analytical 
nor abstract. While restricted codes limit vocabulary and flexibility, they also designate 
group solidarity.” (Henderson, 1995, p.212)
The concepts of restricted and elaborated codes were initiated by Berstein (1971). We see that 
by limiting vocabulary & flexibility, these codes transmit culture, designate group solidarity, 
and facilitate communication within ‘sub-cultures’. However, as my case-study respondent, 
Dr. Lawson, points out in the introduction to one of his conference papers (see section 8.2), a 
plurality of ‘languages’ can sometimes impede communication of ideas between ‘sub­
cultures’. Thus, a central research quesiton of this project is how experts bridge Tingustic’ 
divides between sub-cultures of physicsits and engineers. It is addressed through the survey 
(chapters 5, 6) and especially the case-study (chapter 8). I show that some physicists attempt 
to bridge ‘liguistic’ divides between subcultures o f physicists and engineers through the use of 
physical, pictorial and mathematical analogies which ‘translate’ across these subdomains
16 Hunting lions in Africa was originally published as "A contribution to the mathematical theory of big 
game hunting" in the American Mathematical Monthly in 1938 by "H. Petard, of Princeton NJ" [actually the 
late Ralph Boas]. See appendix 8, section A8.1 for an extended version. Thanks to Ed Trollope for suggesting 
that this joke might be relevant to my thesis.
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and provide the practitioners with insights. As discussed in section 8.2, analogies, used in this 
way, have features in common with conscription devices, boundary objects and construals 
in ‘trading zones’. I will now focus specifically on the creation and use o f analogies in 
science, drawing on research in the related fields o f history, philosophy and psychology of 
science.
1.8 The Creation and Use of Analogies in Science
According to Achinstein: “Analogies are employed in science to promote understanding of 
concepts. They do so by indicating similarities between these concepts and others that may be 
familiar or more readily grasped” (Achinstein, 1968, pp. 208-209). The usefulness o f analogy
tV»has been recognised by many scientists in the past two hundred years. The eminent 19
century psychologist, William James, believed that: “ men, taken historically, reason by
analogy long before they have learned to reason by abstract characters.” (James, 1890, v o l . II,
p. 363). He suggested that genius: “is identical with the possession of similar association to an
extreme degree.” (quoted in Ortney,1993, p.447). The 19th century natural philosopher Sir
Humphrey Davy also recognised the importance of analogy, saying: “Imagination, as well as
reason, is necessary to perfection in the philosophical mind. A rapidity o f combination, a
power o f perceiving analogies, and of comparing them by facts, is the creative source of
discovery.” (Davy, 1840, p.308). Oppenheimer, a distinguished physicist from the 20th
century, highlighted the importance of analogy in science, giving it the qualities of a tool or
instrument. In his own words: “Science is an immensely creative enriching experience; and it
is full o f novelty and exploration; and it is in order to get to these that analogy is an
indispensable instrument.” (Oppenheimer, 1956, p. 130) The linguist, Max Black (1962)
suggests that metaphors are perhaps a necessary preclude to theory-making: “Perhaps every
science must start with metaphor and end with algebra; and perhaps without the metaphor
there would never have been any algebra.” (Black, 1962, p.236). According Alan Gross, (a
specialist in communication studies) metaphor and analogy never disappear outright. He says
that, “Although the official view is that metaphor and analogy have only a heuristic function,
that they wither to insignificance as theories progress, tropes are central to the scientific
enterprise, and never disappear altogether.” (Gross, 1996, p. 18)
Miller’s (1984, 2000) insightful case studies in the history of scientific thought
illuminate the role of metaphorical and analogical reasoning in physics. M iller’s examples
suggest, firstly, that metaphors and analogies provide a means of seeking literal descriptions
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(i.e. scientific theories) of the world around us. Secondly, the comparison property of 
metaphors and analogies brings the distinction between theory and model into sharp focus. 
Thirdly, metaphors and analogies underscore the continuity o f theory change while the 
ontology (i.e. the reality status of something) remains fixed (cf. Miller, 2000, p.219).
As mentioned in section 1.1, physical and pictorial analogies have helped many 
physicists (e.g. Kelvin, Maxwell, Faraday, Einstein) to visualise unseen mechanisms and 
thereby get a handle on things (quite literally in the case of mechanical models of physical 
systems). O f course, as Miller (2000) points out, the physicists who have employed these 
physical and pictorial analogies throughout history did not believe that the electrons 
constituting matter were attached to springs, or that the electromagnetic theory had anything to 
do with wheels and pulleys. These conceptualisations were merely used to build a framework 
within which to explore, discover, develop and explain novel concepts. As discussed in section 
1.8 models (often built upon analogies) are used iteratively by scientists. The initial pictorial 
and physical insights are extended, developed and tested via more formalised, analytical 
means. For example, Nersessian (1992) details how Maxwell adapted and honed his analogies 
as his understanding, of the target domain onto which he was mapping, grew and deepened. 
According to Gorman (1995), Alexander Graham Bell’s mental model for his telephone 
closely followed the analogy of the human ear. Like Maxwell, Bell continually modified the 
analogy as he learned more about his target domain. There is often a movement from pictorial 
and mathematical modes of expression to verbal modes of expression as scientists move from 
problem solving to dissemination of results.
Michalski (1989, p. 127) argues that it is more difficult to notice analogy than to use it 
once it has been observed because the former involves induction while the latter involves 
deduction}1 I would argue that reasoning by analogy actually involves “abduction”. In the 
Peircian view: “Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something 
actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests that something may be. ” (quoted in Hanson, 
1965, p.85). My research will fill a gap in the literature by gathering empirical data on the 
extent to which practicing physicists use analogy to conceptualise and communicate physics, 
and generate original analogies. I also devise a form of classification to explicate the forms of
17 “The process of noticing analogy and creating an analogical mapping between two systems is intrinsically 
inductive; the process of deriving inferences about the analog using the mapping is deductive.. . .This view of 
analogy as induction and deduction combined explains why it is more difficult for people to notice analogy than 
to use it once it is observed. This is so because inductive inference, being an underconstrained problem, typically 
consumed significantly more cognitive power than deductive inference, which is a well-constructed problem.” 
(Michalski, 1989, p. 127)
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analogy employed by physicists in different contexts. Thus, I believe that my empirical data 
will be o f interest to philosophers of science who are interested in shedding light on the 
abductive process in science.
So although previous research (Dunbar, 1995, 1999, 2001; Gooding,1990, 2003, 2005; 
Gentner, 1983; Hesse, 1966; Harre,1988; Klahr, 2000; Nersessian, 1988;) established the 
importance of analogy as a means of providing and promoting understanding both in scientific 
discovery and in the communication of science, further investigations were needed to uncover 
the forms of analogy used by physicists in different contexts. By forms I mean the sources 
from which physicists draw their inspiration (e.g. are they from physics, science, popular 
culture?), and the differing levels o f abstractness of these analogies (are they mathematical, 
pictorial, physical or verbal?) By contexts I mean whether a physicist is employing analogy as 
an exploratory tool in private conceptualisation and theory building, or an explanatory tool in 
communicating with experts, intermediates or novices, in formal and informal settings. I 
address these research questions through my large scale survey of 225 physicists in particular. 
The data is presented in chapters 5 and 6.
1.9 The Creation and Use of Models in Science
A central aim in this project is to provide an account of how practicing physicists create and 
use analogy as one strategy or method of modelling. This research question is addressed via 
the large-scale survey and case study. The research design is outlined in chapter 2 and the 
findings presented in chapters 5 to 8.
The creation and use of models has been a central facet of the scientific enterprise in 
England for well over a century. As mentioned previously, Duhem tells us that contemporary 
19 century English scientists frequently relied on models to explicate their theories, 
contemptuously contrasting the “ample” minds of the English with the “abstract” minds o f the 
French. (Duhem, [1914] 1954, p.69) Duhem wrote:
“Understanding a physical phenomenon is, therefore, for the physicist o f  the English 
school, the same as designing a model imitating the phenomenon; whence the nature o f  
material things is to be understood by imagining a mechanism whose performance will 
represent and simulate the properties o f  the bodies.” (Duhem [1914] 1954, p.72).
On the positivist view, reasoning involves applying a set of rules. The equations and 
definitions make up the complete description of a scientific theory. As Nersessian (1995, 
p222) explains, on this syntactic view, “A conceptual structure is a set of definitions, the
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proper formulation of a theory is as an axiomatic structure and reasoning with the theory is 
deductive, reasoning to the theory is inductive.” However, model creation, via abduction, may 
be at the heart of novel discoveries in science. According to Peirce: “Induction sets out with a 
theory and it measures the degree of concordance of that theory with fact. Induction never can 
originate an idea whatever. No more can deduction. All the ideas of science come to it by the 
way of Abduction.” (Peirce, quoted in Hanson, 1965, p. 146).
Hutten (1954, p.285) believed it was important to reconcile scientists’ and philosophers’ 
accounts of scientific method. At that time, philosophers paid little attention to models, despite 
the fact that scientists’ accounts of scientific method emphasised the importance o f model- 
based reasoning. As Hutten remarked: “It is obviously best to follow the scientists here as 
closely as possible, at least in the first instance; we may hope in this way to avoid forcing 
science into a pre-conceived scheme, as philosophers have so often done” (Hutten, 1954, 
p.81). Many contemporary philosophers and historians have taken Hutten’s advice to heart. 
However, there are disparate views on how to classify models. Goodman (1976, p 171) 
remarked wryly that: “Few terms are used in popular and scientific discourse more 
promiscuously than ‘model’. A model is .. .almost anything from a naked blonde to a quadratic 
equation -  and many bear to what it models almost any relation o f symbolization.” Goodman 
recommended that the term model be used more sparingly, and:
“reserved for cases where the symbol is neither an instance nor a verbal or mathematical 
description: the ship model, the miniature bulldozer, a campus, or a car; and none is a 
description in ordinary or mathematical language. Unlike samples, these models are 
denotative; unlike descriptions, they are nonverbal.” (Goodman, 1976, p. 172)
For Goodman, (1976, p. 171) “what matters with a diagram, as with the face of an instrument, 
is how we read it,” not “the mere presence or absence of letters or figures.” He emphases that: 
“the significant distinction between the digital or notational and the non-notational, 
including the analog turns not upon some loose notion o f  analogy or resemblance but 
upon the grounded technical requirements for a notational language.” (ibid.)
Giere (1998, pp54-56) emphases the non-linguistic character of models, but (unlike Goodman) 
holds that: “The term ‘model’ may be used for all types of representation from the initial, 
tentative construals of data to the well-articulated, unambiguous hypothesis or theory.” This 
leads Giere to conclude that, “theory construction in science is models ‘almost all the way up’ 
from the phenomenology, and theory evaluation is ‘models almost all the way down’.” (ibid.)
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According to Mike Gorman (1998) a mental model can be viewed as a kind of frame: “but one 
that is more visual and kinesthetic than other more prepositional types of frame.” For example, 
Gorman (1998, pl22) notes that, “D og...is more than an abstract concept; most o f us have a 
visual mental model of a dog, perhaps based on our favourite dog.” Gorman explains that as 
frames can be nested within frames, mental models can be nested within mental models. Thus, 
“An inventor can have a mental model of an overall system, and also a mental model of how a 
part of a system might work.” (Gorman, 1998, p. 123). Gorman also uses the term mental 
model “to designate both individual and shared representations that are partly tacit and 
typically have visual and/or kinaesthetic components.” (Gorman, 2005, p.293).
It is worth noting that there may be a distinction on a cognitive level between creating 
and using models. Bailer-Jones (1999, p.36) notes that: “Both creating and using a model are 
processes involving cognition, but not necessarily in the same way, and having a picture o f a 
model may be crucial to using it.” Clement’s (1982, 1983, 1991) investigations on imagistic 
simulation in scientific model construction reveal that contemporary physicists frequently use 
informal, qualitative logic (including analogy and limiting case analysis) to solve problems. 
Clement’s findings suggest that: “the transfer of runnability achieved by grounding a new 
model in a runnable prior knowledge schema as a source analogue may foster a type of model 
flexibility that aids the use of the model in transfer problems. Model flexibility would seem to 
be a very important feature of scientific knowledge for both experts and students.” (Clement, 
2003, p.4).
Thus, although numerous researchers have highlighted the importance o f model
1 8creation and use in science in recent years, there are no broad-ranging, quantitative 
accounts of the extent to which scientists in different fields use models (e.g. analogical or 
computational) and few detailed accounts of how scientists create models (whether digital, 
analog or a mixture of digital and analog). As Morgan and Morrison (1999, p. 12-13) remark: 
“We are given definitions of models, but remarkably few accounts of how they are 
constructed.” Mary Hesse’s (1966) account of models and analogies, Nancy Cartwright’s
18 e.g. Campbell 1920; Braithwaite 1953, 1954; Black 1962; Hesse 1953; 1966; 1974; Harre, R., 1960, 1982, 
1988, 1990; Kuhn, 1977; Giere, 1998; Gooding, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1992; Goodman, 1976; Gorman, 1998, 2005; 
Morrison, 1998; Morgan & Morrison, 1999; Cartright, 1983, 1999;
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(1983) ‘simulacrum’ account,19 David Gooding’s (1990) ‘construals’ account, and Morgan and 
Morrison’s (1999) ‘models as mediators’ account are exceptions.
According to Morrrison (1999, p.43, 44) “ ...many models are constructed in a rather 
piecemeal way making use of different theoretical concepts in nothing like a systematic 
process.” Although models may be constructed in a piecemeal way, they may be used as 
structured problem-solving methods. They provide conceptual frameworks around which to 
build theories, and simplifying lenses through which to view complex data. Harre (1970, p.40) 
argues that “making models fo r  unknown mechanisms” is the creative process in science and 
the catalyst for scientific advances. He contrasts this with “making of models o/know n things 
and processes” which has in his view “a more heuristic value”.
One may obtain a mathematical representaion of a process, system or object in a number 
o f ways, including empirical modelling and physical modelling. Practicing engineers, Bissel 
and Dillon describe empirical modelling as: “any technique for deriving a mathematical model 
with little or no underlying theory or assumptions about the object being modelled.” (ibid. p.5) 
By their definition, physical modelling on the other hand, “involves using the assumptions and 
implications of some scientific or other law ...to derive a mathematical model expressed in 
terms of physical variables such as mass, friction, voltage, current, e tc ...” (ibid.p 5). Physical 
modelling often involves the process of simplification by abstraction: the sophistication of 
models can be gradually increased as fewer phenomena are neglected, e.g. first neglect 
friction, then include viscous friction, then static friction.
Bissell & Dillon also describe a third approach called system identification, which they 
say is, “much less widely known outside engineering circles.” (Ibid. p.5) They explain that:
“in this approach, the system under consideration is treated as a ‘black box’. A model is 
derived by means of input-output testing (impulse or step response, frequency response,
I/O correlation with random input). Typically, system identificaiton operates with a 
restricted range of useful model types (often linear differential equations) and, most 
importantly, it delivers no model of individual component behaviour.” (ibid. p.5)
But one could ask Bissel and Dillon, in what sense is an input-output model a model if  it only 
replicates behaviour? As you will see in section 4.6.4, many questionnaire respondents 
(practicing physicists) cautioned against treating computer simulations as ‘black boxes’ -
19 “[Cartwright] suggests that models are made by fitting together prepared descriptions from the empirical 




where the user has no firm understanding of the theory underlying the computer model. They 
said that no real insights can be obtained if  computer models are used in this manner. 
However, as shown in section 4.4, a majority o f respondents believed that computer 
simulations have strengthened physicists visualization capabilities both in their own research 
area and in physics in general. I will now set the scene for this research question.
1.10 Can computer models strengthen physicists’ visualization 
capabilities?
Dennett (1990) asked if  we might:
“make a computer that expanded our capacity to think in much the same way 
microscopes, telescopes, microphones and cameras have expanded our sensory 
capacities.. .Is there some way o f  attaching a computer to a human mind so that the mind’s 
powers o f  conception are enhanced?” (Dennett, 1990, pps. 299-300)
Mathematician and educator, Walter Whitely (1992) believes that computer software packages 
(e.g. Cabri Geometrie, Geometers SketckPad, and Cinderella.) have important functions as 
educational tools, saying that:
“New computer tools, play with objects and images, and guided practice can change how  
students ‘see’ both external visuals and images in their mind’s eye. The shift from simple 
images to insight is not a matter o f  luck it is a matter o f  learning... .” (Whitely, 1992, web 
PDF, p.3)
Computer scientist and educational psychologist Barbara White (1993) also believes that 
computer simulations have their place in the classroom. Her ThinkerTools Research group’s 
ThinkerTools Force-and-Motion software “provides interactive simulations o f force-and- 
motion phenomena. Students can experiment with and modify the simulations in various ways,
7ftso that they develop and investigate alternative models of force and motion.”
Thus, another aim of this project is to enquire into the creation and particularly the use 
o f computer simulations as visualisation tools when conceptualising and communicating 
physics. As we saw in section 1.9, models can be empirical, physical or mathematical. They 
can be used to simplify complex systems, generate a range of input-output data, produce 
idealized plots and graphs of the time evolution o f systems, etc. According to Wisberg (1999, 
p.264), “visualisation plays a crucial role in sanctioning as well as in analysing simulation
20 Quoted from the ThinkerTools website. The ThinkerTools Force-and-Motion software can be downloaded 
from theis website: http://thinkertools.soe.berkelev.edu/Pages/force.html
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results. Not only does the epistemology of simulation call upon resources that are empirical, 
and come from outside of the theory, it also calls upon the faculties of the observer.”
I investigate physicists’ use of computer simulations to bridge conceptual divides 
between different modes of thought via a large-scale survey, follow-up e-mail 
correspondence and an interview with Prof. Berry. In sections 3.6 and 4.5.1 I show that 
experimentalists sometimes make use of simulations to help them visualise equations into their 
physical meaning, because abstract mathematical forms are often presented by theoreticians in 
their published work while physical and pictorial forms are often preferred by 
experimentalists.
As indicated by the work of Winsberg (1999) and Hughes (1999) the advent of the 
computer has changed not just the way individual problems are addressed but also the sort of 
enterprise in which theorists engage, and hence the kind of theory they propose. Again I use a 
large-scale survey and follow-up e-mail correspondence to enquire into the advantages and 
disadvantages of operating in a virtual laboratory. For example, in sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.4 I 
show that, among other things, computer simulations allow physicists to visualise extremely 
complex geometries and conduct experiments on astronomical scales (e.g. simulating the 
behaviour o f colliding galaxies). However, I also show that many respondents emphasise that 
real world experimental checks should always be carried out where possible to ensure that 
physicists do not become disembodied experimenters. What are the other contexts in which 
computer simulations are useful? For example, do physicists use of computer simulations as 
marketing tools -  to make their work look enticing, with a view to publishing in prestigious 
journals and obtaining funding? My survey data and interview material will explore this 
research question and conclude that many physicists employ computer simulations to good 
effect as marketing devices. In the following sections I return to the role o f analogy in 
conceptualisation, drawing on literature in the fields of cognitive science and design studies.
1.11 Goel’s thesis that it is often necessary for thoughts to be imprecise & 
fluid may suggest a cognitive role for playful analogies in conceptualisation.
An excellent over-view of thirty years of cognitive psychology literature can be found in 
Goel’s Sketches of Thought (1995). Goel reports that: “[designers are certain that there are 
important differences in their various systems o f representation and that these differences 
affect their thought processes.” (1995, pl35). As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, my initial
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findings suggest that physicists also use various systems of representation in the course of 
problem structuring, problem solving, disseminating results and popularising physics and 
suggest that these systems of representation may affect their thought processes. Individuals 
may use any number of different contrasting or complimentary cognitive approaches in the 
course of problem structuring, problem solving, disseminating results, etc. According to Goel 
(1995, p.127):
“Each o f  these observations is common knowledge among designers (Albam and Smith,
1977; Crowe and Laseau, 1984; Goldschmidt, 1991; in press; Laseau, 1989). 
Unfortunately, most members o f  the cognitive science community have been raised in a 
primarily linguistic tradition and find such ideas foreign.”
So, how should one investigate images, visualizations, analogies etc. when faced with a 
linguistically orientated research field? This was a recurring issue throughout this project. It is 
addressed in chapter 2, under the methodological approach taken when constructing a 
cognitive style framework for my case-study on Dr. Lawson. There are three main facets to 
Goel’s thesis:
i. it is often necessary for thoughts to be imprecise, ambiguous, fluid, amorphous, 
indeterminate, etc;
ii. a close relationship exists between the structure o f  our thoughts & the structure o f  our symbol 
systems;
iii. any system o f  internal representation must have the properties necessary to accommodate 
imprecise, ambiguous, fluid, amorphous, indeterminate thoughts.21
I explore the first facet of Goel’s thesis in my research into physicists’ views on the use of 
analogies to conceptualise and communicate physics. As we saw in section 1.9, models and 
analogies are used by physicists to refine and make initial ideas more precise. In chapters 5 
and 6 I will provide examples of analogies used by physicists and show that the forms of 
analogies they use to conceptualise and communicate physics vary according to their goals, 
the expertise of their audience, the tone of the discussion etc. In particular I will show that 
playful analogies do have an important function both in private conceptualisation and when 
promoting physics. I should stress that my main aims are to explicate the representational 
practices employed by physicists in conceptualisation and communication, and more 
specifically to investigate the different forms of analogy employed by physicists in different
21 Goel’s “intuitions and sympathies are clearly in line with the train of thought stemming from Pierce, Cassirer, 
Langer, through to Goodman, which recognizes both the importance of symbolic activity and the multiplicity of 
symbol systems.” ibid, p. 16
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contexts. My aim is not to uncover the cognitive architecture underlying problem-solving (and 
by extension representational) processes. I will leave that to cognitive scientists. To 
investigate the different forms of analogy employed in different contexts it is necessary to 
review the literature to explore the various ways in which analogies have been classified by 
others, in particularly, cognitive scientists. I shall do this in section 1.12.
1.12 How is analogy classified? A Cognitive Science Perspective
Research by cognitive scientists over the past 20 years has resulted in several detailed 
accounts of the cognitive processes involved in analogical reasoning. On most cognitive 
science accounts, drawing an analogy means identifying structural relations between the 
source domain and the target domain. It has been shown that by mapping concepts from a 
source domain (an area which is well understood) to a target domain (an area which is not well 
understood) some scientists use analogy to construct a model or framework within which to 
explore, discover, develop, and explain a new topic (cf. Holyoak, K.J., & Thagard, P., 1995; 
Gentner, 1983, 1989).
Kevin Dunbar (2001) has carried out extensive research on analogical reasoning 
among biologists, using what he dubs “InVivo” and “InVitro” methodologies. InVivo 
research is carried out in naturalistic settings, where groups of biologists are observed at 
laboratory meetings. The findings from InVivo studies can then be fed into InVitro research, 
which involves controlled experiments in a psychology laboratory. Dunbar’s findings led him 
to conclude that analogy is common; often based on deep structural features and higher order 
relations; goal-orientated; used by scientists as scaffolding, and often discarded and forgotten 
after it has served as a bridge when building new explanations and models. (Dunbar, 1999, 
p.89) Dunbar’s studies also showed that the greater the knowledge-base o f the team, the 
greater the number of analogies that were generated, with experts employing more and better 
analogies than their less expert colleagues. Dunbar (1999) classified analogies as local, 
regional and long-distance, and found that the scientists’ goals when they made these 
analogies could be grouped into four classes: (i) formulate an hypothesis, (i) design an 
experiment; (iii) fix an experiment; (iv) explain a result. I have summarised Dunbar’s (1999) 
findings in table 1.0 on the next page.
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Goal of biologist Type of 
Analogy
Definition of type Example As a % of 




and fix an 
experiment
Local where researchers 
make an analogy to an 
experiment in a very 
similar research area, 
or to a similar 
technique or protocol
Drawing an analogy 
from one gene on the 
HIV (virus) to 
another gene on the 
HIV (virus).
~  45%
To formulate an 
hypothesis
Regional where researchers map 
over entire systems o f  
relationships from one 
domain to another
Drawing an analogy 
from the Ebola virus 
to the HIV vims.
~  50%
To explain 
concepts to others, 
rather than as a 





where researchers map 
a concept from a very 
different domain to the 
domain they are 
working on
Attempting to explain 
the way a vacuole 
works by drawing an 
analogy to the pop 
song ‘Hotel 
California’. You can 
check in but you 
can’t check out.
~  2%
Table 1.1: Summary of Dunbar’s (1999) findings on the forms of analogies used by biologists 
in different contexts.
As you can see from table 1.1 above, long-distance analogies accounted for just 2% of the 
total number of analogies used. Are Dunbar’s findings on this issue transferable to physicists? 
Comelis’ studies of analogical reasoning in modem cosmological thinking: “suggests that 
interdisciplinary analogies are problem-solvers, while intradisciplinary analogies generate 
corollaries.” (Comelis, 2000, p.179).22 On an interdisciplinary level, Comelis (2000) 
describes how physicist Roger Penrose drew a visual analogy to work by the graphic artist 
Maur Escher. Specifically, Penrose drew a “visual analogy between the graphical covering of 
the plane and five fold symmetrical covering of a plane with a network of electrons.” (ibid. 
p. 177). On an intradisciplinary level, Comelis (2000) shows that analogies drawn between the 
related disciplines of astrophysics and cosmology, concerning the origin o f the universe, 
helped to form the singularity theorem (i.e. like a black hole, the early universe contained a 
point of singularity). Comelis also distinguishes between formal and informal analogies, 
saying:
22 A corollary is a proposition that can be deduced easily from another proposition or theorem.
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“Informal analogies are analogies where there is a certain relation between the objects o f  
two theories A and B, and where theory B is based on theory A by means o f  that relation. 
Formal analogies regard the relation between the methodologies o f  theories A  and B.” 
(Comelis, 2000, p. 165)
Comelis suggests that if informal analogies concern a related problem, “the solution they lead 
to is in effect the same”, while formal analogies “do not necessarily lead to rigid connections: 
the structure of the drawing can not necessarily have anything to do with the structure of the 
universe...” (p. 178)
Dunbar (1999) and Comelis (2000) both show that analogies can be used to solve 
problems (design and fix experiments and formulate hypotheses) by transferring 
methodological approaches or comparing relational features between theories. However, the 
distinctive role Comelis (2000) suggests for inter-disciplinary analogies as problem solvers 
and intra-disciplinary analogies as corollary generators in physics does not seem obvious in 
Dunbar’s (1999) studies in the field of biology. I shall compare and contrast the findings of 
Comelis (2000) and Dunbar (1999) with the data I gather via the survey, e-mail exchanges, 
interview, and case study.
I shall follow Gentner’s thesis in holding that drawing an analogy in science means 
identifying structural relations and mapping elements between the source and target domains. 
Gentner’s (1989) structure mapping theory asserts that there are three main stages to 
analogy processing:
1) accessing the source domain;
2) performing the source to target mapping;
(2a) judging the soundness of the match: structural consistency, i.e. that there is a 1:1 
match between elements in the source and target; parallel connectivity, i.e. arguments of 
matching predicates must themselves be able to be placed in correspondence; 
systematicity, i.e. alignments that form deeply interconnected structures, in which higher 
order relations constrain lower order relations, are preferred over less systematic sets of 
commonalities.
(2b) storing inferences in the target domain;
3) extracting the common principle.
On my view, analogies can range from those with low level isomorphism24 or systematicity25 
to analogies having high level isomorphism or systematicity. This interpretation, common
23 For a concise overview of Gentner’s structure mapping theory, see Palmer, 1989
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among 20th century cognitive scientists, was actually foreshadowed by the 19th century 
mathematical physicist J.C. Maxwell. On Maxwell’s definition, scientific metaphor or 
physical analogy were where, “each term in its metaphorical [or analogical] use retains all the 
formal relations to the other terms of the system which it had in its original use.” (Maxwell, 
1890, p.227)
It is important to note that analogies can be expressed physically, pictorially and/or 
mathematically. For example, the analogy between the flow of heat and the flow o f electric 
charge can be visualized as incompressible fluids flowing within channels or mathematically 
expressed as:
Flow of heat: dH/dt = - K(T2 - T i) is analogous to the
Flow of electric charge: dQ/dt = - G(V2 -  Vi) where:
H, the quantity of heat is analogous to Q, the electric charge;
K, thermal conductance of the rod is analogous to G, conductance of the wire.
T, temperature is analogous to V, voltage;
The analogy between the flow of heat and the flow of electric charge was put forward by 
William Thompson (A.K.A. Lord Kelvin) in 1842. His contemporary, J.C. Maxwell, drew on
97it, and also on Faraday’s geometrical intuitions regarding “lines of force,” in formulating his 
groundbreaking work on electromagnetism. Maxwell took Kelvin’s analogy between the flow 
of heat and the flow of electric charge, but in the place of heat, Maxwell imagined a 
continuous, incompressible, steady-flowing fluid. The properties of this fluid could thus be 
expressed with standard hydrodynamic equations. In the space between Faraday’s Lines of 
Force Maxwell imagined this incompressible fluid, positing that it would flow along the same 
lines as Faraday’s lines o f force, from source (positive charges) to sink (negative charges). 
According to Christopher Haley (2002):
“In terms of the history of the field, this paper [On Physical Lines o f Force] was a very 
significant step, since it brought Faraday’s physical, geometrical conceptions under the
24 (derived from the Greek word ‘isos’ meaning ‘equal’ and ‘morphe’ meaning shape)
25 (i.e. the analogies break down if taken beyond surface similarity because the 1:1 correspondence does not hold 
for a hierarchy of relations)
26 (i.e. the analogies hold for a hierarchy of relations, from the physical picture attached to the phenomena to 
mathematical formalism which underlies the system)
27 In a letter of 1854, Maxwell told Kelvin that he had been 'greatly aided' by the abovementioned analogy (cf: 
Harman, 1990, p.234). Also, in an 1872 review of Kelvin, Maxwell underscores the value of Kelvin's 1842 paper 
containing the said analogy (cf: Niven, 1890, pp. 301-307). In fact, in his Treatise (volume 1, p. x) Maxwell pays 
tribute to “Sir William Thomson, to whose advice and assistance, as well as to his published papers, I owe most 
of what I have learned on the subject.”
See also Haley (2002, web ref.)
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control o f  powerful analytical mathematics. Moreover, as with Stokes’ hydrodynamics, 
the fact that the medium was treated as continuous was important for the application o f  
advanced calculus.” (Haley, 2005, web ref.).
Haley goes on to say that:
“In terms o f  our understanding o f  M axwell’s methodology, the paper is also highly 
significant, since it displays a characteristic and conscious use o f  what Maxwell called 
physical analogy: a compromise between physical hypothesis, which he felt restricted 
and channel one’s thinking, and pure mathematics, which sometimes lacked sufficient 
connection with the phenomena under discussion.” (ibid.)
Maxwell thus used rigorous mathematical analysis and physical analogies to give fine­
grained and coarse-grained views of phenomena, thereby extending his knowledge.
1.13 How Are Analogy, Simile and Metaphor Related?
The historical distinction between “scientific metaphor” and “physical analogy” is not clear- 
cut. Maxwell appears to use the terms “physical analogy” and “scientific metaphor” 
interchangeably. He defines Scientific Metaphor as: “the figure of speech or o f thought by 
which we transfer the language and ideas of a familiar science to one which we are less 
acquainted.” (1890, p.227). For example, he says:
“the words Velocity, Momentum, Force &c. have acquired certain precise meanings in
Elementary Dynamics. They are also employed in the Dynamics o f  a Connected System
in a sense which, though perfectly analogous to the elementary sense, is wider and more 
general...The characteristic o f a truly scientific system o f  metaphors is that each term in 
its metaphorical use retains all the formal relations to the other terms o f  the system which 
it had in its original use. The method is then truly scientific -  that is, not only a legitimate 
product o f  science, but capable o f  generating science in its turn.” (ibid.)
In my pilot studies I found that contemporary physicists tended to regard the use o f analogy as 
more scientific than the use of m etaphor. The latter they associated with poetry and
popularizations of science. Thus, as discussed in chapter two, I avoided using the term
metaphor when gathering data via the large-scale survey, e-mail exchanges, interviews and 
case study and confined my research to the study of analogy. However, I believe it is worth 
mentioning how analogy, simile and metaphor are related.
Broadly speaking, analogy, simile and metaphor could be said to come, from the same
‘species’ but all three differ in subtle ways. In his paper on models and metaphors, Max Black
(1962, p. 37) remarks that: “It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that
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the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently 
existing.” With simile we make a (like/as) comparison between two things, usually 
transferring certain object attributes between domains. To use the terminology o f cognitive 
scientists, this comparison and transferral of certain object attributes involves a ‘source-target 
mapping’. The comparison is usually limited with simile. For example, in Shakespeare’s 
sonnet 23: “As an unperfect actor on the stage, who with his fear is put beside his part,” 
attributes like nervousness, awkwardness, enthusiasm etc. are intended to be mapped from the 
source to the target domain to convey the sense that the poet is overcome with feeling and 
therefore unable to express himself in person. Object attributes like age, height, weight, etc. 
are not intended to be mapped across. With metaphor we say one thing is another (e.g. “Juliet 
is the sun”). This startling fusion of attributes between source and target domains creates a 
new perspective, allowing us to see something in a new way. With metaphor, as with simile, 
only certain attributes are intended to be mapped between source and target domains. In the 
example, “Juliet is the sun”, one transfers attributes such as warmth and life-giving radiance, 
but not object attributes of size, shape or colour. According to Goodman (1976) “Metaphorical 
force requires a combination of novelty with fitness, or the odd with the obvious. The good 
metaphor satisfies while it startles. Metaphor is most potent when the transferred schema 
effects a new and notable organization rather than a mere relabeling of an old one.” (p.80)
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) suggest that despite novel similes being processed more 
directly than novel metaphors, poets select the metaphor form over the simile form for novel 
figuratives, “because novel metaphors will initially give the reader pause, they should call 
more attention to themselves than novel similes and may therefore be taken more seriously.” 
(p.211). They employ Gentner’s (1983) Structure Mapping Theory to argue that: “metaphor 
can be seen as a species of analogy.” (2005, p. 196). In their view: “literal comparisons, 
analogies, and metaphors all rely on the same basic mechanisms, [outlined in Gentner’s 
structure-mapping theory] with analogies and metaphors more likely to focus on relational 
commonalities and metaphors more likely to involve cross-domain mappings.” (2005, p. 197). 
Gentner, Bowdle, Wolff and Boronat (2001, p.240) suggest that metaphors are typically used 
for: “expressive-affective purposes, and analogies for explanatory-predictive purposes. But we 
often speak of metaphors in science, so it might be more accurate to say that analogy is used 
in explanatory-predictive contexts, while metaphor can be used more broadly, in either
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explanatory-predictive or expressive-affective contexts.” It may be for this reason that the 
physicists in my pilot study tended to prefer the use of analogy to the use o f metaphor in 
science.
1.14 The role of analogy in science education
I believe that my research, an empirical study into practicing physicists’ use of analogy to 
conceptualise and communicate physics, can be of interest to researchers in the field of 
science education. I share the views of Nersessian (1995) and Bissell & Dillon (2000) in 
believing that science educators should be taught about the conceptualisation and 
communication methods used by practicing physicists. In this way they may learn to construct 
a range of analogies which, when used in a more structured way, may be less likely to 
encourage novices to adopt naive interpretations. For example, Prof. Coleman’s dazed chicken 
analogy (discussed in chapter 6) has many features which could be used as a template for 
constructing analogies for use in a science education context: it holds for a hierarchy of 
relations, has little literal similarity between source and target domains and therefore reduces 
the likelihood of taking the analogy too far, follows an easily visualised narrative, is 
humourous etc. I believe that a new databank of ‘good’ analogies, suggested by practicing 
physicists (with a flair for communicating to experts, intermediates and novices) would prove 
useful to physics educators. My research should provide a very useful foundation 
(conceptually and practically) for establishing such a databank in the future.
The pedagogic value of analogical reasoning seems clear: to explain the unfamiliar, in 
terms of the familiar. Chin and Brown’s (2000) studies of science students’ attempts to 
understand physics concepts during physics laboratory classes found that analogical reasoning 
constituted a key conceptualisation technique. In Chin and Brown’s view, the use o f analogies 
may have a, “concretizing role” because they can help students “construct new explanatory 
models with unobservable (but imageable) structures or mechanisms (Brown, 1993; Brown &
28 “Analogy and literal similarity lie on a continuum of degree-of-attribute-overlap. In both cases, the base and 
target share common relational structure. If that is all they share, then the comparison is an analogy (assuming, of 
course, that the domains are concrete enough to have object descriptions). To the extent that the domains also 
share object descriptions, the comparison becomes one of literal similarity. Another continuum exists between 
analogies and relational abstractions. In both cases, a relational structure is mapped from base to target. If the 
base representation includes concrete objects whose individual attributes must be left behind in the mapping, the 
comparison is an analogy. As the object nodes of the base domain become more abstract and variable-like, the 
comparison becomes a relational abstraction.” (Gentner, 1989, p.208)
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Clement, 1989).” 29 The “concretising” facet of analogy is both a strength and weakness. To 
make the invisible atomic world more accessible to students, an analogy is often drawn 
between the solar system and the atom. Here the sun is analogous to the nucleus; the planetary 
orbits are analogous to the electron orbits; the force holding the planets in their obits around 
the sun is analogous to the force holding the electrons in their orbits around the nucleus. 
Although this analogy provides students with a nice mental picture o f the atom, the analogy is 
at best severely limited and at worst dangerously misleading. One eminent physicist who 
contributed to my pilot study (Muldoon, 2002) said he hoped my research would “demystify 
such widely quoted but misleading analogies.” He was keen to stress that if  the atom followed 
the planet analogy: “The answers obtained would be all wrong. The atom would collapse 
under radiation, there would be an infinity of atomic structures for each element, a 
perturbation would change the atomic structure for good and there would be a continuous 
spectrum of radiation.” In order to ‘demystify such widely quoted but misleading 
analogies’ I would have to evaluate the benefits and risks of analogy-based teaching at 
secondary and tertiary levels of education. That is beyond the scope of my project. However, 
as discussed in chapter 9, it is something I may follow up in future, perhaps in collaboration 
with science educationalists.
The planetary model of the atom was used by physicists in order to fit anomalous data 
into a new atomic theory. It was jettisoned in the mid 1920s, when quantum mechanics began 
to explain atomic structure: e.g. why the atom is stable, why atoms of a particular element are 
all the same, why a perturbed atom returns to its initial structure, why a perturbed atom 
radiates in a specific way etc. Use of the planetary model of the atom in research differs 
markedly from its use in educational contexts. As Bailer-Jones (1999, p.36) notes: “It is one 
thing to think of the atom in terms of the solar system in order to develop a model of the atom,
29 “To facilitate the generation of ideas and expand on their thinking, the students using a deep approach used 
strategies such as generating mental images, creating analogies, hypothesizing, constructing thought experiments 
and predicting possible outcomes, giving self-explanations and constructing theories, invoking personal 
experiences and prior knowledge and applying them to new situations, thinking of specific examples, and asking 
questions.” In contrast, “Students using a surface approach gave explanations that were reformulations of the 
questions, a “black box” variety which did not refer to a mechanism, or macroscopic descriptions which referred 
only to what was visible. Their questions also referred to more basic factual or procedural information.” (Chin & 
Brown, 2000, pp. 109-138, p. 130 & 109)
30 Quoting MJ, a 69 year old physicist who was instrumental in the development of the theory of quantum 
bremstrahlung, i.e. the radiation of a high energy intense beam of electrons against an intense beam of positrons, 
something essential in the working of high energy colliders which might be constructed in the future. At the time 




and an entirely different thing to use the image of the solar system in order to reason about or 
to teach ideas about the atom.”
Confusion arises if  one fails to appreciate that the electron orbits must be 
conceptualised as occurring in phase space and the planetary orbits in physical space. Thus, 
from a science education perspective, the usefulness of the analogy relies on students first 
grasping the concept of phase space. Without this underlying knowledge students are very 
likely to conceptualise electron orbits as existing in the same kind of physical space as 
planetary orbits. Science educationalist, Keith Taber has also drawn attention to the obvious 
shortcomings of the planetary model of the atom (Taber, 2001) and continues to urge caution 
in the use of metaphor and analogy in science education (Taber, 2005).
Misunderstandings caused by inappropriate use of analogy are often difficult to oust. 
For example, research by Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson, and Anderson (1989) suggests that even 
when disanalogies are made explicit to university students, many still hold erroneous 
assumptions, often misled by connotations of non-technical descriptive language. The danger 
with analogy is to confuse the map with the territory. Use of analogy should not be avoided; 
analogy has a powerful pedagogic function. What my research suggests is that educationalists 
may need to adopt a more deliberate, structured approach to the use of analogies, to minimise 
naive interpretations.
For example, science educators should make every effort to use multiple analogies 
(properly selected), which counteract the omissions and over-extensions of single analogies. 
As Midgley notes, good writers (whatever the discipline) use: “ ...a  whole constellation of 
related but widely varying images, balancing them against each other and forging them into a 
harmony, so as eventually to convey a new and complex message.” (2002, p.214). A central 
aim of my research is to uncover the forms of analogies used by practicing physicists in 
different contexts. For example, does their use of analogy differ when they are dealing with 
experts, intermediates and novices, in informal and formal settings? Thus, I will now discuss 
expert and novice use of analogy, drawing on research in history, philosophy and psychology 
of science.
31 This issue is discussed further in section 1.15.
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1.15 Expert and Novice Use of Analogy: The Influence of Culturally 
Learned Strategies on Domain Representations.
My research focuses on experts’ and intermediates’ use of analogy when conceptualising and 
communicating physics. All o f my respondents have at least a degree in physics and the 
majority have PhDs. I have not looked at primary or secondary students use of analogy.
It is important to note that experts’ use of analogy may differ sharply from novices’ 
use o f analogy. Gentner & Jeziorski’s earlier studies (1989) indicated that the processes of 
mapping and judging soundness of analogs were heavily influenced by culturally learned 
strategies. With regard to the mechanisms of analogical reasoning, Gentner’s (1989) studies 
suggested that, “access processes seem less amenable to cultural influences and training,” 
(ibid. p230) in which case, differences between access processes of experts and novices may 
be the result o f experts “having different domain representations (e.g. possessing relational 
abstractions) rather than from their having different access processes.” (ibid. p.230). Gentner 
believes that, “The post-access processes can be influenced both by individual training and by 
local strategies,” and suspects that “this is the area in which training in thinking skills can be 
of most benefit.” (ibid. p.233) . There is some evidence to support Gentner’s contention. For 
example, the work of Larkin et al (1980) suggests that scientists work on problems in a 
forward, abstract manner while novices work on problems in a backward, concrete manner; 
the findings of Chi (1992) indicates that unlike novices, experts form abstract representations 
based on first principles and higher order relations.
Related to the influence of individual training and local strategies on post-access 
processes, there is also some evidence to suggest that language and culture can influence 
mental representations. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky 
(1978) speculated on the way in which sociocultural factors influence the development of 
higher order psychological processes. He argued that the internalization of external linguistic 
processes shapes cognitive development. Vygotsky’s speculations are given credence by 
recent research by Vigliocco (in press 2005). She suggests that subtle linguistic differences 
(e.g. pluralisation or gender of nouns) may lead speakers of different languages to mentally 
represent corresponding objects in fundamentally different ways. If this is the case, one 
wonders if  the interactions and motions o f springs, electrons, stars, galaxies etc. might be 
visualized in different ways depending on the gender of the nouns? Vigliocco does not address 
this question in her research. However, Kita’s (2003, web ref.) comparison o f gestures
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produced by speakers of different languages suggests that speakers evoke different images for 
the same event, in a way parallel to the linguistic difference. For example, according to Kita 
because manner (e.g. rolling) and trajectory (e.g. downwards) are considered separately by 
Japanese speakers, imagery is also considered separately. Thus Japanese speakers verbally 
recounting the imagery they saw in a cartoon, where a ball rolls down a hill, will separate the 
motion into two components (rolling and down) in the hand gestures they use. Kita’s work 
therefore casts some doubt on the accuracy of think aloud protocol analysis as a means of 
enquiring into the mental representations of Japanese or Turkish speakers where encoding of 
language seems to affect imagery. There is no evidence to suggest that language encoding 
influences the gestures of English language speakers, however it is something I considered 
when choosing my research methods. The language and culture issue highlights an important 
issue with regard to this research project: numerous factors may influence scientific thinking 
and uncovering these latent factors is a difficult task. Yet it is important to ask what part 
cognitive, social and developmental processes play in scientific thinking. I addressed this issue 
in my case study of Dr. Lawson. This is discussed in section 1.16 below.
1.16 What part do cognitive, social, and developmental processes play in 
scientific thinking?
To obtain a comprehensive picture of scientific thinking, one must consider a myriad of 
interacting factors: biological influences, developmental history, demographics, personality, 
cognitive processes, social processes, etc. For example, the Theoretical Structural Equation 
Model proposed by Feist and Gorman (1998), (represented in figure 1.1 on p.52), integrates 
findings from philosophy, sociology, history and psychology of science, combining and 
generalizing “the path analyses of Helmreich et al. (1980) and Mansfield and Busse (1981) 
and the structural models proposed by Feist (1993), Reynolds and Walberg (1992), and 
Simonton (1977b).” (Feist & Gorman, 1998, p.33). Structural equation models can be used to 
deal with variables which are abstract psychological concepts e.g. intelligence, attitude etc. 
These ‘latent’ variables are observed indirectly through their effects on ‘manifest’ variables. 
One-headed arrows usually represent regression relationships, while two-headed arrows 
represent correlational relations, i.e. shared variation not explained by the model, (cf. Rigdon, 
1996,web ref.). As Feist and Gorman point out: “ .. .scientific behaviour is like any other set of
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complex, integrated behaviours and can be examined from each of the psychological 
subdisciplines.” (ibid. p.35)
However, it would be unfeasible within the time and scope if  this doctoral project to 
attempt to take all of these spheres of influence into account when looking my respondents’ 
different modes o f thought. My survey, e-mail correspondence and interviews (see chapters 3- 
6) relate to cognitive and social processes in science. My case-study deals with personality and 
developmental history as well as cognitive and social processes, because I have made an effort 
to understand how Dr. Lawson’s research background and working environment affected the 
analogies he used. For example, were his education (a mechanical engineering degree during 
the war) and working environment (working as a physicist-engineer at the Rutherford 
Appleton Laboratory) significant factors in his decision to employ certain forms o f analogy in 
certain contexts?
Gruber (1994) also emphasises the importance of considering context when 
investigating the forms of analogy (or metaphor) used by scientists, saying that: “in 
scrutinizing an ensemble of metaphors, then, it is crucial to ask constantly, how does this 
metaphor work in this particular belief system? Merely categorizing metaphors and other 
figures of thought by form or by content is not enough.” Following Gruber & Wallace’s 
(1978, p.35) approach, I asked scientists what they do in their work. Gruber (1980) identifies 
several important features of scientific work, which I have drawn on in formulating a 
theoretical and methodological framework. In particular, Gruber (1980, p.292) defines 
“networks of enterprise” as being where “new lines of endeavour are differentiated, lines 
converge; parallels are recognized and fruitful cross-fertilizations occur; the individual 
responds to problems sensed in the world around him by undertaking new enterprises.” I 
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1.17 Cognitive Style: Different Strokes for Different Folks
Cognitive style has been defined as “an individual's preferred and habitual approach to 
organising and representing information.” (Riding & Rayner, 1998, p .8). Riding & Cheema 
(1991) and Riding & Rayner (1998) have identified two principal cognitive style dimensions:
(a) The Wholist-Analytic Style dimension o f whether an individual tends to organise 
information into wholes or parts;
(b) The Verbal-lmagery Style dimension of whether an individual is inclined to 
represent information during thinking verbally or in mental pictures.
On this view, individuals are positioned along continua, with a ratio indicating their 
position on a dimension.
Analytic (parts)





Has to do with the way material is structured
W holist
Figure 1.2: A representation of Riding’s (2001) Cognitive Style Dimensions diagram. It positions 
individuals along continua and assigns them a ratio to indicate their position on a C.S. dimension.
Thus, for example, while I often compartmentalise things into discrete parts for individual 
analysis, I also like to see the ‘big picture’: to visualise how these discrete parts relate to 
each other, by sketching it (graphically) or by drawing up an overview (textually). I 
would therefore position myself near the “Wholist” end of the continuum and near the 
“Imager” end of the continuum.
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As will be discussed in chapter 2, I used the Cognitive Styles Dimension as an initial guide 
when analysing and theorising about my case study material. I did not choose to locate my 
subject within this space because there are some limitations to the Cognitive Styles Dimension 
system of classification. For example, one could ask where diagrams, schematics, sketches, 
mathematical equations, geometrical proofs, physical models, and computer models fit in this 
scheme? Goodman (1976) articulates what many historical and cognitive case studies show - 
that there are severe problems inherent with classifying symbol systems as ‘linguistic’ or 
‘pictorial’, ‘sentential’ or ‘diagrammatic’, ‘proposition based’ or ‘image based’ etc.
Goodman (1974) offers a rigorous (but rather complex) system for classifying 
representations, according to his theory o f notationality, density, modes o f  reference, and 
repleteness. On Goodman’s view, a scheme is dense if  it “provides for the infinitely many 
characters so ordered that between each two there is a third.” (Goodman, 1976, p. 136). A 
scheme is replete if little can be ruled out, and attenuated if  certain things can be ruled out. As 
mentioned in section 1.9. Goodman stresses that: “The mere presence or absence of letters or 
figures does not make the difference. What matters with a diagram, as with the face of an 
instrument, is how we are to read it.” (1976, p. 171) Goel’s exploration o f the cognitive 
processes involved in Design Problem Solving also attest to the shortcomings of the form of 
classification used in the Cognitive Styles Dimension.
It is especially important to note that an individual actively varies these parameters in 
the creative process. As Gruber (1995, pp. 410& 411) puts it:
“Thinking moves from one modality to another, from visual images to sketches, to words 
and equations explaining (i.e. conveying the same meaning as) the visualization. The 
thinker is pleased to discover that certain structures remain invariant under these 
transformations: These are his ideas. Dialogues, both internal and external, is a ubiquitous 
part o f  the process.”
For example, as discussed in section 1.14, Maxwell drew on Kelvin’s physical analogy 
between the flow of heat and the flow of electric charge, and on Faraday’s geometrical 
intuitions regarding ‘lines of force’, and then expanded on and refined these 
conceptualisations through the use o f contimuum mechanics -  a powerful analytical method 
with which Maxwell was particularly skilled. Thus, Maxwell moved between several modes of 
thought when building his theory. He used physical and pictorial analogies e.g. o f vortex 
currents, which he expressed through sketches and also abstract mathematical equations. One
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could say that one reason why analogies are useful is that they contain deep structural relations 
which hold between analogous systems, i.e. they contain certain ‘invariants’.
Thus, I have used some particularly relevant studies regarding cognitive style to inform 
my research design, in particular in my case study, when constructing interview questions and 
analysing the resultant comments. However, as I emphasise in the next chapter, I have not 
attempted to classify my respondents according to any particular cognitive style. The 
theoretical framework on cognitive style was a useful map with which to navigate certain 
territories but, because of its limitations, I did not follow it closely.
1.18 Knowledge Gap in Literature and Summary Of Research Questions
My literature review has identified some key knowledge gaps in the literature. I have grouped 
them into four sets of research questions. The first three groups of research questions are 
investigated via the on-line questionnaire, the follow-up e-mail exchanges with a select sample 
o f questionnaire respondents, and the semi-structured interview with Prof. Berry. The fourth 
set o f research questions explores in more detail many of the questions contained in groups 1, 
2 and 3. It is specific to my case study of Dr. John Lawson.
Group 1: Visualization.
Firstly, on the topic of visualization, I have found no broad-ranging, quantitative accounts 
concerning the extent to which practicing physicists experience difficulties getting a mental 
picture of the physical processes in their research and few accounts of how they overcome any 
difficulties they have. The historical case studies of Clement, Gooding, Gorman, Gruber, and 
Miller provide remarkable depth but not breath. Thus, the on-line questionnaire and follow-up 
e-mail exchanges will address the following research questions:
□ To what extent do a sample o f  physicists experience difficulties getting a mental
picture o f  the physical processes involved in their research?
□ What reasons do they give fo r  having/not having these difficulties?
□ Where physicists do have difficulty visualizing the physical processes involved in their
research, how do they overcome this?
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Group 2: Computer Simulations as Visualization Tools.
The second group of research questions will deal with physicists’ use o f computer 
simulations as visualization tools. Using the same data gathering means as in group 1 ,1 will 
investigate the following research questions:
□ To what extent do these physicists employ computer simulations in their research? 
Again, although Morgan and Morrison (1999), Hughes (1999), Winsberg (1999) et al discuss 
the use of computer simulations in science, there are no large-scale surveys to indicate the 
extent to which physicists based within certain research areas use computer simulations as 
visualisation tools.
□ In what contexts do these physicists employ computer simulations?
This will be deduced from the examples provided by respondents in response to Q4b of the 
on-line questionnaire. The aim is to produce a range of contexts in which physicists find 
computer simulations useful. By cross-referencing the examples provided by respondents with 
the research backgrounds of respondents one may be able to see that researchers in certain 
fields tend to use computer simulations for specific things, e.g. visualising complex 
geometries, the time evolution of complex systems, designing and building equipment etc.
□ What reasons do these physicists provide fo r  not using computer simulations in their 
research?
This research question will show whether respondents are not using computer simulations as 
visualisation tools because they do not need them in this context, or whether respondents are 
wary of using computer simulations as visualisation tools for some specific reason.
□ Do these physicists believe that computer simulations have strengthened physicists ’ 
visualization capabilities (a) in their own research area? (b) in physics in general?
Walter Whiteley (1992, web ref) highlights the importance of teaching students to see like a 
mathematician and underscores the value of computer software packages. According to 
Chandrasekran & Narayanan (1992, p.30): “Prior exposure [to diagrams and other kinds of 
images] can lead to perceptual fluency in recognition and classification.” Thus, it will be 
interesting to see if practicing physicists believe that computer simulations have strengthened 
physicists’ visualisation capabilities in their own research area and in physics in general. This
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will be ascertained through a quantitative and qualitative question in the on-line questionnaire. 
I expect a range of comments from the positive end of the scale to the negative end of the 
scale.
□ What do these physicists believe are the possible disadvantages o f  employing computer 
simulations in research?
It is possible that respondents may not have made comments on the negative end of the scale 
in the previous question, thus this question will ask practicing physicists to consider the 
possible disadvantages of computer simulations. It will be interesting to see if  any common 
themes emerge and if they are in any way related to the branch of physics within which 
respondents work.
□ Can computer simulations provide physicists with insights when conceptualising and 
communicating physics?
This question arose from the comments of questionnaire respondents. It was addressed in my 
semi-structured interview with Prof. Berry -  a theoretical physicists who uses computer 
simulations regularly in his work in quantum physics.
Group 3: Analogy
The third group of research questions will focus on physicists’ use of analogy to conceptualise 
and communicate physics. Using the large-scale on-line survey and follow-up e-mail 
exchanges with a select sample of these respondents, I will explore the following research 
questions:
□ To what extent these physicists employ analogy in their research?
□ What reasons do these physicists give fo r  not employing analogy in their research?
This question will highlight the limitations of analogical reasoning. This will be relevant to 
the use o f analogy within the context of science education.
□ To what extent do these physicists generate original analogies in their research?




□ To what extent do physicists use analogy when communicating with different 
audiences?
This research question will explore whether analogy is used less with experts than with 
novices; and less during formal discussions than informal discussions. It will combine 
quantitative responses (selections from a 7-point scale) and qualitative responses (written 
comments where elaboration is asked for) thereby providing a rich set of data which can be 
re-coded for particular themes e.g. respondents may say that they still employ analogy to 
the same extent with experts as with novices, but the analogies become more complex and 
abstract.
□ What forms o f  analogy do they use in different contexts?
□ What are the characteristics o f  a good analogy?
As a theoretical framework, I will draw on Gentner’s (1989) Structure Mapping Theory of 
analogy, Dunbar’s (1999) studies o f biologists’ use of analogy in their research and 
Comelis’s (2000) studies of cosmologists’ use of inter- and intra-disciplinary analogies.
Group 4: Case Study exploring in greater depth key questions from Groups 1-3.
I used the findings of the large-scale survey to guide my case-study investigations. I addressed 
the following research questions:
□ To what extent did the case study respondent (Dr. Lawson) experience difficulties 
getting a mental picture o f  the physical processes in his research?
□ What reasons were given by Dr. Lawson fo r  having/not having difficulty?
□ How did educational, professional, cultural, historical, etc. aspects impact on Dr. 
Lawson’s approach to problem solving?
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to acquire and promote insight?
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This question arose early in my analysis of Dr. Lawson’s work as he frequently mentioned 
the use of analogy as a means of gaining insights.
□ How does physical insight differ from  pictorial insight in Dr. Lawson’s view?
This distinction between physical and pictorial insight arose from analysis o f Dr. Lawson’s 
scientific papers and book, because he uses these terms frequently throughout.
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to bridge sub-disciplinary boundaries?
In a 1971 paper, Dr. Lawson remarked that “ ... languages and notations differ; people 
brought up in plasma physics, microwave tube and accelerator environments tend to use 
different descriptions and different groupings of fundamental constants...and we suffer 
from the same problems that trouble the workers on that notoriously unsuccessful project, 
the tower of Babel.” In a subsequent interview I asked Dr. Lawson about this issue and 
he remarked that he used to regard himself as a ‘translator’ between these sub-disciplines. 
This lead me to investigate the techniques he used in this capacity and to discover that he 
employed analogy and synthesis as translation devices.
□ What types o f  analogies did Dr. Lawson employ in this context? I.e. were they within 
domain or between mappings, physical, pictorial, mathematical etc.
Using Dunbar’s (1999) studies o f biologists’ use of analogy in their research and 
Comelis’s (2000) studies of cosmologists’ use of inter- and intra-disciplinary analogies as 
useful reference points, I investigated the forms of analogy employed by Dr. Lawson in 35 
o f his scientific papers and in his book on the physics o f charged particle beams.
In the next chapter I will discuss the way in which I went about answering these research 
questions. I will outline the theoretical and methodological frameworks which influenced 
my research design.
32 Dr. Lawson writes on p.l of “Diversity and unity in sources and beams, ” published in the 






“The dim m ed outlines o f  phenom enal things all m erge into one another 
unless w e put on the focusing-glass o f  theory, and screw it up som etim es to 
one pitch o f  definition and som etim es to another, so as to see dow n into 
different depths through the great m illstone o f  the w orld.”
James Clerk Maxwell, “Analogies” (February 1856)
“Are there Real Analogies in Nature?”
In Campbell, L. & W. Garnett, (1882), The Life o f James Clerk Maxwell 
London: Macmillan & Co. p.237
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2.0 Theoretical and Methodological Aims
In section 1.17, I remarked that in order to obtain a comprehensive picture o f scientific 
thinking, one must consider a range of interacting factors: biological influences, 
developmental history, demographics, personality, cognitive processes, social processes, 
etc. Fest and Gorman’s (1998) Structural Equation Model (figure 1.1) provides a 
diagrammatic rationale for the need to draw on different kinds of study, each using 
different methods, in order to provide a fuller picture of scientific thinking. My 
methodological approach was influenced by the fine-grained historical case studies of 
Gooding (1990, 1992, 2005), Gorman (1990, 1992), Gruber (1980), Nersessian (1992, 
1995), and Tweney (1985); the empirical laboratory investigations of Dunbar (1999, 
2001), Gentner (1983), and Klahr (2000); the sociological studies of Latour (1987), 
Collins (1974), and Henderson (1995, 1991); the anthropological studies of Traweek 
(1988) and Forsythe (1993, 1994); and in the field of pragmatics and linguistics, Myers’ 
(1990, 1991) textual analyses of scientific writings.
From my perspective, (i.e. given my timeframe, resources, expertise, etc), the 
abovementioned methodological approaches all possessed strengths and weaknesses. For 
example, although fine-grained historical case studies offer an excellent window on the 
cognitive processes involved in scientific reasoning, they are case-specific, not 
generalizable, require meticulous attention to detail, and great patience and skill in 
interpreting and recreating events. Well-designed empirical laboratory investigations can 
offer in-depth knowledge of well-structured problems in controlled environments but, as 
Goel (1995) points out, they rarely deal with ill-structured problems occurring in 
naturalistic settings. Sociological and anthropological studies are useful for unveiling the 
complex web of human interactions that are part o f the scientific enterprise, but they are 
time-consuming to conduct and require special ‘interactional expertise’. (Collins & Evans, 
2002, p.254). Although textual analysis is an excellent means of deconstructing the written 
word, it is inappropriate for use with images, visualizations, pictorial analogies etc.
My aim was to see down into different depths from different perspectives and 
thereby avoid over-reliance on any one method. I began by constructing an appropriate 
theoretical lens through which to view my material then alternated from a macro to a micro 
level of investigation. My combined-method approach consisted of an initial global search 
plus content analysis of physics journals and magazines to identify the various form s of 
analogy in use;33 a large-scale survey to gather empirical evidence from practicing 
physicists on issues surrounding visualization and analogy; follow-up e-mail exchanges
33 (this pilot work is presented in my masters dissertation, Muldoon, 2002);
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with 13 of these physicists in order to enquire further into individual physicists’ use of 
analogy and computer simulations in different branches o f physics; an in-depth interview 
with a distinguished theoretical physicist to investigate the role of computer simulations in 
conceptualising and communicating quantum physics; and an historical case study of the 
work o f a prize-winning engineer-physicist, in order to understand how the atmosphere in 
which he worked impacted upon the form s of analogy he used to conceptualise and 
communicate physics.
One of the key strengths in the overall design of the project was that the initial 
discoveries from the on-line questionnaire could be taken on board and pursued further in 
the follow-up e-mails, the interview and the case study, and the distinctions and subtleties 
could be teased out. For example, one of the first issues to surface in the questionnaire data 
was what might be called "meanings in f lu x ”. There were many different interpretations of 
the terms "research”, “analogy”, “visualization”, and “computer simulation” amongst 
respondents. Though this usually indicates inadequate operationalization 34 in the design 
of a questionnaire, it was in fact a conscious decision to give no definitions of these terms. 
The logic was that any definitions supplied in the questionnaire would be either too 
specific or too vague and would act as an obstacle in gathering a wide variety of examples 
o f visualizations, computer simulations and analogies from across the physics community. 
Allowing physicists to interpret the terms for themselves, to discover what e.g. “computer 
simulation” means to them, may highlight trends in interpretation across the physics 
community. At the very least it would help me to develop a nuanced classification o f the 
terms, by using the findings from the on-line questionnaire to inform the following three 
strands of research. This approach was extremely successful.
Numerous researchers have shown that the case study method can offer a ‘window 
on cognition’. (E.g. Clement, 1991; Gooding, 1990, 1992; Gorman, 1998; Gruber & 
Wallace, 1978; Holmes, 1993, 2004; Nersessian, 1992; Tweney, 1985 etc.) By analysing in 
fine detail the work of an individual, one can begin to develop a ‘theory of the individual’. 
My theoretical and methodological approaches, particularly in my case-study, have many 
features in common with Gruber’s (1980) Evolving Systems Approach,35 which recognises 
that individuals exhibit varying degrees of creativity and inventiveness; possess widely 
varying life histories, ‘networks of enterprise’, personalities, styles, work habits, etc. 
Gruber circumscribes the aims of his work by imposing three key restrictions:
34 “Operationalization refers to the rules we use to link the language of theory (concepts) to the language of 
research (indicators).” Rose & Sullivan, 1996, p. 13
35 As Lavery (1993, p .106) notes, Grubers method has been used: “to investigate such individuals as Antoine Lavosier, 
William Wordsworth, Michael Faraday, William James, Vincent Van Gogh, Erasmus Darwin, George Bernard Shaw, 
Sigmund Freud, Dorothy Richardson, Benjamin Franklin, Albert Einstein, Anai's Nin, and John Locke.”
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“Restriction 1: Our aim is not to explain how the person became creative. Rather, we 
are interested in how he or she functions when being creative and how this creative 
process evolves over time.” (Gruber, 1980, p.270)
“Restriction 2: Our theoretical aim in this essay is not to use the study o f  
extraordinary creative processes to draw any conclusions about the general 
population.” (ibid. p.275)
“Restriction 3: Our aim is not to make law-like generalizations about creativity, but 
to develop an evolving systems approach that will serve as a guide to the study o f  
creative individuals.” (ibid. p276)
Restrictions 1,2 & 3 also apply to this project. My aim has been to provide a detailed 
account of the tools, techniques and problem solving strategies employed by my case study 
respondent in his work; in particular the role o f analogy in cognition and communication. 
This individual is not intended to be representative of physicists (-engineers) in general: he 
had an unconventional physics education (during world war 2) and spent much of his 
career working more or less free-lance at Harwell and the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory. 
This cultural and professional background mediated his experiences, shaped his career 
path, and affected the development of his cognitive style(s). The tools, techniques and 
problem solving strategies he used in his work must be situated within this cultural and 
professional matrix. Thus, throughout the case study, an attempt was made to follow 
Gruber’s (1985, p. 178) suggestions:
“ ... To place the person in history, to describe his ensemble o f  metaphors [/analogies], 
to pay close attention to his system o f  categories and to changes in his units o f  
analysis, to see each activity as part o f  his network o f  enterprises, to search out and 
examine those very special skills that the particular creative person may have, and to 
try to understand his special point o f view."
Following Gruber (1985) advice, I have attempted to identify the unique characteristics of 
my case study subject, to uncover:
“an organization that was concentrated by the person him self in the course o f  his 
lifetime, in the course o f his work, as needed in order to meet the tasks that he 
encountered and that he set himself.” (ibid. ,p. 177)
Employing a methodology in which the interviewee provides a personal account can 
produce a wealth of valuable information, but can also suffer from several kinds of error. 
Memory-related kinds of errors were particularly relevant to this study, as the case study 
respondent was an octogenarian who, though extremely cognizant, often remarked that his 
memory was not what it used to be. Thus, every effort was made to avoid three kinds of 
error which in Gruber’s (1995) terminology are defined as:
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“Telescoping: The loss o f detail due to limitations o f  memory, intermediate steps drop 
out and beginnings and ends remain.” (Gruber, 1995, p. 405)
“Rationalization: Changes in intuition and in affective feeling disappear from 
memory and are replaced by post hoc rational and empirical accounts.” (ibid.) 
“Decontextualization: a coherent episode in which a moment (or several) o f  insight 
occurs can be thought o f  as a figural event seen or remembered against a background 
o f  several overlapping contexts.” (ibid.)
Though they suffer from such weaknesses, retrospective accounts can be an extremely 
useful method of uncovering ‘affective transformations key events which had an impact 
on the individual’s network of enterprise, but which are often undocumented or private. 
For example, in section 7.2.4 we see that the collapse of Dr. Lawson’s first project, when 
he was in his early 20s, affected his future approach to similar projects -  he became 
renowned as ‘a good critic’, able to spot potential problems before they arose. The 
subject’s reports about himself are taken as an inevitable point of departure so, as Gruber 
puts it: “ ... we do not abandon critical judgement and reconstructive work. We have the 
double task of reconstructing events from the subjects point of view and then 
understanding them from our own.” (Gruber, 1980, p.276-277). Following Gruber’s 
approach, the aim is not to “discover anything like a ‘latent structure,’ a set of relationships 
unknown to the knower." The methodological approach used here has the intention of 
“schematizing the ideas of the creative thinker in a way that he would probably recognize 
and accept as a reasonable representation.” (Gruber, 1980, p.290). With this in mind, I 
gave Dr. Lawson the opportunity to proof read some draft chapters in the final year of this 
project. He returned the draft chapters (with some minor corrections) and in the 
accompanying letter wrote:
“.. .as far as I can tell you have given a fair and accurate account o f  our interviews and 
painted a flattering picture o f  me from a study o f  my published papers and other 
people’s comments. Best wishes and good luck for the future.” (Dr. Lawson, 
01/02/2006).
I will now discuss each method in turn. First, I mention the literature review (already 
discussed in chapter 1). Second, I briefly outline the pilot work consisting o f a global 
search and content analysis o f physics journals and popular science magazines to explore 
the forms of analogy used in different contexts. Third, the survey data (i.e. gathered via an 
on-line questionnaire) is discussed in detail as this strand of my research accounted for 
over half of the data gathered. Fourth, I explain the rationale behind the selection of 30 
questionnaire respondents to enquire further into the techniques they use to conceptualise 
and communicate physics, and outline the backgrounds of the 13 who replied to my
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follow-up e-mail queries. Fifth, I briefly discuss the use of an in-depth interview with Prof. 
Sir Michael Berry to focus on the techniques he employs to conceptualise & communicate 
quantum mechanics. Sixth, I provide a detailed account o f my case study o f a physicist- 
engineer who was an enthusiast for analogy and had interesting research training.
2.1 Method 1: Literature Review:
As discussed in the previous chapter, a wide-ranging literature review of scientific thinking 
was conducted throughout the duration of the project. This included the fields o f history, 
philosophy, psychology, and sociology of science as well as science education, science 
communication, literary theory, and design studies. These explorations provided a broad 
perspective, theoretically and methodologically, enabling me to formulate appropriate 
research questions and choose a suitable methodology for this work, given the time and 
expertise at my disposal.
2.2 Method 2: Pilot Work:
Pilot work for this thesis was carried out in 2002 for my MSc dissertation, ”On the Role o f  
Analogy in Physics. ” This early work consisted of a global search plus content analysis (of 
physics journals, magazines, popular science books etc.) to identify forms of analogy used 
in various contexts; semi-structured interviews (with five physics lecturers based at the 
University of Bath); and semi-structured e-mail correspondence with seven physicists 
based in Ireland, France, Switzerland, the U.S., and Australia.36 This early work informed 
and shaped subsequent doctoral work. Firstly, the word ‘analogy’ was used throughout my 
doctoral work as the term ‘metaphor’ had poetic connotations for some pilot-study 
respondents. Secondly, some of the examples of analogy used by the pilot-study 
respondents were used in the on-line questionnaire. Thirdly, the remark by an eminent 
pilot-study respondent from CERN that he hoped my work would, ‘demystify such widely 
quoted but misleading analogies’ as the solar system model of the atom, was an impetus to 
explore the differences between experts’ and novices’ use o f analogy.
36 Three were former physics lecturers of mine from NUI Galway, and four were physicists I had 
corresponded with during my internship at the Institute of Physics, when working on a Physics World 
magazine, special issue on Art and Science.
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2.3 Method 3: Web Questionnaire:
There are many advantages to using a web questionnaire to gather data (from a sample of 
physicists): it can be distributed to very large sample, at virtually no cost, it is easy for 
respondents to submit data, and the incoming data (already in electronic form) can be 
easily imported into electronic packages (e.g. Excel & SPSS for qualitative and 
quantitative analysis), saving considerable time and money.
2.3.1 Designing and Broadcasting the web questionnaire.
In the winter of 2002, a web questionnaire on conceptualisation and communication in 
physics was designed, built and piloted on a small sample of physicists at the University of 
Bath. 37 Feedback from the pilot study resulted in several amendments to the
'JO
questionnaire. As mentioned in section 2.0, I made a conscious decision not to 
rigorously define terms such as ‘research’, ‘analogy’, ‘visualizations’ , ‘computer 
simulations’ because I wished to see how physicists from different branches o f physics 
interpreted these terms. In order to encourage a broad interpretation of the term ‘analogy’, I 
supplied several exemplary analogies, ranging from the metaphorical end of the spectrum 
to the mathematical end of the spectrum. Interestingly, even these examples o f analogies 
were questioned by some of the respondents. These differences of interpretation revealed 
some physicists’ hidden preferences for one way o f reasoning and dislike for other, 
“simplistic”, ways of reasoning.
In order to reach a good cross-section of the physics population in the UK and 
Ireland, the URL of the web questionnaire was broadcast by:
(i) Constructing an electronic mailing list by trawling through physics department web­
pages, copying e-mail addresses of some 500 physicists from 10 universities (and 
observatories) in Ireland, and some 3,200 physicists from 55 universities in the UK. 
Though this method was time-consuming, it did provide a good cross section of the
37 I am grateful to Ms. Yvonne Aburrow for her infinite patience and kindness in assisting me in the 
construction (and repeated re-construction) of the on-line questionnaire, and also for making me more 
conscious of my own style of graphic design.
38 E.g. the term “thought experiment” was replaced with the term “visualization”, the questionnaire length 
was shortened and respondents were afforded the opportunity to download the questionnaire in MS Word 
format, so that they could complete it off-line and e-mail it back at their leisure. (The findings from the
questions on thought experiments are outlined in section 3.7 of this thesis).
Some physicists use analogy in their research.
- e.g. using a billiard ball model when considering the movement of charge through a solid;
- e.g. comparing ultrasonic transmission down a rod, to an electrical transmission line;
- e.g. comparing the vibrations of a 'cosmic string' to the vibrations of a guitar string;
- e.g. Schrodinger's equation is derived by using Hamilton's mathematically unified treatment of geometrical 
optics and analytical mechanics;
- e.g. Sheldon Glashow has remarked that he ‘was led to the group SU(2) x U (l) by analogy with the 
approximate isospin hypercharge group which characterises strong interactions’.”
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population o f physicists (doctoral students through to deans) based in academia in 
Ireland and the UK.
(ii) An appeal in Physics World magazine Letters to the Editor40. The magazine has a 
circulation of approximately 20,000 people, mostly in the UK and Ireland but it also 
has readers in Australia, New Zealand, the USA etc. Importantly in this case, 
readers include many physicists who would not have been in the sample who were 
e-mailed directly i.e. retired physicists, physicists working in industry, and physics 
students at pre-doctoral level. In fact, as a result o f seeing my letter to the editor of 
Physics World one retired physicist wrote to me about his experiences o f using 
analogy in his work and enclosed several of his scientific papers, spanning a 40 year 
period. This respondent subsequently became the subject of my historical case 
study.
2.3.2 Categorising respondents according to research background, age, 
gender, occupation, etc.
In order to compare and contrast responses between sub-cultures o f the physics 
community, and to explore whether physicists’ use of analogy might be influenced by age, 
gender, experience, etc. the questionnaire began by asking respondents a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative questions concerning their education, experience and research 
interests. For example:
i. What third level qualifications do you hold?
(Respondents were asked to select Yes/No from a drop down menu comprising: BSc, MSc, 
BEng, MSc, PhD, PostDoc41, other)
ii. In what subject area?
(Respondents were asked to fill in the empty field)
iii. With which of the following groups would you associate yourself?
(Respondents were asked to select Yes/No from a list o f 12 physics groups42, and also 
provided with the opportunity to enter an “other” option)
40 “How do you see?” March 2003, Vol. 16, No.3, p.20
41 With hindsight the word ‘research experience’ should have been added to ‘PostDoc’ as it is not a 
qualification like the others.
42 The Institute of Physics’ 12 physics groups were utilised in order to cover as broad a range as possible.
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iv. What is your present job title, occupation or course of study?
(This was an open field)
v. Age
(This was an open field)43
vi. Gender
(This was an open field)
vii. What are your present research interests? Please include some keywords.
(This was an open field)
2.3.3 On getting a mental picture of the physical processes involved in 
research.
Question two of the online questionnaire posed the following question: “Do you ever fin d  
it difficult to get a mental picture o f  the various kinds o f  physical processes involved in 
your research?” As discussed in chapter 1, certain simplifying assumptions had to be 
made when deciding on the phrasing of the questions. I was well aware that many forms of 
visualizations exist, and that many physicists do not seek mental pictures of physical 
processes. However, I reasoned that by taking a simple approach and asking respondents if  
they found it difficult to get a mental picture of the various kinds o f physical processes 
involved in their research, this would elicit a wider range of responses, i.e. from physicists 
for whom mental pictures were meaningful and useful, and from physicists who did not 
seek or use mental pictures of physical processes. As the data in section 3.2a and 3.2b 
shows, this approach proved successful.
43 Some physicists included “years” in their reply, which goes to show how effective their early training was 
i.e. the constant reminder to always include the correct units with every calculation!
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2.3.4 Receiving Responses to the on-line questionnaire:
Between February and May 2003,1 received 225 questionnaire replies from physicists who 
had either received a direct e-mail or read my appeal in Physics World magazine. This 
represented a very low response rate, but produced a wealth of material, providing a good 
map o f the territory, informing and shaping future investigations. 44 In his studies of 
biologists’ use of analogy, the cognitive psychologist Kevin Dunbar (1999, p.89):
“..found that scientists have little memory for the analogies that they use. When we go 
back and ask the scientists to remember how they generated a new concept or solved a 
problem, at a meeting that we recorded, they have little memory o f  how it occurred.
Thus biographies and anecdotes do not mention many o f  the analogies that went into 
making a scientific theory.”
I accept Dunbar’s criticisms of biographical and anecdotal accounts of reasoning by 
analogy. However, I believed that questioning physicists on this issue and promoting them 
to reflect on the methods they use in their work could still prove enlightening. My findings 
are testimony to this.
2.3.5 Analysing Web Questionnaire Data
Questionnaire replies arrived in an electronic format not conducive to analysis. Thus, each 
reply was imported into an Excel spreadsheet, with columns representing each question 
and rows representing each physicist’s response. Quantitative questions and responses 
were imported into SPSS. Re-coding was carried out on some of the data (e.g. defining age 
ranges, educational levels etc.). Some rudimentary statistical analyses were performed on 
these data to uncover any possible patterns. Rigorous statistical analyses were not 
performed because the purpose of the on-line questionnaire was not to establish 
statistically significant correlations and hence make law-like generalizations. The objective 
was to gain insight on an exploratory level, insight which could then be incorporated into 
in-depth, follow-up studies. Qualitative questions and responses were analysed using 
Excel. To obtain an initial, tentative hypothesis o f the individual, each physicist’s full set 
o f responses was read in turn. For example, how educational background, age, research 
interests etc. might have affected visualization difficulties, the techniques used to 
overcome their visualization difficulties, views on computer simulations etc. As patterns 
began to emerge, all 225 responses to a given question were read and the qualitative
44 O ne possib le  factor in the low  response rate is that the U niversity o f  Bath firew all b locked  and/or re­
directed incom ing replies i f  they cam e from  a dom ain nam e that the server did not recognise. M any re­




responses of each physicist thematically colour-coded. E.g. in response to Q2c. “ Where 
you do have difficulty [getting a mental picture o f  the physical processes involved in your 
research], how do you overcome this?” mention of sketching was colour coded grey, 
analogy was colour-coded orange, simplification/limiting case analysis was colour-coded 
pink, change of scenery was colour-coded green, etc. 45 In a new excel spreadsheet, each 
question was listed by row, and a colour-coded summary of each theme was set out in each 
column. A tally was made of the number of times a said category of response was 
mentioned, and the totals were inserted into the colour-coded summary. The categories 
were then ordered (left to right) according to their frequency of occurrence. For maximal 
visual impact, the colour-coded summary was then graphed in excel. This process was 
repeated for every qualitative question. This system of analysis proved useful at 
uncovering the key factors accounting for visualisation difficulties, the key techniques 
employed to overcome visualisation difficulties, the key forms of analogy employed in 
different contexts, the key views on computer simulations etc. They are not included here 
because they were intermediate tools of analysis. Re-categorisation was carried out 2 years 
later, after additional understanding had been gained through the follow-up e-mail 
correspondence, interviews and historical case study.
2.3.6 Classifying the Forms of Analogy used in Research
The 147 examples of analogies provided by respondents were categorised and then counted 
to explore the forms of analogy employed. Boon’s (2005, p.4) system of classification for 
models, i.e. mechanistic, diagrammatic, nomo-mathematical was a useful framework and 
reference. For example, she looks at the epistemological aims of the model users, the 
scientific knowledge they utilise, the manner in which the models are expressed or 
represented, and the use for which the models are intended. This is summarised by Boon 
(2005, p. 15) in tabular form and reproduced by me below.
45 My colour-coding system had some logic: e.g. sketches (i.e. pencilling) = grey, change of scenery (i.e. 
taking a stroll in nature) = green; simple models (i.e. Barbie dolls) = pink etc. Also, when colour-coding the 
number of physics groups/branches with which physicists associated themselves, I used a temperature-colour 
gradient scale, with ‘cold’ colours at low numbers and ‘warm’ colours at high numbers. This kind of colour- 
coding was something I did subconsciously at first but, once I became conscious of it, I continued to employ 
it as it facilitated speedy visual analysis.
70
Chapter 2
Table 2, page 15 diagrammatic model nom o-m athem atical m odel
a) Epistemological 
aim
Distinction in spatial regions and 
causal explanation o f  physical 
behaviour in each region.
Mathematical description o f  




and/or causal understanding o f the 
phenomenon.
Theoretical principles, theoretical 
and empirical laws, and 
knowledge presented in 
diagrammatic model.
c) Representative tool Diagram or graph-like schema Set o f  mathematical equations
d) Intended use i) Explaining how phenomenon in 
technological device is physically 
produced or manipulated.
ii) Basis for nomo-mathematical 
model.
i) Quantitative description o f  
physical parameters and variables 
relevant to technological device.
ii) Basis for computer simulations
Table 2.1 A re-presentation of Boon’s (2005) system of classification of models
I initially believed that Boon’s (2005) attention to the scientific knowledge utilised, the 
form of expression and the intended use would prove very useful in my endeavours to 
classify the 147 examples of analogy. However, as there was often very limited detail 
provided in each of my examples o f analogy, it was difficult to know with certainty what 
kinds o f models the analogies were being used in. Consequently it was difficult to closely 
apply Boon’s (2005) system of model classification to the classification of my examples of 
analogy. Drawing on Gentner’s (1989) structure mapping theory and on b), c) and d) of 
Boon’s system of classification, I therefore classified my sample of analogies according to:
(i) how they were usually expressed in research (i.e. verbal, physical, pictorial, 
mathematical);
(ii) systematicity (according to Gentner’s structure-mapping theory: those with low 
systematicity have superficial relations which break down if taken beyond surface 
similarity; while for those with high systematicity a hierarchy o f relations holds 
between source and target domains, from pictorial and physical similarity of the 
phenomena to similarity of mathematical structures used to represent the 
phenomena);
(iii) the background knowledge, experience, skills which these analogies often rely on;
(iv) functions (e.g. tools of exploration in private conceptualisation, tools o f explanation 
when conveying novel ideas to colleagues or when communicating basic physics to 
novices; to play with ideas in informal settings);
(v) context of use;
This is summarised in tabular form. A general definition o f the three classes o f analogy and 
a characteristic example drawn from the on-line questionnaire data are provided for clarity.
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Expressed As Verbal / Physical / Pictorial Analogies Physical and Pictorial Analogies (Nomo) (Formal) Mathematical Analogies
Systematicity Low Medium to High High
Definition The analogies are often novel and amusing, relating 
abstract physics concepts to familiar, everyday things 
like dazed chickens, cheese sandwiches, Snickers 
bars, football stadiums, donuts, etc.
The physical picture attached to one situation can be used to 
visualise another. These idealised pictures are usually used 
iteratively: further refined and abstracted through rigorous 
mathematical and experimental testing.
The same mathematics can be used to describe two 
situations. Phenomena in one situation will have a 
counterpart in the second, as the mathematics for 
the two is identical.
Example "A Tokamak is like a donut, but filled with plasma 
instead of cream." Phys_189 
"Reversal of magnetisation through a magnetic logic 
NOT-gate likened to a car performing a three-point 
turn." Phys 191
"Cerenkov light is created when a particle passes through 
matter at above the local speed of light. The effect is similar 
to the skock wave created by an airplane flying at above the 
speed of sound." Phys_198
"I quite often use the analogy of cold atoms to try to 
tackle problems in other areas. Cold atoms are a 
very clean and well understood research topic 
where I have experience in, and its results are 
widely applicable also to other areas." Phys 35
Often rely on Popular associations; 
Creative imagination;
Geometrical intuition (seeing patterns and symmetries in the 
underlying mathematics)
Kinesthetic awareness (of macroscopic capacities);
Tacit knowledge (gained through experimentation);
Geometrical intuition (seeing patterns and 





To make physics accessible, memorable and 
entertaining, in order to enlist support. 
Occasionally used by expert physicists in private 
conceptualisation to play with ideas.
Tools of Exploration;
Heuristics;
Provide physical and pictorial insight;
Mechanisms underlying phenomena in analogous systems 
can be compared & contrasted.
Tools of Exploration;
Allow direct comparison of physical systems to be 
made on an abstract mathematical level.
Basis for computer simulations;
Contexts of Use (1) Private Conceptualisation; (1) Private Conceptualisation; (1) Private Conceptualisation;
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in very informal 
settings;
Often used to entertain an audience or to make a point 
in a lively debate;
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in formal and informal 
settings;
Use in journal publications is dependent on norms of 
research area and "in-house style" of journal. Some journals 
object to creative use of language.
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in formal and 
informal settings, including journal publications & 
presentations to conferences of experts;
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in informal 
settings (used to entertain);
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in formal and 
informal settings;
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in formal 
and informal settings;
(4) Expert-Novice communication (to make physics 
accessible and memorable by drawing on concepts 
from everyday life);
(4) Expert-Novice communication (in particular to visualise 
the unseen, e.g. atomic physics, nano-physics, cosmology 
and astrophysics, etc.);
(4) Almost never used by physicists to 
communicate with novices as concepts from the 
source domain would be unfamiliar to novices.
Table 2.2 A summary of the system of classification I used to determine the forms of analogy used in different contexts
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2.4 Method 4: Case study of physicist-engineer who was an enthusiast 
for analogy and had an interesting research training.
The findings of the initial survey of 225 physicists highlighted several key issues 
concerning the tools, techniques and problem solving strategies used by a sample of 
physicists. In particular, the role of analogy in gaining physical and/or pictorial insight, and 
the affect of training, experience and nationality on conceptualisation and communication 
techniques, in particular on the use of analogy. Thus, in year two, the study moved from 
the macro to the micro, carrying out a case study of an individual physicist. My aim was to 
explicate the conceptualisation and communication techniques employed by a particular 
physicist-engineer, and to explore how the context in which he worked may have 
influenced his approach.
Dr. John Lawson contacted me in March 2003 after seeing my request for 
questionnaire respondents in Physics W orld magazine (2003, Vol. 16, No. 3, p.20). In his 
March 2003 letter he explained that he would have found many of the questions in my on­
line questionnaire difficult to answer because, firstly, he had been retired for the past 
fifteen years and thus had little contact with the physics community, and secondly, the 
concepts e.g. ‘mental picture’ were not particularly well defined in his view. He enclosed 
10 of his scientific papers (dating from 1950 to 1989) with post-it note annotations 
regarding his use of analogy.
His enthusiasm for using analogy in his scientific work suggested that he would 
make an interesting case study subject. In addition, Dr. Lawson’s letter o f March 2003 
touched on several other cognitive, social, developmental, and behavioural factors of the 
kind detailed in Feist and Gorman’s (1998) Structural Equation Model, which I was 
interested in exploring further. In the cognitive sphere he said he was a great enthusiast for 
analogies, since he liked to think “pictorially and not mathematically”. In the 
social/cognitive spheres, he remarked that he had worked with and delivered lectures to 
physicists of varying research backgrounds and nationalities and had noticed, in the course 
of his long and varied career, how research background and nationality affected physicists’ 
use of analogy. In the developmental sphere, he had interesting research training: after 
acquiring a practically orientated, 2-year, ‘war-time’ degree in mechanical sciences he 
worked on airborne radar at the Telecommunications Research Establishment Malvern, 




During our first interview I also discovered that he was very well renowned in the area of 
particle physics. In the late 50s he gave his name to the ‘Lawson criterion’ (which deals 
with the conditions needed for a fusion reactor to reach ignition), in 1969 he received an 
ScD Physics from Cambridge University, in 1985 he was awarded the Thomas Young 
Medal by the Physical Society (given for optics), and in 1988 was elected a Fellow of the 
Royal Society. Thus, Dr. Lawson was a perfect candidate for a case study. Dr. Lawson 
contacted me when I was receiving responses from my on-line questionnaire. Although it 
was tempting to begin analysing his work immediately, I adhered to my research design, 
explaining to him that I would not begin the case-study until after I had analysed the 
material from the on-line questionnaire. Dr. Lawson was very patient and accommodating 
in this and many other respects. A timeline of Dr. Lawson’s career path is provided in 
appendix 7 and an extended outline of his career is discussed in section 7.0.
2.4.1 Summary of Case-Study Specific Research Questions (cf.
chapter 1)
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson experience difficulties getting a mental picture of 
the physical processes in his research?
□ What reasons were given by Dr. Lawson for having/not having difficulty getting a 
mental picture of the physical processes in his research?
□ How did educational, professional, cultural, historical, etc. aspects impact on Dr. 
Lawson’s approach to problem solving?
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to acquire and promote insight?
□ How does physical insight differ from pictorial insight in DR. Lawson’s view?
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to bridge sub-disciplinary boundaries?
□ What types of analogies did Dr. Lawson employ in this context? I.e. were they 




A 30-minute semi-structured interview took place on at Dr. Lawson’s residence on 15-Jan- 
2004. Dr. Lawson produced a print-out of the on-line questionnaire and verbally responded 
to many of the questions, often going off on interesting tangents. As Dr. Lawson was 
effectively interviewing himself, I attempted to make as few inteijections as possible, but 
did make some for the purpose of clarification, and to compare and contrast Dr. Lawson’s 
views with those of other questionnaire respondents. Throughout, I avoided reference to 
existing theoretical stances on analogy or visualization. The interview was tape-recorded to 
provide an accurate record of our discussion. Dr. Lawson exhibited no strong signs of 
discomfort or inhibition on being tape-recorded and seemed comfortable in his familiar 
surroundings.
2.4.3 Content analysis and textual analysis of a selection of Dr. Lawson’s 
scientific papers
In his letter of March 2003 Dr. Lawson furnished me with 10 of his scientific papers with 
post-it note annotations regarding his use of analogy. Personal photocopies were made of 
these papers, Dr. Lawson’s original post-it notes were stapled to them, and the original 
papers were returned to Dr. Lawson. A search of the Institute o f  Physics on-line journal 
database produced an additional 9 scientific papers authored by Dr. Lawson. At our first 
meeting Dr. Lawson provided me with a list of 98 of his “publications and more important 
unpublished reports” dating from 1946 to 1997, and marked off 11 papers worthy of 
pursuit (one of which was already in my possession). In the following weeks I procured the 
remaining 10 recommended papers and, in order to balance the purposive sampling (or 
‘cherry-picking’) of particular papers featuring analogy, 6 others that were in stock in the 
University of Bath library. 46 This brought the total number of papers in my possession to 
35. Passages from these papers, (relating to analogy, physical insight, simplification, 
training, research communities), were transcribed, colour-coded and ordered 
chronologically. (Dr. Lawson’s post-it note annotations were also transcribed and inserted 
where relevant.) The aim was to provide a systematic over-view of a broad selection of Dr. 
Lawson’s papers. 47
46 Mostly from Nature and from Philosophical Magazine
47 From this over-view, one could see that explicit analogies were used in approximately 50% of the sampled 
papers. However, limiting-case analysis and mathematical simplifications did feature throughout Dr. 
Lawson’s papers, and it was often difficult (for a non-specialist) to identify every mathematical analogue. 
Thus, this must be taken into account when evaluating the prevalence of analogy in this sample of papers.
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2.4.4 Content analysis of Dr. Lawson’s book
I obtained a copy of Dr. Lawson’s 446-page book, “The Physics of Charged Particle 
Beams” part of the “International Series of Monographs of Physics”. A procedure similar 
to that outlined above was followed when analysing the book. Approximately 5,500 words 
o f relevant excerpts were transcribed and keywords (e.g. analogy, physical insight, 
simplification, training, research communities) were colour-coded during transcription to 
facilitate subsequent analysis and collation. This revealed approximately 55 examples of 
analogy, including mathematical analogues, physical analogues and pictorial analogues. 
Examples of pictorial analogues were photocopied for future reference.
2.4.5 Collation of results:
Particularly pertinent excerpts (from the interview transcript, scientific papers and 
monograph which had been colour-coded during transcription) were then arranged 
thematically, under the research question headings. The aim was to provide a framework 
within which to better understand how latent factors, akin to those outlined in Feist and 
Gorman’s (1998) SEM, may have impacted on the tools, techniques and problem solving 
strategies employed by Dr. Lawson.
2.4.6 Use of a Cognitive Styles Framework As An Investigative Tool
Dr. Lawson, a retired physicist-engineer, was not a designer in the artistic sense considered 
by Williamson (web ref) 48 or the architectural sense considered by Goel (1995), discussed 
in section 1.11. However, there are some similarities between the cognitive/working styles 
of design engineers and physicist-engineers. For example, my subjects deal with ill- 
structured problems, manipulate representations of the world, and use many different 
symbol systems that vary according to context, objectives, personal preferences etc. By 
adapting the cognitive style dimensions of Riding & Rayner (1998) and of Williamson 
(web ref), a cognitive styles framework was constructed. 49 This framework was used as a 
tool of investigation and guide in analysing my case-study material. For example, it was 
used to sort data and frame follow-up interview questions. The goal was not to establish 
Dr. Lawson’s cognitive style(s) and hence generalise that all those who employ analogy
48 Jack Williamson is Adjunct Assistant Professor of Design Studies, The University of Michigan School of 
Art. His notes on designer styles were gleaned from a power point presentation which can be found on-line 
at: www.designmichigan.org/design futures/powerpoint/plainDesTvpes.ppt. Last accessed on 11-01-2005
491 assume that Williamson regards working style, sources of inspiration, problem scale, and social-historical 
dimension to be facets of cognitive style, although it is unclear from the list of horizontal pairings he puts 
forward. In any case, I have not differentiated between these sub-classes. Instead, I have selected relevant 
characteristics and integrated them into my more general cognitive styles framework.
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exhibit similar cognitive styles. One may choose to infer from my findings that scientists 
who are enthusiasts for analogy share similar cognitive styles. However, my aim is not to 
establish this connection. As mentioned in section 1.18, the cognitive styles framework 
was a very useful map or guide with which to navigate and explore the terrain, e.g. I used it 
to formulate questions which then led on to other things unrelated to cognitive style.
I carried out a content analysis of 30 of Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers, the 2nd 
edition of his book on the physics o f charged particle beams, and our personal 
correspondence and semi-structured interviews which were carried out at his home and by 
telephone. In order to explore initial hypotheses e.g. that Dr. Lawson tended to ‘synthesise’ 
ideas, often through drawing analogies, I used the cognitive style framework to gather 
evidence in a systematic manner. This was done by constructing a table consisting of three 
columns, containing respectively:
various cognitive styles (adapted from Riding & Rayner, 1998; Williamson (web- 
source), and Goel, (1995);
my estimation of the degree to which Dr. Lawson exhibited this characteristic
(based on my analysis o f his work and our personal correspondence); 
excerpts from the data to support these estimations.




Characteristic My Estimation Supporting evidence
Synthesizer Very much so
“The approach is synthetic; simple examples are considered first, and 
the complications introduced gradually....” (The Physics of Charged 
Particle Beams, 1989, 2nd ed, p.l)
“an attempt has been made here to bring together and compare all 
commonly used versions.” (TPOCPB, 1989, 2nd ed, p i2)
Generalist Very much so
“In this monograph, the unity of things encountered in different 
contexts is emphasised and classification is in terms of physical features 
rather than application..” (monograph, p .l)
“I used to say that I was a “jack of all trades and master of one”. (Dr. 









depends on how 
one defines 
innovative.)
“as a boy, I was always making things..” (Dr. Lawson, Jan 2004 
interview)
“as a boy I was always doing experiments and building things..” (Dr. 
Lawson, March 2004 telephone iv)
“I’m not sure that I had all that many [ideas]. A lot of my ideas were in 
showing how things wouldn’t work as they were being claimed, 
especially with new things.” (Dr. Lawson, Jan 2004 interview)
“Often if there’s a complicated problem that you don’t quite know how 
to tackle, the thing is to invent a simpler problem of the same class, 
which you think you can tackle.” (Dr. Lawson, March 04 phone iv)
“I have to invent my own way of thinking about particular problems. 
Just seeing how certain problems seem to be related in one way or 
another.” (Dr. Lawson, March 2004 phone iv)
“Not particularly [innovative]. I don’t think I’ve invented any new 
thing, but I’m a good critic really.” (Dr. Lawson, March 2004 phone 
interview)
Hands-On Very much so
“I regard myself as a sort of engineer-physicist, I think. I mean as a boy, 
I was always making things,...” (Dr. Lawson, January 2004 
interview)
“I had a Faraday-type approach where most of my colleagues were 
Maxwell like.” (Dr. Lawson, Feb 2004 letter)
“I did a degree in engineering.. .You have your feet on the ground a bit 
more if you’re an engineer.” (Dr. Lawson, March 2004 phone i.v.)












“I like something that has a form and a structure to it.” (Mar 2004 iv) 










“Often, I think, it’s better to go back to the physics, and look at the 
essentials, and in fact, solve a problem that is easier than the one that we 
want to solve but it’s the same nature.” (Jan 2004 interview)
“I’m not one for emphasising rigour in the early development stages of a 
subject. In fact, I think the more we keep away from rigour, the better it is. 
And this joke about a calculation... ‘assume a spherical elephant’.. .well, I 
would approve of that.. .Very often you can see, rather simply, that this is 




“.. .what I have done is merely to collect together and display as a single 
exhibit a number of well tried old approaches. I believe however that it is 
worth while having a clear idea of what the really fundamental constraints 
are, so that instead of banging our heads against the wall of our prison we 
can stand back to see whether it has a door.” (J.D. Lawson, 1971, 








“I spent a lot of time [doing lectures at conferences and attending 
workshops]. And I was quite - - well, my style was, I think, quite popular, 
in that I was, you know, invited all over the place. I went to various 
European countries - Poland and Romania, Hungary - and I had a special 
invitation to Russia and to China .. .and I spent some time in Japan. So 
these were all just because I seem to have got a reputation for putting 
things in a way that people liked — it must have been I think.” (Jan 2004 
Interview)
“I used to work largely on my own.. .and then just appearing and 
interacting at workshops and conferences which we often had- - and I 
always used to - - 1 seemed to go down quite well, and often got invited to 
give the opening talk or concluding talk to sum it up.” (March 2004 
phone interview)
Independent Very
“I was rather a timid person.. .a bit of a ‘loner’ in my research.. .” (Jan 
2004 interview)
“I was better working on my own rather than as a team member, so I was 
just allowed to do what I wanted to.” (Jan 2005 phone interview)
Collaborative Quite
In 1952 J.D. Lawson was leading the team developing the X-band 
Klystron.
Table 2.4: A technique I employed when developing a cognitive styles framework
50 See Collins & Evans, 2002, p.254
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2.4.7 Telephone interviews with Dr. Lawson to test hypotheses generated 
through using cognitive styles framework.
Using the cognitive styles framework, I formed some initial hypotheses about the tools, 
techniques and problem solving strategies used by Dr. Lawson in different contexts. I then 
formulated a list o f pertinent questions and conducted a 30-minute ‘semi-structured’ 
telephone interview with Dr. Lawson51 in order to explore my hypotheses concerning the 
techniques he used to conceptualise and communicate physics. The interview questions 
explored:
(i) the tools, techniques and problem solving strategies that he used in his work;
(ii) specifically the role of analogy as a means of providing ‘insight’;
(iii) whether there had been a historical shift in the meaning of the term ‘analogy’;
(iv) the extent to which Dr. Lawson’s early training influenced his research style;
(v) degree to which audience composition influenced Dr. Lawson;
Dr. Lawson’s responses were evaluated within my cognitive styles framework and a better 
understanding of how the contexts in which he employed certain tools, techniques and 
problem solving strategies was acquired. This process was repeated several times in order 
to hone my understanding of e.g. how the atmosphere in which he worked impacted on the 
ways in which he conceptualised and communicated physics. For example:
□ On 04-0ct-2004 Dr. Lawson returned a completed questionnaire sent by me on 15- 
08-2004. It details what he means by the term ‘insight’.
□ On 14-Nov-2004 I sent J..D. Lawson a questionnaire concerning the contexts in 
which he found certain conceptualisation and communication tools useful and the 
atmosphere in which he worked. I ask that he give me his responses by telephone at 
some point.
□ On 13-Jan-2005 we carried out a semi-structured interview by telephone exploring 
the issues raised in the questionnaire o f 14-Nov-2004.
□ On 07-Jan-2006 I sent Dr. Lawson 3 draft chapters based on his work. After a 
cursory glance of the content of these chapters he agreed to waive his right to 
anonymity.
□ On 01-Feb-2006 Dr. Lawson returned the draft chapters (with annotations) and 
remarked: “as far as I can tell you have given a fair and accurate account of our interviews 
and painting a flattering picture of me from a study of my published papers and other 




In chapters 7 & 8 I build on the information gathered using the cognitive styles framework 
and discuss Dr. Lawson’s role as a synthesiser and translator of ideas between experts in 
his fields of interest. I show that the atmosphere in which he worked contributed greatly to 
his use o f analogies to conceptualise and communicate physics. For example, during a 
formative time in his career he worked at Malvern in close-knit teams where informal 
modes o f communication was encouraged. As we will see in section 6.6, analogy is used to 
a greater extent when the tone of the discussion is informal. Then later in his career he was 
given the freedom to pursue his own research interests, gaining experience in five separate 
sub-fields of physics and engineering. This wider field of view contributed to him noticing 
and using analogies to provide and promote insights to his colleagues.
Thus, a major strength of the project was that the findings from one strand of 
investigation were used to inform and shape subsequent investigations. First, in our first 
interview, I drew on the findings from the questionnaire when I asked Dr. Lawson if  the 
complexity o f the analogy would increase directly proportionally to the expertise of the 
target audience. Secondly, Dr. Lawson said he liked to think pictorially and not 
mathematically. Therefore, in my follow-up e-mail exchanges with 13 physicists and in my 
interview with Prof. Berry I asked about how best to communicate to physicists having 
different modes of thought. For example, were analogy and computer simulations useful 
tools in this context? As you can see in chapters 4 and 5, these focused e-mail and 
interview exchanges provided a deeper understanding of the key areas of interest.
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2.5 Method 5: Follow-up e-mails with a select sample of questionnaire 
respondents to enquire further into the techniques they use to 
conceptualise and communicate physics.
After analysing the on-line questionnaire data and beginning my case study of Dr. 
Lawson’s work I had identified several research questions requiring further investigation. 
For example, whether the use of analogy was more accepted and widespread in certain 
branches o f physics than others., whether analogy constituted a substantial method of 
scientific innovation etc. 30 physicists were singled out for the follow-up e-mail 




(iv) Do/(do not) have difficulty getting a mental picture o f physical processes;
(v) Do/(do not) use analogy to conceptualise and communicate physics;
(vi) Do/(do not) use computer simulations as visualization tools;
(vii) Depth and clarity of original questionnaire replies;
(viii) Have agreed to be contacted in future;




Age range (in years) 19-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-67
Number within this age range 8 8 4 8 2
Number that were male 27
Number that were female 3
Research Background
An attempt was made to have a combination o f classical physics and quantum physics, theoretical physics and 
experimental physics.
Table 2.5: Characteristics of the 30 physicists who were selected for follow-up e-mail enquiries.
The questionnaire’s 7-point scale ran from “ 1/never” to “7all the 
time”. Never/1 2 3 4 5 6
7/All the time
Difficulties getting 
mental picture of 
physical processes.
For example 3 physicists said they never 
find it difficult to get a mental picture o f the 
physical processes in their research
3 11 5 2 5 2 1
Use Analogy in their 
research
14 physicists said they use analogy all the 
time in their research 1 0 3 1 4 7
14
Use computer 
simulations in their 
research
4 physicists selected “3” on the 7 point scale 
regarding the use o f  computer simulations in 
research
6 2 4 6 5 1 6




Respondents were asked questions like the following:
□ “Q. In your research, do you use an analogy as scaffolding, often discarding and 
forgetting it after it has served as a bridge when building new explanations and models? 
Or do the analogies you use in the early stages of your research usually make it into 
your personal notebook (or equivalent) and then into your research papers, perhaps in 
an adapted form?”
□ “Q. You said that only occasionally do you find it difficult to get a mental picture of 
the physical processes involved in your research because you find ‘geometry and 
patterns...very easy to visualise’ as a result o f studying, ‘ too much organic steric 
chemistry as an undergrad.’ What visualization tools did you use when you were 
studying ‘too much organic steric chemistry’? For example, did you use physical 
models, free-hand sketches, computer visualizations, etc.? I ask because I would like to 
explore whether formal training in specific visualization techniques might benefit 
physicists who experience visualization difficulties”
□ “Q. In your opinion, could all of physics benefit from theoreticians presenting their 
work in a more visualisable form? Or is that simply not practical because many 
theorists are skilled at ‘constructing mental pictures of mathematical structures’ and 
prefer this approach?”
□ “Q. Are computer visualisations the best alternative visual aid? Or could physicists 
learn specific visualization skills (what some respondents have called "tricks") that 
would assist them in their attempts to ‘visualize equations into their physical meaning’? 
Because as you [/ one respondent] said, when ‘trying to imagine NEW laws - computer 
simulations won't work because one needs the laws to put into the computer to 
simulate.”
13 of these 30 physicists responded to my follow-up queries. As one can see in tables 2.7 
and 2.8 on the following pages, the majority o f these respondents had stated in the on-line 
questionnaire that they had a tendency to employ analogy frequently. However, as my aim 
was to provide a detailed account of the forms of analogy used in different contexts, not to 
make generalizations about how widespread the use of analogy is, the fact that the sample 
of follow-up responses is skewed towards enthusiasts for analogy is not problematic. These 
13 respondents had provided some of the most revealing responses to the initial on-line 
questionnaire, so their continued input was particularly valuable.
52 With hindsight, ‘visual sense’ would have been better than ‘visualisable’ because, as mentioned 





Age Gender Job title Research interests 
(re-coded for the 




















Phys_2 27 Male Phd
Optoelecrtoincs
Opto-electronics 3/7 No tangible evidence for whats going on. 7/7 5/7 3/7
Phys_19 60 Male Professor of
Theoretical
Physics
Condensed matter 1/7 Excellent visuo-spatial iq 7 /7 5/7 7/7
Phys_27 25 Male PhD student Carbon nano-tubes 3/7 Geometry and patterns I fmd very easy to 
visualise, too much organic steric chemistry as 
an undergrad.
6/7 5/7 3/7
Phys_54 40 Male Lecturer in 
Theoretical 
Physics
Quantum physics 5/7 I'm interested in quantum gravity which does 
not exist as a theory yet and may require a 
reformulation of the nature of space and time 
at some level. If one sticks to known models 
then it is possible to visualise things; 
otherwise it gets difficult.
7 /7 5/7 3/7
Phys_57 37 Male Senior Lecturer in
Coastal
Engineering
Coastal engineering 2/7 My understanding is usually pictorial / by 
analogy. Possibly because my mathematical 
thinking is weaker.
7/7 4 /7 4 /7
Phys_91 47 Female Professor of 
Astrophysics
Astrophysics 2/7 I have a strong spatial imagination - have 
never had difficulty with maps, direction- 
finding, pattern recognition, can draw quite 
well. I sometimes get stumped by extreme 
instances of 3-D imagining.
5/7 2/7 5/7








6/7 If I have got the mental picture the research is 
mostly done. So getting the picture is as 
difficult as doing research. Here the difficulty 
depends on the choice of topic.
7 /7 6/7 i n





Age Gender Job title Research interests 
(re-coded for the 




























i n Not a problem: neat visualisation is half the fun! 7 /7 6/7 6/7








5/7 Because the basic entities with which quantum theory 
(and to a lesser extent relativity) deal are not directly 
observable, and behave in ways for which everyday 
experience provides no reliable analogy.
3 /7 2/7 4 /7




i n The physical world behaves differently at very small 
scales, you can't directly see/experience what goes on so 
you have to infer from measurements that translate the 
information into larger scale changes you can directly 
see.
3 /7 2/7 5/7
Phys_193 31 Male PhD student High temp, 
superconductors
2/7 I've not fully understood the problem 7/7 7/7 7/7







i n My brain is mainly visual and not strongly 
mathematical(numerical). (Mild)Dyslexia could have an 
impact on this although the word had not been coined 
when I was at school/university.
6/7 3/7 1 n
Phys_202 50 Male Senior 
Lecturer in 
Geophysics
Geophysics i n I seem to have an ability to visualise the objects and the 
fields in both 2 and 3 dimensions. I first realised this, 
consciously, when I had just started my PhD. I could 
"see" the object that was generating an anomalous 
response, just from the shape of the response.
6 /7 3/7 3/7
Table 2.8: Initial questionnaire responses of the physicists who responded to my follow-up e-mail queries.
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2.5.1 Several rounds of particularly detailed responses from Phys_54 on 
issues concerning visualization techniques, including thought 
experiments.
This questionnaire respondent (based in Australia) provided 4 rounds of extremely detailed 
e-mail replies to my queries concerning visualization techniques. He provided some 
extremely interesting comments on his use o f thought experiments to conceptualise and 
communicate his research. (His responses appear in sections 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7). In the on­
line questionnaire I chose not to include questions concerning the use of thought 
experiments as visualization tools as my ‘test-questionnaire’ (distributed to physicists 
based at the University o f Bath) suggested that the term ‘thought experiment’ was too 
profound and philosophical a description of what these physicists said they did in their 
work, and it also made the questionnaire too long. However I did ask respondents to select 
from a 7-poiint scale in order to indicate to what extent they visualised experiments which 
were (i) then physically performed, (ii) too expensive or technically difficult to physically 
perform, (iii) physically performable, but doing so would offer no further insight, (iv) 
impossible to physically perform. Thus, I have included the data from this question in 
section 3.7 alongside the follow-up e-mail comments of Phys_54 concerning his use of 
thought experiments.
2.5.2 Follow-up e-mail exchanges with Prof. Paul Coleman to enquire 
into the origins of the Dazed Chicken Analogy he employed in his 
inaugural lecture.
Prof. Paul Coleman responded to the on-line questionnaire. In fact, he referred to the 
questionnaire when he introduced his Dazed Chicken Analogy sketch during his highly 
entertaining inaugural lecture. I had several e-mail exchanges with Prof. Coleman in 
order to ascertain the creative origins or the sketch, his aims when employing the sketch, 
the feedback he has received from his colleagues and students to his use of the sketch etc. 
The data from these e-mail exchanges appears in sections 6.6.3 and 6.7.1 on the use of 
analogy in science communication.




2.6 Method 6: In-depth interview with Prof. Berry to focus on the 
techniques he employs to conceptualise & communicate quantum physics
A semi-structured interview was carried out with Prof. Sir Michael Berry at his office at 
Bristol University. He had not responded to the on-line questionnaire, but is highly 
regarded as a theoretical physicist and science communicator and his scientific pictures 
have won several awards. In the semi-structured interview I focused on the techniques he 
uses to acquire and promote insight in quantum mechanics. As the interviewee had the 
freedom to digress, we explored some very interesting tangents. For example, Prof. Berry 
drew my attention to Physical Review Letters censorship of creative language. This is a 
particularly interesting point, because it ties in with the fact that playful analogies and 
other creative use of language are unacceptable in certain media. This discovery highlights 
one o f the great strengths of semi-structured interviews: their ability to uncover 
information which is highly relevant but which would not have come to light through the 
use of more structured forms of data gathering. The data from this semi-structured 
interview appears in sections 4.8 -  4.12, on the use of computer simulations when 
conceptualising and communicating physics with experts, intermediates and novices.
2.7 Expertise: Establishing oneself as a worthy (associate) member of 
the physics community.
In the early stages of my case-study investigation, Dr. Lawson (my case-study respondent) 
expressed some concerns about my study. For example, he asked: What were the aims and 
objectives of my study? How could I isolate variables? How could I generalise from this 
one case study? Exactly how much physics expertise did I possess? Did I have sufficient 
understanding of the subtleties of the physics contained in his papers and book to properly 
analyse and comment upon them? I explained that my intention was not to generalise from 
this one case study. Rather, I wished to explicate the conceptualisation and communication 
techniques used by one particular physicist and explore how the contexts in which he 
worked may have influenced his approach. I also explained that though I would like to 
become an expert in the research areas of all o f my respondents, I did not have the time. 
My clarifications concerning my aims, objectives, methodological approach and expertise 
assuaged Dr. Lawson’s initial concerns. Sociologists of Scientific Knowledge are often 
confronted with these types of questions as they attempt to gain a foothold in a domain in 
which they have little or no expertise. Harry Collins has highlighted this issue on many 
occasions in his studies of physicists working on gravitational waves.
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In a recent paper, Collins and Evans define three types o f expertise that a sociologist of 
scientific knowledge may possess:
1) “No expertise: That is the 
degree of expertise with 
which the fieldworker sets 
out. It is insufficient to 
conduct a sociological 
analysis or do quasi- 
participatory fieldwork.
2) Interactional Expertise: 
This means enough 
expertise to interact 
interestingly with 
participants and carry out a 
sociological analysis.
3) Contributory Expertise: 
This means enough 
expertise to contribute to 
the science of the field 
being analysed.” (Collins 
& Evans, 2002, p.254)
Within this classification scheme, I could be said to possess “interactional expertise” but
not “contributory expertise”. However, Gooding (via personal communication, July 2004)
points out that the Collins-Evans classification is research-focused and does not consider
communication aspects, and suggests splitting 3 into: “(3a) research contributory expertise;
(3b) -  communicatory expertise.” Adding, “clearly these two overlap, but I ’d say you have
54competence in 3b. Any science writer must have.”
54 This Gary Larson cartoon seemed like a nice way of highlighting this notion of expertise. In the early days 
of my PhD research I was concerned that I may not have quite enough expertise in physics, psychology, 
sociology, philosophy, etc. to carry out investigations into the visualization techniques used in cognition and 
communication in physics. I would like to thank Prof. David Gooding, Prof. Helen Haste, Dr. Chris 
Philippidis and many colleagues from the departments of psychology, education, physics, and computer 
science for giving me faith in my own abilities.
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Figure 2.1: (Copyright Gary Larson)
Caption reads: “M atthews...we’re getting another one o f  
those strange ‘aw blah es span y o l’ sounds. ”
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Someone who undoubtedly possesses what Collins calls “interactional expertise” is the 
anthropologist, Sharon Traweek. She has spent over three decades observing the 
international community of high-energy physicists.55 According to Traweek:
“Protection o f  oral communication encourages the development o f  a closed  
community. In physics it is consistent with the group’s image o f  itself as a 
meritocracy: only an informed, worthy member o f  the community will know what is 
to be said and what is to be written.” (Traweek, 1988, p. 120)
Thus, Dr. Lawson’s reticence was entirely understandable, particularly in the light of 
Traweek’s findings.
2.8 Ethics
In accordance with ethical guidelines, interviewees were provided with a brief over-view 
of my research project and a consent form at our first meeting. The consent form asked 
interviewees if they would waive anonymity on condition that they would have the 
opportunity to proof-read and amend thesis chapters to which they contributed. Bailer- 
Jones (2002) used a similar approach in her analysis of nine interviews of UK scientists on 
the topic of scientific models.56 All questionnaire respondents remain anonymous but, on 
the suggestion of one respondent, their valuable input was acknowledged in an alphabetical 
listing in the appendix of the thesis. I aim to provide full access to my thesis on-line and 
publish a summary of my findings in popular science magazines such as Physics World in 
order to provide feedback to the physics community. Thus, this project is, to a certain 
extent, ‘action research’ because it is my hope is that these findings will lead to a different 
approach to the use of these model-based reasoning techniques in physics education and 
communication. For example, I hope that educators will work with practicing physicists to 
develop better analogies that can be used in a more structured way which is less likely to 
mislead students.
55 Traweek conducted field research for two years at SLAC [the Stanford Linear Accelerator Centre], three 
years at KEK [the Japanese National Physics Laboratory] at Tsukuba, Japan, six months at Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory in Illinois, and shorter visits to CERN [European Centre for Nuclear Research] in 
Switzerland, DESY [electron synchrotron facility] in Germany, and the Saclay laboratory in France),
56Bailer-Jones’ rationale was that: “the interviewees are, as scientists, trained and able to undertake such 
rationalizations [of what scientific models are and how they use them] and they are experienced speakers, so 
there is little risk of putting them into an uncomfortable, difficult situation by questioning them about 
models. This is why, for instance, I see no particular need to make anonymous the presentation of my results, 




In Search Of Enlightenment: Visualization 
Techniques Employed By A Sample Of Physicists.
“M ighty is the charm
O f these abstractions to a m ind beset
W ith images, and haunted by  herself, 160
A nd specially delightful unto me
W as that clear synthesis built up aloft
So gracefully; even then w hen it appeared
N ot m ore than a m ere plaything, or a toy
To sense embodied: not the thing it is
In verity, an independent world,
C reated out o f  pure intelligence.”
W illiam  W ordsworth,




This strand of the research explores visualization in physics. The data is derived from 225 
responses to an on-line questionnaire on visualization and analogy in contemporary 
physics,57 follow-up correspondence with a select sample of 13 questionnaire respondents 
58 and a semi-structured interview with a distinguished theoretical physicist.59 First, I 
present data on the degree to which these physicists reported finding it difficult to get a 
mental picture of the physical processes involved in their research. Second, I detail the 
reasons they gave for this. Third, I give an overview of the many visualization techniques 
these practicing physicists reported using when building & adapting their theories, models 
and experiments. The on-line questionnaire had additional detailed questions on the role of 
analogy and computer simulations as specific visualization tools. This will be presented 
and discussed in chapters 4, 5 & 6. This chapter sets the scene for these subsequent 
discussions. Lastly, I enquire into whether the kinaesthetic skills of sketching, and physical 
& mental modelling are vitally important in helping a sample of physicists to visualise 
physical processes in their research, and whether they have developed these skills on their 
own or have learned them through formal education. It would seem from my initial 
enquiries that while such skills are vital components in a physicists’ toolkit, rarely are they 
enshrined in the curriculum.
57 Received between February and May 2003
58 Received between 31-05-2005 and 20-01-2006)
59 Professor Sir Michael Berry, conducted at his office at the University of Bristol, on 05-07-2005
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3.1 Background information on questionnaire respondents.
As outlined in chapter 2, the first section of the on-line questionnaire asked respondents to 
state their 3rd level qualifications, the branches o f physics with which they would associate 
themselves (they were given a list o f 12 to choose from), their age, gender, current 
occupation or course of study, research interests, etc. As you can see in figs. 3.1 and 3.2 
the age ranges and occupations of respondents provided an excellent cross section of the 
physics community. The IoP groups with which respondents associated themselves were 
also well distributed, but had a definite clustering around Astrophysics. Analysis of this 
background information revealed an apparent relationship between age and views on 
computer simulations (see section 4.6.4). However, the aim was not to identify statistically 
significant correlations between e.g. gender and visualization difficulties. In general, the 
information was used in a qualitative manner when interpreting an individual’s response to 
a given question. So for example, the responses o f a 25-year old PhD student, studying 
quantum computing (identified as Phys_221) were interpreted slightly differently from 
those o f a 65-year old Professor of condensed matter physics (identified as Phys_222). The 
accompanying CD contains an excel file containing the entire questionnaire dataset, 
including respondents research backgrounds and replies to questions on visualisation, 
analogy, computer simulation and physics communication. The “edit - find"  facility in 
excel is useful for locating comments pertaining to specific things, e.g. sketches, reality, 
models, abstract, etc.



















19-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-67 Unknown
Individual Ages Re-coded into 5 Age Ranges


























F igure 3.2: C hart indicating the job  categories o f 225 respondents. T he data provided by respondents has been re-coded as follows:
Category 1: Hold an MSc but no PhD
Category 2: Pursuing their PhD’s
Category 3: Hold a PhD. Now work in industry.
Category 4: Hold a PhD. Now retired.
Category 5: Post-Doctoral Research Associates or Research Fellows 
Category 6: Teaching Fellows 
Category 7: Lectures 
Category 8: Readers



























































































Groups with which 225 respondents associated themselves.
8 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondnts were asked to select Yes/No from a list of 12 loP Groups plus an "other" category
Figure 3.3 Chart indicating the groups with which respondents associated themselves.
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Interestingly, of the 60 respondents who associated themselves with “Astrophysics”, 35% 
associated themselves with just this one group. In comparison, of the 43 respondents who 
associated themselves with “Applied Optics” only 9.3% associated themselves with just 
this one group. This may be an indication o f the extent to which Astrophysics is a more 
distinct community.60 (See appendix 3 for a tabulated summary of the number of groups 
with which respondents associated themselves).
3.2 Do physicists ever find it difficult to get a mental picture of the 
physical processes involved in their research?
Question two of the online questionnaire posed the following question: “Do you ever fin d  
it difficult to get a mental picture o f  the various kinds o f  physical processes involved in 
your research?” Respondents chose from a 7-point scale ranging from “ 1/never” to “7/all 
the time”. As can be seen in table 3.1 and figure 3.4, there was a skew towards the “seldom 
find it difficult” end of the scale, with 66.7% of respondents selecting from the (1-3) range; 
15.6% selecting the midpoint (4); and 17.8% selecting from the (5-7) range i.e. the “often 
find it difficult” end of the scale. Only 3.6% of respondents said that they find it difficult to 
get a mental picture of the physical processes involved in their research “7/all the time”. 









Never/1 22 9.8 9.8
2 73 32.4 42.2
3 54 24.0 66.2
4 35 15.6 81.8 Mean 3.09
5 29 12.9 94.7 Median 3.00
6 4 1.8 96.4 Mode 2
7/all the time 8 3.6 100.0 Std. Dev. 1.4
Total 225 100.0 100.0
Table 3.1: Statistics regarding the extent to which questionnaire respondents find it 
difficult to get a mental picture of the physical processes involved in their research.
60 An attempt was made to pursue this issue in follow-up e-mail exchanges with some of the physicists who 
associated themselves with Astrophysics, but no replies were received. The e-mail addresses may have 
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7-point semantic differential scale which ranges from "1/never" to "7/all the time"
Figure3.4: Chart showing quantitative data on the degree to which respondents say they have difficulty getting a mental picture of the physical processes 
involved in their research.
97
Chapter 3
Question 2 of the on-line questionnaire was followed by question 2b which asked: “ Why 
do you think this is? As discussed in chapter 2, the qualitative responses were re-coded to 
give an indication of the frequency of occurrence of certain common factors. Each 
respondent’s research background and research interests were taken into account when 
interpreting the qualitative responses. Thus, for example, an attempt was made to 
distinguish respondents who regularly dealt with quantum physics from those who tended 
to employ classical or semi-classical physics. A summary of the re-coded qualitative data 
is presented below. The numbers are approximate and do not add up to 225 as comments 
sometimes overlapped between categories.
3.2.1 Reasons given by respondents for having difficulties
Approximately 47 respondents said their difficulties were due to the abstract or complex 
or theoretical nature of their subject. 28 said their difficulties were due to the numbers of 
dimensions or the complex symmetries involved. 23 said they had difficulties because they 
worked with quantum concepts for which visualization was extremely difficult. For 
example, Phys_160 (a 52 year old Reader in Theoretical Physics) said his difficulties arose 
“Because the basic entities with which quantum theory (and to a lesser extent relativity) 
deal are not directly observable, and behave in ways for which everyday experience 
provides no reliable analogy.” 22 respondents said that they had difficulties because they 
had to deal with areas outside their expertise (e.g. because their work was multi­
disciplinary or because they had recently moved to a new area of research, e.g. 
biophysics); 18 said the had difficulties because their research was difficult to relate to 
everyday concepts (these were distinct from those that mentioned quantum physics 
specifically); 14 said their difficulties arose from the number of interacting processes and 
their counter-intuitiveness; 11 didn’t know what accounted for their difficulties; and 4 
simply said physics is supposed to be difficult.
3.2.2 Reasons given by respondents for not having difficulties
The comments of 33 respondents suggested that they did not have difficulties because they 
have good innate abilities (mathematical, visuo-spatial, etc). For example, Phys_121 (a 59 
year old Prof. o f Physics) indicated that he very rarely has difficulty, adding: “Both my 
parents were artists - I'm a very 'visual' person. I've had plenty o f practice thinking in 
pictures and in three dimensions.” 15 respondents said their subject was easy to visualize. 
For example Phys_77 (a 33 year old PDRA) indicated that he very rarely has difficulty,
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adding: “Optics is quite understandable in terms of getting a mental picture.” 7 respondents 
said it comes with practise and specific training. For example, Phys_ 119 (a 48 year old 
university lecturer) indicated that she “never” has difficulty on account of: “Long practice, 
starting as a small child (age 8?). Most difficult was electricity — solved by using 
mechanical analogies.”
Many respondents who seldom found it difficult to get a mental picture of the 
various kinds of physical processes involved in their research, would not or could not 
explain why this was the case. This is not particularly surprising: if  they had no 
visualization difficulties they would not have spent much time thinking about issues 
surrounding visualization. 6% of the sample (i.e. 13 respondents), offered “don't 
know/blank” replies, of which: 5 respondents selected 1: [on the 7-point scale], 4 
respondents selected 2; and 3 respondents selected 3. This resulted in a mean value of 1.8.
Having analysed all the qualitative and quantitative data from the on-line 
questionnaire, I have identified four broad factors accounting for the varying degrees of 
visualization difficulties experienced by respondents. These are subject matter, innate 
abilities, training, and experience. This is summarised in table 3.2 below.
FACTORS
Visualization Difficulties 
lessened by the following factors:
Visualization Difficulties 
compounded by the following factors:
Subject
matter
- easy to visualise;
- on a human scale;
- 3 dimensions at most;
- easy to identify and isolate interactions;
- deal with a well-developed area.
- abstract nature, complex symmetry;
- on microscopic/gigantic scales;
- between 3 and 10 dimensions;
- lots of interacting processes;
- new unexplored area.
Innate
abilities
- Have good mathematical, visio-spatial, 
technical, verbal, social abilities
- Have poor (or under-developed) 
mathematical, visio-spatial, technical, 
verbal, social abilities
Training
- Previously learned methods can be 
applied to problem (e.g. Feynman 
diagrams);
- Previous learned methods cannot be 
applied to problem.
Experience
- Is an expert at particular area of focus,
- Easy to relate to everyday experience, 
and can often proceed intuitively.
- Is a novice at particular area of focus,
- Difficult to relate to everyday 
experience, and often counterintuitive.
Table 3.2: Summary of factors which account for respondents visualization difficulties
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3.3 Techniques Used To Overcome Visualization Difficulties.
In his book “Doing Physics - How Physicists Take Hold Of The World”, Martin Kreiger 
tells us that A Physicist’s Toolkit consists o f three main types of tools: mathematical, 
diagrammatic, and rhetorical. These are subdivided by Krieger as follows:
1. “Mathematical Tools
a. counting and approximation: statistics and combinatorics.
b. pattern: geometry, symmetry, conservation laws.
c. linearity: calculus and optimisation procedures
2. Diagrammatic Tools
a. geometric and spatial: vectors and graphs.
b. patterned algebraic expressions.
3. Rhetorical Tools
a. media: spacetime vacuum, crystal, hydrogen atom, gas.
b. objects: particles, oscillators, fields, waves.
c. interactions: collisions, Lagrangians, response functions.
d. strategies of address: find a good vacuum, or ground state, or equilibrium; 
group objects into families; find nicely separable parts; divide the labour 
among specialists.
e. Commonplaces or qualitative methods, such as using a classical picture 
supplemented by quantum rules.” (Krieger, 1992, p.l 16)
Krieger’s categorisation is misleading if  interpreted rigidly. Mathematical tools and 
diagrammatic tools are not mutually exclusive and might be better classified as “visuo- 
mathematical”. For example, James Clerk Maxwell regarded Michael Faraday as “a 
mathematician of a very high order” (Maxwell, 1890b) because Faraday employed “visuo- 
mathematical” techniques. I believe that Krieger’s system of classification would also 
benefit from highlighting physicists’ use of constructive modelling tools. Nersessian’s 
(1995) findings from her cognitive-historical studies (of Maxwell in particular) suggest 
that constructive modelling, which she defines as: “a dynamic reasoning process involving 
analogical and visual modelling and mental simulation to create models o f the target 
problem,” is “highly productive o f solving problems and widely employed by experts in 
physics.” (Nersessian, 1995, p.207 & 222).
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Question 2c of the on-line questionnaire asked: “Where you do have difficulty [getting a 
mental picture o f  the various kinds o f  physical processes involved in your research] how 
do you overcome this?” Questionnaire data reveal a spectrum of visualization techniques 
from across the physics community, although individual physicists tended to mention using 
only one or two techniques.61 Examples provided by respondents included (re-coded and 
presented here in order of prevalence): the use of models/simplification/limiting case 
analysis; drawing/sketching ephemeral ideas; looking for analogies elsewhere in science; 
using computers as visualization tools; constructing mental pictures of mathematical 
structures (as opposed to visualizing the physical entities to which they supposedly refer) 
i.e. seeking visualizability rather than visualization; doing some background reading or 
asking a colleague/expert; trying to explain it to someone else; thinking about something 
completely different/having a change of scenery; achieving an altered state of 
consciousness through sleep deprivation or smoking cannabis; etc.
As with visualization difficulties, visualization techniques employed by an individual 
often depended on their innate abilities, training, resources and environment. Many 
physicists said that they work through their visualization difficulties by discussing it with 
colleagues or supervisors because the challenge of communicating their ideas verbally, 
symbolically, graphically, or mathematically often enabled them to look at the problem 
from a new perspective, thus producing fresh insights. This is in line with the views of 
physicists David Bohm and David F. Peat who tell us that:
“ ... communication is as essential for the creative act as is perception through the 
mind. Indeed, within this context, perception and communication are inseparably 
related, so that creation arises as much in the flow o f  ideas between people as in the 
understanding o f the individual alone.” (Bohm & Peat, 1987, p.63)
There is also considerable evidence from recent studies in the field of cognitive 
psychology to suggest that peer collaboration is important to problem solving and that 
verbalising one’s thoughts enhances one’s problem solving abilities (cf. Chi, 1996). This 
notion can in fact be traced back to the educational psychologist Lev Vygotsky’s research 
on the importance of ‘private speech’ on cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1934). 
Vygotsky held that “private speech” enables children (and to a certain extent adults) to 
consciously direct their thought processes.62
61 60% of respondents mentioned using one visualization technique, 24% of respondents mentioned using 
two visualization techniques.
62 As Norman has commented: “People operate as a type of distributed intelligence, where much of our 
intelligent behaviour results from the interaction of mental processes with the objects and constraints of the 




Many questionnaire respondents said they overcome their visualization difficulties in 
private, by reading journal articles or allowing their mind to process the information ‘off­
line’ by having a change of scenery e.g. taking a walk outdoors, etc. After studying the 
infamous insights of Archimedes, Poincare et al., Rene Taton wrote in 1962 that “the study 
of various types of invention and discovery has shown us that after a long effort of 
reflection and research a discovery will suddenly flash into the mind o f the research worker 
by means of a sudden illumination, the so-called Geistesblizt.’ (Taton, 1962, p.74). Taton 
wrote that,
“this flash of thought... does not generally appear during periods of assiduous work, 
but rather during those of rest or relaxation... Maturing slowly as a result of previous 
effort and the work of the subconscious, a discovery till suddenly appear at such times 
as the investigator’s mind did not seem to be dealing with it.” (ibid. p.28-29)
There are many reasons why a physicist may work through their visualization difficulties 
on their own rather than seeking help from others. For example they may have little access 
to expert opinion, particularly if they themselves are at the forefront of the research. 
Alternatively, working alone may be a personality trait. As detailed by Feist & Gorman 
(1998, p.26-27), there is some evidence to suggest that a scientist’s personality influences 
theory creation, acceptance, and orientation, although no clear-cut causal relationship has 
been shown to exist between personality and scientific behaviour.
The availability of practical resources is also a key factor. For example, if 
physicists have equipment or computer software at their disposal, they can attempt to 
confirm a theory through carrying out an experiment in the laboratory or through 
numerical modelling. With regard to innate abilities and training, physicists who have 
good visuo-spatial abilities and are mathematically inclined, often construct mental 
pictures of mathematical structures, rather than visualising the physical entities to which 
these structures supposedly refer; while physicists who are not mathematically inclined 
often take a mechanistic approach, using visual analogies as scaffolding around which to 
build their understanding.
Approximately 30 respondents mentioned using sketches to overcome their 
difficulties o f getting a mental picture o f the physical processes involved in their research. 
There appear to be parallels between my findings on the visualisation techniques used by 
physicists, and Suwa, Gero, and Purcell’s (1999) findings on the techniques used by 
designers. Suwa et al (1999) tell us that:
63 e.g. Phys_225, an undergraduate physicist from Zimbabwe remarked: “The University with which i am 
doing my degree is underprivileged and the availability of resources is not always at our disposal.”
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“Design sketches serve as a medium through which a designer makes visual/spatial 
reasoning; a designer externalises newly formed but still vague ideas in the form of 
less rigid and ambiguous depictions on paper. By inspecting those externalised ideas, 
the designer finds useful clues to refine them, which motivates him or her to draw 
again.” (Suwa, Gero, & Purcell, 1999 web ref.)
3.4 Achieving conceptual fluency:
According to Descartes, conceiving and imagining are quite distinct. What we cannot 
imagine we might well conceive. Descartes’ famous example was the chiliagon, a regular 
1000-sided figure, indistinguishable in imagination from a regular 999-dised figure. 
According to Dennett:
“Conceiving of something complex -  whether an abstract mathematical structure, a 
complicated physical process, or a system of rules or moves like chess or a grammar -  
is a matter of learning your way round in a ‘space’ you must construct in your mind.
Only by actively exploring such spaces can we become familiar with them to the point 
of conceptual fluency, which is the point at which the Cartesian illusion is engendered 
of an act of direct conception. Getting to that level of fluency can be very difficult.” 
(Dennett, 1990, p299)
As I mentioned in chapter 1, Einstein was a visual and kinaesthetic thinker. Was Einstein’s 
inability to achieve a sufficiently high level of ‘conceptual fluency’ in certain areas of 
physics a contributing factor in his inability to formulate a unified field theory? As Miller 
(1984, p.246) puts it:
“Could it have been that Einstein never achieved his lifelong goal of the highest level 
in his hierarchy -  the unified field theory -  because of limitations on his mode of 
visual thinking? Such a highly-placed theory would be impoverished in concepts 
because its concepts would be at best indirectly connected with objects from the world 
of perceptions. Perhaps this was the reason why there were no more thought 
experiments like the ones of 1895 and 1907.”
This issue o f seeking ‘visualisability’ rather than ‘visualisation’ is highlighted by two 
questionnaire respondents in particular. The first respondent, Phys_160, (a 52 year old, 
male reader in theoretical physics) finds it quite difficult to get a mental picture of the 
physical processes involved in his research: “Because the basic entities with which 
quantum theory (and to a lesser extent relativity) deal are not directly observable, and 
behave in ways for which everyday experience provides no reliable analogy.” He said he 
overcomes these difficulties: “ 1) By learning to manipulate mathematical symbols without 
visualization 2) By constructing mental pictures o f mathematical structures, which is not
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the same thing as visualizing the physical entities to which they supposedly refer.” The 
second respondent, Phys_214, (a 24 year old, male PhD student) also finds it quite difficult 
to get a mental picture of the physical processes involved in his research, because he deals 
with “quantum phenomena that do not always have classical counterparts.” To overcome 
these difficulties he says he must: “Raise concepts to a higher level o f abstraction so that I 
visualise the form of the theory rather than the form of the objects involved.” Thus, my 
questionnaire data suggests that in certain areas o f quantum physics, the ability to abandon 
an attachment to concepts drawn from the world o f perceptions may be necessary for 
scientific progress. In sections 3.5 & 3.6 I present data from my on-line questionnaire and 
my interview with Prof. Berry concerning the way in which different modes of thought 
predominate with different individuals.
3.5 Different modes of thought predominate with different individuals.
The influential 20th century philosopher-psychologist-physiologist William James, who 
coined the term, “stream of consciousness,” believed it was possible for different modes of 
thought to predominate with different individuals: “With one, visual images predominate, 
with others, tactile.” (James, 1971, pp. 68, 69). However, many fine-gained historical case 
studies of renowned scientists suggest that they employed hybridised forms o f scientific 
reasoning, often combining what might be referred to as pictorial, visual, diagrammatic, 
graphical, symbolic or mathematical forms of reasoning, depending on the context and 
objectives. For example, Matt Ridley (author of the best selling popular science book, 
Genome, 1999) marvels at Francis Crick’s ability to think in three modes o f thought at 
once. In a recent article, Ridley writes: “I have never met a mind like his. He could think in 
three ways at once: in words, in algebra and in visual images. It was the sheer power of his 
imagination that dominated molecular biology in the 1950s and 1960s and neuroscience in 
the 1980s.” (Ridley, 2004, web ref.).
Several respondents remarked upon a dichotomy in modes of thought exhibited by 
physicists within and across sub-branches of physics. For example, Phys_54 (a 40 year old 
lecturer in theoretical physics) remarked that he had:
“noticed a big difference among mathematical physicists who deal with geometry and 
who ‘think in pictures’ (like myself), and those who deal with algebra (relevant for a 
lot of quantum field theory) and who just think in terms of various sets of algebraic 
relations as being the most fundamental thing. One gets interesting differences 
between people in terms of the sort of mathematics they like to work with.”
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This anecdotal evidence is supported by the findings of cognitive psychologists. Klahr and 
Dunbar’s (1988) Big Track experiments identified two distinct cognitive styles among their 
participants: theorists who spent more time searching hypothesis space, and experimenters 
who spent more time in an experiment space. Klahr tells us that:
“Differences in preference between experiment-driven and theory-driven strategies 
have been noticed in other laboratory studies (Okada, 1994; Okada and Simon, 1995). 
Studies based on historical approaches can be interpreted in terms of the balance 
between hypothesis space search and experiment-space search. For example in most 
histories of Faraday’s discovery of induction of electricity by magnets, much emphasis 
has been placed on the influence of Ampere’s theory of magnetism on Faraday’s 
thought, but a strong case can be made (Gooding, 1990) that Faraday’s primary search 
strategy was to focus on experiment-space search, yielding a discovery path that was 
driven largely by phenomena rather than theory. (See Klahr and Simon, 1999, for 
further comparisons between laboratory and historical studies of the discovery 
process).” (Klahr, 2000, p.206)
Many respondents held the view that their reliance on “physical insight and analogies” 
probably stemmed from them being “weaker mathematician[s].” O f course, this places 
them in good company - Einstein also relied on physical insight gained through employing 
thought experiments and analogies and was not a mathematician of high calibre. In fact it 
is said that Einstein often ordered his mathematics delivered from his friend Marcel 
Grossman (cf. Miller, 2000, p.213).
Phys_57 (a 37 year old, senior lecturer in coastal engineering) said in the additional 
comments section o f the questionnaire that he would be: “interested to find out if  those 
who consider themselves stronger in mathematical/theoretical development need to use 
visualisation or analogies at all. I suspect that as a weaker mathematician I need to rely on 
‘physical insight’ and analogies more than others. Certainly I find it difficult to develop 
theory if  I cannot first visualise the processes.” This reliance on physical insight and 
analogies was also shared by my case study respondent who (like Phys_57) also 
considered himself to be a weaker mathematician. (This is discussed in chapters 7 and 8).
Phys_50 (a 50 year old, professor o f experimental physics) said he “never” finds it 
difficult to get a mental picture of the physical processes involved in his research: 
“Because I think with mental images much more than I do with language or with 
mathematics.” He went on to say that he has been: “engaged in controversy with 
philosophers, who in my view mistakenly think that language is important or essential in 
thinking and in science. E.g. ‘logical positivism is the position that science consists of 
* statements* th a t. . . ’ [end quotation]”. As Nersessian points out:
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“What is wrong with the positivist formulations from the perspective of learning is 
that even if the precise formulation of a theory were linguistic/formulaic in format, 
this does not imply that the kinds of representations humans employ in thinking with 
the theory are primarily of this format or that reasoning during problem solving is 
solely carrying out logical operations on linguistic/formulaic objects.” (Nersessian,
1995, p.222)
Richard Feynman provides a nice anecdote to illustrate the fact that thoughts can be 
visual as well as verbal. He recounts (Feynman, 1988, p.54) how:
“One time, we were discussing something -  we must have been eleven or twelve at the 
time -  and I said, “But thinking is nothing but talking to yourself.”
“Oh yeah?” Bennie said. “Do you know the crazy shape of the crankshaft in a car?”
“Yeah, what of it?”
“Good. Now tell me: how did you describe it when you were talking to yourself?”
So I learned from Bennie that thoughts can be visual as well as verbal.”
Considerable uncertainty remains regarding the nature and form of scientific thinking (e.g. 
Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002, suggest that visual imagery can actually impede 
reasoning). Both the language-based, syntactical view 64 of scientific theories, and the 
model-based, semantic view of scientific theories65 have merit. Progress in this research 
area is hampered by the complexity of the issue: there are difficulties operationalising 
terms, distinguishing what it means to represent, resemble, image, visualise, etc. as well as 
difficulties interpreting the psychological and neurological data on language processing, 
cognitive architectures, perception, vision, etc. Thinking is usually categorised according 
to coarse divisions such as: words or images; verbal or mathematical descriptions; iconic 
(i.e. pictures, diagrams and metaphors) or symbolic (i.e. mathematical) representations, etc. 
However, a pictorial/ mathematical or pictorial/algebraic classification is too coarse to 
handle the concept of a graphical language, which combines aspects of both. For example, 
Phys_198, (a 32 year old, male, lecturer in physics, whose research interests include the 
study o f matter antimatter asymmetries in the Universe (CP violation) through accelerator 
based experiments) claimed to “never” find it difficult to get a mental picture of the 
physical processes involved in his research, because: “High Energy physics has developed
64 As Morgan & Morrison (1999, p. 1) explain, in the syntactic view, “the theory itself was explicated in 
terms of its logical form with the meanings or semantics given by an additional set of definitions, the 
correspondence rules. That is to say, although the theory consisted of a set of sentences expressed in a 
particular language, the axioms syntactically describable. Hence, without correspondence rules, one could 
think of the theory itself as uninterpreted.”
65For discussions on the semantic view see: Johnson-Laird, 1983; Gentner, 1983; Nersesian, 1999; Campbell, 
1920; Braithwaite 1953, 1954; Black, 1962; Hesse, 1966, 1970; Harre, R., 1960, 1982, 1988, 1990; Kuhn, 
1970; Morgan & Morrison, 1999; Hartman, 1999; Hughes, 1999; Winsberg, 1999; Cartright, 1983 (pp.133- 
134), 1999; Cartright, Suarez and Shomar, 1995; Pickering, 1989; Gooding, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1992; Giere, 
1998, Suppes, 1961, 1967; Suppe, 1977; vanFraassen, 1980.
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a very powerful graphics language that ties in with the math. This helps to create the 
mental picture.” Rather than attempting to classify a graphic language according to a 
pictorial/mathematical system of classification, could one adapt Goodman’s (1976) system 
of classification (discussed in section 1.17) such that a graphical language is regarded as a 
notational system that is dense but attenuated7 66
Although it is notoriously difficult to operationalise terms and categorise thinking, 
it is widely accepted that individuals have preferred modes of thought. As we saw in 
chapter 2 and previously in this chapter, for many physicists, there is a sharp divide 
between theoreticians and experimentalists. For example, Phys_198 remarked that 
visualization difficulties he occasionally experiences are due mainly to the fact that: 
“Theoreticians generally don't present their work in a suitably ‘visual’ sense. It can be hard 
to visualise equations into their physical meaning without adequate diagrams etc.” This 
prompted several questions to my mind: Could all o f physics benefit from theoreticians 
presenting their work in a more visual sense? Or is that simply not practical because many 
researchers are skilled at constructing mental pictures of mathematical structures and 
prefer this approach? Are computer visualisations the best alternative visual aid? Bearing 
in mind that computer simulations fall short when trying to imagine new laws, because one 
needs the laws to put into the computer in order to run simulations. Should more of an 
effort be made to teach physics, mathematics and engineering students to ‘see’? Could 
computers be successfully employed in this educational endeavour? Barbara White’s 
ThinkerTools research group, which develops computer bases learning environments 
would seem to suggest so. (cf. White, 1993; White, Shimoda, & Frederiksen, 1999). I 
pursued these questions in my follow-up e-mail exchanges with a select sample of 
physicists and also in my semi-structured interview with Prof. Berry. This is discussed in 
section 3.6 below.
3.6 Presenting Research to Physicists Possessing Different Modes of 
Thought
In Prof. Berry’s view, having both pictorial/diagrammatic and analytical/algebraic modes 
o f thought was “very useful.” In our semi-structured interview, I asked if he thought it was 
“an area that might need developing, in that not all theoretical physicists operate on both 
levels.” Prof. Berry was pensive for a moment on this question. He then said: “Well, I find
661 considered applying Goodman’s system of classification to my examples of analogy (discussed in chapter 
2). However, I found that my data was not very well suited to this system and that it was more revealing to 




it advantageous to have both and I think it’s a strength. But as I said, people I respect, who 
have made enormous contributions, don’t think visually -  so it hasn’t affected them.” I 
continued to press the issue, asking: “From the point of view of interdisciplinary work. If 
you have people writing in a journal and other people reading it, and obviously if you think 
in a different way, it’s more difficult to Prof. Berry interrupted, saying: “Yes, but then 
you put both. I mean I do. My scientific papers are full o f equations and pictures.” This 
may be part of Prof. Berry’s success. As he utilises both modes of thought himself, he 
presents his work both algebraically and pictorially. As a result, it is likely that Prof. 
Berry’s papers are understood by a larger population of theoretical physicists than if he 
presented his work in just one mode of thought.
Similarly, in chapters 7 & 8 we see that Dr. Lawson used pictorial and algebraic 
modes of thought in his scientific papers and conference talks in order to bridge conceptual 
and ‘linguistic’ divides between experts coming from sub-disciplines related to particle 
physics. In Dr. Lawson’s case, physical and pictorial analogies were presented alongside 
abstract mathematical equations. I also raised this issue in follow-up email exchanges with 
some physicists who had provided interesting comments to related issues when responding 
to the on-line questionnaire. I asked:
“/«  your opinion, could all ofphysics benefit from theoreticians presenting their work 
in a more visualisable form? 67Or is that simply not practical because many theorists 
are skilled at ‘constructing mental pictures o f mathematical structures ’ and prefer this 
approach? ”
Phys_57 certainly thought physics could benefit from theoreticians presenting their work 
in a suitable visual sense: it was vital for him to have a mental or physical visualization in 
order to understand the theory. As he put it in his follow-up reply:
“Yes: I have great difficulty understanding any physics/ physical process unless I can 
interpret that process mentally. For me, mental or physical visualization is essential to 
my being able to interpret theory and investigate the implications of that theory.” 
(Phys_57b)
Phys_54 said that one must be tolerant of different approaches because what works in one 
area o f physics might not work in another. However he felt that physicists who normally 
work entirely with mathematical structures should learn to relate the arcane mathematics to 
observable quantities in the real world for the benefit o f everyone. In his words:
“It is a question of who they are presenting their work to. Certainly if it is to the 
general public, or even to graduate students, then visual presentations help, even if it is
67 [With hindsight, ‘visual sense’ would have been better than ‘visualisable’ because, as mentioned 
previously, there is a subtle philosophical distinction between ‘visualization’ and ‘visualizability’.]
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at the level o f  ‘constructing mental pictures o f  mathematical structures’. The problem 
nowadays is over-specialization. There are many people who work on arcane areas, 
where they do just work with mathematical structures, without having to worry about 
physical applications. I believe all these approaches have their uses and importance, 
and what works in one part o f  theoretical physics won't necessarily work in another 
part; we have to be tolerant o f different approaches, rather thinking that our own 
individual niches hold everything. Just whenever anyone gets to the point where they 
have to relate the mathematics to something which one considers to be an observable 
quantity in the real world, then it helps to have simple visual models, since we are 
supposed to be talking about the real world after all. That's a skill people should 
learn.” (Phys_54b)
This emphasis on being tolerant of different approaches echoed Prof. Berry’s views. 
Having both modes can be advantageous for oneself and for others who value reading 
papers containing both modes of thought, but many acclaimed individuals have made great 
advances using non-visual and non-physical modes of thought when conceptualising and 
communicating their work.
Phys_160, (a 52 year old, male, Reader in Theoretical Physics) urged caution in his reply 
to my follow-up queries, saying:
I think that asking theoreticians to present their work in a visual form would be both 
impractical and dangerous, but perhaps not for the reason you suggest. Here are some points 
that occur to me:
a) I am by no means as skilled at constructing these mental pictures as I would like to be. 
To the extent that I can do it, I find that the pictures build themselves while I am poring over 
equations and trying to grasp what they mean. It would be nice to have a conscious strategy 
for accelerating this process, but I don't think I could formulate one.
b) These mental pictures are mainly very personal. It would be hard to explain to someone 
else what the picture I have looks like, and I doubt whether they would find it helpful i f  I did.
c) They are also quite vague. Occasionally, I try to help m yself by drawing them on paper, 
and I usually don't recognise the result once I have done it.
d) They are also incomplete. They help me to preserve a sense o f  how various ideas fit 
together, but they don't always give a detailed representation o f  what those ideas actually are. 
Often, they are a sort o f  mnemonic -  like the knot in a handkerchief, which jogs the 
memory, but doesn't tell you explicitly what you were supposed to remember. This is the 
dangerous part. Even if  I could explain to someone else what my picture looks like, and
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what it means to me, the other person might be seriously misled by not seeing where my 
picture fails.
e) It is notoriously difficult to get theoretical physicists to agree even on such relatively 
straightforward matters as notation and sign conventions. It would surely be much more 
difficult to get them to agree on any standard ways o f  visualizing - and one would need 
common standards if  this were to be o f  any practical use. The way o f  expressing a given idea 
that seems most transparent to one person does not necessarily seem so to another. I am 
inclined to think that this reflects not only the ways in which different individuals think, but 
also the routes by which different individuals have arrived at their understandings o f  the 
same idea. (Phys_160b)
Phys_160’s comments in (d) resonate with the use of analogies in science: Analogies are 
incomplete associations; they can be extremely useful as heuristic devices when solving 
problems via constructive modelling; creative misunderstanding in the use of analogy can 
prove productive and enlightening, however other forms of misunderstandings, like over- 
extending the analogy or confusing the map with the territory, can be dangerous.
In follow-up exchanges with a selection of questionnaire respondents I also asked:
“Are computer visualisations the best alternative visual aid? Or could physicists learn 
specific visualization skills (what some respondents have called "tricks") that would 
assist them in their attempts to "visualize equations into their physical meaning"? 
Because as you [ /  one respondent] said, when "trying to imagine NEW laws - 
computer simulations won't work because one needs the Ictws to put into the computer 
to simulate."
Phys_160 makes several interesting points in his reply to these questions. Firstly, he points 
out that we must acknowledge that there are different types o f visualizations. Secondly, 
there exist many visualization tools for dealing with exact representations. Thirdly, the 
type of visualizations implied in my questions are not exact, however, and computer 
simulations of these merely suggest the structure one is trying to understand. Fourthly, that 
the suggestiveness o f these images cannot be predicted or controlled by the image creator, 
because physicists will interpret them according to their previous training, their own 
research focus, perhaps even associating the mathematical creations with geographical 
features o f their surrounding landscape. In Phys_160’s words:
“I would think that this depends very much on what it is that one is trying to visualize.
O f course, we do have various means o f visualizing certain things: graphs, 
histograms, Venn diagrams, Feynman diagrams, ...Sometimes, computer graphics can 
extend the power o f  what we can already do on paper, for example by making 3-d
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images freely rotatable or by animation. I think that visual aids or mental tricks work 
well when it is possible to give rules which say precisely what each element o f  an 
image represents. This means that the image is an exact representation o f  some 
mathematical idea (or one that could in principle be exact - for example, one can get a 
good enough idea o f  what sin(x) means from a rough sketch o f  the curve, without 
plotting all the points to 10 figure accuracy, but this works only because we know in 
principle how the rough sketch might be transformed into a precise graph.). However, 
the visualizations that I think you are more interested in are not exact, even in 
principle. They can at best only be suggestive o f  the structure one is trying to 
understand. Then one has the problem that a given image will suggest different things 
to different individuals, depending on many factors that the image creator cannot 
control. For example, it happens that various mathematical ideas are linked in my 
mind with geographical features o f  the town in which I grew up (which happens to be 
close to your university). Probably, this is for no better reason than that I happened to 
remember some event in the past at the time I was working on some particular 
problem. These serendipitous associations are not the mental pictures we are mainly 
talking about, but they illustrate the personal nature o f  imagery as a whole.” 
(Phys_160b)
The concluding remarks of Phys_160 touch on the “distributive cognition 
perspective” which “contends that the environment provides a rich structure that 
supports problem solving.” (Nersessian, 2005, pp.27-28)
Phys_57 believed that the models underlying these computer-generated 
visualizations are useful at providing falsifiable outcomes or in helping users to identify 
patterns amid complex calculations. However, computer-generated visualizations still fall 
short when one is trying to imagine non-visualizable entities like higher dimensionality. As 
Phys_57 remarked:
“N o & Yes. I agree with the above phys 115 that models often represent a sometimes 
correct but irrelevant view o f  our world...(ie wrong assumptions, but valid 
calculations) but they are useful for providing ‘testable’ (falsifiable) outcomes or 
presenting complex calculations in which patterns are evident. However, sometimes it 
is just possible to imagine concepts such as higher dimensionality that cannot be 
represented even by a 3D im age.. .In any case some sort o f  visualisation would always 
be useful to me.” (Phys_57b)
In response to the same question Phys_54 said:
No; while computer visualisations are fine for extending existing physics to new  
regimes, they are not necessarily the best visual aid when you are trying to develop 
something which requires a new identification o f the relationship between observed 
quantities and mathematical symbols.” (Phys_54b)
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Phys_54’s research often involves revolutionary new ideas in cosmology, general 
relativity and quantum gravity, where computer visualizations are not always useful. So 
what methods does Phys_54 use when trying to imagine new laws? Following in the 
footsteps of Albert Einstein, he often uses thought experiments.
3.7 The Value of Thought Experiments
Phys_54 said that he finds thought experiments very useful when talking about conditions 
that are impossible to reproduce in the laboratory. He explains:
“In trying to do something really new, I go for that old method o f  Einstein, the 
Gedankenexperiment. I try to picture something visually in terms o f  things I believe 
correspond to measurements, and then think my way through it. As it happens, you have 
caught me at just the time when I am trying to write down a new model cosmology which if  
correct would change a fundamental paradigm: get rid o f  dark energy as an explanation for 
‘cosmic acceleration’ and replace it by a complicated hierarchical fractal geometry, as 
allowed by Einstein's equations.... While the idea that one can explain cosmological 
parameters by inhomogeneous geometry is something that dozens o f  other people have 
pursued, they have been concentrating on mathematical techniques and theorems. I am trying 
to do things quite differently, going very much outside the box as far as the perturbative 
mathematical techniques are concerned, by thinking carefully about what it is that is actually 
measured and giving a solution which identifies various cosmic clocks in a different way to 
convention, but consistently with general relativity. The important section o f  the paper I am 
now writing begins with a Gedanken experiment. I...w ould be happy to send you a copy.” 
(Phys_54b)
Phys_54’s reference to changing a fundamental paradigm ties in with Kuhn’s (1981)
views on thought experiments: essential analytic tools deployed during crisis, enabling
the scientist to use pre-existing knowledge to bring about a conceptual change or
“paradigm shift”. (See also Sorensen, 1992; Brown,1991). Phys_54 uses thought
experiments as conceptual tools of exploration in his private conceptualisations and also
when presenting his ideas to his peers in formal contexts. Phys_54 introduces his
Gedankenexperiment in section 2.1 of his scientific paper in the following way:
“To introduce a conceptual framework and appropriate terminology to deal with the
possibility that we might live inside a density perturbation, let us conduct a simple
Gedankenexperiment. Take an initial spatial hypersurface corresponding to the end o f the
inflationary epoch. Onto this hypersurface randomly scatter small spheres o f  all proper sizes,
allowing spheres to fall inside other spheres, from some smallest scale, up to some largest
scale p. By this means larger spheres will naturally contain all smaller spheres, according to
a distribution which could in principle be calculated. The fact that there exists a largest scale,
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P, o f  perturbations is simply due to the fact that inflation ends, so there must be a cu t-o ff to 
the spectrum o f perturbations at some upper bound..
Phys_54 had not yet finished his paper in 2005. Proving his theory to the satisfaction of his 
peers involved, “recalculating all the standard things about the early radiation dominated 
epoch, before the universe was a few hundred thousand years old. It takes a while!” 
(Phys_54d) In a subsequent e-mail I then asked Phys_54:
“In your experience how common are Gedankenexperiments in the journal papers in 
your area? Is there a tendency for them to appear in certain journals in particular? An 
eminent British physicist I spoke to last year said that he tends to avoid Physical 
Review Letters because they censor his creative use o f  language, even though his 
'creative' terms have been widely adopted by his peers. I was just wondering if  you've 
come across anything similar in your area.”
I was referring to Prof. Berry’s experiences with Physical Review Letters censorship of 
two terms he coined “diabolical point” and “quantum chaology” (discussed in section 5.8). 
Phys_54 said:
“ ...thought experiments are a useful construct in exploring the limits o f  our 
conceptual understanding. I wouldn't say that thought experiments are more likely to 
be in certain journals than others, but that they are more likely in areas o f  fundamental 
physics for the reasons above, and any journal selection effect is a consequence o f  
that. It is true that Physical Review do not like people coining new terms, and they do 
not like jokes, but otherwise it is just as likely to find them there as anywhere else.” 
(Phys_54e) 68
Phys_54 provided me with some examples of thought experiments used by his peers. 
These are summarised in appendix 3, section A3.2. Phys_54 concluded his e-mail by 
saying that: “Basically thought experiments are a way o f taking physical principles and 
understanding to situations beyond our usual experience, and in the cases above to realms 
where there is no way that we know of conducting the experiments in reality, at least in the 
foreseeable future.” (Phys_54e) Thus, the type of thought experiment performed by 
Phys_54 would be classified as “truly imagined” in Gilbert & Reiner’s (2000) theoretical 
framework, i.e. a construct of the imagination only and thus impossible to conduct in a lab. 
As distinct from “merely imagined” TE’s, i.e. an experiment which could have been 
carried out in a lab, but for some reason or other was not.
68 P hys_54  added: “Phys. Rev. Letters is a hard one as they restrict you  to four pages; it's not easy to get a 
thought experim ent over in such a lim ited length. In fact, anything radically n ew  is very difficu lt to get across 
in 4  pages; I sent gr-qc/0503099 to Phys. R ev. Lett, originally but they rejected it as the referees didn't 
understand w hat I am trying to do. That's w hy I'm going for a very long paper n ow .” (P hys_54e).
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3.7.1 Quantitative data on the degree to which questionnaire respondents 
visualise different kinds of experiments.
In the early stages of my research, I did actually intend to investigate the extent to 
which physicists employ thought experiments in their work. However, the pilot 
questionnaire showed that many physicists were put off by the questions regarding 
their use of ‘thought experiments’ in their work. Many physicists felt that the term 
‘thought experiment’ sounded either too profound or too much like armchair 
philosophy to be identified with what they did in their work. Thus, the Thought 
Experiments section was removed, and four (tick box) questions on “visualising 
experiments” were added to the Visualization section of the questionnaire, using 
Gilbert & Reiner’s (2000) theoretical framework as a guide. Question 2d read:
“Q2d. How often do you visualise experiments which are:
(i) then physically performed;
(ii) too expensive or technically difficult to physically perform;
(Hi) physically performable, but doing so would offer no further insight
(iv) impossible to physically perform .
The quantitative data relating to these questions is plotted in figures A3.1 to A3.4 in 
Appendix 3, section A3.3. As shown in table 3.2 on the next page, there was a large 
number o f missing responses and large standard deviations. This indicates that there 
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are impossible to 
physically perform
N  Valid 214.0 212.0 206.0 212.0
N  Missing 11.0 13.0 19.0 13.0
Mean 4.1 3.8 2.7 3.2
Median 4.0 4.0 2.0 2.0
Mode 4.0 5.0 1.0 2.0
Std. Deviation 2.0 1.9 1.6 2.1
Table 3.3 Statistics from Q2d on the extent to which respondents’ visualise experiments.
As there was no qualitative question to follow it up, and the remaining questions generated 
an extremely large amount of qualitative and quantitative data, I chose not to explore 
thought experiments as a central research question. However, the issue subsequently arose 
in my e-mail conversations with Phys_54, concerning visualization techniques. Thus, for 
the purpose of thoroughness and clarity I have included it here.
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Some respondents felt that the questionnaire was tailored towards experimentalists rather 
than theorists and consequently theoretical and computational physicists may be unable to 
respond to the questions concerning the extent to which they visualise experiments.69 For 
example, Phys_177 (a 24 year old, PhD student, whose research interests include, quantum 
communication and information theory) said in the additional comments section, that the 
questionnaire: “seems a bit directed toward experimental physics, some theoretical or 
computational physicists may never imagine experiments...you could argue that is not 
physics though i suppose...” It is unclear whether Phys_177 is implying that imagining 
experiments is not ‘physics’, or that computational physics is not ‘physics’. If  the former: 
surely every experiment performed, was first imagined in some considerable detail when 
designing the experimental set-up and procedure. As P.B. Medawar once said (1969, p57): 
“For an experimentalist the most exciting and pleasing act in science is thinking up or 
thinking out an experiment which provides a really searching test of a hypothesis. We 
recognise the intuitive element in such a process when we speak of experimental flair or 
insight, but here too no one word in common speech stands for everything it should 
convey.”
Similarly, Gooding notes that, “Faraday recognised a connection between 
experimenting, representing & theorising,” (Gooding, 1989, p.209) as did other great 
physicists like Richard Feynman and John Bardeen. Thus, Phys_177 was probably 
suggesting that computational physics is not physics. The reality status o f computer 
simulations is discussed in section 4.6.4.
3.8 Learning to See.
As mentioned in section 0.2, Nersessian believes that “we will be more successful at 
training students to think scientifically if  they are taught, explicitly, how to engage in the 
modelling practices of those with expertise in physics.” (Nersessian, 1995, pp204, 205). I 
believe that modelling practices are often founded on the notion of Teaming to see’. 
Mathematician and educator, Walter Whiteley (1992, web ref) highlights the importance of 
teaching students to see like a mathematician and underscores the value o f computer
nr\ #
software packages as educational tools. In Whiteley’s experience:
“New computer tools, play with objects and images, and guided practice can change 
how students ‘see’ both external visuals and images in their mind’s eye. The shift 
from simple images to insight is not a matter of luck it is a matter of learning... There 
are levels of visual performance, of seeing, thinking and communicating, just like
69 my own degree in experimental physics may have influenced my focus in the questionnaire.
70 Examples of software packages for teaching school geometry, mentioned by Whiteley are Cabri 
Geometrie, Geometers SketckPad and Cinderella.
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there are levels o f performance in algebra. These are skills to be understood, shared, 
practiced and valued in the mathematics classroom and in assessment.” (Whiteley,
1992, p3, web ref.).
Whiteley outlines three steps towards teaching students to see like mathematicians:
1. A  first step is an evolving awareness o f  how visuals are or could be used, and an explicit 
encouragement o f their used.
2. A  second step is paying attention to when students don’t see what we see, seeking those 
occasions out and exploring them.
3. A third step is developing and sharing diverse examples, and diverse ways to see individual 
examples, along with tools which let students experience what we are seeing.” (ibid.)
According to Chandrasekran & Narayanan (1992, p.30): “Prior exposure [to diagrams and 
other kinds of images] can lead to perceptual fluency in recognition and classification.” As 
will be discussed in chapter 4, a majority of respondents believed that computer 
simulations “definitely have” helped strengthen physicists’ visualization capabilities both 
in the respondent’s own research area and in physics in general. But aside from the use of 
computer simulations, how do physicists learn to see the unseen? Are the specific 
visualization techniques mentioned in previous sections formally taught to physics 
students? I sought answers to this question in follow-up email exchanges with 
questionnaire respondents who had specifically referred to their education impacting on 
their visualisation abilities.
For example, Phys_27 is a 25 year old, PhD student, whose research interests 
include: “Chemical vapour deposition growth of patterned arrays carbon nanotubes for 
interconnect and sensor applications.” He rarely (i.e. 3/7 on the 7 point scale) finds it 
difficult to get a mental picture of the physical processes involved in his research because, 
as he put it: “Geometry and patterns I find very easy to visualise, too much organic steric 
chemistry as an undergrad.” He said “Difficulties arise when I can’t make analogies from 
my problem to such patterns of things I have a more intuitive knowledge. ‘Let us begind 
[sic] by approximating a cow as a hollow shpere [sic] filled with milk.’” In a follow-up e- 
mail I asked Phys_27:
“You said that only occasionally do you find  it difficult to get a mental picture o f  the 
physical processes involved in your research because you find  'geometry and patterns...very 
easy to visualise’ as a result o f  studying, ' too much organic steric chemistry as an 
undergrad. ’ What visualization tools did you use when you were studying ‘too much organic 
steric chemistry ’? For example, did you use physical models, free-hand sketches, computer 
visualizations, etc. ? I  ask because I  would like to explore whether formal training in specific 




“I have two methods to be very helpful for this kind of problem, first is to use a 
physical model (such as a ball and stick model for molecules) that I can actually touch 
and hold and rotate in my hands. The second is just good old concentration I find 
when I first approach some sort of visualisation task, it helps to sit somewhere quiet 
with my eyes closed, then start to visual the problem as some very simple such as two 
linked points or a simple euclidian shape and build it up from there in simple 
elements, much as you would if you were drawing a model with computer 
software.” (Phys_27b)
In response to Q2 of the questionnaire, Phys_91, a 47 year old, Professor of Astrophysics 
whose research interests include “Astrophysics of stars and their circumstellar 
environments, and observational astronomy” said she very rarely (i.e. 2/7) finds it difficult 
to get a mental picture of the physical processes involve in her research because she has “a 
strong spatial imagination - have never had difficulty with maps, direction-finding, pattern 
recognition, can draw quite well. I sometimes get stumped by extreme instances of 3-D 
imagining.” To overcome any visualisation difficulties she occasionally has she will, “Try 
to find simple limiting cases that I can visualise and build from there. Very occasionally I 
might think to resort to a concrete model (built from pencils, bits of paper etc..)”
Meanwhile, Phys_2, a 27 year old, PhD student, whose research interests include: 
“Vertical cavity devices, communications, high output devices” said he rarely (i.e. 3/7) 
finds it difficult to get a mental picture of the physical processes involved in his research 
because there is “No tangible evidence for what’s going on.” To overcome his difficulties 
he will, “try drawing a picture or similar visualisation.” It would seem that such practices 
are rarely a part o f formal education, as I discovered when I asked Phys_2 and Phys_91 
the following question:
“Were your visualization abilities enhanced by any particular facet o f your formal physics 
training? For example, another questionnaire respondent, Phys_27, said: ‘Geometry and 
patterns Ifind  very easy to visualise, too much organic steric chemistry as an undergrad’. ” 
Phys_2 replied: “Not that I can think of. I've always preferred the inclusion of drawings to 
aid with both understanding and explanation.” Phys_91 replied:
"...not really. I think I mainly developed them as a child and early teenager. Formal physics 
training gives strong emphasis to mathematical reasoning. A good physics teacher will draw 
analogies but you won't find such enshrined in the curriculum! I have spotted and taught 
myself via analogies from time to time in my professional career."
For these three physicists, tacit or kinaesthetic knowledge - constructing physical models 
that one can see and touch and rotate in one’s hands - is an important part of their 
visualizations. Thus in answer to Root-Bemstein’s (1985, p.63) question: “to what extent
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visual imagination is dependent or independent of the kinaesthetic skills of drawing or 
modelling,” in the case of these three physicists, it is highly dependent. However, the 
extent to which these important skills are formally taught is unclear. On the surface it 
appears that the skills of drawing or modelling are developed by the physicists themselves 
prior to or in parallel with their formal scientific education. Perhaps all physics students 
should be formally taught to generate analogies, build mental and physical models and 
(like some physics students and most engineering and architectural students) learn some 
basic drawing and drafting techniques to strengthen their tacit and visual skills.
3.9 Conclusions:
The primary aims were to investigate (i) the degree to which physicists experience
difficulty getting a mental picture of the physical processes involved in their research;
(ii) the primary factors perceived by respondents to account for these difficulties (iii) and
the techniques used by respondents to overcome any difficulties they had. As shown in
section 3.2, initial findings indicated that two thirds of respondents have difficulty getting a
mental picture of the various kinds of physical process involved in their research,
somewhere between “1/never” and "3 ” on a 7-point scale which runs from “ 1/never” to
“7/always”. Subject area was the most significant factor in determining the degree to
which physicists experience visualization difficulties in their research. Factors such as (ii)
innate abilities, (iii) training, and (iv) experience were less significant factors in
determining the degree to which physicists reported experiencing difficulties getting a
mental picture of the various kinds of physical processes involved in their research. A
complex web of inter-related factors surrounds this issue. For example two respondents
may have undergone the same initial training (e.g. a degree in experimental physics) but
chose to carry out doctoral work in different subject areas (e.g. quantum computing,
geophysics, astrophysics, or biophysics). As these subject areas vary in their visual nature,
respondents with similar innate abilities, training and experience may have different levels
of difficulty visualizing things. With regard to subject area: in areas where classical
physics predominates, physicists often employ mathematical, physical and pictorial
analogies to gain insights. In highly theoretical areas, at the forefront of research,
respondents often abandon attempts to form mental pictures of the physical processes
involved in their research and instead raise concepts to higher levels of abstraction and
visualise the form of the equations representing the objects under investigation. Thus,
following the lead of Bohr and Heisenberg they search for “visualizability (visual images
generated from scientific theories) and not visualization (visual images abstracted from
phenomena we have witnessed in the world of perceptions.” (Miller, 2000, p. 310). Certain
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areas like high-energy physics have developed a very powerful graphical language that 
fuses mathematical intuition with visual imagery. For many physicists, this helps to create 
the mental picture of the physical processes involved. The on-line questionnaire revealed a 
spectrum of visualization techniques from across the sub-cultures of the physics 
community. The most often cited techniques were the use of models, simplification and 
limiting case analysis, drawing and sketching, analogical reasoning, and the use of 
computer simulations. The latter two techniques are discussed in considerable depth in 
chapters 4, 5 & 6 as there were additional sections in the questionnaire covering these 
topics.
Though there were numerous examples given (cf. section 3.3), individual physicists 
tended to only mention one or two specific techniques that appeared to be affected by their: 
innate abilities (i.e. mathematical, visuo-spatial, technical, verbal, social etc.); their 
training (i.e. theoretical, experimental, mathematical; a preference for geometry or 
algebra; experience of dealing with complex geometries from undergraduate classes in e.g. 
steric chemistry); resources (i.e. availability o f equipment, computer software, etc.); 
environment (e.g. they may gain inspiration from their physical surroundings, everything 
from what sits on their desk - a snickers bar, a cheese sandwich - to what they see when 
they look out their window — a football stadium, a river; and/or they may gain inspiration 
from their social surroundings if  the have the opportunity to brainstorm their ideas with 
colleagues, advisors e tc .)
Thus, it is clear that some physicists’ still experience difficulties getting a mental 
picture of the various kind of physical processes involved in their research, but that a 
majority are successful at overcoming these difficulties through personal or communal 
strategies, e.g. by employing sketches, analogies or computer simulations or by raising the 
concepts to a higher level of abstraction and seeking visualizability rather than 
visualization. For many physicists, kinaesthetic skills of drawing and of physical modelling 
and reasoning by analogy are important aspects of their ability to visualise their subject 
matter. It is unclear to what extent these important skills are formally taught to physicists. 
Some physicists appear to develop these skills themselves prior to or in conjunction with 
their formal physics education. I suggest that all physics students should be formally taught 
to generate analogies, build mental and physical models and learn some basic drawing and 
drafting techniques (like those learned by some physics students and most engineering and 




On Physicists’ Use Of Computer Simulations 
As Visualization Tools
"The purpose of computing is insight, not numbers." 
"Machines should work. People should think."
71Richard Hamming
71 Richard Hamming (1915-1998) was a mathematician whose work was influential in the fields o f  
computing and telecommuications. He worked on the Manhattan project in 1945 and at Bell Labs 
1946-1976. In 1947 he founded the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) the world's 
first scientific and educational computing society.
Paraphrased from Wikepedia: The Free Encyclopedia.




This chapter presents data from section four o f the on-line questionnaire on issues 
surrounding physicists’ use of computer simulations as visualization tools. The following 
research questions are addressed:
□ To what extent do these physicists employ computer simulations in their research?
□ In what contexts do these physicists employ computer simulations?
□ What reasons do these physicists provide for not using computer simulations in 
their research?
□ Do these physicists believe that computer simulations have strengthened physicists’ 
visualization capabilities (a) in their own research area? (b) in physics in general?
□ What do these physicists believe are the possible disadvantages of employing 
computer simulations in research?
□ Can computer simulations provide physicists with insights when conceptualising 
and communicating physics?
My findings show that computer simulations are used as visualization tools by 
questionnaire respondents in a variety of contexts. However, many respondents also use 
computer simulations for other purposes where visualizations are not the main goal but 
rather useful by-products. A majority o f respondents believed that computer simulations 
have helped strengthen physicists’ visualization capabilities both in their own research area 
and in physics in general. However, a small number of respondents held opposing views, 
believing that computer simulations may in fact weaken one’s innate visualization abilities 
by acting as a mental crutch. When specifically asked about the disadvantages of 
employing computer simulations many respondents said that computer simulations suffer 
from the GIGO syndrome: if one puts Garbage In on gets Garbage Out. Following on from 
this, many respondents remarked that computer simulations could be misleading if  misused 
by inexperienced researchers. For example, if  no attempt is made to verify the computer 
model via physical and/or analytical means and the model becomes a black box whose 
inner workings are unknown. Many said that few (physical, pictorial, or mathematical) 
insights could be obtained when computer simulations became black boxes. This line of 
questioning suggested that many respondents take an instrumentalist view regarding the 
reality status of computer simulations. In many instances their primary function is as 
instruments to develop and test theories or design and build equipment.
121
Chapter 4
4.1 Physicists’ Use of Computer Simulations as Visualization Tools.
Q uestion 4 o f  the on-line questionnaire asked: In your research, do you ever use computer 
simulations to help you visualise things?” Overall, there was a skew towards using 
computer simulations as visualization tools, with 48.2%  o f  the sample selecting between  
“5” and “7/all the time” on the 7-point scale. The largest single group, 22.7%  o f  the total, 
selected “7/all the time”.
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Selection from a 7-point scale, ranging from "never/1" to "7/all the time'
Figure 4.1: C hart show ing extent to w hich respondents use com puter sim ulations to v isualise things.
Q 4 . In  y o u r  r e se a r c h , d o  y o u  ev e r  u se  c o m p u te r  s im u la t io n s  to  h e lp  y o u  v is u a lis e  th in g s?





Mode Mean Median SD
” n ever/1” 33 14.7 14.9 14.9
2 26 11.6 11.7 26.6
3 20 8.9 9.0 35.6
4 36 16 16.2 51.8
5 34 15.1 15.3 67.1
6 22 9.8 9.9 77.0
”7/all the tim e” 51 22.7 23.0 100
Sub T otal 222 98.7 100 100
M issing Data 3 1.3
Total 225 100 100 100 7 4.3 4.0 2.1
T able 4.1: D escriptive statistics for Q4 on use o f  com puter sim ulations to visualise things.
The large standard deviation (o f  2.1) may be the result o f  respondents not using computer 
simulations for the express purpose o f  visualization, but rather for calculating-outcomes for 
which visualization is instead a useful by-product. This possibility is d iscussed in the 
fo llow ing sections.
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4.2 Instances in which respondents’ use computer simulations:
Question 4b of the questionnaire asked: “I f  so, can you  p lease  offer an example [ o f  an 
instance in which you  use com puter sim ulations to help you  visualise th in gs]?” The 
following examples offered by respondents have been selected with the intention of 
highlighting the wide variety of contexts in which respondents use computer simulations:
□ “I simulate jets of gas from young stars - this helps enormously in understanding,
• noparticularly when coupled with animations of the results.” Phys_21
□ “Use of hydro-dynamic simulation to look at the temperature and density evolution of a
noplasma irradiated by a laser pulse.” Phys_25
□ “CFD [Computational Fluid Dynamics] visualisation of airflow around an aircraft 
showing shock waves and the TBL [Turbulent Boundary Layer].” Phys_48 74
□ “Erosion patterns due to waves on beach profiles.” Phys_5775
□ “Before we build a piece of hardware, we always make technical drawings o f it, often 
with 3-D visualization. For every physical experiment performed, I tend to perform 3 
computer experiments. Eg I have thermal models of systems, I can simulate many more 
configurations using a computer than in real life.” Phys_95 76
□ “Pollution transportation transformation of particles in the atmosphere.” Phys_11777
□ “The detectors we design for high energy physics are heavily simulated already in the 
design phase. Without this we would simply not know if we built an instrument with a 
sufficient quality to do the job.” Phys_198 78
□ “I use visualisation software to look at the atomic arrangements within crystal 
structures. ” Phys_20179
72 Phys_21, a 30 year old, male, lecturer, whose research interests include: “Interaction of gas flows around 
forming stars, and elements of how stars die.”
73 Phys_25, a 40 year old, male, senior lecturer, whose research interests include: x-ray scattering from dense 
plasmas as a way of finding out their properties e.g. electron-ion equilibration times.
74 Phys_48, a 23 year old, male, research scientist, whose research interests include: “Research into 
application of optics, and Electro-optics i.e. detectors (SWIR, MWIR & LWIR), lasers etc for industrial and 
military applications.”
75 Phys_57, a 37 year old, male, senior lecturer in coastal engineering and hydraulics.
76 Phys_95, a 27 year old, male, PhD student, whose research interests include: “Building / testing 
meteorology sensors for Mars landers; Experimental physics; Fluid dynamics; Thermal analysis.”
77 Phys_117, a 35 year old, male, senior lecturer, whose research interests include: Global Climate; Particle- 
Cloud Physics and Chemistry. Air pollution; Techniques for sampling pollutants; Atmospheric Spectroscopy 
and Mass Spectrometric Techniques.
78 Phys_198, a 32 year old, male, lecturer in physics, whose research interests include: Study of matter 
antimatter asymmetries in the Universe (CP violation) through accelerator based experiments.
79 Phys_201, 36 year old, male, Lecturer, whose research interests include: High-pressure crystal structure 
studies of small-molecule systems.
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As you can see, the examples range from visualizing complex interactions on nano-scales 
when working with crystals, to interactions on giga-scales when working with stars and 
galaxies. Simulations are particularly useful when dealing with things that are difficult or 
impossible to physically manipulate. Thus, they are also used to design equipment and to 
explore the evolution of systems when subjected to a variety of boundary conditions. This 
is discussed further in sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.4.
4.3 Reasons given for not using computer simulations in research.
Question 4c of the on-line questionnaire asked respondents: “If you don't use computer 
simulations in your research, is there a specific reason why you don't?” Most physicists 
who made selections in the negative end of the scale when replying to question 4, 
explained in Q4c that:
(i) they didn’t need to use simulations as visualization tools because their work was 
easy to visualise;
(ii) they used simulations as number crunchers rather than visualization tools;
(iii) they did not have the time, funding or skills required to create simulations;
(iv) their work was observational, they dealt with “*real* data”.
Two physicists were dismissive of the value of computer simulations, but for somewhat 
different reasons -  one practical, the other philosophical. Phys_200, (a 60 year old, male, 
semi-retired, self employed, cement industry consultant with experience in “process 
engineering, process control etc. etc.”) said he “never” uses computer simulations as 
visualisation tools because he does “not believe that modelling is sufficiently near to 
reality to be of value. It is only as good as the model used and most real life physical 
systems are much more complex than the model can handle in a reasonable amount of 
time.” He said, “In my experience, the (mathematical) modellers have followed what I/we 
have done and not led us.” Phys_115 (a 51 year old, professor, involved in spectroscopy) 
said he “never” uses computer simulations as visualization tools because of a, “Distrust of 
pseudo reality.” When questioned about the possible disadvantages of employing computer 
simulations, in question 4f, he said one disadvantage was the, “Promotion o f a cartoon 
view o f reality”. In his view, “Vision is only one of the ways in which we know the world. 
Its dominance at present is pedagological rather than fundamental.” The reality status of 
computer simulations (and models in general) is discussed further in section 4.6 when data 
arising from Q4f is presented. First, I will present data from Q4d, on whether respondents 
believed computer simulations have strengthened physicists’ visualisation capabilities.
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4.4 Quantitative Data On The Extent to Which Computer Simulations 
Are Thought To Have Strengthened Physicists’ Visualization Capabilities
There were two parts to question 4d of the on-line questionnaire, intended to draw on 
physicists’ personal experiences of using computer simulations as visualization tools and 
their experiences of others using them. It asked: Q4d. Do you think that computer 
simulations have strengthened physicists’ visualization capabilities (i) in your own 
research area (ii) in physics in general? ” As figures 4.2 and 4.3 on the next pages indicate 
a majority of respondents felt that computer simulations “definitely have” strengthened 
physicists’ visualization capabilities both in respondents’ own research area (51.6%) and in 
physics in general (52.5%).
Note in the descriptive statistics tables 4.2 and 4.3 on the next page, that responses 
concerning whether computer simulations have strengthened physicists’ visualization 
capabilities in respondents own research area and in physics in general are similar on the 
positive end of the scale but differ on the negative end of the scale. For example, 3.1% of 
respondents said that computer simulations “definitely have not/1 ” strengthened physicists’ 
visualization capabilities in their own research area compared to 0.9% in physics in 
general. The cumulative percentage for 7-point scale selections 7 & 2 & 3 is 17% for 
respondents’ own research area, but only 7.2% for physics in general. The standard 
deviation is 1.87 for the former and 1.43 for the latter.80
As shown in section 4.5, an analysis o f written explanations to Q4e suggests that the 
quantitative differences in Q4d may be because many of the physicists who responded to 
the questionnaire worked in areas where computer simulations were not used for the 
specific purpose of visualization. This may be because: (i) their work deals with abstract 
quantum mechanical concepts which are in-exact and therefore not easy to programme into 
a computer; (ii) their work is more concerned with calculating outcomes than visualizing 
physical processes; or (iii) as the findings in section 3.3 suggest many respondents have 
particularly good visuo-spatial I.Q. and/or prefer to use analogies, sketches or physical 
models instead of computer simulations.
Many of the respondents who made selections on the negative end of the 7-point 
scale for Q4d(i) (i.e. his own research area) but positive selections for Q4d(ii) (i.e. physics 
in general) did not explain their selections in Q4e. Among the respondents who did, was 
Phys_194, a 26 year-old, male, postdoctoral research fellow, involved in an “exploration 
o f the interface between quantum physics and non-equilibrium driving.” In response to
80 As mentioned in chapter 2, my aim is not to show statistically significant correlations. I use the quantitative 
data in a qualitative way to uncover possible patterns which can be further investigated qualitatively.
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Q4d(i) he was one o f 19 respondents who selected 2 on the 7-point scale and for Q4d(ii) he 
was one of the 38 respondents who selected 5 on the 7-point scale. When asked in Q4e to 
explain his selections he added: “I think in essentially classical physics (fluid flow, for 
example) [computer simulations] have been very useful for visualisation. In quantum 
problems, it's not even clear what one should plot!”
Another factor that must be taken into account when analysing the computer 
simulation data is that many respondents were uncertain how to interpret the term 
‘computer simulation’. As mentioned in chapter 2, respondents’ definitions of what 
computer simulations were, varied considerably. Interestingly, this often depended on the 
respondent’s research background. For example, Phys_ 19, a 60 year old, male, Professor 
o f Theoretical Physics indicated in his selection from the 7-point scale that he used 
computer simulations “7/all the time” in his research of “Atomic, molecular and optical 
and condensed-matter physics, occasionally nuclear. Notably: hevy-particle collision 
theory, Wannier above & below threshold phenomena and ferromagnetism, including 
fractals.” He highlighted an experimentalist / theorist divide when he added:
“I detest the word 'simulation': this is an experimentalist's derogatory description o f  
modelling, algebra, analysis, numerical analysis, computational physics, computer 
programming, checking, testing etc etc. I effect theoretical and computational physics 
calculations as a large part o f  my research job (Personal Chair)”
Thus, the data must be viewed in light of this. (See also full dataset on the accompanying 















Q4c. Do you think that computer sim ulations have strengthened physicists' visualization  















Selection from 7-point scale, ranging from "no, they definitely have not/1" to "7/yes, they
definitely have"
Figure 4.2: Chart showing % breakdown of questionnaire respondents’ 7-point scale 
selections for Q4c.
Q4d. Do you think that computer sim ulations have strengthened physicists' visualisation  
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Selection from 7-point sca le  ranging from 
"no, they definitely have not/1" to "7/yes, they definitely have'
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Figure 4.3: Chart showing % breakdown of questionnaire respondents’ 7-point scale 
selections for Q4d (part 2).
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Q4d. Do you think that computer simulations have strengthened physicists' visualization
capabilities in your own research area?






"definitely haven't/1" 7 3.1 3.1 3.1
2 19 8.4 8.5 11.7
3
12 5.3 5.4 17.0
r 27 12 12.1 29.15 26 11.6 11.7 40.8
6 17 7.6 7.6 48.4
"7/definitely have" 115 51.1 51.6 100
Sub Total 223 99.1 100 100
Missing Data 2 0.9
Total 225 100 100 100 7 5.5 7 1.87
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for 7-point scale selections to Q4d of on-line questionnaire
Q4d. Do you think that computer simulations have strengthened physicists' visualization
capabilities in physics in general?






definitely haven't/1 2 0.9 0.9 0.9
2 4 1.8 1.8 2.7
3 10 4.4 4.5 7.2
4 24 10.7 10.8 17.9
5 38 16.9 17.0 35.0
6 28 12.4 12.6 47.5
7/definitely have 117 52 52.5 100
Sub Total 223 99.1 100 100
Missing Data 2 0.9
Total 225 100 100 100 7 5.89 7 1.43
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for 7-point scale selections for Q4 
questionnaire

























Q4d (part 1) Do you think that computer simulations have strengthened 




no response definitely haven't/1 & 2 3 & 4 & 5 6 & 7/definitely have
S e lec tio n s  from 7-point sca le , recoded  into 4  main groups
Figure 4.4: chart showing % breakdown of responses to Q4d (part 1) re-coded into 4 main groups.
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Q4d (part 2). Do you think that com puter s im u la tio n s have stren gth en ed  p h y sic is ts '  











No response definitely haven't/1 & 2 3 & 4 & 5 6& 7/definitely have
Selections from 7-point scale, re-coded into 4 main groups.
Figure 4.5: Chart showing % breakdown of responses to Q4d (part 2) re-coded into 4 main groups.
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4.5 Respondents’ verbal explanations of why computer simulations have 
or have not helped to strengthen physicists’ visualization capabilities.
As mentioned in the previous section, respondents were asked in question 4e of the on-line 
questionnaire: “Can you please elaborate on your choice in Q4d above?” O f the 7 
respondents who believed that computer simulations “definitely have not/1” helped to 
strengthen physicists visualization capabilities in their own research area, only two
a i
respondents appeared to hold negative or dismissive views regarding the worth of 
computer simulations as visualization tools. Most of the physicists whose responses were 
in the negative end of the scale explained that computer simulations were not used as 
visualization tools to a great extent in their own research areas because their work was 
either easy to visualise without the aid o f computer simulations or, on the other hand, 
insufficiently advanced to allow for useful computer models to be written. Phys_165, a 36 
year old, male, advanced research fellow was among the 7 physicists who said that 
computer simulations "definitely have not/1 ” helped strengthen physicists visualization 
capabilities in his own research (Particle Physics, Computational Physics, Hadron Physics, 
Lattice Gauge Theories, QCD) and among the 2 physicists who said this was also true for 
physics in general. However, he added in question 4e that a distinction must be made 
“between ‘visualisation’ where the advent of computers has not changed much and 
‘simulation’.” He does believe that “simulating complicated physical systems is a 
genuinely new tool of scientific discovery.” So although his quantitative responses were on 
the negative end of the scale regarding computer simulations strengthening physicists’ 
visualisation capabilities, he recognises the value of simulations as discovery tools when 
used to simulate complex physical systems. As will be discussed in sections 4.5.3, 4.5.4 
and 4.5.5, computer simulations provide a virtual laboratory with the type of control not 
possible in real physical situations. So although a small number of respondents believed 
that computer simulations have not helped strengthen physicists visualisation capabilities, 
the majority of respondents believed that computer simulations “definitely have/7” 
strengthened physicists’ visualization capabilities both in their own research areas an in 
physics in general. In their experience computer simulations can be used to produce visual 
representations of complex geometries, which would be extremely difficult to mentally 
visualize; follow the time evolution of complex systems; visualise solutions o f equations 
etc. I will now discuss the main virtues of computer simulations drawing on the written 
comments of the 225 physicists who responded to the on-line questionnaire.
81 Phys_200 & Phys l 15 quoted in section 4.3
82 (See appendix 4, section 4.1 for a list of additional quantitative and qualitative data on this issue)
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4.5.1 Virtues of com puter simulations: Visualization Tools:
Phys_63, a Professor of Astronomy, said that computer simulations definitely have 
strengthened physicists’ visualisation capabilities in his own research area “studying the 
formation, evolution and structure o f galaxies”. He explained, “they certainly allow me to 
understand geometries that I would have trouble with on a piece of paper.”
Phys_99, a lecturer in physics, said that computer simulations definitely have 
helped strengthen physicists’ visualisation capabilities both in his own research area 
“Superconductivity in semiconductors; Quantum Electrodynamics and Vacuum Energy” 
and in physics in general. He listed some contexts in which computer simulations have 
proven useful: “Spatio-temporal chaos and the formation of patterns; molecular structures; 
velocity fields in hemodynamics; optical interference patterns; atomic orbitals. The list is 
simply phenomenal.”
Phys_149, a senior research fellow, also believed that computer simulations 
definitely have helped strengthen physicists’ visualisation capabilities both in his own 
research area “relativistic electron beams; free electron lasers; collective radiation-matter 
interactions” and in physics in general. In his experience, “Visualisation can make abstract 
mathematical models come alive. You perceive the mathematical solution in a way that 
taps into the very fundamental sense of sight and therefore perhaps utilise a large sub­
conscious processing power that is not available from the purely abstract.”
Phys_95, a PhD student, indicated that computer simulations have strengthened 
physicists visualisation capabilities both in his own research area “building / testing 
meteorology sensors for Mars landers; Experimental physics; Fluid dynamics; Thermal 
analysis” and in physics in general. He said that in his own area, most fluid dynamics 
calculations are now done on computers, with “only a few isolated experimental data 
points obtained in wind tunnels for confirmation.” The computer output he works with 
“can be visualised with many colors, axes etc in a very instructive way.” He remarked that 
his own work “generally deals with phenomena on a human scale - as such it is fairly easy 
to visualise much of what is going on.” He contrasted this with other areas o f physics 
where researchers deal with “either the very large or the very small” and “behaviour at 
these scales is less intuitive and can be more difficult to visualise (especially quantum 
processes!).” In his experience, some researchers in these fields “seem to understand 
processes entirely through mathematics, without recourse to visualisation (which they feel 
can be dangerously misleading).” For researchers like himself, who normally deal with 
classical and semi-classical physics, and phenomena on human scales, “computer
83 (He selected 6 on the 7-point scale for both parts of the question)
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visualisations have been tremendously useful in these fields [e.g. when dealing with 
quantum processes] because they let the rest of us know what on earth they're talking 
about!” I believed that this was a particularly important finding and (as discussed in section 
3.6) I raised the issue with several theoretical physicists during my follow-up e-mail 
exchanges.
Also, as mentioned in chapter 3, research by cognitive scientists suggests that: 
“Prior exposure [to diagrams and other kinds o f images] can lead to perceptual fluency in 
recognition and classification.” (Chandrasekran & Narayanan, 1992, p.30). So, might 
exposure to complex geometries and evolving systems strengthen one’s ability to generate 
visualizations unaided by a computer? The comments of Phys_158 & Phys_179 suggest 
so. Phys_158, a PhD student, indicated that computer simulations have to a certain extent 
(i.e. 3/7) strengthened physicists’ visualization capabilities in his own research area, 
“Quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution” but have done so to a much greater 
extent (i.e. d/7) in physics in general. He said: “personally I think that there is a limit to 
what a human can visualise if we have not seen something like it before. By using a 
computer we can increase our own data bank of unusual images to help increase our 
powers o f visualisation.” Similarly, Phys_179, also a PhD student, indicated that computer 
simulations have to a certain extent (i.e.4/7) strengthened physicists’ visualization 
capabilities in his own research area, “magnetic interactions within 1- and 2-dimensional 
arrays o f nanomagnets, constructed from magnetic-cored ferritin proteins and superlattice 
nano wire arrays” and in physics in general (also 4/1). Elaborating in Q4e, Phys_179 
wavered between the virtues and vices o f computer simulations as visualisation tools 
remarking: “I'm not sure if  the programs strengthen our visualisation capabilities (the 
programs themselves were initially visualised to be written) or if  they stop us from having 
to, making life easier but not using our minds any more so. Maybe they do help though, 
providing a 'platform' to use in future to visualise, away from the screen.”
4.5.2 Virtues of Computer Simulations: Exploration of Complex Systems by 
Controlling and Varying Parameters.
Aside from the virtues of visualisation, my data revealed that computer simulations are 
also extremely useful for exploring the response of systems by controlling and varying 
different parameters. For example, P h y s_ lll, a research student investigating “Epitaxial 
Systems, Non Equilibrium, Probabilistic Description” remarked that it “depends on what 
you mean by visualisation.” He said, “if you mean complete visualisation then it probably 
does not help, but it certainly allows us to do ‘ideal’ experiments under controlled
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circumstances.” Phys_205, a postdoctoral researcher, is involved in, “Turbulence research 
in astrophysics (fluid mechanics, numerical hydrodynamics, turbulence modelling); 
application in stellar astrophysics.” He said that computer simulations definitely have 
strengthened physicists’ visualisation capabilities both in his own research area and in 
physics in general. He noted that, “studying physical systems in several (spatial) 
dimensions has always been an enormous challenge to physicists.” Computer simulations 
“provide a laboratory with a type of control not possible in real physical systems.”
Phys_74, a research fellow, noted that: “It is impossible to probe certain functions 
systematically without computers (this is not necessarily 'simulation' in the sense used by 
some physicists, but is definitely visualisation).” He said that much is his research “in 
fundamental physics (eg classical crystal optics, statistical geometry of stochastic 
functions) would have been impossible without computer visualisation techniques.” 
Similarly, Phys_43, a lecturer, said that, in his research into laser plasma interaction 
particle acceleration, he deals with “extremely complex, multi-body systems, for which 
analytical solutions or treatment are of limited use.” He said that fortunately, 
“computational codes (thanks to the ever increasing computer performances) can deal with 
demanding numerical calculations and provide visual outputs. In particular, in codes it is 
possible to switch on and off particular phenomena or effects and see their impact on the 
final results (which is not possible in experiments in most cases).”
This has parallels with the neighbouring field of engineering where Bissell & 
Dillion (2000, p. 10) tell us that well-designed computer-based tools can contribute to a 
clearer understanding of systems behaviour. They can “enhance expertise by allowing the 
engineer to use the processing power of the computer to explore easily and quickly the 
predicted effect on system behaviour of different design strategies.” One advantage is that 
“this exploration is carried out directly in the language of the engineer, rather than in that 
o f the mathematician.” The “language of the engineer” is usually a more concrete language 
than that of the mathematician, as we shall see in chapters 7 & 8 in my case-study of Dr. 
Lawson, an engineer-physicist. In a similar vein, many questionnaire respondents 
remarked that computer simulations allow them to tweak parameters and probe functions 
systematically, allowing for greater understanding of the system.
4.5.3 Virtues of Computer Simulations: Simulating Physically Impossible
Experiments.
Many respondents pointed out that computer simulations provide a laboratory with a type 
o f control not possible in real physical systems. This virtual laboratory allows physicists to
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perform experiments that are too expensive, technically difficult or physically impossible 
to perform. Visualization is central in some of these instances and merely a by-product in 
others. For example, Phys_4 is a senior research scientist whose research interests include: 
“Laser material interaction with particular reference to short pulsed lasers such as 
femtosecond lasers, experimental studies and numerical modelling.” This is a “broad inter­
disciplinary area spanning electro-optics, plasma physics, materials science and applied 
mechanics.” He said he can “get at information in simulations that is physically impossible 
to obtain with experimentation, e.g. the temperature in the bulk of a target being irradiated 
with a laser beam... A simulation solving the fourier heat conduction equation in 3D will 
however yield most of the relevant information.” Similarly, Phys_25, a 40 year old Senior 
Lecturer whose research interests include “x-ray scattering from dense plasmas as a way of 
finding out their properties e.g. electron-ion equilibration times” said that: “Many 
interesting behaviours are only revealed using the power of simulation. In my own field we 
realised that some of our plasmas emitted x-rays longer when hit by a more intense laser, 
not because of the reduction in recombination rate which intuition told us was the answer 
but because of a sustained collisional ionisation rate as revealed by simulation. This latter 
is a rather technical example.” Phys_ 95, a PhD student who builds and tests metrology 
sensors for Mars landers (whom we met in section 4.5.1) replied saying: “Before we build 
a piece of hardware, we always make technical drawings of it, often with 3D 
visualization.” He explained that: “for every physical experiment performed, I tend to 
perform 3 computer experiments.” He creates “thermal models of systems” and said he 
“can simulate many more configurations using a computer than in real life.” In the 
experiences o f Phys_220, a Higher Scientific Officer involved in “radiation protection - 
occupational exposure to radon,” computer simulations “help with visualisation, especially 
when the objects are outside our normal, everyday view, e.g. nuclear interactions.”
4.5.4 Virtues of Computer Simulations: Visualization is a useful by-product.
Some respondents were keen to emphasise that visualization is not the most significant 
factor in their decision to employ computer simulations in research. They said computer 
simulations are used in numerical modelling not as a visualization tool, but simply to 
calculate outcomes. As Phys_ 139 (a lecturer involved in biophysics) put it, “Simulations 
have increased understanding. Visualization is a by-product.” Similarly, Phys_143, (a 
PhD student) remarked that, “Computer simulations allow systems to be reduced to a 
simpler form, hence identifying characteristic behaviour. They allow predictions to be 
made. I wouldn’t imagine that ’visualisation' is the most important aspect o f computer
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simulations.” Visualisation of simulated data makes it easier to understand what the model 
is doing and therefore to evaluate it. It is not necessarily a direct source o f physical insight, 
but is often used in the same way as visualisation o f empirical data from real experiments. 
The physical insights are partly designed into the simulation model and partly extended by 
the ability to play with it. This is in contrast with the role of visualisation in modelling, 
where it may be a direct expression of physical, biological or other insights. Thus, for 
example, in Phys_75’s experiences, simulations are essential in understanding results from 
particle physics, since the phenomena are so far outside the human scale. However, “in 
physics in general, simulation is often only used as a tool to ‘crank the handle’ on a model, 
rather than to obtain real physical insight.” Similarly, Phys_50, (a professor o f 
experimental physics) remarked that, “Things like molecular dynamics simulations are not 
there to strengthen visualisation but to calculate outcomes.”
Interestingly, many respondents remarked that it was in fact very difficult to 
distinguish between the use of computer simulations to solve problems and the use of 
computer simulations for the purpose o f visualization. For many, the two were 
“inextricably linked.” For instance, Phys_185, a research fellow, involved in “quantum 
computing, quantum many body physics, phase transitions, physics o f information,” said 
she has “colleagues who have explicitly put together visualisation systems to help their 
research. On the other hand, I don't really distinguish between computer simulations to 
solve problems and computer simulations to visualise processes...” Likewise, Phys_ 160, a 
Reader in Theoretical Physics, believes that computer simulations “have had an enormous 
impact on almost every aspect o f physics. In many cases, they provide tools which actually 
solve problems that could not be tackled in any other way.” However, he emphasises that 
“it is probably impossible to distinguish meaningfully between (a) computations which 
produce the desired answers, conveniently presented in a visual format, and (b) the use of 
computer graphics to aid visualization. I think the two things are inextricably linked.”
Thus, the questionnaire data presented in section 4.5 illustrates that a majority of 
respondents believe that computer simulations have strengthened physicists’ visualization 
capabilities in their own research area and in physics in general. Their virtues include 
visualisation o f complex geometries, exploring complex systems by controlling and 
varying parameters, providing physicists with a virtual laboratory in which to simulate 
physically impossible experiments. Visualisation is almost always a useful by-product, but 
not necessarily always the main goal. Computer simulations may also be used for the sole 
purpose of numerical modelling or number crunching. Having discussed the virtues I will 
now address the vices.
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4.6 The Possible Disadvantages of Using Computer Simulations:
Question 4 f of the on-line questionnaire posed the following question:
“What, in your opinion, are the possible disadvantages o f  using computer simulation ”?
4.6.1 No Disadvantages:
Seven respondents (Phys_16, Phys_80, Phys_129, Phys_153, Phys_189, Phys_196, 
Phys_110) could see no disadvantages. As Phys_80 said: “None - they are essential in my 
field [star formation, astronomy, biological systems].” I believe it is relevant that most of 
these physicists work in the related fields o f space science, galaxy formation and 
cosmology. As it is often impossible to physically carry out experiments in these fields, 
computer simulations are the nearest things one can get to ‘experimental data’. A post­
doctoral researcher in cosmology, Phys_110, remarks that: “Many simulations in 
cosmology (galaxy formation simulations, Lyman Alpha forest simulations) are unphysical 
because of the lack of understanding of physics and because of the lack of resolution but 
both improve and these are early days yet.” She notes that “Boltzmann codes to simulate 
CMB [Cosmic Microwave Background] data are the exception, being based on plasma 
physics 50 years old and carried out on computers easily, big and fast enough to make the 
results quite accurate.” While most respondents extolled the virtues of computer 
simulations on account of the knowledge to be gained into the workings of the modelled 
system, there was overwhelming agreement and widespread concern that computer 
simulations could lead physicists astray if  they were misused. I have grouped these 
concerns thematically in the following sections.
4.6.2 They May Encourage Laziness and Weaken Innate Visualization Abilities:
Five physicists,84 representing a range of ages (in their 20s, 30s, 40s and 50s respectively) 
mentioned that computer simulations might make physicists “lazy”. Phys_ 177, a PhD 
student, working on quantum communication and information theory, said simply that a 
possible disadvantage was that computer simulations, “can make us lazy.” Phys_116, a 
lecturer, involved in solid state physics, suggested a possible disadvantage was a, “loss o f 
imagination, increase of laziness.” Phys_41, a lecturer in astrophysics said that they: “may 
make researchers ‘lazy’ in the sense of making them less likely to try to find analytical 
solutions to a problem, although such analytical solutions can often offer insight.” 
Phys_78, a Reader in Physics, said a possible disadvantage is that it, “Encourages laziness, 
discourages personal interaction . . .” Phys_215 said, “they can sometimes have a harmful
84 Phys_177, Phys_116, Phys, 41, Phys, 78, Phys, 215
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effect - people get carried away with generating ‘pretty pictures’ and they can become 
lazy. Rather than seeking to understand, derive and simplify formulae, they just stick them 
into a program.” One could ask if  Phys_215’s reference to ‘pretty pictures’ is related to his 
initial training as an engineer.85 In her study of the visual culture of engineers, Henderson, 
(1995) says that renderings in perspective are used to generate financial and organisational 
support for design and commercial promotion. These renderings are drawn by illustrators, 
not engineers, “who have been known to scornfully refer to them as ‘pretty pictures’.” 
(Henderson, 1995, p.203).
Other respondents were also slightly concerned that using computer simulations as 
visualization tools may have a negative affect on some individuals: acting as a mental 
crutch it may weaken their innate visualization abilities. However, they were not 
suggesting that physicists should avoid using computer simulations as visualization tools 
because, as they themselves have found, computer simulations are powerful visualization 
tools in numerous contexts. They were instead advocating a cautious use of computer 
simulations, informed by studies such as this one, which aims to find out what works and 
what doesn’t work, according to the practitioners themselves. For instance, Phys_166 said, 
“one may become less able to construe mentally certain geometrical functions or shapes if 
one finds easier to resort to a computer simulation (but presumably, this may make more 
time available for other activities).” Phys_ 127 also wavered between pros and cons. For 
example, he said one disadvantage was the “loss o f mental ability to be creative in 
visualisation.” However he qualified his remark by adding, “that's just a prejudice, though 
-- personally I find that familiarity with graphical representations help me to be more 
mentally inventive.” He concluded with a disadvantage saying, “there's a danger of 
thinking that the program's representation is the only way, though...” Phys_155 also 
alternated between the pros and cons of using computer simulations. On the positive side 
she said, “I think getting the computer to do the visualisation for us can be detrimental for 
our own imagination of the graph to be obtained before it is actually generated.” However, 
she added, “on the other hand, generating one graph can lead to speculations on variants of 
that graph and thus hone our imagination.”
85 He holds a BEng in Electrical/Electronic Engineering as well as an MSc in Optics (physics), and was 
writing up his PhD on Laser Optics (physics) when he replied.
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4.6.3 The Immediacy of Graphical Images Can Be Powerful But Misleading
Three respondents from the fields of astronomy and astrophysics remarked that an image is 
a powerful thing and its immediacy can be misleading. Phys_22 (a PDRA in astronomy) 
said the disadvantage was: “mainly in people forgetting to bear in mind that these are only 
simulations, not definitely showing what is going on (an image is a powerful thing) . . . ” 
Phys_21 (a lecturer in astrophysics), said: “It is very easy to be misled by results from 
computer simulations which appear to be physically reasonable, but in fact are a result of 
some bug/weakness in the simulation itself. One needs to maintain a very critical approach 
to simulation results, in spite of the bright colours and nice pictures, and many people do 
not.” Phys_205, (a PDRA), said the danger was: “To believe too much in the nice pictures 
usually displayed at the end of such work: they are also usually based on approximations 
and their impact is more readily ignored if  ‘convincing’ evidence is given in graphical 
form.” It makes sense that these three respondents come from the fields of astronomy and 
astrophysics. The scientific realism of images is particularly relevant for researchers in 
these fields. Many astro-images have become ‘iconic’, adorning computer desktops and 
regarded by many as works of art. An image of the Eagle Nebula (created by Jeff Hester 
and Paul Scowen of Arizona State University / NASA) was voted second most influential 
astrophoto of the 20th century by the readers of Sky and Telescope. 86 It has appeared on 
many magazine covers and posters and was among four images chosen for a special set of 
US stamps to commemorate the 10th anniversary o f the Hubble Space Telescope. The 
photograph is a false-colour image. It is shown in fig. 4.6 below.
Figure 4.6: The Eagle Nebula. Credit J. 
Hester & P. Scowen, Arizona State 
University / NASA.
86 The number one spot went to the so-called ‘Earthrise’ photo taken during the Apollo 8 lunar mission.
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In a special issue on “iconic images” in Physics World magazine Muldoon & Rodgers87 
write that:
“Although the false colours are undoubtedly eye-catching, Scowen stresses that they 
are chosen for scientific reasons rather than principles o f  realism or aesthetics. For 
instance, the hydrogen is coloured green in the image, even though it is really red, 
because sulphur is also red and astronomers need some way o f  telling them apart.” 
(Muldoon & Rodgers, 2002, p.35).
Scowen said that he always tries “to highlight the scientific value behind the images as 
well, so that the public sees more than the simple ‘gee whiz’ factor.” (ibid.) The issue of 
scientific realism surfaces again, in section 4.12 when Prof. Berry discusses his deliberate 
use of artificial colours in order to dissuade people from taking his abstract mathematical 
representations to be literal pictures of physical phenomena that could be seen in the 
natural world. Berry’s images have won awards in ‘science as art’ competitions. However, 
like Scowen, Berry is keen to emphasise the scientific value of his computer-generated 
images so that the public see more than the simple gee whiz factor.
4.6.4 It is hard to know the extent to which they accurately reflect reality: 
Experimental checks are necessary
A large number of written/verbal responses to Q4f related to the view that computer 
simulations could be particularly dangerous if  they were not used in conjunction with other 
physical method, i.e. if, in an extreme scenario, physicists were to become disembodied 
experimenters working solely in an imaginary computer micro-world. O f the 225 
physicists who responded, 18 respondents specifically referred to the reality status of 
computer simulations, when asked about the possible disadvantages of employing 
computer simulations in research in question 4 f of the on-line questionnaire. (A full set of 
18 responses can be found in appendix 4, section A4.2). Boon (2006) identifies a 
distinction between scientific & technological practices, arguing that:
“...scientific and technological practices employ different quality criteria or 
epistemological norms. Depending on ones position in the realism debate, norms in 
science are truth, universality, theoretical consistency, coherence, simplicity, empirical 
adequacy, and approval by the scientific community. Quality in technology means the 
practical success o f  a technical solution and approval by the engineering and industrial 
practice; other epistemological norms in technology are applicability, reliability, 
effectiveness and efficiency.”
871 worked with Physics World editor Peter Rodgers during my MSc in Science Communication.
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The respondents of my on-line questionnaire came primarily from basic science, although 
there were some researchers involved in applied science. Some respondents were 
theoreticians involved in highly abstract areas o f quantum physics; some were 
experimentalists involved in designing, testing and building equipment; some were 
computational physicists bridging the divide between theory and experiment. I have not 
been able to identify a clear-cut relationship between these 18 respondents’ research areas 
and their views on computer simulations. However, I do believe there may be an age 
related skew: older respondents tended to mention the reality status of computer 
simulations to a greater extent than younger respondents. For example, of these 18 
physicists, 2 were in their 20s, 4 were in their 30s, 4 were in their 40s, 3 were in their 50s, 
3 were in their 60s, 2 did not specify their ages, but said things like “old”. If  we express 
this as a percentage of the total number of respondents in each age bracket, there does 
appear to be an age related skew.
Re-coded Age 
Ranges o f  
Respondents
Total no. o f  
respondents 
in this age 
category
No. o f  respondents in this age bracket 
who used the words ‘real’ or ‘reality’ 
when discussing the disadvantages o f  
computer simulations




19-29 92 2 2.2
30-39 57 4 7.0
40-49 39 4 10.0
50-59 26 3 11.5
60-67 8 3 37.5
Sub-Total 222 16 7.1
Indeterminate 3 2 66.7
Total 225 18 8
Table 4.4: Shows that older respondents tended to mention the reality status of 
computer simulations to a greater extent than younger respondents.
Phys_162, (a 55 year-old professor of solar-planetary physics) said: “It is hard to know to 
what extent they accurately reflect reality, and there is the possibility of being fooled by 
them.” Phys_121, (a 59 year old, male professor) said that “Care [is] needed in setting up 
the simulation to make it represent reality. Experimental checks are needed” Phys_136, a 
63 year-old Professor of physics said: “It's not 'real' physics. You must always be careful 
to make it as physically realistic as possible.” Phys_ 217 (a 66 year old, reader) said that 
the main disadvantage is: “to mistake the model for the 'truth'. This has always been a
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danger of any model (ie any approximation), including Newton’s mechanics and Einstein's 
special relativity.”
Although 8% of respondents seemed to take a realist stance, when they were 
prompted to reflect on the disadvantages of computer simulations, the majority o f 
respondents did not seem to take a strong realist stance. On the whole, most physicists 
seemed to be concerned with speed, efficiency, usability, empirical reliability and 
empirical adequacy. They would probably share Morrison’s (1998) instrumentalist view 
which holds that in scientific practice, models are not judged on how well they map onto 
reality; they are judged on their adequacy to predict and calculate, to design equipment and 
measure outcomes. For example, Morrison contends that:
"Theory plays a role in the construction o f  models in physical optics but the models in 
each domain stand on their own as a source o f  information for practical problem 
solving. There is no worry that the models do not map onto an accurate realistic 
account o f  the nature o f  light, on the contrary, it is their idealized structure that makes 
them useful as instruments in the design o f  lenses and for the calculation o f  different 
effects produced in different experimental contexts." (Morrison, 1998, p.73)
The number of assumptions made in building the model and the empirical reliability of the 
results are vitally important factors, but are constantly weighed up with the requirements of 
the user. As Gooding, (2005, p. 176) notes, when dealing with models, “there is always a 
tension between complexity and realism on the one hand and solvability on the other.” 
Koponen (a practicing physicist) argues convincingly that:
“Physics does not require strong realist interpretations; more important than truth are 
the empirical reliability o f  knowledge. The empirical reliability o f  models (or 
theories) requires only that they produce empirically successful predictions and that 
the reliability is established in a methodologically accepted way. These are the 
minimal (and often only generally agreed) criteria for knowledge in physics. 
Moreover, whether or not the empirical reliability has been fulfilled can be evaluated 
and assessed, contrary to the claims o f  ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ which are beyond such 
scrutiny.” (2006, draft, p. 15)
In fact, 8 respondents remarked specifically on the importance of establishing the empirical 
reliability of models in a methodologically accepted way, i.e. via experimental checks. 
(The full list of 8 responses is contained in appendix 4, section A4.3). For instance, 
Phys_121, a 59 year old, Professor of Physics said that: “Care needed in setting up the 
simulation to make it represent reality. Experimental checks are needed.” Similarly, 
Phys_58, a 31 year old, lecturer asked: “do you believe the model? - it has to be tested 
against experiment.” Thus, my findings support Cartwright’s (1999, p. 9) stance that: “ ...
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we tailor our systems as much as possible to fit our theories, which is what we do when we 
want to get the best predictions possible.” Interestingly, Phys_ 105, a 31 year old, PDRA 
whose research interests include, “biomineralization, magnetism, material science” 
underscored the importance of tailoring a computer model with exact experimental results, 
but found this difficult to do in practice because, in his view, many experimentalists 
believe computer simulations are superfluous. In Phys_105’s words:
“It is highly dependant on experimental results and also on how the experiment was 
conducted. A  good calculation needs to be coordinated with experimentalists but 
unfortunately most experimentalists don't understand the computation methods well enough 
probably because they are convinced they can do without computations.”
I share Koponen’s view that the empirical adequacy of models is established by a three- 
phase process of match-making:
“...first, between experimental data and empirically reliable models (empirical 
substructures); second, between empirically reliable models and theory (or theoretical 
models); and third, between empirically reliable models and phenomena themselves.”
(2006, draft, p.23)
However, it seems that even when models are established as empirically adequate, some 
physicists remain sceptical. As Phys_137, (a 40 year old, Reader in Physics, who often 
uses computer simulations of lattice field theory) quipped:
“...there is a prejudice, which I share on Tuesdays and Thursdays, that numbers from 
a computer, however well they agree with experiment, do not communicate any 
fundamental understanding.”
These findings are extremely interesting and should, in my view, be pursued further in 
more in-depth, future research.
4.7 Can computer simulations provide physicists with insight?
The importance of acquiring (physical) insight appeared on numerous occasions in the on­
line questionnaire’s section concerning the possible disadvantages of using computer 
simulation in Q4f. Phys_119 and Phys_107 quoted Richard Hamming, who once said 
that: “The purpose of computing is insight, not numbers.” O f course the same could be 
said of experiment, numerical modelling, etc. In general, most references to insight 
suggested that computer simulations could not offer real insights on their own, but could 
offer limited insight if physicists improved their understanding of their model by using 
analytical methods and therefore did not use them as black boxes. For example, Phys_183 
said, that, “physical insight can be lost when simulation is a ‘black box’, simulation should 
only be used alongside mathematical analysis to get the whole picture.” Phys_119, also
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referred to a black box type scenario saying: “I suppose it is also a bit like what is wrong 
with school-kids using calculators. If  you depend on the box, you sometimes fail to look 
after your ‘physical insight’ -- your understanding and internal predictive ability.” In her 
experiences, “simulation lets you see what YOUR MODEL predicts. It doesn't prove you 
have the right model, although very good agreement with actual data would perhaps 
persuade you that your model had potential.” Phys_89, on the other hand, mentioned 
theoretical insight, saying that computer simulations: “cannot by themselves provide 
theoretical insight, nor replace real-world experiments.” It is not completely clear what 
these physicists mean when they talk about ‘theoretical insight’ or ‘physical insight’. For 
some physicists ‘insight’ seems to have visual and pictorial connotations, e.g. getting the 
“whole picture”. On the other hand, Phys_119 defines “insight” as “your understanding 
and internal predictive ability,” which is somewhat similar to the Gestalt psychologist 
Kohler’s interpretation of insight as an “understandable relationship”. (Kohler, 1947, 
p.326). In chapter 8, I will explore the meaning o f the term insight in more depth, when 
analysing the scientific papers of J.D. Lawson.
In order to give a more visual account of the types of simulations used by 
researchers in his field, Phys_54 provided a link to the Cambridge Cosmology web­
page, hosted by the Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics at 
the University of Cambridge. On this website, the Cambridge team pose the question,
“why are simulations useful” and answer it by saying that: “although the movies are 
in some sense a nice by-product of the simulation, they can provide extremely useful 
insights into the detailed dynamics of the strings.” They explain that because e.g. 
cosmic strings are extremely complex non-linear objects, “the only rigorous way to 
study their evolution and cosmological consequences is therefore to simulate it on 
the computer.” Figure 4.7 below, taken from their section on “Comic Strings and 
Other Defects” simulates the dramatic effect o f radiation for two interlocking loops.
The Cambridge team add that, “this configuration is unlikely to happen in a 
cosmological setting, but it is nevertheless quite enlightening. Notice the succession 
of complicated dynamic processes before the loop finally disappears!” This fits with 
the stance put forward by Morgan and Morrison (1999). They note that:
“A simulation, by definition, involves a similarity relation yet, as in the case o f  a 
model’s predictions mapping on to world, we may be able to simulate the behaviour o f  
phenomena without necessarily knowing that the simulated behaviour was produced in 
the same way as it occurred in nature.” (Morgan & Morrison, 1999, p.29)
143
Chapter 4
Figure 4.7: Snapshots from a simulation showing the intersection, unification 
and decay of two interlocked loops. The accompanying caption reads: “Note 
that when the united loop Anally collapses to a point and annihilates, there is 
sufficient energy available to create a transient’ new loop, just as in the long- 
string intercommuting case above (R. Battye & E. P. Shellard)” Source URL: 
http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/user/gr/public/cs interact.html
So here again, we have evidence that computer simulations can offer “insights” and be 
“quite enlightening” even when a particular configuration is unlikely to happen in a 
cosmological setting. The Cambridge team are keen to point out that in order to obtain a 
more accurate and more detailed description of the evolution of cosmic strings, it is 
necessary to use high-resolution numerical simulations. For example, figure 4.8 below is a 
snapshot of a simulation of an initial string box containing “a configuration o f strings such 
as one would expect to find after a phase transition in the early universe.” The computer 
model then evolves this initial box, by using the laws of motion o f the strings to determine 
how it should look at a future time. This process is repeated for a large number of 
timesteps then converted into frames and combined to form movies.
Figure 4.8: “A snapshot o f a 
typical initial string box. Notice 
that the displayed box is only a 
fraction o f  the total simulation 
box. (C. Martins & E. P. 
Shellard) ” Taken from 
Cambridge Cosmology, a 
website created by the 
Department of Applied 
Mathematics and Theoretical 
Physics at the University of 
Cambridge.





These simulations are very difficult to perform, and require extremely long CPU times. 
Thus, the Cambridge team remark that, “one of the aims in performing numerical 
simulations of the evolution of cosmic string networks is to subsequently use the resulting 
information as an input to build (relatively) simpler analytic models that reproduce (in an 
averaged sense) the crucial properties of these objects.”
Thus, the comments and examples presented here suggest that computer 
simulations do provide many physicists with useful insights even when their configurations 
may be unlikely in a cosmological setting. The simulations are used to build simpler 
analytic models that are useful in making quantitative predictions about the implications of 
e.g. cosmic strings. This provides additional supporting evidence for Koponen’s contention 
that “physics does not require strong realist interpretations; more important than truth are 
the empirical reliability of knowledge.” (2006, draft, p. 15). I will continue with my 
exploration of issues surrounding visualisation, analogy and computer simulations in 
section 4.8 by presenting material from my semi-structured interview with Professor Sir 
Michael Berry. In particular, I will present data on Prof. Berry’s experience of using 
computer simulations to hone his already well-developed geometrical intuition.
4.8 Can Computer Simulations Help Physicists Develop a Geometrical 
Intuition?
As mentioned in chapter 2, I pursued several interesting findings from the on-line 
questionnaire via follow-up e-mail exchanges with 13 questionnaire respondents, a case 
study of Dr. Lawson’s work, and an interview with Prof. Berry. During my interview with 
Prof. Berry I asked if visually representing and expressing different phenomena actually 
provides him with a better understanding of it himself. He said it did, adding:
“... representing phase using colour. N ow  when you do that you get... very immediate 
representations. In my case it’s w aves... we discovered many things from using these 
pictures, they were visually obvious -  and when we saw them, we said ‘well we 
hadn’t realised the equations had that in them’, then we went and understood it 
mathematically. But this is all within the world o f  theory. It’s not like looking at a 
picture o f  something that you haven’t seen before, a picture that comes from nature.”
Berry’s distinction between pictures confined to the world of theory and pictures that come 
from nature could be compared to Miller’s (2000, p.310) distinction between 
“visualizability (visual images generated from scientific theories)” and “visualization 
(visual images abstracted from phenomena we have witnessed in the world of perceptions”
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discussed in sections 1.1 &1.4). Prof. Berry is very keen to emphasise that his pictures are 
mathematical abstractions: “entirely in the world o f theory” as he explains:
“You’ve got mathematics which is expressed compactly as equations, but the content 
is...very densely coded. Elegant, beautiful, but densely coded. Our formulae are often 
wiser than we are. And indeed by looking at the pictures and observing that certain 
features are separate when we thought they would be co-incident with each other we 
get a new understanding.”
Prof. Berry says, “it is part of the process o f understanding and making discoveries.
It has been with us to look at pictures and see things in them which we hadn’t 
expected. So it’s not just presenting something I know already. It’s part o f the 
process.” Again, to quote Miller (2000, p.324) on this issue: “The partially 
interpreted symbols in scientific theories can then attain meaning of a descriptive and 
depictive sort. The accompanying visual imagery is effective in problem solving and 
can have truth value.”
I asked Prof. Berry: “So they’re generative? You come up with new ideas?”
He responded: “Exactly. I wouldn’t say it’s a HUGE part of the process. I mean 
visualizing is. But [computer simulations are] a part of the process.” I probed deeper, 
asking: “so do they help you to develop a geometrical intuition as to what’s going 
on with the equations?” Berry replied:
“Exactly. Exactly. Now people are very different in this. There are physicists that I 
enormously respect that have made huge contributions that don’t think visually at all. I 
find that very strange because I do [think visually]. Actually I say I find it strange, it 
took a while for me to leam it. And that might be an unexpected thing. Because you 
think of visualising as something even children might do. I mean it might be, but you 
can lose i t ... I used to think completely algebraically and linearly - - 1 still do, I mean 
that’s part of the work clearly - - but that was all I did when I first came to Bristol in 
my 20s. But I learned that there was a culture here of pictures - - there was a visual 
culture - - long before computers, people thought visually - - they would draw 
diagrams and as they talked they would move their hands - - and I found this very 
attractive and I learned it. And it came naturally to me. But it was in my 30s that it 
really flourished. And I moved into the kind of physics where geometry helps. So it’s 
now completely interiorised.”
Prof. Berry’s recollections suggest that, with practice and guidance, one can learn to be 
part of a visual culture even if  one has an initial predisposition for a non-visual mode of 
thought. To quote Dennet (1990, p299), “conceiving of something complex” like a 
mathematical structure, is a matter of learning your way around, “a ‘space’ you must 
construct in your mind”. By navigating through these conceptual spaces, one attains
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“conceptual fluency” (ibid.) However, “getting to that level of fluency can be very 
difficult” (ibid). In Prof. Berry’s case, although this new visual culture came naturally to 
him it was ten years before “it really flourished”, i.e. before he had truly attained 
“conceptual fluency”. Having established the important role that computer simulations 
play in research, I will now address the issue o f using computer simulations in 
communication, as promotional tools.
4.9 Just Pretty Pictures? Or Just Making Good Science Look Good?
Henderson tells us that:
“For those engaged with drawing, painting, or mechanical drafting, how they see their 
world is strongly tied to the learned conventions o f  rendering it. Engineers who 
generate and manipulate visual renditions o f  objects do so using the conventions o f  
drafting. But daily work is not school; work habits also play a major part in the 
construction o f  engineers’ visual culture.” (Henderson, 1995, p. 198)
As mentioned in section 4.6.2, Henderson’s work on the visual culture of engineers refers 
to renderings in perspective used to generate financial and organisational support for 
design and commercial promotion “drawn by illustrators, not engineers -  who have been 
known to refer to them scornfully as ‘pretty pictures. ’” (Henderson, 1995, p.203). Some 
physicists and engineers receive similar scientific training, e.g. in the use of sketches, 
physical models, computer models, limiting case analysis etc. Thus, it is not entirely 
surprising a similar attitude towards ‘pretty pictures’ was expressed by three physicists 
who responded to my questionnaire.88 Colourful renderings and nice visualisations, made 
with the latest computer graphics and animation technologies, are seen by some as 
superficial representations, used in a promotional capacity - either to generate financial and 
organisational support for their research, or to encourage an interest in physics among 
novices. Phys_168 highlights the journal N ature’s like of colourful visualisations 
remarking that: “ ... a nice (that means made with the latest computer graphics and 
animation technologies) visualisation is the best way to get grant money and/or publish 
something in journals like Nature.” He added that: "computer simulation can be used both 
for serious research and nice-picture making.” As Gooding notes, “the appeal o f seeing via 
representations that appear to depict remains strong even when the objects depicted have 
no basis in any possible human experience.” (Gooding, 2004b, p. 16). This is illustrated by
88 In fact, Phys, 168 holds a BSc and MSc in Radiophysics and Eletronics, while Phys_215 holds a BEng in 
Electrical/Electronic engineering. We met Phys_215 in section 4.6.2 when discussing the disadvantages of 
computer simulations. He said computer simulations “can sometimes have a harmful effect - people get 
carried away with generating ‘pretty pictures’ and they can become lazy. Rather than seeking to understand, 
derive and simplify formulae, they just stick them into a program.”
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a recent controversy regarding the depiction of electron orbitals in the scientific journal 
Nature, (cf. Humphreys, 1999, Zuo et. al., 1999, Scerri, 2001). Similarly, Phys_79, who 
works on condensed matter physics, commented that: “Visualisation is just a very nice 
marketing tool for physics. It came as well fitted to the visualisation of complex systems 
fractals and old classical physics recently extending into chaos theories (e.g. the celebrated 
Mandelbrot pictures) but visualisation is meaningless for n-dimensional spaces Lie 
algebras in QM etc... ” In these areas, physicists cannot abstract visual images from the 
world of sensory experience, they must rely on their theory to generate visual images of 
mathematical structures.
The use of computer simulations as so-called ‘marketing tools’ is not a trivial matter. 
It is an extremely important issue. In order to acquire funding, physicists first need to have 
their research understood, accepted, and published in peer reviewed journals, then in 
popular science magazines where they receive support of the educated and interested 
masses, and last but not least, by experts and non-experts who sit on funding boards. As 
the sociologist of science Bruno Latour remarks in his book, Science in Action (1987, 
p. 104): “ You may have written a definitive paper... but this paper will not become 
definitive if  others do not take it up and use it as a matter of fact later on. You need them to 
make your paper a decisive one.”
Computer simulations can be vital tools in enlisting support for one’s research. In 
Fleck’s (1935/1979) notion of discursive and material means of communication, facts are 
consolidated as knowledge in their translation from the language in which they are 
represented among specialists to language suitable for a lay audience. As Fleck put it: 
“Certainty, simplicity, vividness originate in popular knowledge... Therein lies the general 
epistemological significance of popular science.” (Fleck, 1935/1979, p .l 15). Physicists use 
of computer simulations to market their research and consolidate facts as knowledge is an 
extremely important issue and worthy of further investigation. I raised this issue with Prof. 
Berry. He said:
“... I do like pictures. I like them to look good, whatever the reason is for using 
them... [My view] is expressed very nicely in the title o f  the lecture that Felice 
Frankel gave... '‘Making good science look good*9... It’s not a question o f  pretty
89 Prof. Berry is referring to Felice Frankel’s (2002) book “Envisioning Science: The Design and Craft of the 
Science Image” in which she discusses how she (an artist) works with scientists to make good science look 
good. When I interviewed Prof. Berry he had just returned from an Image and Meaning conference which 
Felice Frankel helped to organise. The title of Prof. Berry’s talk was Visual Thinking in Physics. His 
contributors were George Barbastathis, David Kaiser (moderator) and Melissa Franklin
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pictures implying some kind of triviality to impress somebody. I like my pictures to 
always look good, whatever the context.” 90 
Prof. Berry’s pictures have appeared in scientific journals, popular science magazines, and 
at Science As Art exhibitions. He has undoubtedly succeeded in making good science look 
good. In section 4.10 we will see how he has done this.
4.10 Presenting scientific pictures to experts and non-experts.
As mentioned in chapter 1, a central research question of this project concerns how 
analogies, but also computer simulations and images, are used in different contexts. For 
example, how they are used between experts, between experts and intermediates, and 
between experts and novices on informal and formal occasions. In the next chapter I will 
present findings from my on-line questionnaire on the various forms of analogies used in 
different contexts. In chapters 7 and 8 I discuss Dr. Lawson’s use of analogies to 
communicate particle physics between experts in sub-disciplines related to the design of 
particle accelerators.
During my semi-structured interview with Prof. Berry I enquired into whether or 
how he changes his images when he presents them to different audiences, in different 
media. For example, to his colleagues in academic papers, to his students during lectures, 
to non-physicists in popular science magazines, and even to artists in competitions such as 
the Visions o f  Science Photographic Awards. I asked:
“So you’re using these images in quite different contexts: in academic papers, in 
popular science and then right into the art-science side of things. Ahm... how do you, 
sort of, tailor them to different audiences? Do the captions change? Or do the colours 
ever change?”
Prof. Berry explained:
“... let’s imagine I’m giving a lecture. Then for technical audiences I have pictures but 
I have all kinds of arrows pointing on them and I have little equations and little 
comments, labelling where the axes are and so on. When I present it to members of the
90 The full quotation reads: “Well I don’t do money. I mean I don’t need much for what I do. The Royal 
Society supports my research and they give me more money than I need, it’s not a lot. And as a theorist I 
don’t require a lot. I do like pictures. I like them to look good, whatever the reason is for using 
them.. .Frankly I find it a fairly unattractive stance that somehow there’s a slight - - implied in this view that 
you’re reporting to me - - there’s a slight sense of superiority - - that pretty pictures don’t really have any 
place in science but these fools give you money so you might want to impress them. I have a completely 
different view - - completely. Which is expressed very nicely in the title of the lecture that Felice Frankel 
gave... ‘Making good science look good’. And that’s a lovely title. And that’s exactly the view I have. And 
the other way she expresses it, which again is exactly my thinking. Is that her project is called Envisioning 
Science. So that’s the way I think about it. It’s not a question of pretty pictures implying some kind of 
triviality to impress somebody. So I like my pictures to always look good in whatever contexts they are. The 
fact that some of my best pictures are published - - they’re all published in scientific papers.”
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public, I sometimes use the same pictures but I strip out that technical stuff so there 
are no distractions. If I have to say something I’ll say it in words. So that’s the main 
difference. The pictures are often the same actually, interestingly enough, but it’s the 
extra material that one puts in that does exactly that.”
Prof. Berry subsequently furnished me with examples to illustrate this. In figures 4.9 and 
4.10 below, he depicts conical refraction. When presenting it to an audience of experts he 
includes technical details that he is quite sure his audience will be able to absorb. For 
example, he locates and labels the focal image plane lying between the entrance face and 
exit face of the crystal, the radius of the light beam as it passes through the focal image 
plane and the radius of the cylinder o f light as it emerges from the crystal. His three 
dimensional structure, consisting of shaded planes with clearly marked accompanying 
labels enables the expert viewer to easily identify the key components.
emerging from the 





slab focaf /mage p/ane
entrance face
inc iden t beam
Figure 4.9: Example of picture Berry prepared for an audience of 
experts in his field.
In contrast, when presenting conical refraction to an audience of non-experts, Prof. Berry 
strips away all the technical details in an effort to ensure that the audience is not distracted 
nor over-whelmed by what they see before them. Thus, as you can see in figure 4.10 on the 
next page, the entrance face, internal focal plane and exit face are still identifiable but have 
not been labelled nor shaded separately. Prof. Berry employs red and yellow colours to 
good effect, making fig 4.10 more eye-catching and it’s content more digestible for non­




prediction of internal conical refraction





Figure 4.10: Example of picture Berry prepared for 
an audience of non-experts
However, he is also aware that the immediacy of his pictures may lead some non-experts to 
think that the pictures of abstract mathematical things are un-adulterated pictures of 
phenomena that exist in the physical world. Thus, Prof. Berry often deliberately uses 
artificial colours to prevent people from interpreting his pictures literally.
4.11 Berry’s use of artificial colours to prevent a literal interpretation.
Berry’s Random Phases picture (shown in figure 4.11 on the next page) won 1st prize in 
the Science as Art category of the Visions o f Science Photographic Awards in 2002. The 
caption for the Visions o f  Science Photographic Awards tells us that Random Phases is a: 
Interestingly, Prof. Berry explained that he “submitted it as part of Science Concepts, but 
the committee re-classified it as Science as Art... they say it was cheerful.” To those who 
may wonder why he used such garish colours, Berry explains that he: “didn’t want the 
colours to look natural, because they’re not natural colours. And by making them 
completely saturated - - that’s the technical term, there’s no white in it - - it guaranteed that 
they looked artificial which is what I wanted... I wanted them to look artificial because I 
didn’t want the system of visualization to be taken literally as a picture of something 
One could contrast Prof. Berry’s philosophically sophisticated approach with Richard 
Catlow’s (1996) use of simulation-based visualization to ‘model reality’.
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Figure 4.11: Random Phases, by 
Professor Sir Michael Berry.
This image won 1st prize in the 
Science as Art category of the 
Visions of Science Photographic 
awards in 2002.
http://www.visions-of-science.co.uk 
Visions of Science caption reads: 
“Computer generated image of the 
phases of several interfering waves 
travelling in different directions. 
Phase is colour-coded by hue. Points 
at which the colours meet are ‘phase 
singularities’, where the interfering 
waves cancel each other out. ”
Figure 4.12: Bouncing & Spreading, 
by Professor Sir Michael Berry.
This image won 3rd prize in the Science 
Concepts category of the Visions of 
Science Photographic Awards in 2002. 
http://www.visions-of-science.co.uk
Visions of Science Caption reads: 
“Image generated by computer from 
the Schrddinger equation, illustrating 
wave-particle duality, a key concept in 
quantum physics. The image shows a 
wave, representing a quantum particle, 
bouncing between two walls (at the left 
and right sides o f the picture) The 
probability o f finding the particle is 
colour-coded, with red the most 
probable, and black the least probable. 
Initially the wave is localised and 
moving to the right (bottom of picture). 
It hits the wall and interferes with its 
reflection. Then the wave moves to the 
left and spreads before it gets reflected 




As I have shown in this chapter, there are some interesting findings on practicing 
physicists’ experiences of using computer simulations as visualization tools in their 
research and as communication tools when presenting their work to experts and non­
experts. I will now address each research question set out in the introduction of this 
chapter.
4.12.1 To what extent do these physicists employ computer simulations in their 
research?
In section 4.1 I showed that there was a skew towards using computer simulations as 
visualization tools, with 48.2% of the sample selecting between "5 ” and “7/all the time ” 
on the 7-point scale. In fact, the largest single group, 22.7% of the total, selected “7/all the 
tim e”. However, as discussed in sections 4.3 to 4.5, some respondents pointed out that 
they did not use computer simulations primarily for visualization -  they used them as 
means of calculating outcomes or designing equipment. The visual rendering of the output 
was often a useful by-product.
4.12.2 In what contexts do these physicists employ computer simulations?
An analysis of the qualitative replies revealed several common themes accounting for the 
prevalence of computer simulations in some areas and their paucity in other areas. In 
sections 4.2 -  4.5 I showed that computer simulations are often used if  the research 
involves unusual geometries, several dimensions, numerous interacting parameters, huge 
search spaces, non-linear equations, complicated hardware design or experimental design, 
microscopic or extraterrestrial systems which are impossible (or extremely costly) to 
experiment upon. Computer simulations tend not to be used in areas that are easy to 
visualise (on account of the scale or the limited number of interacting processes), or, on the 
contrary, are at the edge of current theories because one lacks the equations and laws 
needed in the computer code. As I showed in sections 4.9 and 4.10, computer simulations 
are also particularly useful as a means o f marketing physics: enlisting support from 
funding bodies, peers, and the general public by making good science look good.
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4.12.3 What reasons do these physicists provide for not using simulations in their 
research?
In section 4.3 I explained that most physicists who made selections in the negative end of 
the scale when replying quantitatively to question 4, explained in their written comments 
that:
(i) they didn’t “need to” use simulations as visualization tools because their work was 
easy to visualise;
(ii) they used simulations as “number crunchers” rather than visualization tools;
(iii) they did not have the time, funding or skills required to create simulations;
(iv) their work was observational, they dealt with “*real* data”.
However, two physicists were dismissive of the value of computer simulations because in 
their view simulations promoted a ‘cartoon view of reality’ and replaced the real world 
with a ‘virtual’ one. But for the most part, respondents were of the opinion that the 
advantages of using computer simulations outweighed the disadvantages.
4.12.4 What are the possible disadvantages of employing computer simulations in 
research?
In section 4.6 I presented respondents written comments on the possible disadvantages of 
computer simulations. Many respondents stressed that computer simulations must always 
be used in conjunction with other physical methods, where possible. The models should 
constantly be matched with experimental data. The experimental data in turn should be 
tailored to the computer models in order to test its internal predictive ability. If one is 
simulating colliding galaxies, it is not possible to carry out ‘real’ world experiments, 
however the grounding physical assumptions made when building the model, should have 
empirical reliability where possible. Computer simulations are powerful discovery tools. 
They must be used cautiously, informed by studies o f this kind that draws on practitioners’ 
own experiences of what works and what doesn’t work.
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4.12.5 Do these physicists believe that computer simulations have strengthened 
physicists’ visualization capabilities (a) in their own research area? (b) in physics in 
general?
As shown in section 4.4, a majority of respondents felt that computer simulations 
“definitely have” helped strengthen physicists’ visualization capabilities both in 
respondents’ own research area (51.6%) and in physics in general (52.5%). In section
4.5 I presented the main reasons given by respondents. To recap, I found that computer 
simulations:
(i) produce visual representations of complex geometries, which would be 
extremely difficult to mentally visualize;
(ii) allow one to follow the time evolution of complex systems; and to visualise 
solutions of equations;
(iii) exposure to complex geometries and evolving systems may help to strengthen 
one’s ability to generate visualizations unaided by a computer;
(iv) computer simulations allow one to tweak parameters and probe functions 
systematically, allowing for greater understanding of the system.
(v) provide a laboratory with a type o f control not possible in real physical systems. 
This virtual laboratory allows physicists to perform experiments that are too 
expensive, technically difficult or physically impossible to physically perform. 
Visualization is central in some of these instances and merely a by-product in 
others;
The minority of respondents who made selections on the negative end of the scale 
explained that computer simulations are used in numerical modelling, for example, not as 
visualization tools, but instead to calculate outcomes. Thus, they do not strengthen 
visualization capabilities. Also, they said computer simulations may have a negative affect 
on some individuals: acting as a mental crutch it may weaken their innate visualization 
abilities, making them lazy and discouraging them from pursuing analytical solutions.
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4.12.6 Can computer simulations provide physicists with insights when 
conceptualising and communicating physics?
Many respondents were keen to emphasise that computer simulations offer little or no 
physical insight if  they are used as ‘black boxes’ where the user has no knowledge of the 
internal predictability of the model or the mathematical foundations upon which the model 
is built. However, when used in conjunction with mathematical analysis, computer 
simulations can provide physicists with insights which deepen their theoretical 
understanding. In this chapter we’ve seen several examples of this. In particular, the 
experiences of Phys_ 183, Phys_119, and Phys_89 discussed in section 4.7. In addition, 
interview material shows (cf. section 4.8) that Prof. Berry has made use of the generative 
power of computer simulations: highlighting surprising facets of the underlying 
mathematics which Prof. Berry came to understand in depth after conducting further 
mathematical analysis. In fact, Prof. Berry appears to have used computer simulations to 
further develop his geometrical intuition to the point where he has achieved conceptual 
fluency in navigating through abstract spaces constructed in the mind.
In chapters 5 and 6 I present data on my respondents’ use of analogy to 
conceptualise their own research and communicate physics in different contexts. Then in 
chapter 8 I show how Dr. Lawson used analogies and synthesis to bridge conceptual 
divides between expert practitioners in sub-disciplines related to the design of particle 
accelerators. My research shows that, like computer simulations, good analogies can offer 





Physicists’ Use of Analogy 
to Conceptualise and Communicate Physics
“I quite often use the analogy of cold atoms to try to tackle problems in other 
areas. Cold atoms are a very clean and well understood research topic where I 
have experience in, and its results are widely applicable also to other areas.”
Phys_35 91
“Kelvin-Helmholtz instability/ pouring 
cream into the coffee, intersection of two 
rivers, uprising cigarette smoke, turbulence 
causing stall o f the airplane wings.”
Phys_103 92
“The analogy of the 
gravitational mass quadrupole 
moment of a body, and its 
tensor of inertia.”
Phys_120 93
‘I am looking at a parallel plate resonator. The analogy I make is 
with a cheese sandwich and a stereo. The Cheese is the resonator, 
the Bread is the substrate and the Butter is the superconducting 
film under test. I apply a signal from a speaker to the cheese 
sandwich to build a standing wave (like you see when the tide is 
going out of an estuary) inside the cheese. Data is obtained by 
placing a microphone at the other end of the cheese sandwich. 
The amount o f signal that is lost is mainly due to losses in the 
butter. In this way I can compare my cheese sandwich to other 
peoples cheese sandwiches.”
Phys_193
91 Phys_35, a 33 year old, male, post-doctoral researcher, whose research interests include, “Cold atomic 
systems: degenerate Fermi and Bose gases; Bose-Einstein condensation; Atoms in lower dimensional 
systems (D<3); Quantum Information: Implementation of a quantum logic using cold atoms; Principles of 
non-classical light sources; Solid State Physics: Quantum Dot Materials; Vertical Cavity Lasers;”
92 Phys_103: a 28 year old, female, research associate, whose research interests include, “Space Physics, 
satellite data analysis of the Earth's magnetosphere + numerical simulations.”
93 Phys_120: a 52 year old, male, senior lecturer in Physics, whose research interests include, “Gravity, 
Gravity gradiometry, Gravity Wave detection.”
94 Phys_193: a 31 year old, male, PhD student, whose research interests include, “High Temperature 




This chapter focuses on physicists’ use of analogy in their research. The data stem from the 
responses of 225 physicists to section 3 of my on-line questionnaire, follow-up e-mail 
correspondence with a select sample of 13 questionnaire respondents, and my semi­
structured interview with Prof. Sir Michael Berry. I address the following research 
questions:
□ To what extent do these physicists employ analogy in their research?
□ To what extent do these physicists generate original analogies in their research?
□ If  they do not employ analogy in their research, what reasons do they give?
□ Do these physicists use different forms of analogy in different contexts?
□ What are the characteristics of a good analogy?
I should out at the outset of this chapter that these physicists are not necessarily 
representative of the entire community of physicists in the UK and Ireland. They probably 
chose to respond to my questionnaire because they had a particular interest in the role of 
visualization and/or analogy and/or computer simulations in the conceptualisation and 
communication of physics. However, my as my main aim is to explore the various forms 
of analogy employed in different contexts, it is actually advantageous to have a sample 
which has much experience of using analogy to conceptualise and communicate physics. 
The views o f these ‘analogy enthusiasts’ are balanced by the views of physicists who were 
prompted to respond to the questionnaire because they were interested in issues 
surrounding visualization and/or computer simulations. Thus, I believe that the range of 
responses obtained via the on-line questionnaire is extremely valuable.
In this chapter I will show that there was a skew towards using analogy in research 
but not towards generating original analogies. Thus, most respondents recognise that their 
analogies are drawn from a stockpile of analogies which already exist in their respective 
research areas. Some respondents appeared to hold a narrow interpretation of analogy that 
excluded formal, mathematical analogies. I suggest that some branches of physics may be 
more open to the use of analogical reasoning than others. I also uncover certain journals’ 
apparent censorship of creative language. I question the usefulness of this interventionist 
approach if it is clear that a physicist is using intelligently constructed, creative language, 
as a means of marketing their research to peers in order to enlist support.
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5.1 Ambiguity Over How to Define Terms Like Research & Analogy
By my definition ‘research’ consists of a blend of private cognition and public 
communication: data interpretation, theory generation, experiment design, hypothesis 
testing, scientific discovery, literature reviewing, physics-based conversations with 
colleagues, presentation of one’s work at conference level, etc. However, the ‘public’ or 
‘official’ view of research emphasises the external, systematic and technical aspects, over 
the personal, mental, interpretative aspects. It is not particularly surprising then that some 
questionnaire respondents experienced difficulty interpreting what I meant by the term 
‘research’. For example, in response to Q3 "Do you use analogies in your research?” 
Phys_224, a 34 year old, female, post-doctoral research associate, whose research interests 
include “modelling solar cells” indicated that she sometimes (i.e. 4 out o f 7) used analogies 
in her research. She provided two examples: “Flow of water for current carrier dynamics. 
Elastic band three dimensional grids for atomic lattices.” When asked in Q.3d “I f  you don't 
use analogies in your research, is there a specific reason why you don't”? She replied: 
“(Not sure about this question). The above analogies I use to help me think about and 
explain to others what I might be thinking, I don’t use them in the research as such.” (ibid.) 
Thus while Phys_224’s comments fit with my own definition o f ‘research’ she appears to 
interpret ‘research’ as being similar to that which is presented in scientific journals, where 
the scaffolding used in the early stages of cognition is usually edited out of the texts.
Literature in the History and Philosophy of Science, Cognitive Science, Science & 
Technology Studies, and Science Education suggests a broad interpretation of the term 
analogy. Holyoak and Thagard’s (1995) comments provide a good summary:
“Scientific analogies have at least four distinguishable uses: discovery, development, 
evaluation, and exposition. The most exciting is discovery, when analogy contributes 
to the formation o f  a new hypothesis. After a hypothesis has been invented, analogy 
may contribute to its further theoretical or experimental development. In addition, 
analogy can play a role in the evaluation o f  a hypothesis, as revealed in the arguments 
given for or against its acceptance. Finally, analogies are often used in the exposition 
o f science, when new ideas are conveyed to other people by comparing them with old 
ones.” (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995, p. 189)
However, as outlined in chapter 2, data from the on-line questionnaire indicated that many 
physicists have a much narrower interpretation of what constitutes an analogy. It is as 
though the term ‘analogy9 has been contaminated though its associations with poetics,
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popular science, politics etc.95 For many physicists, metaphor, and to a lesser extent 
analogy, are synonymous with ambiguity, inaccuracy and dangerously seductive 
simplicity; they believe that physicists must be wary o f being misled by these incomplete 
descriptions of the world. Thus, many of the physicists who propound this view would 
probably not share science writer Martin Krieger’s views that:
“ ... to accuse the physicist o f employing everyday models and metaphors is no more 
interesting to the physicist than accusing the novelist o f  writing fictions and 
employing genre conventions... ” (Krieger, 1992, p. 100)
While most respondents happily admit to employing analogy as a pedagogic tool when 
communicating physics with novices, many physicists are keen to emphasise that they use 
something “stronger than analogies” in their research. For example, Phys_185 (a 45 year 
old, female research fellow, whose research interests include quantum computing, quantum 
many body physics, phase transitions, and physics of information) explains: “What I use is 
often stronger than analogies, in that the underlying mathematical description is the same 
or similar in the first approximation. For example, harmonic waves appear all over the 
place in very different physical situations.” 96 This description is in line with what Hesse 
(1974) terms ‘formal analogies’. According to Hesse (1974, p.90) the function of formal 
analogies is: “to aid the imagination in understanding formal relationships, and to enable 
transfer of mathematical results from one system to another irrespective of subject matter.” 
Thus, some physicists, while wishing to distance themselves from the term ‘analogy ’ were 
actually providing examples of what would be termed ‘form al analogies ’ in the fields of 
history and philosophy of science, and cognitive science. However, it is not surprising that 
practicing physicists were slightly uncertain how to interpret or define the term ‘analogy’: 
there is no standard meaning for the term; it varies both within and across the cognitive- 
historical-psychological disciplines (c.f. Hesse, 1974, p.92)
Phys_221 (a 24 year old, male PhD student involved in quantum computing) offers 
excellent understanding into the difficulty physicists have in interpreting the term 
‘analogy ’ as he explains in the Additional Comments section of the questionnaire: 
“Analogies in physics tend to take two different forms. One is close the usual 
meaning, i.e. this thing is 'like' that thing, maybe it will behave the same. In these 
cases, the analogy would give an idea, which is then later tested with rigorous maths.
The other form o f  analogy is where the same maths can be used to describe two 
situations. In this case the meaning o f 'analogy’ is much stricter: any phenomena in
95 In fact, use o f  the term ‘m etaphor’ w as deliberately avoided after p ilo t studies found that it had negative, 
‘flu ffy ’ connotations for som e physicists.
96 Other physicists referred to harmonic w aves and LCR circuits as exem plary analogies how ever.
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one situation _w ill_ have a counterpart in the second, as the maths for the two is 
identical. The analogy allows you to use the physical picture attached to one to 
visualise the other. A good example is the use o f spin-1/2 systems to represent any two 
level system. A superposition o f two atomic levels can then be thought o f as the spin 
pointing in the x or y directions.” (Phys_221)
Phys_221’s description sounds similar to Nersessian’s (1992a, p .17) account o f Maxwell’s 
view of analogy. She tells us that: “According to Maxwell, a physical analogy provides 
both a set o f mathematical relationships and an imagistic representation of the structure of 
those relationships drawn from a ‘source’ domain to be applied in analysing a ‘target’ 
domain about which there is only partial knowledge.”
The difficulty in defining analogy was also underscored by the comments of 
Phys_190, a 44 year old, senior lecturer in physics and astronomy. She was uncertain 
whether or not she employed analogy in her research because some of the examples of 
analogy provided in the questionnaire were not, to her mind, analogies, but, “a shorthand 
description of a specific set of mathematical assumptions.” In the Additional Comments 
section of the questionnaire she put forward her alternative perspective saying:
“Not sure I agree with some o f your examples o f  ‘analogy in research’. A ‘billiard 
ball model’ isn't to my mind an analogy - it's a shorthand description o f  a specific set 
o f mathematical assumptions. The same goes for the cosmic string vs guitar string”
In her experience, analogies are: “very seldom helpful *in the research* (but very useful 
when explaining research to outsiders, e.g. giving talks to astronomical societies - I use 
analogies all the time then).” She added a note o f caution, saying: “Getting too wedded to 
analogy in research can be dangerous, since analogies are seldom precise.”
Thus, in follow-up email exchanges with a select sample of questionnaire 
respondents, I pursued this issue, asking whether analogical reasoning is “regarded as a 
modelling activity that constitutes a substantial method o f  scientific innovation?” Phys_2, 
a PhD student, whose research interests include: “Vertical cavity devices, communications, 
high output devices,” said, “yes, analogies are a very important factor in both 
understanding and learning, it can make even the most specialised of topics open to all.” 
Phys_202, a senior lecturer in geophysics also said “yes” because in his experience it 
“allows us to try to explain in simple physical terms what is happening, and in perhaps 
taking developments from one area of endeavour to another.” Phys_185, who had said in 
the on-line questionnaire that what she uses is “often stronger than analogies, in that the 
underlying mathematical description is the same or similar in the first approximation” said 
in a follow-up e-mail, “I think I interpreted ‘analogy’ more narrowly than you intended.”
161
Chapter 5
It is from comments like these that I have concluded that many respondents appear 
(initially) to hold quite a narrow interpretation of analogy, excluding abstract, 
mathematical analogies - what Hesse (1974) would call formal analogies. In this chapter 
and the next I show that different forms of analogy are employed by physicists in different 
contexts and that the appropriateness of the analogy depends especially on the level of 
expertise of the target audience and the tone of the discussion.
5.2 Degree to which respondents use analogy in their research.
As discussed in chapter 2, section 3 of the on-line questionnaire opened with this 
statement:
"Some physicists use analogy in their research.
- e.g. using a billiard ball model when considering the movement o f charge through a solid;
- e.g. comparing ultrasonic transmission down a rod, to an electrical transmission line;
- e.g. comparing the vibrations o f a ’cosmic string' to the vibrations o f a guitar string;
- e.g. Schrodinger's equation is derived by using Hamilton’s mathematically unified treatment o f 
geometrical optics and analytical mechanics;
- e.g. Sheldon Glashow has remarked that he ‘was led to the group SU(2) xU (l) by analogy with 
the approximate isospin hypercharge group which characterises strong interactions ’. ”
In an effort to encourage respondents to take a broad interpretation of ‘analogy’, the 
exemplar analogies ranged from simple, pictorial analogies to more complex and abstract, 
mathematical analogies. The first two examples were given by physicists who contributed 
to my master’s dissertation (Muldoon, 2002); the third is derived from Brian Greene’s 
best-selling popular science book The Elegant Universe (1999); the fourth is from a paper 
in the European Journal of Physics (Tzanakis, 1988); the fifth is extracted from Sheldon 
Glashow’s Nobel Lecture (Glashow, 1979).
Respondents were then asked: “Q3. Do you use analogies in your research?” As 
indicated by Figure 5.1 on the next page, the use of analogy in research was widespread 
among the physicists who responded to the on-line questionnaire. 52 respondents (23.1% 
of the sample) said they use analogy “all the time/7” in their research. This is over three 
times as many as those that claimed to “never/1 ” use analogy in research. As mentioned at 
the outset o f this chapter, I do not wish to generalise from this sample to all o f physics. I 
will use the quantitative and qualitative data to provide a much needed account of the 
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never/1 2 3 4 5 6 7/all the
time
Respondents selected from 7-point scale ranging from "1/never" to "7/all the
time"
Figure 5.1: Chart showing the degree to which respondents employ analogies in research
5.3 Reasons given for not using analogy in research.
The physicists who did not use analogy in their research gave the following reasons:
5.3.1 Not necessary as work is already imaginable:
For many respondents, the use of alternative problem solving and visualization techniques 
makes analogy unnecessary. For example, Phys_13, a lecturer involved in “far-infrared 
optics, microwave background astronomy, telescope design,” said, “much of it is classical - 
straightforward to imagine” Similarly, Phys_34 said: “Most o f my work can be seen 
visually as an outflow from a star so there are no advantages to using an analogy.” 
Phys_65, a senior lecturer, said: “The work I'm doing directly is building and testing 




5.3.2 Too difficult to formulate:
On the other hand, some respondents said that the nature of their work means that 
analogies are difficult to formulate. For example, Phys_18, a 43 year old research 
associate, whose research interests include: “high energy astrophysics, stellar evolution in 
particular massive stars, starburst regions” said, “it is often too difficult or not very useful 
to formulate appropriate analogies that describe a certain problem.” In the experiences of 
Phys_ 143, a 22 year old, PhD student: “The ’emergence’ of superconductivity from simple 
systems means that making analogies is more effort than not.”
5.3.3 Only use ‘analogy’ when explaining research to non-specialists:
Phys_82, a 24 year old, research associate, whose research interests include, “optical 
interconnects, optical computing, computer memory,” said in his experience, you “don't 
tend to use analogies in day-today research as your colleagues should be able to grasp the 
concepts with out them, its more needed when talking to non-colleagues.” Similarly, 
Phys_123, a 47 year old, Professor of Physics, whose research interests include molecular 
spectroscopy, said: “I use it more in explaining my research to others (particularly non­
specialists).” Thus, for some physicists analogy is most appropriate and useful when 
communicating their research with novices, rather than with peers. However, one should 
consider the possibility that these physicists may not have been thinking of analogy in the 
sense of abstract mathematical analogies that other respondents mentioned using in their 
research. Instead they may have been thinking of analogy in a simplistic sense, as it is 
often used in popular science books for example.
5.3.4 Analogies are too simplistic and can be misleading:
The string theorist (and prize-winning popular science author) Brian Greene tells us that, 
“if  you relentlessly stretch a rubber membrane, sooner or later it will tear. This simple fact 
has inspired numerous physicists over the years to ask whether the same might be true of 
the spatial fabric making up the universe.” (Greene, 1999, p.265) In Greene’s experience, 
“These images have considerable explanatory power; they are used regularly by physicists 
as a visual guide in their own technical work.” (ibid. 376). However, Greene acknowledges 
the dangers of over-extending the analogy and asks, “ ... can the fabric o f spacetime rip 
apart, or is this merely a misguided notion that arises from taking the rubber membrane 
analogy too seriously?” (ibid, p.265) Although analogies can be particularly useful when 
dealing with concepts far beyond perceptual experience, such analogies can be misleading 
if taken too far. Therefore it is not surprising that some questionnaire respondents were
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overtly wary of analogy, saying it was too simplistic and misleading to be of use to them. 
However, as with section 5.3.4 above, it is not clear how they interpreted and defined 
‘analogy’. P h y s_ lll, a research student who deals with “Epitaxial Systems, Non 
Equilibrium, Probabilistic Description,” said he “Seldom use[s] analogies unless the 
similarities are uncanny. Often analogies are taken too far.” He distinguished between 
analogies and simplifications (as Phys_190 did) saying that, “a simpler description of the 
system is not an analogy, but a simplification. There are however, direct analogies, e.g. 
Mass, spring, damping is completely analogous to LCR circuits.” He concluded by saying 
that he “prefer[s] to deal with simpler versions of the system instead of divorcing it from 
its context.”
Similarly, Phys_146, a 43 year old, Senior Lecturer, whose research interests 
include, “Nuclear reaction mechanisms” said: “I'm not especially keen on analogies 
because I prefer to focus on reality and stay with what is actually happening, or as close to 
it as I can get, rather than going off track to something similar and perhaps simplistic.” 
Phys_146’s comments suggest a realist stance. However, as her research interests are in 
"nuclear reaction mechanisms” this prompts two questions: Firstly, do she and her 
colleagues not employ various phenomenological models, founded on formal analogies -  
the liquid drop model, the shell model, the compound nucleus model, the optical model -  
in order to describe scattering, fission etc.? Perhaps such formal analogies are “taken for
• 07granted”, as Phy_128’s experiences in condensed matter physics suggest. (cf. section
5.6). In his view, “in builders’ terms, in an established field the analogy is not the 
scaffolding, but the foundation.” Secondly, doesn’t the ‘correct’ experimental set up 
sometimes produce ‘unrealistic’ (but useful) results that may not exist outside the 
laboratory? (cf. Morrison, 1999, p.45). The type of model one uses to represent something 
depends upon the problem in question. For example, one may use two different models to 
represent water: (i) Diffusion or Brownian motion: which regards water as a collection of 
molecules; (ii) Water flowing through pipes: which regards water as a continuous fluid. 
Depending on one’s goals, either model could prove enlightening for a particular problem. 
Phys_146 may not have been thinking of formal mathematical analogies (though examples
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were supplied in the questionnaire) when she responded in this manner.
97 “Here a simple analogy between electrons in crystals and atoms in standing light waves caters for, say, 10- 
20% of the current theoretical research in condensed-matter physics. The pioneering work was to discover 
this analogy and to demonstrate it in experiments, the rest is follow-up and less original where the analogy is 
taken for granted.” (Phys_128)




5.4 Degree to which respondents generate original analogies.
Question 3b o f the on-line questionnaire asked: “I f  you do use analogies in your research, 
how often do you generate original analogies? ” The quantitative responses are plotted in 
figure 5.2 below.
Q3b. If you do use  analogies in your research, how often do you generate original
analogies?
never/1 2 3 4 5 6 7/all the time
Respondents selected from 7-point scale ranging from 
"1/never" to "7/all the time"
Figure 5.2: Chart showing degree to which respondents generate original analogies in 
research.
In figure 5.1 we saw that 61.8% of respondents selected between 5 and 7 when 
commenting on the degree to which they use analogy in research. However, as shown in 
figure 5.2, when commenting on the degree to which they generate original analogies. 
60.8% selected between 7 and 3 (and 82.2% selected between 7 and 4). Thus, a majority of 
respondents are aware that they mostly use an existing stockpile o f tried and tested 
analogies. This finding is not particularly surprising. The pilot study suggested that 
physicists realise that they often rely on a stockpile of conventional analogies. As Krieger 
(1992, p.74) notes: “To do physics, one participates in its practices, culture, and ideology, 
thus employing the conventional models and analogies.” However, as discussed in chapter 
1, reasoning by analogy is an iterative process, involving considerable re-structuring, prior 
to solution. As Nersessian (1995) points out:
“Of course, there are cases in which a direct analog representation for a problem 
exists, and substitution and mapping is all that is required. But, more often,
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substantive changes need to be made to the analogical source in order to fit the 
constraints o f the target problem.” (Nersessian, 1995, p.207)
Similarly, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) argue that:
“ The most cognitively complex origin o f a source comes when it is not noticed, 
retrieved, or compiled, but must be constructed. Construction may involve aspects o f  
the other three processes but goes beyond them in the extent to which the source is 
different from anything that was known to the scientist...” (1995, pp. 193-194)
According to Holyoak and Thagard, to understand the use of analogy in science, it is 
important to realise that “selection of source analogues often involves very complex 
designs and constructions that go beyond simple recall o f past cases.” (ibid.) Visual 
representations often play an important part in the construction of productive source 
analogues. These can be in the form of “mental images, diagrams on paper, or both.” 
(ibid.) Thus, generating original analogies would appear to be cognitively more complex 
than noticing analogies, although the latter task is not trivial either.
Some physicists were confused over how one could know whether or not one’s 
analogy was ‘original’ if  it had not been published. For example, Phys_18, a 43 year old 
research associate said she never used analogies in her research on “high energy 
astrophysics, stellar evolution in particular massive stars, starburst regions” because, “it is 
often too difficult or not very useful to formulate appropriate analogies that describe a 
certain problem.” In the additional comments section, she explained that she:
“found the part on analogy not so easy to answer. Although I may use analogies for 
m yself in order to understand a problem I think I have never used it in a proper 
publication so I cannot tell whether I have produced original analogies” (Phys_18)
Question 3b was intended to promote self-reflection, to enquire into whether analogies 
generated in the early stages of research actually make it into physicists’ personal 
notebooks, discussions, lab meetings, presentations and scientific articles. The hypothesis 
was that they do not, unless the similarities are uncanny and rigorously tested. It is unclear 
whether Phys_18 is questioning the “production/publication” aspect of generating original 
analogies in her research, or the “originality” aspect. Her additional comments seem to 
contradict her response to Q3d. The objective was not to focus on originality in a 
copyright sense, but to see the extent to which physicists are creative at dreaming up/ 
composing/building/generating/seeing analogies in their work; as a poet, musician or 
painter might do in their work. Phys_18’s uncertainty probably revolves around whether 
she was learning something new to her or generating something that is new to everyone. 
As mentioned in section 1.5 Gardner (1993) calls this ‘big-c’ Creativity and ‘small-c’ 
creativity, where many people exhibit small-c creativity but only a few are big-c Creative.
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Similarly, Csiksszentmihali (1988) identifies two forms of creativity: personal creativity.
i.e. where an individual regards the product of their own work as creative; and social- 
cultural creativity, i.e. where others within the same society and culture regard the product 
o f an individual’s work as creative (cf. Yu-Tung Liu, 2000, p.267).
5.4.1 Examples of Original Analogies Used By Physicists’ in Their Research
The examples of original analogies offered by Phys_63 and Phys_193 (shown in table 5.2 
below) are similar to what Dunbar (1999) would call long-distance analogies, where the 
scientist maps from a commonplace source domain (a snickers bar or a cheese sandwich) 
to a more specialised target domain (a bar-shaped galaxy or a parallel plate resonator). This 
kind of mapping allows one to remember a key point in a very simple way. It acts a 
scaffolding or framework with which to explain one’s concept. In my system of 
classification (which I will discuss in detail in section 5.5) these examples are playful 
analogies, expressed verbally/pictorially/physically, with low systematicity. Whether or 
not these original analogies are produced in popular science magazines or scientific 
journals depends on in-house style, or conventional norms respectively. As Phys_9, a 
lecturer in physics and astronomy explained in the on-line questionnaire’s section on 
science communication: “Analogies may be perceived as a dumbing-down, humorisation 
or over-simplification of a concept; therefore they need to be used with care if  the audience 
is already expert or ‘stuffy’.” Phys_63 has used his “snickers” analogy in the title of 
conference papers. This may be because the field o f cosmology is more open to the use of 
playful analogies than other fields (cf. Muldoon, 2002). This issue is something I pursued 
in follow-up e-mail exchanges with a selection of questionnaire respondents (see section
5.7). The educational value of using analogies which map from a commonplace but 
implausible source to a specialised target is discussed in the next chapter.
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Q3b. If you do use 
analogies in your 
research, how 
often do you 
generate original 
analogies?
Q3c. If possible, can you offer an example of an analogy you use/ have used in your research? Q3d. If you don’t 
use analogies in 
your research, is 
there a specific 
reason why you 
don’t?
Phys_63 5 4
Likening the shape o f  the "bar" structures found at the centres o f  some galaxies to a peanut in its 
shell (hence the "Snickers hypothesis" that there is a peanut in every bar...)
Phys_134 3 2
In 1996 ,1 had a mental image o f a stadium; this image was helpful for describing properties o f  D0- 
branes interactions
I am not intelligent 
enough
Phys_157 7 5
High energy physics experiments are vast. They are broken down into smaller components. One 
area o f  my research is pattern recognition and in order to solve the complex interconnectivity o f  the 
objects I was forming so that they could be categorised and classified I invented the analogy o f an 
interconnection network o f nodes for these objects.
Phys_193 7 7
I am looking at a parallel plate resonator. The analogy I make is with a cheese sandwich and a 
stereo. The Cheese is the resonator, the Bread is the substrate and the Butter is the superconducting 
film under test. I apply a signal from a speaker to the cheese sandwich to build a standing wave 
(like you see when the tide is going out at o f  an estuary) inside the cheese. Data is obtained by 
placing a microphone at the other end o f  the cheese sandwich. The amount o f  signal that is lost is 
mainly due to losses in the butter. In this way I can compare my cheese sandwich to other peoples 
cheese sandwiches.
N/A
Table 5.1: Examples of Original Analogies Used By Physicists’ in Their Research
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5.5 Frequency of occurrence of different forms of analogy
A marvellously diverse range of analogies was provided by the physicists who 
responded to the on-line questionnaire. In total, 147 examples of analogies were given, 
ranging from analogies with superficial relations to analogies with deep, structural 
relations. Many of these examples were drawn from the usual stockpile used in physics 
textbooks (current flow as analogous to water flow; LCR circuit analogous to harmonic 
oscillator), however there were also many specialised analogies. (See A5.1 for examples 
supplied by respondents who said they use analogy all the time in their research). These 
147 examples of analogy were sorted according to three basic forms, as shown in figure
5.2 below. Set A indicates that there are 50 examples which could be classified as 
verbal or pictorial or physical analogies, used by physicists either in playful exploration 
of new ideas during private conceptualisation and informal communication with 
colleagues; or to make physics accessible and entertaining to novices. Set B indicates 
that there are 90 examples that could be classified as physical or pictorial analogies, 
used by physicists to provide physical and pictorial insight in conceptualisation and 
communication in formal and informal contexts. Set C indicates that there are 45 
examples which could be classified as mathematical analogies, possessing a high degree 
of systematicity -  i.e. a hierarchy of deep, structural relations. These analogies are used 
by physicists as tools of exploration in private conceptualisation and when 
communicating with peers in informal and formal settings. They are almost never used 
















with a high 
degree of 
systematicity, 





B: Physical and/or Pictorial analogies used 
to provide physical and pictorial insight in 
conceptualisation and communication
Figure 5.3: Venn Diagram showing that the 147 examples of analogy offered by 
respondents were sorted into three sets A, B, C according to form, function and context.
170
Chapter 5
The overlap between A and B indicates that many playful analogies have physical 
and/or pictorial components, e.g. “Modelling electron transport through nanocrystalline 
T i02 as 'hoppers’ walking randomly through a cubic lattice.” (Phys_69). The overlap 
between B and C indicates that most of the mathematical analogies supplied have 
pictorial and/or physical components. For example, the “physical picture of the density 
matrix by using the Bloch vector analysis.” (Phys_218). Analogies of a more abstract 
nature may have not been as easy to express through the medium of a questionnaire and 
may therefore have been omitted in favour of more expressible analogies. A table 
summarising the forms of analogy employed in different contexts is presented on the 
following page.
The analogies in set A contain concepts drawn from everyday experience and 
are thus accessible to novices. The analogies in set B contain an intermediate range of 
concepts, descriptions and processes, and consequently are accessible to those with 
some physics education. The analogies in set C are more technical and specialised, and 
are therefore accessible to experts, some intermediates but few novices. Thus, from the 
venn diagram (figure 5.3) we can see one reason why set B contains the majority of 
analogies: the analogies in this set are accessible and appropriate to a broader range of 
contexts, as the set overlaps with the domains of experts, intermediates and novices. To 
use the terminology of literary theory, the analogies in set B have greater ‘addressivity’. 
I introduce the Bakthinian concept of speech genres and addressivity in section 6.2 and 
discuss the key factors which affect physicists use of analogy when communicating 
with different audiences in different contexts. It will become clear in chapters 6, 7 and 
8, why I make these claims about the use o f analogy to communicate physics to non­
physicists. However, I felt it would be useful to include it here in order to clarify the 
forms o f analogy used in scientific research.
Thus, from the myriad of examples provided by respondents, one can see some 
evidence for Nersessian’s assertion that: “ ... analogies are not ‘merely’ guides to 
thinking, with logical inferencing actually solving the problem, but analogies 
themselves do the inferential work and generate the problem solution.” (Nersessian, 
1992a, p.20, italics in the original).
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Expressed As JSet A: Verbal or Physical or Pictorial Analogies Set B: Physical and Pictorial Analogies Set C: Formal, Mathematical Analogies
Systematicity Low ^Medium to High High
Definition The analogies are often novel and amusing, relating 
abstract physics concepts to familiar, everyday things 
like dazed chickens, cheese sandwiches, Snickers 
bars, football stadiums, donuts, etc.
The physical picture attached to one situation can be used 
to visualise another. These idealised pictures are usually 
used iteratively: further refined and abstracted through 
rigorous mathematical and experimental testing.
The same mathematics can be used to describe two 
situations. Phenomena in one situation will have a 
counterpart in the second, as the mathematics for the two 
is identical.
Example "A Tokamak is like a donut, but filled with plasma 
instead of cream." phys-189
"Reversal of magnetisation through a magnetic logic 
NOT-gate likened to a car performing a three-point 
turn." phys-191
"Cerenkov light is created when a particle passes through 
matter at above the local speed of light. The effect is 
similar to the shock wave created by an airplane flying at 
above the speed of sound." Phys-198
"I quite often use the analogy of cold atoms to try to 
tackle problems in other areas. Cold atoms are a very 
clean and well understood research topic where I have 
experience in, and its results are widely applicable also to 
other areas." phys-35
Often rely on Popular associations; 
Creative imagination;
Geometrical intuition
Kinaesthetic awareness (of macroscopic capacities); 
Tacit knowledge (gained through experimentation);






To make physics accessible, memorable and 
entertaining, in order to enlist support. 
Occasionally used by expert physicists in private 
conceptualisation to play with ideas.
Tools of Exploration;
Provide physical and pictorial insight; 
Mechanisms underlying phenomena in analogous 
systems can be compared & contrasted.
Tools of Exploration;
Allow direct comparison of physical systems to be made 
on an abstract mathematical level.
Basis for computer simulations;
Contexts of Use (1) Private Conceptualisation; (1) Private Conceptualisation; (1) Private Conceptualisation;
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in very informal 
settings;
Often used to entertain an audience of experts or to 
make a point in a lively debate amongst peers;
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in formal & informal 
settings;
Use in journal publications is dependent on norms of 
research area and "in-house style" of journal. Some 
journals object to creative use of language.
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in formal & informal 
settings, including journal publications & presentations to 
conferences of experts;
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in informal 
settings (used to entertain and offer insights);
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in formal and 
informal settings;
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in formal and 
informal settings;
(4) Expert-Novice communication (to make physics 
accessible and memorable by drawing on concepts 
from everyday life);
(4) Expert-Novice communication (in particular to 
visualise the unseen, e.g. atomic physics, nano-physics, 
cosmology and astrophysics, etc.);
(4) Almost never used by physicists to communicate with 
novices as concepts from the source domain would be 
unfamiliar to novices.
Table 5.2: Summary of Different Forms of Analogy Employed in Different Contexts.
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5.6 Do analogies form the scaffolding or the foundation in research?
As discussed in the literature review, Dunbar (1999) found that, amongst the biologists he 
studied, analogy was used as scaffolding and often discarded and forgotten after it had 
served as a bridge when building new explanations and models. In order to explore how 
analogies evolve in the course of theory building and disseminating ideas to the scientific 
community and the general public, several questionnaire respondents (Phys_202, Phys_19, 
Phys_2, Phys_193) who were all enthusiasts for using analogy in their research were 
asked the following question in a follow-up e-mail:
" Q. In your research, do you use an analogy as scaffolding, often discarding and 
forgetting it after it has served as a bridge when building new explanations and 
models? Or do the analogies you use in the early stages o f your research usually make 
it into your personal notebook (or equivalent) and then into your research papers, 
perhaps in an adaptedform? ”
Phys_202, replied to the follow-up question saying: “It can go either way. If it has served 
its purpose but has become limiting in its application, then it gets discarded. If however it 
is still serving a useful purpose, then it is retained. Either way, it sometimes does make it 
into notes and papers, often amended or altered to suit.” In the on-line questionnaire he had 
said that he very often (i.e. 6/7) uses analogy in his research but rarely (i.e. 3/7) generates 
original analogies. In the questionnaire, he gave the following analogy as an example: 
“Smoke rings to describe the flow of currents induced in the ground by the rapid turn-off 
of a current in a transmitting loop on the surface. First proposed by Misac Nabighian, but 
very useful. I use it in both teaching and research.” Also, in the on-line questionnaire he 
had said he very rarely (i.e. 2/7) finds it difficult to get a mental picture of the physical 
processes involved in his research. In his words, “I seem to have an ability to visualise the 
objects and the fields in both 2 and 3 dimensions. I first realised this, consciously, when I 
had just started my PhD. I could see’ the object that was generating an anomalous 
response, just from the shape of the response.” When he does have difficulty getting a 
mental picture of the physical processes involved in his research, he said: “I try to pare the 
problem down to its simplest elements, or to in a sense transform it to something similar 
but simpler.” This is where analogy comes in. This tool o f exploration can be used in a 
structured way to map ideas from one area to another, thereby extending one’s knowledge.
Phys_19, a 60 year old Professor of Theoretical Physics did not address the 
“scaffolding” issue in his response to the follow-up query, but instead focused on the 
physical aspect of reasoning by analogy, saying: “it is important to think physically in all 
our work: deriving formulae, doing calculations etc. It is otherwise very easy to make an
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error or a faulty judgment. To give a simple example, it is important to check a computer 
code using known (high or low) asymptotes.” In the on-line questionnaire, he had said he 
never (i.e. 1/7) has difficulty getting a mental picture of the physical processes involved in 
his research because of his “Excellent visuo-spatial iq.” (Unlike most respondents he has a 
BA in mathematics). He also said that he uses analogy “all the time” in his research, e.g. 
“particle sliding on the surface of a tapering cone so that the azimuthal angle is arbitrary 
for forward scattering” and often (i.e. 5/7) generates original analogies.
Phys_2 replied to the follow-up query saying: “I would tend to bring it as far as I 
need. i.e. If I felt a better understanding was being gained from using it I would carry on 
with it.” In the on-line questionnaire he had said he occasionally (i.e. 3/7) has difficulty 
getting a mental picture o f the physical processes involved in his research because here is, 
“No tangible evidence for what’s going on.” To overcome his difficulties he will “try 
drawing a picture or similar visualisation.” He had also said he uses analogy “all the time” 
in his research, e.g. “Polarisation flipping in lasers describes using potential wells similar 
to ball on a hill” and often (i.e. 5/7) generates original analogies.
Phys_193 said in the on-line questionnaire that he uses “analogy all the time/7” in 
his research and also generates original analogies “all the time/7”. Recall that Phys_193’s 
example of analogy (shown in table 5.1) compared a parallel plate resonator to a cheese 
sandwich connected to a stereo. He replied to my follow-up question saying:
“In my line o f  research [his PhD was on “Non-linear Behaviour in HTS and MgB2 
Superconductors at High Microwave Power”] I’ve found that an analogy is used 
mainly as a way o f explaining an idea to either non specialists or to explain a new  
concept to co-workers. We all need something to relate to. As physics is explained 
using mathematics as a tool, it is difficult to see how you can use analogy to justify an 
argument rigorously. Analogy could be used in scientific papers to explain new or 
difficult theories but I think that as you put it analogy is used only as an exploratory 
tool in the early stages o f research.” (Phys_193)
Thus, in his line of research analogies fall mainly into set A, or possibly set B, but not set 
C of the venn diagram shown in section 5.5. The follow-up question prompted 
considerable self-reflection on the part of Phys_193. He added:
”1 hope that the answers are satisfactory. Having thought about your questions I am 
unsure o f  the result o f  the unconscious mind on the formation o f  ideas. What I mean is 
sometimes you have an idea about something when you are doing something else 
which has no connection to what the idea is about. Could the mind not be making 
analogies to what we are doing unconsciously but we just don’t get it? It would be 
interesting to know your opinion about this.
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Phys_193 makes a very interesting point. As discussed in chapters 3 and 8, numerous 
studies from the history of science suggest that creative insights often come during periods 
of relaxation, after a scientist has undergone a period o f intense intellectual activity. The 
high-energy physicist and popular science writer, Fritfof Capra (1992) emphasises this 
point, saying:
“The rational part o f  research would, in fact, be useless i f  it were not complemented 
by the intuition that gives scientists new insights and makes them creative. These 
insights tend to come suddenly and, characteristically, not when sitting at a desk 
working out the equations, but when relaxing, in the bath, during a walk in the woods, 
on the beach, etc. During these periods o f  relaxation after concentrated intellectual 
activity, the intuitive mind seems to take over and can produce the sudden, clarifying 
insights which give so much joy and delight to scientific research.” (Capra, 1992, 
p.39)
I also pursued this line of questioning (on the use of analogy as scaffolding) with 
Phys_128 because he said in the on-line questionnaire that he uses analogy “all the time/7” 
in his research and very often (i.e. 6/7) generates original analogies. He replied to my 
follow-up query saying:
“Analogies are at the heart o f  my research. I am looking for connections between 
apparently separate phenomena, such as light in transparent materials like glass or 
water and light in curved space-time. I try to find out the similarities and, once this is 
established, I apply the theory developed for one subject in order to understand the 
other. I feel that this is an extremely fruitful and enjoyable approach which combines 
mathematical rigor with creativity and imagination. The analogies are not discarded,
99they are vital and make it into the research papers.”
He went on to say that, “ ... In builders’ terms, in an established field the analogy is not the 
scaffolding, but the foundation.” When responding to the on-line questionnaire he said the 
following example is an analogy he uses in his research:
“The black hole resembles a space-time river racing towards a water fall, Singularity 
Falls. Picture a river with fish that have a maximal velocity, say c. If the river flows 
faster than c the fish are swept away. ”
99 Phys_128, is a 37 year old, m ale, w ith a German D iplom a in  Physics; PhD  in Theoretical Physics; 
Habilitation in Theoretical Physics. H is current job title is Professor o f  Theoretical Physics. H is research  
interests include, “artificial b lack holes, Bose-Einstein condensates, em ergent space-tim e geom etries in  
quantum optics and soft condensed-m atter Physics.” In the on-line questionnaire, he said he very often (i.e. 
6/7) has d ifficulty getting a mental picture o f  the Physical processes in volved  in h is research. H e said, “I f  I 
have got the m ental picture the research is m ostly done. So getting the picture is as difficult as doing  
research. Here the difficulty depends on the choice o f  to p ic ... Quantum phenom ena are hard to com prehend.”
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I assumed Phys_128 was using the Singularity Falls analogy primarily to communicate 
science to intermediates and novices. That is, it would fall between sets A and B in the 
venn diagram of figure 5.3. Recall that set A contains verbal or physical or pictorial 
analogies with low level systematicity, used by physicists in the playful exploration of 
ideas and when communicating with novices. Set B contains physical or pictorial analogies 
with medium level systematicity used to provide experts, intermediates and novices with 
insights in the conceptualisation and communication of physics. Set C on the other hand, 
contains more abstract, mathematical analogies, with high level systematicity and tend to 
be used in a structured way as tools of exploration in research and when explaining 
concepts to peers. However, it was possible that Phys_128 also used it in private 
conceptualisation or when communicating with peers. Thus, in the same follow-up e-mail, 
I asked him: “In what contexts have you used the Singularity Falls analogy? E.g. private 
conceptualisation, communicating with peers, research students, the general public?” 
Somewhat to my surprise he replied, “In all the cases you mentioned, even in the 
introduction of original research papers and in grant proposals. It is a superb analogy.” It is 
unusual for an analogy to span all three sets, A, B and C, so, what makes the singularity 
falls analogy a “superb analogy”, useful in so many different contexts? Like many 
analogies which feature in set A, it draws on everyday concepts, is easily expressed 
(verbally and graphically) and is memorable. However, analogies of this kind are not 
commonly used in scientific papers. I believe that an important factor may be its esteemed 
origins. It is attributed to William G. Unruh, one of the pioneers of black hole quantum 
mechanics. The analogy was also used by Leonard Susskind (one of the pioneers of String 
Theory) in a Scientific American article in 1997. (See figure 5.4 on next page). I discuss 
this hypothesis in section 5.6.1 below, where I look at the use of analogous visualisations 
in popular science articles and scientific journal articles.
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Figure 5.4: The sketch that accompanied Leonard Susskind’s article on “Black
Holes and the Information Paradox.” (Scientific American, April 1997, pp. 40-43)
5.6.1 The use of analogous visualisations in popular science articles and scientific 
journal articles.
In 2003, Carlo Rovelli wrote an article on quantum gravity in Physics W orld, entitled, 
“Loop Quantum Gravity.” (Rovelli, 2003, pp. 37-41). Rovelli’s article contains five images 
pertaining to his topic of discussion. I was interested to uncover at what point in the 
conceptualisation and communication process such visualisations tend to be employed and 
at whose suggestions (i.e. the magazine editor or paper author). Would physicists use 
similar visualizations in their journal articles if they thought it was acceptable? I asked 
Physics World editor, Peter Rodgers about this in an email (11-11-2003).
Responding to my query about the differences between popular science magazines’ 
use of images and journal articles’ use of images, Rodgers said that in his experience, 
“research papers (rightly) focus on schematics of the experiment etc. and graphs/plots with 
the actual data. The problem with strings is that there isn’t really any data and no one 
knows how to visualizse 10-dimensions!” Rodgers told me that the lack of images at their 
disposal (pertaining to e.g. string theory and loop quantum gravity), “presents real 
problems for a magazine like PW where we try to make articles LOOK 
interesting/appealing and also try to make them understandable by non-expert (albeit a 
non-expert with a physics degree).” He said that, “ [mjost pop articles on strings I have
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seen either resorted to the standard boring diagram (e.g. p.30/33) or completely invented 
computer-generated landscapes (as does the Brian Greene programme [e.g. last episode 
shown on channel 4, Sunday 16th Nov 2003]).” He said that in general, in Physics World, 
they “choose images that look nice and help the reader understand what it gong on.”
Rodgers said that the images on pages 37, 38, 39 and 40 of Rovelli’s article were “all 
sent by the author.” He said the image on page 41 was “suggested” by the staff at Physics 
World because they “had used this image in an article on quantum gravity before.” One 
might ask: if Rovelli sent the images to Physics World, are they something he uses in his 
scientific publications, or only in his popular science publications? A review of thirty or so 
of Rovelli’s recent scientific publications shows that many contain mathematical and 
geometrical representations but only one conference paper contains an image of the kind 
used in physics world. This was in a paper entitled: “Notes for a brief history o f quantum 
gravity.” (Rovelli, 2000, web ref). Rovelli says in the introduction o f this paper:
“When John Stachel asked me to prepare a brief history o f  the research in quantum 
gravity for the 9th Marcel Grossmann Meeting, I trembled at the size o f  the task, 
worried o f repeating only information already known to everybody, and feared to 
displease my colleagues. John managed to convince me to try anyway, and here is the 
result.” (Rovelli, 2000, web ref., p .l)
As we will see in chapter 6, communicating physics to an audience composed o f people of 
differing levels of expertise is daunting to most physicists. Speakers worry that an overly 
complex talk will confuse those with limited expertise in physics, but an overly simplistic 
talk will patronise experts in the audience. As I discuss in section 6.6 Kroemer’s approach 
in his Nobel laureate address (cf. Kroemer, 2000, web ref.) is to begin by using physical 
and pictorial analogies to present a simple picture, then to build up to more technical 
explanations. In this way Kroemer is able to satisfy most of the audience: introducing the 
subject to novices and reminding experts of the achievements made.
During his conference talk, Rovelli (2000, web ref., p. 17) provides a basic 
overview of the history of quantum gravity. He notes, for example, that that the notion of a 
weave, “is evidence o f a discrete structure of spacetime emerging from loop quantum 
gravity” and adds that “the first example of a weave which is considered is a 3d mesh of 
intertwined rings.” In Rovelli’s (2003) Physics World article, this notion o f weaving space 
was illustrated by the image on page 37 of the magazine (see figure 5.5 on the next page)
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However, at this conference of 
experts and intermediates Rovelli 
(2000, web ref.) does not present the 
same image. Instead he entertains 
his audience with a playful version 
which extends the analogy far 
beyond the domain o f quantum 
gravity to the domain of popular 
culture, thereby highlighting the 
limitations of such analogies, a 
common techniques used when 
communicating with experts. He 
quips, “not surprising, the intuition 
was already in Wheeler! See Figure 
1, taken from Misner, Thome and 
Wheeler (1973).” (Rovelli, 2003, 
p. 17). See figure 5.6. Thus, like the 
Singularity Falls analogy, the 
‘weave’ analogy can be traced back 
to an eminent theoretical physicist -  
in this case John Wheeler, who also 
introduced the idea o f ‘spacetime 
foam’ in 1963 and, among other 
things, coined the term ‘black hole’ 
in 1967. Thus, there is some 
evidence to indicate that an analogy 
is more likely to span sets A, B and 
C (i.e. be used with experts a well 
as novices in formal and informal 
settings) if attributed to an eminent 
physicist, renowned for generating 
useful visualizations in private 
conceptualisation and expert- 
novice communication. This point 
will be picked up in chapter 6.
Figure 5.5: Image illustrating the notion of weave, used 
in Rovelli’s (2003) Physics World article. This was one 
of four images which Rovelli sent Phvsics W orld.
Figure 5.6: The Notion o f ‘w eave’ appeared in the richly 
illustrated book, “Gravitation” by eminent theoretical 
physicists M isner, Thorne and Wheeler in 1973. It also 
featured in a conference paper by Rovelli (2000) in 
which he provided a brief history o f quantum gravity.
Weaving space -  the 3D structure of space in loop 
quantum gravity can be visualized as a net of 
intersecting loops. This simple model was built 
by the author using key-rings, before spin 




Like Rovelli, Leonard Susskind also wrote an article in the same issue of Physics World 
entitled “Superstrings” (Susskind, 2003). This article also contained five images relating to 
string theory. However, unlike Rovelli, it seems that Susskind only submitted sketches for 
figl (p.30), fig3 (p.33) and fig4 (p.34) once he was pressed. Rodgers told me:
“We found the image on page 29 ourselves (from Andrew Hanson 100 at Indiana). We 
knew about Hanson because we had used a similar image of Calabi-Yau manifold 
produced by him before. We sort of came up with the image on page 32 ourselves 
(based on diagrams we has seen elsewhere).”
Opposite is a scan of 
Hanson’s creation, taken 
from the Physics World 
publication. The computer 
generated image also 
appeared in Brian Greene’s 
books The Elegant Universe 
(1999), and The Fabric o f  
the Cosmos (2004), and in 
Callender & Huggins 
(2001), Physics Meets 
Philosophy at the Planck 
Scale. As Physics World 
editor, Peter Rodgers said, 
there is a lack of images 
pertaining to string theory.
Thus, when colourful 
visualisations, based on 
quite well-established 
mathematical theory, are 
generated (by people like 
Hanson) they are used 
repeatedly in popular science publications.
100 [Hanson is currently Professor o f Computer Science at Indiana University. He has a PhD in theoretical 
physics. His most recent research focuses on Mathematical Visualization, Virtual Reality, and Astronomy.
See Hanson’s website for numerous images and animations: http://www.cs.indiana.edu/~hanson/
(Last accessed 01-03-2006)]
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String space -  superstring theory lives in 
10 dimensions, which means that six of the 
dimensions have to be “com pacified" in orderto 
explain why we can only perceive four. The best way to 
do this is to use a complicated 6D geometry called a 
Calabi-Yau manifold, in which all the intrinsic 
properties of elementary particles are hidden.
Figure 5.7: Hanson’s image of string space included by 
Physics World staff to make the article look 
interesting/appealing and understandable by non-expert, 
with a degree in physics.
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Responding to my query about the differences between the use of analogous visualisations 
in popular science magazines and scientific journal papers, Rodgers said that:
“Illustrating abstract/highly theoretical topics like strings is always difficult. The 
original research papers themselves rarely contain illustrations. I don’t know about 
talks etc. at conferences -  however, ‘overheads’ are available for most conferences in 
this field . . . ”
Following Rodgers’ suggestions, I looked at the ‘overheads’ and audio recordings for the 
Strings 2003 Conference. Susskind did not attend the conference so the over-heads and 
live video recording of another eminent theoretical physicist, Ed Witten, were analysed. 101 
At one point in his talk to an audience of experts, Witten uses a trampoline analogy when 
talking about the warping of spacetime according to general relativity, but is cautious to 
identify the limitations of the analogy. Regarding electron spin, he says, “I can draw the 
picture, but the picture is wrong” because it requires matrix description. Near the end of his 
talk he presents an artist’s conception of something but remarks that he doesn’t really like 
artists’ conceptions of physics. Perhaps Susskind only supplied Physics World with 
sketches when he was pressed because he shares a similar view to Witten regarding artists’ 
conceptions o f physics? The concrete nature of analogous visualisations can be misleading 
if  taken them too literally. As we saw in section 4.6.3, many questionnaire respondents 
noted that the immediacy of computer simulations can be powerful but misleading. 
Similarly in section 5.3.4 we saw that many questionnaire respondents said that they avoid 
using analogies because they believe that they can be overly simplistic and misleading if 
taken too far. The latter issue is discussed further in chapter 6.
5.7 Are certain branches of physics more open to analogical 
reasoning than others?
Thus we can see that for some physicists, like Phys_128 “The analogies are not discarded, 
they are vital and make it into the research papers.” For others, like Phys_193, “Analogy 
could be used in scientific papers to explain new or difficult theories but I think that as you
put it analogy is used only as an exploratory tool in the early stages of research.” While
100others, like Phys_150, 1UZ “have used analogy predominantly in informal settings, as a 
means of increasing enlightenment.” Phys_150 added, “I am not aware of using analogy in 
a journal publication, but believe that a cautious use is accepted by the journals of interest
101 In section 6.3 I present some o f  Ed Witten’s ‘overheads’ and comment on his use o f  freehand diagrams 
and style o f  address.
102 Phys_150 is a 56 year-old, male, with a BSc in Physics; PhD in High Energy Physics and post-doctoral 
experience in High Energy Physics. He is currently employed as a Research Assistant, interested in, 
“Detectors for High Energy Physics and Astronomy.”
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to me.”103 Phys_128’s experiences of analogical use in scientific papers appear to differ 
from Phys_150’s. This was not particularly surprising. My pilot study work (Muldoon, 
2002) showed that the term “analogy” featured more frequently in the titles and abstracts 
of journals in some branches of physics (e.g. cosmology) than others.
Basic quantitative analysis was carried out on the on-line questionnaire data to see 
if there were any obvious relationships between respondents’ use of analogy and the 12
Institute of Physics groups with which they associated themselves.
Qla. With which 









Q3. Do you ever use analogies in your research?
11
Never 2 3 4 5 6
7/
All the time
Applied Optics 43 11.6% 9.3% 9.3% 9.3% 25.6% 9.3% 25.6%
Chemical Physics 28 0.0% 7.1% 10.7% 14.3% 28.6% 14.3% 25.0%
Computational
Physics 55 0.0% 12.7% 9.1% 3. 6% 38.2% 10.9% 25.5%
Surface Science 
& Technology 20 0.0% 0.0% 15.0% 15.0% 30.0% 15.0% 25.0%
Nuclear Physics 18 11.1% 11.1% 0.0% 16.7% 22.2% 22.2% 16.7%




68 4.4% 4.4% 13.2% 13.2% 27.9% 13.2% 23.5%
High Energy & 




65 0.0% 10.8% 12.3% 4.6% 27.7% 7.7% 36.9%




40 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 17.5% 25.0% 12.5% 25.0%
Astrophysics 60 11.7% 13.3% 8.3% 6.7% 33.3% 13.3% 13.3%
Table 5.3: Shows the degree to which respondents, who associate themselves with certain 
research groups, use analogy in their research.
Although there does not appear to be any clear relationship on the positive end of the scale, 
there does appear to be one on the negative end of the scale. No respondent who associated
103 In Q1 of the questionnaire Phys_150 associated himself with 2 of the 12 Institute of Physics groups: 
“Computational Physics” and “High Energy Particle Physics” so the journals “of interest” to him are likely to 
lie in these areas.
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themselves with “Chemical Physics”, “Computational Physics”, “Surface Science and 
Technology” or “Quantum Electronics and Photonics” said they “never/1” used analogy in 
their research. This is in contrast with over 11% of respondents who associated themselves 
with “Applied Optics”, “Nuclear Physics”, or “Astrophysics” who said they “never/1” use 
analogy in their research. These respondents may not be representative of researchers 
involved in those fields so I will not attempt to draw any generalisations from these results.
However, I will suggest that the data could be used to support the view that the 
respondents who said they never used analogy in their research held a narrower 
interpretation of the term “analogy” which excluded mathematical analogies. The fact that 
the largest proportion of “use analogy all the time in research” responses came from 
respondents who associated themselves with “Mathematical and Theoretical Physics” 
gives credence to this hypothesis.
The question of whether analogy is more common in some branches o f physics than others
was investigated in follow-up e-mail exchanges with a select sample of respondents, most
of whom were enthusiasts for analogy. The following question was addressed to Phys_27:
"You indicated that you frequently use analogy in your research and often coin 
original analogies ...Is analogical use common in your research area? Is it considered 
an acceptable means o f problem solving? ”
Phys_27 replied saying:
“My research area is mostly in Carbon nanotubes, with a lot of work in their growth 
and production. Many analogies are used to describe new growth forms such as: 
"nano-trees", "bamboo structure" "nano-onions" etc. These analogies not only are a 
succinct way of describing a new structure, but are also useful as a way of marketing 
your research to other scientists in the titles of your papers or posters. People are more 
likely want to know more about your research (ie read your paper or look at your 
poster) if they can easily identify with some concept in your title or abstract, the more 
commonly understood the concept the more people will be likely to read your paper.” 
Phys_27 seems to be underscoring an issue mentioned in the previous chapter; that 
promoting one’s research is vital if one is to receive the support of peers, funding bodies 




In an effort to understand whether certain branches of physics seem more open to 
analogical reasoning than others, the following question was posed in follow-up e-mails to 
Phys_2, Phys_19, Phys_128, Phys_193 and Phys_202:
Q. The findings o f my research suggest that certain branches o f physics seem more 
open to analogical reasoning than others. Do you have any experience o f  this? For 
example, have you encountered different ways o f 'doing' and 'presenting'physics while 
carrying out interdisciplinary research or publishing papers in journals from different 
fields?
Several responses highlighted the fact that analogies can take different forms. Focusing on 
the physical component of analogies, Phys_2, a PhD student, whose research interests 
include: “Vertical cavity devices, communications, high output devices” said: “Not as 
such, though I would suggest that practical subjects can be more readily interpreted via 
analogies.”
In contrast, Phys_19 focused on the abstract, mathematical component of analogies, 
saying:
... one must remember that I am a Theoretical Physicist who would consider himself 
to be an expert in applied mathematics. Thus many analogies are not merely 'physical' 
but mathematical: eg we might solve a particular equation in, say, mathematical 
biology, the way we solved Ricatti nonlinear equations in above immediate threshold 
electron-atom collisions.
Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that theoretical physicists in the sample were 
probably interpreting the term analogy in a more abstract, less physical way than the 
experimental physicists, as I suggested above.
Phys_202, a lecturer in geophysics, was pensive on the question o f whether certain 
branches of physics seem more open to analogy than others. It was not something he had 
remarked upon within the discipline of physics, but he did notice a contrast between the 
physical sciences and the social sciences, from his experiences outside of physics e.g. 
dealing with archaeologists and geologists through his work as a geophysicist. 104
104 “Hmmm. Haven't noticed or thought much about this. Certainly in disciplines outside the 
physical sciences, analogy seems to be used less, but that's more from my own experience. The 
social scientists (e.g. archaeologists) seem to try to avoid analogy because they do not want to 
prejudge their findings, whereas we physical scientists are much more open to it as a way of 
visualizing our results and findings. Certainly geologists use analogy frequently as a way of 
connecting similar features and processes.” (Phys_202)
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Phys_128, who gave the example of the Singularity Falls analogy and said that his 
analogies “are not discarded, they are vital and make it into the research papers,” felt that 
“interdisciplinary research truly based on analogies is quite rare. Unless a subfield with 
such profile is established, it is also not easy to publish, in particular when a paper 
demands a high level of understanding in several areas.” He said he new of, “a case where 
a truly outstanding sophisticated paper was rejected time after time until it found a home in 
a journal.” Phys_128 gave an example from condensed matter physics, where an analogy 
accounts for 10-20% of the current theoretical research in the area. It is relevant I think to 
note Phys_128’s comment that the analogy has come to be “taken for granted”. Like a 
building’s foundations, it provides structural support, but is often over-looked.105 (See 
section 6. 7 for further discussion in this issue).
5.7.1 Is there a relationship between the number of groups with which respondents 
associate themselves and the extent to which they use analogy in their research?
Related to the issue of interdisciplinary work and the use o f analogy, the on-line 
questionnaire data suggested a relationship between the number of IoP groups with which 
physicists associated themselves, and the extent to which they used analogy. Respondents 
who associated themselves with many groups were more likely to be enthusiasts for using 
analogy in their research. From figure 5.8 we can see that almost 70% of those who said 
they “never/1 ” use analogy associated themselves with just one of the 12 IoP groups. In 
contrast, respondents who associated themselves with 7 or 8 of the 12 IoP groups were 
clustered on the positive end of the 7-point scale. As we will see in chapters 7 and 8, Dr. 
Lawson attributed his frequent use of analogy to the fact that he had a wider field of view 
(with experience in 5 sub-fields of physics) and therefore noticed many analogies.
Again, on the issue of interdisciplinary work, of the 60 respondents who associated 
themselves with “Astrophysics”, 35% associated themselves with no other group. This is 
shown in appendix 5, table A5.1. By comparison, of the 43 respondents who associated 
themselves with “Applied Optics” only 9.1% associated themselves with no other group. 
This suggests that “astrophysicists” are a distinct sub-culture.
105 “An example of an established field is the realization of the Hubbard model in condensed-matter 
physics using atomic Bose condensates in optical lattices. Here a simple analogy between electrons 
in crystals and atoms in standing light waves caters for, say, 10-20% of the current theoretical 
research in condensed-matter physics. The pioneering work was to discover this analogy and to 
demonstrate it in experiments, the rest is follow-up and less original where the analogy is taken for 
granted. In builders’ terms, in an established field the analogy is not the scaffolding, but the 
foundation. Another famous case is the analogy between polymers and magnetic chains due to 
Pierre-Gilles de Gennes, Nobel Prize 1991.” (Phys_128)
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The 8 rows above contain the numbers of respondents who made these 
selections regarding the degree to which they use analogy in their research.
Figure 5.8: Relationship between number of groups with which respondents’ associate 
themselves and the degree to which they use analogy in their research.
Phys_128 mentioned that scientific journals sometimes reject outstanding research because 
it does not fit their particular profile. As you will see in section 5.8, Prof. Berry’s 
experiences suggest that there are particular journals within physics that are less accepting 
o f the use of analogy and other forms of creative language.
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5.8 Censorship of Creative Language: A diabolical point for Physical 
Review Letters?
A particularly interesting and novel result to emerge from my research is the apparent 
censorship of creative language by some American Institute of Physics journals. This is 
related to the issue of reasoning by analogy because it is a consequence of journals 
requiring physicists to retrospectively present their work in a logical, deductive manner, 
editing out the creative insights and playful associations which led them to their 
discoveries. The biologist Evelyn-Fox Keller remarks upon this “erasure” and 
“representational logic” saying:
“The man-made (or more accurately, men-made) nature of scientific knowledge 
cannot be represented in the texts of science, for precisely what has been constmcted 
is the illusion that this knowledge is not made by men — not crafted, articulated, or 
constructed, but discovered, in a word, simply true.” (Fox-Keller, 1996, p.420)
I do not adhere to social constructivism or scientific relativism but I do believe that the 
“erasure” and “representational logic” inherent in scientific papers leave little room for the 
creative use of language with a view to making the topic engaging. Prof. Berry told me 
that: “some of the most prestigious [American Journals], according to the fashions of the 
time, are too interventionist and they don’t allow the creative use of language. There are 
several terms that I ’ve invented which they have censored ... ” I asked, “what terms?” and 
Prof. Berry replied: “Oh diabolical point - - In fact my lecture in Ireland [a previous topic 
of conversation for us] was: ‘Hamilton’s Diabolical Point.
Prof. Berry explained this term, saying:
“Certain mathematical constructions involve a double cone. A double cone is a 
diabolo. It’s also the organising centre of degenerate behaviour. So it seems good to 
call it diabolical It’s a term I introduced DECADES ago in proceedings of the Royal 
Society with proper reference to the Oxford Dictionary and all this. And people use it!
It’s caught on in nuclear physics -  {inaudible} - based on a paper I wrote. But 
Physical Review Letters don’t allow it.” (Prof. Berry 05-07-2005)
Diabolical point is not the only one of Berry’s terms censored by Physical Review Letters, 
however. Another term coined by Prof. Berry “Quantum Chaology” has also been 
censored. 106 Although the term “diabolical point” has caught on amongst Prof. Berry’s
106 Prof. Berry continued: “Another one is Quantum Chaos. A commonly used expression, but strictly 
speaking there isn’t any. At the beginning of the subject there was a lot of confusion -  what are we studying? 
-  there’s no chaos in quantum Physics in the technical sense. And I had to say, actually I’m not studying 
chaos in quantum Physics, I’m studying the reflections of chaos in classical Physics. So it’s Quantum 
Chaology, that I use. But they don’t allow those either. Again the first time, I think my Bakerian lecture at the 
Royal Society in 1986 was called Quantum Chaology. It began by quoting from the Oxford English 
Dictionary, saying Chaology was an old term used in Theology which meant ‘that which existed before the
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peers, and been used in the titles of his public lectures to pique listeners’ curiosity and 
make the topic more memorable (a key component o f good science communication), the 
rules and conventions of Physical Review Letters prevent him from using the same 
creative language when communicating with his peers. One could argue that, unlike 
popular science magazines or books, the purpose o f a research paper is to establish some 
facts or models, not to explain how they were thought up; that a playful term adds nothing 
to the establishment of scientific facts and merely connotes personal quirkiness. However, 
I believe that the attempt to maintain some kind o f conceptual and linguistic purity is 
misguided.
The key point is that such terms are not being used in a justificatory capacity but in 
something akin to a marketing capacity. As we saw in section 5.7, the experiences of 
Phy_27 suggest that analogies are, among other things, “useful as a way of marketing your 
research to other scientists in the titles of your papers or posters.” I would argue that an 
intelligent and creative use of language should have an important function in the scientific 
enterprise. The number o f scientific publications has increased exponentially in the past 
decade as the scientific community grows and lives in the shadow of a “publish or perish” 
regime. Scientists are often portrayed in the media as cold, detached, logical, objective, 
semi-human beings who prefer their laboratory equipment or equation-covered 
whiteboards, to things from popular culture. O f course this stereotype is nonsense. 
Scientists, just like everyone else, are more likely to read something if it catches their 
attention or arouses their curiosity. An interesting title or abstract is the best way of 
‘hooking’ the prospective reader or listener. Examples of catchy titles from public talks are
107Prof. Berry’s public lecture, “Making Light o f Mathematics”, and Prof. Paul
Coleman’s inaugural lecture, “Probing Matter with Anti-Matter: A Career in Self-
10RAnnihilation. ” I believe the same basic principle could hold when publishing scientific 
papers. Once the target audience has been ‘hooked’ they will proceed to read and absorb 
the detailed content of the paper. The content will then be stored in memory and associated 
with the catchy title, thereby facilitating subsequent recall. This strategy is the cornerstone 
o f marketing. I believe such marketing techniques have a place in all areas of the scientific 
enterprise, particularly if  used in an intelligent, thoughtful way. In fact, Prof. Berry touches 
on this point when he says that his “complaint to [Physical Review Letters] is that this is a
creation.’ It’s not used anymore. It’s a minor branch of theology. Even when the Oxford English Dictionary 
was first written in 1890 or so it was even then obsolete, so we published it and defined it carefully. But 
Physical Review Letters didn’t like it.” (Berry, during our interview of 05-07-2005)
107 delivered on 30th April 2003, to an audience of about 100 people at the Hewlett Packard Labs in Bristol, 
UK. Also related by video-link to the HP Labs in Palo Alto, California and Cambridge, Massachusetts.
108 delivered on 1st May, 2003, to an audience of about 100 people, at the University of Bath, UK.
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form of censorship... when other people use [the term diabolical point], it means it 
satisfies a free market test.” He concludes by saying: “I can’t be bothered with the hassle, 
so I don’t publish in Physical Review Letters.” I believe that scientific journals should be 
more open to the communication techniques employed by creative scientists, like Prof 
Berry, who obviously care a great deal about language and know how to use it to its fullest 
potential to educate, entertain and inform physics experts, intermediates and novices. I 
hope that my research will go some way towards promoting this view.
5.9 Conclusions
As mentioned in chapter 2, the on-line questionnaire was intended to be a form of 
reconnaissance: to provide a map of the territory and highlight key issues for exploration 
during subsequent follow-up studies. In this capacity it was extremely successful, 
producing a mountain of information which continues to be mined. It also reached a large 
cross section of the physics community, providing numerous volunteers for these 
subsequent studies. However, as Dunbar’s research has shown, analogy is often used as 
scaffolding, discarded and forgotten after it has served as a bridge when building new 
explanations and models, (cf. Dunbar 2001). Thus, physicists’ self-rated use of analogy 
may not be representative of their actual use of analogy, so in-depth studies, which do not 
rely on self-rated responses, may prove useful.
Nevertheless, it is clear from an analysis of the empirical data gathered via the on­
line questionnaire, follow-up e-mails and semi-structured interviews that there are 
numerous and complex factors at play in physicists’ use of analogy in scientific research. 
Firstly, there is no unanimous definition of what constitutes analogy. Some physicists 
appear to only associate analogy with textbook physics and consequently regard it as 
overly simplistic and misleading. Other respondents hold a broad definition o f analogy that 
includes complex mathematical analogies and simple visual analogies. For these physicists, 
complex analogies are used almost exclusively in formal settings (private conceptualisation 
& communication with peers), while the simple analogies are used in informal settings 
(private conceptualisation and communication with peers, intermediates and novices).
Taking this into account, use of analogy in research was widespread among the 
physicists who responded to the on-line questionnaire. In section 5.2 I showed that 52 
respondents (23.1% of the sample) said they use analogy “all the time” in their research. 
This is over three times as many as those that claimed to “never” use analogy in research. 
The reasons given by respondents for not using analogy in research fell into four main 
categories: (i) they didn’t need to use analogy because their work was already easy to
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visualise, (ii) analogies were too difficult to formulate because their subject matter was 
highly abstract, (iii) analogies only seem appropriate for non-specialist audiences, (iv) 
analogies are overly simplistic and can be misleading.
In section 5.4 I showed that when commenting on the degree to which they use 
analogy in research 61.8% of respondents selected between 5 and 2  on the 7-point scale 
which runs from “never/1” to “all the time/7”. However, when commenting on the degree 
to which they generate original analogies, 60.8% selected between I and 3 on the 7-point 
scale. This indicates that, a majority of respondents are aware that they mostly use an 
existing stockpile of tried and tested analogies, rather than generating original analogies. 
However, as shown in table 5.1, several respondents provided examples of original 
analogies which they have found useful when conceptualising and communicating physics. 
From this we can see that playful analogies, drawn from everyday experience, do have a 
place in the scientific enterprise, although they rarely make it into scientific publications. I 
suggest that an analogy is more likely to span sets A, B and C (i.e. be used with experts 
and novices) if  it is attributed to an eminent physicist with a flair for generating useful 
visualizations in private conceptualisation and communication.
The 147 examples of analogies supplied by respondents fell into three broad categories:
(i) verbal, physical or pictorial analogies used to play with ideas in private 
conceptualisation; and to make physics accessible, memorable and fun when 
communication with novices in all settings and with colleagues in informal settings.
(ii) physical and pictorial analogies used as heuristics in problem solving, to provide 
physical and pictorial insights;
(iii) mathematical analogies used as structured tools of exploration, in theory building 
and when communicating with peers who are experts in physics;
Mathematical analogies and physical & pictorial analogies are frequently used by 
respondents in their research. Although they rarely appear in journal papers, original, 
playful analogies also have their place in scientific research -  to conceptualise and 
communicate novel ideas and enlist support. This was a surprising finding and one which 
could have useful applications in the area of science education. For example if playful 
analogies could be used in a structured, integrated way they may help students to 
conceptualise physics without encouraging a naive interpretation of the analogy. The use 




Key factors that influence physicists’ use of 
analogy when communicating with audiences of 
different backgrounds
Truth & Uncertainty
(By Ciara Aisling Muldoon)
Sleepwalkers in a cosmic maze, 
Searching for a golden thread,
Some stumble, fumble, in a daze, 
Following their dreams instead.
With Mathematics as their guide,
Some journey through shadowlands, 
Where Nature’s timid secrets hide, 
Phantoms slipping through their hands.
Those shadows danced in Plato’s cave 
Two millennia ago,
Now as a particle and wave 
They passionately tango.
The vibrant music of The Spheres 
Orchestrates the melody,
From Timeless Beauty, Truth appears 




This chapter explores the key factors that influence physicists’ use of analogy when 
communicating with audiences of different backgrounds. As in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the 
data is derived from the responses of 225 physicists to my on-line questionnaire on 
visualization, analogy and computer simulations; follow-up e-mail responses with a select 
sample of 13 questionnaire respondents; observation of Professor Paul Coleman’s 
inaugural lecture and our subsequent e-mail exchanges; and my semi-structured interview 
with Professor Sir Michael Berry. I will address the following research questions in this 
chapter:
□ To what extent do these physicists use analogy when communicating with different 
audiences?
□ Can analogical reasoning provide insights when conceptualising and communicating 
physics?
□ To what extent do (a) physics expertise of audience; (b) tone of discussion; (c) nationality 
of audience affect physicists’ use of analogy?
□ What forms of analogy do they use in different contexts?
□ What are the characteristics of good analogies?
My findings will show that physicists who are enthusiasts for analogy in their own research 
tend to tailor their analogies when communicating with different audiences. In particular, 
the analogies they employ increase in complexity as the audience’s level o f expertise 
increases. With experts, they use complex analogies drawn from within the domain of 
science. These analogies have an underlying mathematical structure, but sometimes lack 
pictorial or physical components. In contrast, with novices, they use simple analogies 
drawn from everyday experiential knowledge. These analogies are made accessible to 
novices by their pictorial and physical components. Essentially, the aim is make physics 
accessible by finding common ground that one can build upon. Experts have everyday 
experiential knowledge plus specialised physics knowledge. Therefore, when experts 
communicate with one another they have a larger common ground upon which to build. 
When writing scientific papers, they build upon the most solid ground, i.e. mathematical 
foundations. When they are playfully exploring new ideas, or marketing their research to 




6.1 “When it comes to atoms, language can only be used as in poetry.”
As discussed in section 0.7, although conventionally thought of as polar opposites, 
physicists and poets are similar in at least one respect: both are creative in devising symbol 
systems with which to represent their subject matter. As Neils Bohr once remarked, the 
atomic physicist and the poet are engaged in a similar enterprise, “not nearly so concerned 
with describing facts as with creating images,” because, “[w]hen it comes to atoms, 
language can only be used as in poetry” (Bohr, quoted in Bronowski, 1973, p.340). Werner 
Heisenberg,109 also pointed out the difficulties of describing quantum physics in words in 
1963. He said: “we have at first no single guide for correlating the mathematical symbols 
with concepts of ordinary language; and the only thing we know from the start is the fact 
that our common concepts cannot be applied to the structure of the atom.” (Heisenberg, 
1963, pp. 178-179). Many contemporary quantum physicists still face similar problems 
described by Heisenberg (1963) when trying to communicate their ideas to a non-specialist 
audience. The high-energy physicist and best selling popular science author, Fritjof Capra 
(1992, p.38) tells us that eventually physicists will want to talk about their results to non­
physicists and “will therefore have to express them in plain language. This means they will 
have to formulate a model in ordinary language which interprets their mathematical 
scheme.” According to Capra, “even for the physicists themselves, the formulation of such 
a verbal model...will be a criterion of the understanding they have reached.” So what 
techniques do physicists employ in order to communicate such counter-intuitive and 
abstract things as quantum physics? Do they employ analogy, and if  so, what kinds?
6.2 Bakhtin’s Speech Genres, Utterances and Addressivity
Literary theory offers some useful terminology and theoretical tools with which to analyse 
the science communication facet of this project. The key terms of interest to us are 
‘utterances’ and ‘addressivity’. According to Bakhtin, words and sentences are impersonal; 
they belong to nobody and are addressed to nobody. In contrast, an utterance has both an 
author and someone to whom it is directed. This is its ‘addressivity’ (Bakhtin, 1986, p.95). 
Bakhtin, says that when speaking he always takes into account the “apperceptive 
background of the addressee’s perception of my speech”. For instance, “the extent to 
which he is familiar with the situation, whether he has special knowledge o f the given 
cultural area of communication, his views and convictions, his prejudices (from my
109 who laid the groundwork for today’s quantum physicists and gave his name to The Uncertainty Principle 
which says that one cannot precisely determine the exact position and momentum of a particle at the same 
time. Only the probability of its location at a certain time can be predicted.
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viewpoint), his sympathies and antipathies -  because all this will determine his active 
response and understanding of my utterance.” (Bakhtin, 1986, p.96). According to Bakhtin, 
in sum, “it all comes down to the scope of his specialised knowledge.” (ibid.) In chapters 7 
& 8 I show that Dr. Lawson explicitly constructed his utterances in the knowledge that e.g. 
theoreticians, who originated from countries lacking a tradition o f experimental science, 
tended to be more mathematically inclined.
Thus, the key to good communication is to place yourself in the minds of your 
audience: to estimate their expertise, their level o f English proficiency, their cultural 
background, their interests etc. When using analogies as explanatory devices, it is 
important to realise, (as some on-line questionnaire respondents did), that an audience from 
Hungary may not be familiar with the landscape of the Arizona desert; an American 
audience may know nothing about cricket; and an Irish audience may have no kinaesthetic 
awareness of ice-skating. Obviously an audience is not homogeneous: it is composed of 
individuals with different backgrounds. Thus, tailoring one’s talk to one’s audience can be 
a difficult task. One risks boring the experts if a talk is overly simplistic and boring the 
novices if a talk is overly complex. Recall that in section 5.5 I categorised the 147 
examples of analogies employed by respondents in their research according to their form, 
function and context of use. I found that the largest proportion fell within set B. These 
analogies had greatest ‘addressivity’ because they drew on an intermediate range of 
concepts, descriptions and processes.
Some questionnaire respondents’ seemed to gauge the background knowledge of 
their audience in a probabilistic manner. For example, when asked to what extent the 
physics expertise of his target audience influenced his use o f analogy, Phys_25, (a 40 year 
old lecturer), said he would ask himself: “Are they undergraduates or fellow researchers?” 
His experience indicates that, “for undergraduates there is a clear distinction in which year 
of study they are - they will know some things and not others and this can be predicted 
quite well. For researchers and general public this is harder to predict.” This is an 
extremely beneficial approach to take in my view. In a similar vein, Phys_122 (a 23 year 
old PhD student) said it is important to: “think a lot before hand on what to assume the 
audience knows.” He said it is “better to give a simplified talk to non-physicists. On the 
other hand, specific knowledge needs to be transferred to a scientists audience.” However, 
Phys_160 (a 52 year old Reader in Theoretical Physics) remarked: “In my experience, no 
audience feels patronized by the substitution of an appropriate analogy for the ‘real thing’.”
The physicist David Mermin also advances the view put forward by Phys_160. 
Mermin fervently argues for simplicity and clarity when communicating science to experts,
194
Chapter 6
intermediates and novices. In a 1992 Physics Today article he gives tongue-in-cheek 
“Advice to Beginning Physics Speakers (and Intermediate or Advanced Ones). ” Through 
the voice o f a fictitious character, Prof. William A. Mozart, he says:
“Never, ever, have I heard anybody complain about a talk on the grounds that ‘I 
understood everything in it.’ People feel good after talks they can understand. Even 
those few people who hear nothing they didn’t already know can derive substantial 
enjoyment from hearing their subject presented well. The most important thing your 
talk can do for such experts is to give them an opportunity to leam how to do better in 
their own talks.” (Mermin, 1992, p.9)
I share Mermin’s view that simplicity and clarity should still be used with an audience of 
specialists and that one’s, “only goal must be to furnish ordinary physicists with some 
modest glimpse of what sustains your own interest in your subject.” (Mermin, 1992, plO). 
He remarks that, “no matter how detailed you might be tempted to make your talk, it 
cannot possibly be detailed enough for those few who are knowledgeable enough to 
appreciate such refinements.” Physicists interested in technical details can discuss them 
with the speaker in private afterwards. Even among specialists, there are differences in 
what is considered interesting. The anthropologist, Sharon Traweek (1995) has remarked 
that in the field of high-energy physics, theorists had little access to or knowledge of 
detectors. Thus, at seminars and conferences, though the experimentalists spend at least 
one third of their talks providing a detailed description of their detectors: “ ... the theorists 
rarely attend carefully to these ‘technical details,’ referring to them as the ‘scotch tape’ part 
of the talk.” (Traweek, 1995, pp. 159-160).
I would argue that the way in which physicists’ deliver talks at conferences varies 
between sub-cultures of physicists but also between individuals. Often the approach an 
individual physicist takes will depend on factors such as:
i. personality e.g. how confident they are at public speaking, where they lie on an 
introvert/extravert scale, whether they like using humour, whether they are defensive;
ii. style of thinking, e.g. the degree to which they are mathematical or pictorial/physical 
thinkers, whether they like to use ‘visuals’ such as graphs, tables or dynamic computer 
simulations;
iii. ranking, i.e. their position within the group may have a marked affect the speech 
genre. Those on the lower rungs of the academic ladder may adopt dry, technical 
speech to give a sense of professionalism and imply that they know what they are 
talking about despite their youthful appearance;




6.3 Traweek’s analysis of high-energy physicists’ social and 
psychological goals when presenting their work
Traweek has identified some common styles o f address among high-energy physicists. In 
Traweek’s experience (as an anthropologist and sociologist of science):
“Experimental high energy physicists usually do their talks at conferences with the 
lights off, the ‘overhead’ projector on, and their backs to us, not, as ethologists [i.e. 
animal behaviourists] might surmise, a sign o f  submission, but as an authoritative 
gesture. They turn away from us to the illuminated facts as a priest might turn to the 
altar, and they speak to us in that masterful voice o f  authority and with that rather 
patronizing tone o f certainty. Often their ‘transparencies’ are handwritten, 
deliberately, as proof that the enlightened facts we are reading were so recently 
gleaned that word o f  their discovery was confirmed only a few moments ago in a 
telephone call received from the laboratory.” (Traweek, 1995, p. 218)
Traweek may indeed be correct in her interpretation of physicists’ motivations for 
delivering their talks in such an authoritative manner. There are, however, many alternative 
explanations for this behaviour. For example:
(i) Lights off and their backs to the audience:
It is usually easier to see the data being displayed if the lights are turned down low. Also, 
for someone who is not confident speaking in public, it can be a relief not to have to face 
one’s audience from time to time and the audience may be less distracting if they melt into 
the darkness. If physicists are using an overhead projector to display their data (as opposed 
to reading a paper or using a laptop), they may have to turn around to see it properly. I 
would not advocate turning 180 degrees away from one’s audience but would advise 
standing to the side of a projected image, turning 90 degrees and pointing at a projected 
image with a wooden or laser pointer. In my experience, an audience’s gaze usually 
follows that of the speaker and this technique is a very useful way of focusing the 
audience’s attention on the object of interest.
(ii) Masterful voice of authority/patronizing tone of certainty:
If  a physicist doesn’t display confidence in his/her own research, other physicists won’t
either. In fact, Traweek makes this very point in her book, Beamtimes and Lifetimes,
when she says: “Persuasion is a critical skill. I have been told o f interesting experiments
that no-one has bothered to corroborate because ‘the group didn’t go out talking about their
work. If they don’t believe in their work, why should we?’.” (Traweek, 1988 p. 118)
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(iii) handw ritten transparencies:
It is ten years since Traweek made these comments in “Choreographing History ”, so one 
could surmise that high-energy physicists no longer use handwritten transparencies to the 
same extent, preferring instead to use presentation tools such as ‘powerpoint’. However, a 
cursory glance at the on-line proceedings of physics conferences reveals that there are still 
many physicists who prefer to use handwritten transparencies when presenting their work 
to peers. Often, they are the more renowned physicists. As mentioned in section 5.6.1, Ed 
Witten, one of the greatest of contemporary theoretical physicists presented his work on 
two separate occasions at the Strings 2003 Conference, held in Kyoto, Japan in June 
2003.110 First, he spoke to an audience of physicists with specialised knowledge of string 
theory, then to an audience containing a large proportion of local people with a non­
specialised knowledge of physics.
When communicating with peers he hand wrote on the transparencies as he spoke. I 
would argue that if  a physicist is thoroughly grounded in the details o f the material, and 
feels confident delivering his material ‘live’ (as Witten certainly is), it may be simpler and 
quicker to sketch things out by hand. Anyone who has used a program like Equation 
Editor will know that subscripts, superscripts and Greek letters are time-consuming to 
insert electronically. Not to mention dealing with Feynman diagrams!
Thus, physicists may use hand written transparencies, not as Traweek contends to 
give the impression of their ‘up-to-datedness’, but simply because it requires less 
preparation time. Simple diagrams are sufficient for Witten’s task (he begins by reviewing 
proton decay from the viewpoint of grand unification) because the audience he is 
communicating with have sufficient expertise in the field to be able to read the diagrams. 
As mentioned in section 1.17, reading a diagram involves learning conventions. In this 
instance, the convention that with Feynman diagrams, virtual particles are represented by 
wavy or broken lines and have no arrows, and that the time axis generally points upward 
and the space axis to the right, unless one is a particle physicist, in which case they may 
take the reverse orientation.
Note that the analogy Witten uses in page 4 of his set o f transparencies (see fig. 6.1 
below) would fit between sets B and C of my venn diagram (see section 5.5). It is a 
mathematical analogy, with a medium degree of systematicity, used as a tool of 
exploration in private conceptualisation and a tool of explanation with expert peers.
110 According to the official website, “The Strings Conference is held annually, where physicists 
get together from all over the world to present and discuss new developments o f  string theory. It 
consists o f  invited talks by leading physicists o f  this field.”
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Figure 6.1: Two of the thirty-four hand written transparencies used by Ed 
Witten during a presentation to his peers entitled, “Proton Decay In 
Intersecting D-brane Models,” at the Strings 2003 Conference held in Kyoto, 
Japan, Julv 6th- l l ,  2003. (Available at httD://www2.vukawa.kvoto- 
u.ac.iD/~str2003/index.html Last accessed 30-03-2006)
When communicating with an audience of local Kyoto residents whose native language 
was not English, Witten prepared type written transparencies devoid of mathematical 
notation of any kind. There were no Feynman diagrams, subscripts, superscripts nor Greek 
letters. (See fig 6.2 below).
Iii p h \rsics. there are objects 
m easured  b y  num bers — like  
tem perature, energy', electric  
fie ld  — and there are stranger 
quantities, like the spin o f  an 
electron , that are really  
quantum  m ech an ica l in 
nature th ey  cannot be 
properly m easured  by  
num bers .. the description  
rea lly  n eed s 'm atrices. " 
w h ich  w e  leam  about in h igh  
sch o o l
In everyday life we measure 
spacetime by numbers 
It is now 3 O clock, we are 
200 meters above sea level at 
40 degrees north latitude....
Measuring spacetmie by 
numbers is one bit of 
common sense that Einstem 
preserved ... while he 
overturned so many other 
“obvious” ideas.
Figure 6.2: Two of the forty typed transparencies used by Ed Witten during a 






As we saw in section 4.10, Prof. Berry also strips away technical details and mathematical 
notation when presenting his pictures to non-experts. However, Prof. Berry still uses 
images of some kind. In my view, a simple, visual analogy (e.g. of the warping of the 
fabric of spacetime around a black hole) would have added to Witten’s presentation to non­
experts (fig. 6.2 above). 111 As we will see in subsequent sections, a majority of 
respondents indicated that physical and pictorial analogies can greatly enhance a 
presentation when communicating with non-experts. This technique makes physics more 
accessible by building on the audience’s existing knowledge. However, one must always 
be careful not to over-simplify the subject and promote a naive interpretation.
6.4 Respondents9 use of analogy when communicating physics with 
different audiences.
The questionnaire data on the degree to which respondents use analogy when 
communicating with groups of varying expertise and background was somewhat difficult 
to unravel. There were two related questions:
Q5. “How often do you communicate physics with the following groups: ”
(i) colleagues in your own research area
( H ) peers from  a competing research group
(iii) physicists from  another branch
(iv) scientists from  a different discipline
fr) post-graduate students
(Vi) graduate students considering doing a PhD in area
(vii) under-graduate students
(viii) The general public
Q5b. “Do you ever use analogy when communicating with the following 
groups. . .”
(i) to (viii) as above.
111 On the issue of making physics accessible to people of all levels of expertise, I would argue that legible 
fonts are perhaps the most important means of doing this! Witten used of a variety of different font colours 
on his overhead slides, many of which were difficult to read. This detracted from the clarity of his 
presentation. I believe strongly that anyone who uses typewritten transparencies or ‘powerpoint’ slides to 
present their work should take advice on the most appropriate colour formats, as many people suffer varying 
degrees of visual impairment (cf Arditi, 2005).
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The quantitative selections and written comments from the on-line questionnaire revealed 
that that analogy was used to a greater extent with audiences having less physics expertise. 
and in more informal settings.
As some respondents had little or no experience of communicating with some groups their 
responses to Q5b. may have been biased.
For example, if  a respondent rarely communicates with the public, their responses to Q5b. 
may be rated lower on the 7-point scale because they factor in the frequency of 
communication with their tendency to use analogy.
A better way of phrasing Q5b would have been to use the conditional tense and ask: “to 
what extent would you use analogy i f  you were communicating with the following  
groups?”
Thus, the large standard deviations (see table 6.1) may be due to physicists’ uncertainty 
over how to interpret or define analogy or to their unfamiliarity with communicating 
physics with these groups.
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Figure 6.3: Chart showing extent to which respondents’ use analogy when communicating 
with groups having differing levels of physics expertise and academic status.
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Q.5b. Do you ever 
use analogies when 
communicating 




























Physicists were asked to select from a 7-point semantic, differential scale which ran from 
“never/1 -  2 -  3 -  4 -  5 -  6 -  7/all the time”
Valid responses 218 210 215 213 213 213 214 212
No response 7 15 10 12 12 12 11 13
Mean 3.87 3.65 4.37 4.55 4.27 4.40 4.83 5.33
Median 4 3 5 5 4 5 5 6
Mode 2 2 5 7 4 5 7 7
Std. Deviation 1.89 1.87 1.87 2.05 1.80 1.92 1.90 1.99
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Figure 6.4: Chart showing mean values for respondents’ 7-point scale selections regarding the extent to which they use analogies when communicating with eight 
different audiences, listed on the x-axis.
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One could offer some tentative hypotheses on the reasons behind the variation in mean 
values. For example, that they are lowest (3.65) when communicating with peers from a 
competing research group because analogy is avoided when the objective is to sound 
authoritative and rigorous. When analogies are used in this context they are more likely to 
be abstract, mathematical analogies, lying within set C of my venn diagram’s system of 
classification. (See figure 5.3, in section 5.5). The mean value increases (3.87) when 
dealing with colleagues in one’s own research area, because although one is dealing with 
an expert audience, the setting is more informal. As Phys_95 (a 27 year old, male PhD 
student) remarked: “For a rigorous, 'dry' explanation, it is best to steer clear of analogies. 
In a more relaxed setting, it's much more fun to let the imagination run a bit and come up 
with parallels! Hence the tone of a discussion affects how much I use analogous 
visualisations...” When analogies are used in this context they can span sets A, B and C. 
The mean value increases again (4.37) when communicating with physicists from a 
different branch because analogy is being used to transfer knowledge across sub- 
disciplinary boundaries of expertise. These kinds o f analogies would fall within the 
intersection between sets B and C in my venn diagram’s system of classification. The 
mean value increases further (4.55) when communicating with scientists from a different 
discipline because in this scenario physicists must find a vehicle that will allow them to 
transfer knowledge across disciplinary boundaries of expertise. Again, the analogies would 
be similar to those within set B, having physical and pictorial components with medium- 
level systematicity. The mean value drops back down (4.27) when communicating with 
postgraduate students because they have probably been trained in the same discipline and 
are likely to be familiar with the concepts being communicated to them. The mean value 
begins to increase again (4.40) when communicating with graduate students who are 
considering doing a PhD in the respondent’s research area because analogy is also being 
employed as a rhetorical tool to make the topic sound interesting, accessible and perhaps 
even fun. The mean value increases further (4.83) when communicating with 
undergraduate students because not only does the speaker wish to make the topic sound 
interesting, s/he also wishes to transfer knowledge to an audience having less physics 
expertise than almost all o f the previously mentioned groups. Finally, the mean value is 
highest (5.33) when communicating with the general public because this audience has 
little expertise, the setting is informal, and the objective is usually to inform, educate and 
entertain. In the last context, the analogies tend to be similar to those within set A of my 
venn diagram. Their components are drawn from everyday concepts and experiences. They
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are often playful but rarely expressed using mathematical notation as this would not be 
accessible to the general public.
6.5 Degree to which level of expertise affects physicists’ use of analogy:
According to Barrow (1992, p.21):“[I]f we look more closely at what scientists do, it is 
possible to see their descriptions as the search for analogies that differ from those used as a 
popularising device only by the degree of sophistication and precision with which they can 
be endowed.” The findings presented in chapter 5 support this view. I argued that the 
analogies used by physicists could be divided into three main sets (A, B and C) where the 
form of the analogies varied depending on their context of use. Simple analogies (with 
physical and pictorial features) were more common in the early stages of a physicist’s 
private conceptualisations, when communicating physics to peers in very relaxed settings 
or to novices in all settings. Complex analogies (with mathematical features) tended to be 
used as structured tools of exploration in research and as tools of explanation when 
communicating with experts. Thus, Q5c of the on-line questionnaire asked:
"Do the following factors influence your use o f  analogy when communicating 
with your target audience?
- Physics expertise o f  target audience;
- Academic status o f  target audience;112
- Nationality o f  (majority of) target audience.
- Other (please state).
Respondents were asked to select from a drop down menu, which ranged of the from:
“not at all/1 -  2 - 3 -  4 -  5 -  6 7/very much so ”. The quantitative responses to “physics 
expertise of target audience” are plotted in figure 6.5 below.
112 the meaning of ‘academic status’ caused some confusion amongst respondents so was changed 
to “Prestige of Occasion” after the first 50 replies were received. Unfortunately this also caused 
confusion for the next 175 respondents, so the data must be interpreted in light of this.
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Degree to which physics expertise of target audience influences 
respondent's use of analogy in communication
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Figure 6.5: Chart showing the extent to which “Physics Expertise of Target Audience” 
influences respondents’ use of analogy when communicating physics.
Quantitative analysis indicates that the physics expertise o f the target audience has a huge 
influence on respondents’ use of analogy when communicating physics. Qualitative 
analysis reveals a range of interesting explanations to account for the influence which 
expertise of target audience has on physicists’ use of analogy. These have been re-coded 
and their frequencies ascertained. This is presented below:
(0 More expertise means less need for analogy (analogy may seem patronising) 43.1%
(ii) More expertise means more complex analogies can be employed 21.3%
(hi) [Failed to give a reason as to why audience expertise influences use of analogy] 17.8%
(iv) Talk must be tailored to audience’s background knowledge 12.4%
(v) [Vague Replies] 2.2%
(vi) Expertise is irrelevant 1.8%
(vii) More expertise implies a more complicated subject, which makes it more
difficult to generate analogies 1.3%
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The largest single group (accounting for 43.1% of respondents) said that the need for 
analogy decreases as the expertise of the audience increases. Some of these respondents 
specifically referred to the fact that an audience o f experts may find analogy patronising. 
On the other hand, the second largest group (21.3%) said that one may employ more 
elaborate analogies as the expertise of one’s target audience increases. These 48 physicists 
thus deviate from the popular view: that the degree to which analogy is used is inversely 
proportional to the expertise of the target audience. However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, I believe that respondents had different definitions of ‘analogy’ in mind when they 
made their selections. This is despite the fact that 5 different examples of analogy were 
supplied to respondents to encourage them to take a broad view. For many physicists, 
analogy appeared to be associated with simplified models used in secondary school 
problem solving, popular science books, and science documentaries. I believe that 
respondents in the largest group (43.1%) did not consider formal mathematical analogies 
when giving their reply, unlike the second largest group (21.3%) who appear to have held a 
broader view of analogy: that “analogies” include (i) playful analogies; (ii) analogies in the 
form of physical and pictorial heuristics; and (iii) formal mathematical analogies with a 
high degree of isomorphism. Thus, I would argue that the quantitative and qualitative data 
suggests that respondents’ do consider Bahktinian ‘addressivity’ when they are 
communicating physics, although they may not have expressed it within this theoretical 
framework.
6.5.1 Analogy is used less as the audience’s physics expertise increases:
Based on the findings of my pilot studies (Muldoon, 2002), I hypothesised that the 
common perception amongst respondents to the on-line questionnaire would be that 
analogy is a particularly useful communication tool when popularising science to the 
public but isn’t always appropriate when communicating their research to experts. As 
expected, a majority of respondents indicated that they would use analogy less as their 
audience’s level of physics expertise increased.
For example, Phys_33 (a 47 year old “chief physicist”) said simply that the, “need 
for analogies decreases when physics knowledge increases.” Phys_ 86 (a 36 year old 
Spacecraft Operations Engineer) said: “An analogy is only useful when it allows people to 
visualise some concept which they are unfamiliar with in terms of one which they are 
familiar w ith... A highly physics illiterate audience (ie the general public) will require the 
use o f a lot analogies and oversimplification whereas peers would require very little, since 
you could talk on the same terms.” P h y s_ lll (a 27 year old PhD student) said that: “The
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language and terminology used tends to be different when communicating with different 
groups.” Phys_ 97 (a 22 year old PhD student) said: “When talking to people with no 
physics background it's easier say to analogise, say, spacetime as a rubber sheet which 
curves when you put masses on it, rather than talking about tensors, metrics and covariant 
derivatives, which would mean absolutely nothing to them.” Phys_147 (a 25 year old PhD 
student) said that: “The level of detail will certainly depend on how much knowledge of 
physics the audience has. Simplified descriptions of e.g. electromagnetic showers would be 
appropriate for undergraduates/A-Level students, perhaps employing some form of 
analogy, whereas more detailed and technical descriptions would be appropriate at, say, a 
conference.” Phys_8, (a 25 year old assistant lecturer) said: “the greater the expertise, the 
less need for an analogy. It, in fact, can confuse your argument and lead to scepticism.” 
This mention of ‘scepticism’ is developed further in section 6.6 where I show that there 
appears to be a relationship between respondents’ wariness of using analogies and their 
ages: younger physicists wish to impress their superiors by using a more technical mode of 
communication. On the other hand, more experienced researchers, who have already 
established the merit of their work, sometimes feel freer to use inexact and playful modes 
of communication with experts.
6.5.2 More complex analogies are used as the audience’s physics expertise increases:
Although a majority o f respondents indicated that they would use analogy less as the 
audience’s level of physics expertise increased, several respondents said that they would 
use analogy to the same extent with experts, but they would use more complex analogies. 
These analogies would fall within set C in my venn diagram (figure 5.3). They are often 
expressed mathematically. They hold for a hierarchy of relations, from the underlying 
mathematical structure, to physical and pictorial manifestations of the analogy.
For example, Phys_127 (a 24 year old PhD student working on high energy particle 
physics, said that, “Inexact analogies are out of place for physics-expert audiences since 
they are equipped to understand the ‘proper’ version. Rock solid analogies are still good, 
though.” Phys_200, (a 61 year old, semi-retired, self employed, cement industry 
consultant) said that, “the use of an analogy is basic to the way I work and think and hence 
I use analogies of increasing complexity as my audience becomes more technical and 
science based.” Similarly, Phys_114, (a 59 year old, Professor of Physics, whose research 
interests include quantum information theory and the foundations of quantum mechanics) 
said that with a more expert audience, “this increases the available repertoire of possible 
analogies.” Phys_21 (a 30 year old lecturer in the area of astrophysics) said that, “If  the
208
Chapter 6
audience knows a lot of physics then the analogies can be drawn from other areas of
physics, if  not then they can only be drawn from every-day life. ” Similarly, Phys_177 (a
24 year old PhD student in the area of quantum communication) said that when: “talking to
general public, you better use analogies that have something to do with their life. Physicists
can understand analogies to their specific field of work.” The comments of Phys_160 (a 52
year old Reader in Theoretical Physics) suggest that he uses analogies with form and
11^function in sets A, B and C of figure 5.3. First, in his own area of specialisation there are 
“shared analogies” that he “probably make[s] use of without necessarily realising” he is 
doing so, i.e. analogies in set C possibly intersecting with set B. Second, when talking to 
physicists with other specializations he says “I typically draw on analogies between what I 
do and what they do.” These are analogies in set B, and to a lesser degree, the intersection 
between B and C. Third, he uses “everyday” analogies with non-physicists, i.e. set A.
These findings provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that many respondents 
interpreted the term ‘analogy’ differently. Respondents who said they use less analogies as 
the audience’s physics-expertise increases probably held a narrower interpretation of 
analogy which did not encompass formal, mathematical analogies? It is also possible that 
respondents had different (more or less sophisticated) views of their target audiences or 
contexts of use, perhaps on account of their relative experience or inexperience. It is also 
possible that there is a dearth of sophisticated analogies in certain areas of physics. For 
example, some respondents claimed that it was too difficult to formulate analogies in their 
research area. Or perhaps those who use analogies of increasing sophistication as the 
physics expertise o f their audience increases are more adept at formulating analogies.
To answer these questions it would have been necessary to recode the qualitative 
data and test for correlations. However, as there were a large number of blank replies, 
nothing conclusive could have been obtained from that data. I decided to focus on this 
issue in the follow-up correspondence with the 70% of respondents who agreed to be 
contacted in the future. Unfortunately, those that left blank replies tended be less willing to 
be contacted in the future so it was difficult to completely clarify the matter without a full 
round of re-sampling and re-testing. However, the results of my follow-up e-mail 
exchanges show that the physicists I surveyed are sensitive to context and audience in their 
use of analogy. This is also borne out in my January 2004 interview with Dr. Lawson, who
113 “People I talk to are divided quite sharply into two groups: those who work in roughly the same 
area as I do, and those who know very little about what I do. Within my own area, there are shared 
analogies that I probably make use of without necessarily realizing that I am doing so. When 
talking to physicists with other specializations, I typically draw on analogies between what I do and 
what they do. On the rare occasions that I discuss my work with non-physicists, I make use of 
everyday analogies to the extent that that is possible.”
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said that his use of analogy was highly dependent on the context and audience. For 
example, he said that if you are dealing with “a fairly sophisticated physicist, you can take 
a sophisticated analogy;” With “the general public” on the other hand, “it’s very often 
helpful to find a very simple analogy to things that they’re familiar with.” 114 Dr. Lawson 
agreed that the complexity of the analogy would increase directly proportionally to the 
expertise o f the audience. Thus, Dr. Lawson’s experiences of using analogy to 
communicate physics are in line with 12% of questionnaire respondents who highlighted 
the need to tailor the talk to the audience’s background knowledge, and 21% of 
questionnaire respondents who said that the complexity o f the analogy tended to increase 
directly proportionally to the expertise of the audience.
6.6 Degree to which academic status or prestige of occasion (or 
tone of discussion) influences physicists9 use of analogy.
Fear of misleading one’s audience is not the only deterrent in using analogy in 
communication; fear of being looked down upon is also a factor. In all areas of 
communication, one must mould one’s speech to the tone o f the discussion. For example, 
the tone adopted when speaking about one’s research to one’s friends in the pub will 
probably differ from speaking about one’s research at a departmental seminar (even though 
the same friends may make up 90% of the audience). The presence of one’s head of 
department e.g. will probably make certain (witty, humorous, self-deprecating) comments 
less ‘appropriate’. Gauging the tone can be difficult. It depends on one’s own perception of 
what is ‘normal’ and ‘appropriate’. Personally I appreciate the use o f humour to make 
topics more engaging. Many individuals, however, consider it unprofessional to employ 
humour in scholarly work. Essentially it revolves around two issues: projecting an 
appropriate image of oneself and not wishing to offend experts. The common perception is 
that if  one wishes to be taken seriously in an academic setting, one must adopt a 
professional approach, upholding the standards and traditions o f the field. Use of dry and 
technical speech is believed to be a safe way to project a professional image and thereby 
climb the rungs of the academic ladder. The quantitative data does not at first glance 
support this hypothesis as the majority group say that the prestige of the occasion would in 
no way influence their use of analogy. (See figure 6.6 below).
114 Dr. L aw son in conversation w ith Ciara M uldoon, Jan 2004.
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7 -point sca le
Figure 6.6: Chart showing the degree to which prestige of occasion influences physicists use 
of analogy when communicating with their target audience
However, upon further examination, it becomes evident that the wording of the question 
was quite confusing which resulted in many failures to elaborate. Many respondents also 
had little experience communicating at so-called ‘prestigious occasions’ and consequently 
could not comment. It is difficult to investigate the extent to which social setting 
influences behaviour. Such concerns are often sub-conscious. Even when an individual is 
conscious of them they may not wish to openly acknowledge that they have this concern. 
Written comments were re-coded according to certain common themes and their frequency
o f occurrence ascertained. This is presented below:
(i) [No comment] 24.9%
(ii) Academic Status/Prestige of Occasion is irrelevant - would still use analogies 24.0%
(iii) Prestigious Occasions tend to be more PR orientated => more analogies 6.0%
(iv) On more prestigious occasions I would try for more original analogies 6.2%
(v) I have no experience of this 2.7%
(vi) It depends on what audience knows and how they're inclined to listen 0.9%
(vii) Less spontaneous in use of analogies on more prestigious occasions 0.9%
The meaning of these figures is explained in sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2, drawing on 
respondents written comments. (See appendix 6, section A 6.1 for additional comments.)
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6.6.1 analogy is looked down upon in formal settings:
The use o f amusing and playful analogies, and other creative use of language are 
considered by many physicists to be appropriate in informal settings, but less appropriate 
in more formal settings. For example, when asked whether the “prestige of the occasion” 
might influence their use of analogy with their target audience, Phys_93 (a 32 year old 
research fellow involved in quantum cryptography) said: “This is important. In an informal 
discussion, where a problem is analysed sometimes only in a few minutes, analogies help a 
lot. For a formal talk its better to be more professional.” The state of development of the 
community of practitioners may also play a part. According to Bissel and Dillion (2000, 
p. 10): “ ... in less secure areas, in communities whose boundaries are changing or whose 
members feel vulnerable to external criticism, there is an emphasis on formality that is a 
direct result o f perceived external pressures.”
According to Phys_36, (a 24 year old PhD student involved in space science): 
“analogy is occasionally ‘looked down upon’ in a formal scientific situation.” His 
implication is that analogy is too simplistic and imprecise to use with experts. Similarly, 
Phys_90 (a 25 year old PhD student involved in particle physics) said that it was a catch- 
22 situation when an audience is composed of individuals with varying levels o f expertise, 
as he put it: “Experts will often feel insulted by what they feel are simple-minded 
analogies. Even if they do not, they may think less of your capabilities. On the other hand, 
it's important to help those who don’t know the areas as well to understand as easily as 
possible.” Likewise, Phys_9 (a 32 year old lecturer in physics and astronomy) said that: 
’’Analogies may be perceived as a dumbing-down, humorisation or over-simplification o f a 
concept; therefore they need to be used with care if  the audience is already expert or 
‘stuffy’.” Phys_14 (a 53 year old professor of physics in the area of surface science 
technology) said: “At conferences of experts, I usually find analogies less useful and less 
comfortable to use.” Phys_29 (a 42 year old researcher in the area of astrophysics) said: “I 
do not like to use too many analogies at a high power conference because analogies are 
sometimes perceived as a crutch for the inarticulate.”
As mentioned previously, the manner in which one communicates is o f course 
dependent on one’s character -  introvert or extrovert, insecure or confident, comical or 
droll; on one’s own preferences for visual, verbal, or mathematical explanations; etc. 
However, there appeared to be some correlation between respondents’ age and the degree 
to which prestige of occasion was influential. (See table 6.2 on the next page). 
Respondents in the 19-29 year old age-bracket seemed to be the most influenced. 
Positioned as they are, lower down the academic ladder, these physicists may feel more
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insecure about their abilities and more inclined to impress their superiors. However this 
age group did have the least experience of presenting at prestigious occasions so their 
comments were more conjectural. Also, these respondents may have held a narrower 
interpretation of analogy, which excluded formal, mathematical analogies. Taking all this 
into account, it is, in my opinion, easier for esteemed physicists to employ less formal 
analogies in communication because they have nothing to prove. Unlike younger, 
‘unknowns’, esteemed researchers have confidence: their work is highly regarded so they 
can afford to be more informal in their presentations. Phys_68 (a 44 year old reader in 
physics) said that in his experience: “I find that even amongst distinguished colleagues it is 
better to give a picture that everyone can understand. I have seen this done by the most 





Response to auestion concerning academic 
status (0- 50) and re-worded 
prestige of occasion (51-225 ).
Phys_13 32 female lecturer “Probably don’t want to make it seem too easy!!”
Phys_20 23 male PhD
student
“Depending on audience, presentations will be 
altered to suit. Don't want to be patronising to those 
more qualified, but don't want to leave others 
behind during the talk.”
Phys_27 25 male PhD
student
“You want the people who give you money now or 
who might give you a job later on to think you are 
smart, not that you are a playschool presenter.”
Phys_30 23 male PhD
student




“I have limited experience of this but I am more 
careful with my wording!”
Phys_176 24 male PhD
student
“perhaps i'd avoid more simplistic analogies if the 
audience contained distinguished physicists!”.
Phys_187 26 male PhD
student
“Don't want my research to seem over simplistic.”
Table 6.2: showing t lat there appears to be a relationship between respondents’ age and the
degree to which prestige of occasion was influential, with younger respondents being wary of 
offending experts by using analogies.
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6.6.2 Eminent Physicists’ Use of Analogy: Kroem er’s Nobel Prize Address
Following on from the comments of Phys_68,1 thought it would be interesting to analyse a 
sample of Nobel Prize speeches (or equivalent) to see if  there is any evidence to support 
this hypothesis. What little exploration I have done, suggests that non-formal analogies, 
(and other forms of simplified visualizations), are often employed by physicists in their 
Nobel Prize addresses. For example, in 2000, Alferov, Kroemer, and Kilby shared the 
Nobel Prize In Physics.115 Kroemer has a famous adage:
- Kroemer’s Lemma of Proven Ignorance: “If, in discussing a semiconductor problem, you 
cannot draw an Energy Band Diagram, then you don’t know what you are talking about.”
- Induced-Ignorance Corrollary to Kroemer’s Lemma of Proven Ignorance: “If you can, 
but don’t, then your audience won’t know what you are talking about.”
In a band diagram arrows indicate forces, the slope indicates elementary charge times 
field, and the electrons and holes simply respond to the slope of the band edges. Early in 
his Nobel address, Kroemer quoted his Lemma o f Proven Ignorance (Kroemer, 2000, web 
ref.) and accompanied it with a series of simplified band diagrams, as shown in figure 6.7.
Herbert Kroemer 451
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Figure I. Quasi-Electric Fields: (a) A true electric field simply tilts the bands; (b) quasi-electric 
fields, with no force on electrons, but a force on holes; (c) quasi-electric fields forcing electrons 
and holes in the same direction. From Kroemer (1957a).
Figure 6.7: Im age o f  band diagram  used by K roem er (2000) in his N obel address.
115 "for basic work on information and communication technology", "for developing semiconductor 




Kroemer then went on to use a simple expository analogy:
“Electrons are being driven to the right -  they are behaving like water on a sloped 
surface. Holes are being driven to the left -  they behave somewhat like bubbles in 
water, which, of course we all know, rise.” (Kroemer, 2000, web ref., 2001)
This analogy has some shortcomings, but could be considered acceptable because the 
audience is composed of a mixture of novices and experts, from differing disciplines. Also, 
the majority of Kroemer’s Nobel address was actually geared toward an audience with a 
good knowledge of physics. By beginning from a simple picture, and building up to more 
technical explanations, Kroemer was able to satisfy most of the audience, introducing the 
subject to novices and reminding experts of the achievements made.
6.6.3 The importance of play and humour when communicating physics
My findings suggest that successful science communicators often employ humour to make 
their subject matter engaging. The use of humour and play is delicate however. One cannot 
be seen to be unprofessional or flippant if one is to project a respectful image to one’s 
peers or superiors. Several respondents highlighted this fact (in response to the question 
concerning how prestige of occasion might influence use of analogy). Phys_212, a 
postdoctoral researcher said that: “Until one has a permanent job one cannot be too flippant 
at a formal occasion. Informal talks are different - humour often helps.” Phys_165, a 36 
year old, advanced research fellow, said that the prestige of the occasion: “Might have a 
small effect. People tell me that the most silly jokes should be omitted in more prestigious 
occasions and that the pictures should look more fancy.”
When communicating with novices, successful physics communicators continuously 
emphasise the fact that an analogy is an idealisation, not to be taken literally. Some even 
make light of the fact that people take analogies too literally. In fact, poking fun at people 
who take analogies too literally is a useful means of warning people of the dangers of 
being misled by these simplified representations. Professor Paul Coleman of the Physics 
Department at the University of Bath did this on numerous occasions during his 
wonderfully engaging inaugural lecture entitled: “Probing Matter with Anti-Matter: A  
Career in Self-Annihilation . ” He used humour to great effect throughout. His opening 
words drew laughter from the audience and immediately set the tone:
“Thank you George116 for that overwhelming introduction - - what I wrote. (Laughter 
from audience}. Ah, most of you here tonight are probably expecting me to talk for 
50-55 minutes; well, because of that I had a trial run this afternoon -  18 and a half
116 Prof. George Lunt, deputy vice-chancellor.
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minutes. {Laughter from audience/. Therefore, I’m going to take a leaf out of 
Kingsley Amis’s book -  literally {he opens the book}: ‘Talk slowly, every third 
sentence speak loudly, {laughter from audience} to give the impression you’re saying 
something important {laughter from audience} and interweave your talk with long 
passages of Portuguese''{laughter from audience}. You think I’m joking, {laughter 
from audience}.” 117
Prof. Coleman had the confidence to do this because he is well regarded in his field. 
However, he was constantly wary of not offending his colleagues through his use of his 
playful tone or inclusion of simplified analogous visualisations. For example, later in the 
lecture, while explaining the fate of positrons in matter, he displayed a billiard ball 
representation of a positron bouncing around an atomic lattice; he stressed the idealised 
nature of the representation to the novices in the audience and acknowledged that this 
approach would be frowned upon by experts, remarking: “I must apologise to my scientific 
colleagues for this billiard ball approach but it’s easier to draw than its quantum 
equivalent.” (ibid.) This aside does two things: it reminds novices that this is a simplified 
version of the physical situation and that experts deal with much more complicated 
visualisations; by doing this, it ensures that experts do not worry that the novices in the 
audience are being misled by this overly simplified version of the physical system.
Figure 6.8: Prof. Coleman, during his inaugural lecture. 
© Imaging and Photographic Unit, University of Bath.
117 Coleman, during his inaugural lecture: “Probing Matter with Anti-Matter: A Career in Self- 
Annihilationi, ” delivered the University o f  Bath, on 1st May, 2003
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Bissel and Dillon (2000, p.6) note that: “Models are starting points for conversations 
among practitioners about the system they are claimed to represent... As part of their 
development engineers leam how to talk about their models.” I would argue that like 
engineers, physicists must also “leam what stories to tell about [their models] and to 
recognise what sorts of conversations are legitimate.” (ibid.)
Professor Coleman emphasised the idealised and simplified nature of his billiard ball 
representation of positronium, on another occasion in his inaugural lecture, saying:
“Again if my colleagues will forgive me I’ll show you- I’ll try to show you -  a 
billiard ball representation of this. There we are. This is a hydrogen atom with a 
proton in the middle, and an electron going around it. And this is positronium with the 
ahm -  positive things are red, you see and the electron is blue as everybody knows -  
so here is the electron and the positron going around, but on the same orbit, so it’s 
about the same size as the hydrogen atom, although the distance between the particles 
is double, in the case of the positronium.” (ibid.)
His tongue in cheek remark that “the electron is blue as everybody knows” draws attention 
to the hugely simplified representations of subatomic particles introduced in textbooks in 
secondary level education, which often persist with many people, particularly if they have 
not taken science at a higher level. This is a wonderful example of using humour to 
highlight the pros and cons of employing analogies in physics.
6.7 The Drawbacks of Analogy: Confusing the Map with the Territory.
The drawbacks in employing analogy in conceptualisation and communication have been 
outlined by many historians, philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists of science over 
the past 40 years (e.g. Hesse, 1966; Larkin & McDermott, 1980; Gentner, 1983; Gentner & 
Gentner, 1983; Nersessian 1995; Holyoak and Thagard, 1996; Taber, 2001). As mentioned 
in chapter one, Holyoak and Thagard (1995, p.204) caution that: “Without guidance from a 
teacher, analogy is often a trap for the unwary novice, rather than a stepping stone to 
expertise.” As Hesse (1966) explained, models have positive analogies (e.g. the earth 
orbiting the sun : the electron orbiting the nucleus), negative analogies (the size o f the sun 
: the size o f the nucleus), and neutral analogies (where the relation is not known).
Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson, and Anderson (1989) provide an excellent summary of 
the dangers of reductive analogies in the intermediate stage between novice and expert. 
The intermediate’s goal is: (a) mastery of complexity (going beyond superficial 
familiarity with simplified versions of concepts) and (b) knowledge applicability (the 
ability to apply or transfer knowledge adaptively). Their examples are derived from
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medical students’ common misconceptions that, in Spiro et al.’s view, are: “traceable to 
cognitive (and sometimes instructional) overreliance on single analogies.” (op cit. p. 499).
According to Spiro et al. (op cit. p.515) single analogies suffer the following shortcomings
which often results in deeply held erroneous knowledge:
(a) information that is missing from the source;
(b) information in the source that is misleading about the topic;
(c) information that is inappropriately focused in the source.
Spiro et al. (1989) identify eight varieties of analogy-induced misconception, and suggest 
that multiple analogies can act as an antidote if they are properly “selected, integrated and 
psychologically managed.” (op. cit. p. 500). What Spiro et al. propound is what they call 
“non abstractive integration”. They explain it thus:
“By using a composite of several analogies, understanding is not abstractively 
reduced either to a superordinate system or to any one of the analogies acting as 
privileged with respect to the others. In contrast, in abstractive integration the 
individual elements are replaced by a subsumptive abstraction that stands for the 
elements and/or their combinations. By presenting the composite analogies as 
simultaneous overlapping images, the composite leads to a perceptual integration.”
(op. cit. p523)
To illustrate this idea they compare it to the perception of complex objects like human 
faces, where the whole is psychologically graspable without loss of information about 
parts. One can recognise overall facial expressions or else focus on the components of the 
face, e.g. distance between the eyes, size of the nose, shape of the mouth etc. They say: 
“The physiognomy is perceptually integrated while the component parts continue to make 
their contributions individually (in contrast to the supplanting of individual elements in an 
abstractive integration).” (ibid.) I support Spiro et al’s (1989) call for the “systematic 
assembly o f  multiple knowledge sources -  integrated multiple analogies, compiled 
fragments from diverse schemata, re-presentations of the same information under different 
organizational schemes, etc.” (opcit. p.529).
In the same volume, Brewer picks up on this idea of ‘nonabstractive integration’, 
posing the following provocative question:
“What is the form of representation of the knowledge of muscle physiology in the case 
of the true expert? Does the research scientist who studies muscle physiology continue 
to use ‘nonabstractively integrated’ instances, or does the information become an 
integrated abstract structure?” (Brewer, 1989, p.53 8)
This question could also be asked of advanced knowledge acquisition among physics 
scholars. Respondents to the on-line questionnaire could be classified as intermediate (PhD
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students), advanced (Post Doctoral Research Associates) and expert (Lecturers and 
Professors). When conceptualising and communicating physics many of these physicists 
reported using analogies that are inconsistent or mutually contradictory. In nuclear physics, 
for example, physicists use various phenomenological models (founded on formal 
analogies) - the liquid drop model, the shell model, the compound nucleus model, the 
optical model - in order to describe scattering, fission etc. The situation is similar in optics 
where, as Morrison explains, the models’, “idealized structure...makes them useful as 
instruments in the design of lenses and for the calculation of different effects produced in 
different experimental contexts.” (Morrison, 1998, p.73). So while physics students do 
leam some multiple analogies as antidotes to single analogies which are misleading, 
incomplete, or inappropriately focused (e.g. flowing waters or teeming crowds for 
electricity) for the most part, multiple analogies are used as a source o f information for 
practical problem solving at a later date. 118 Once assimilated, the models become part of a 
physicist’s toolkit. As a result o f their practicality they are taken by many to be realistic, 
for all intents and purposes, and cease to be regarded as ‘analogies’ as such. They are 
“taken for granted” as Phys_128 said.
When asked, in Q5d, to what extent the physics expertise of the target audience 
influenced his use of analogy, Phys_89 said: “I'd use analogy either with an audience that 
is very expert in what I'm saying, or with an audience that is totally 'blank'. I'd use less 
analogy with an intermediate audience, that might be misled.” 119 Phys_89 was the 
exception in this respect. For the most part, the science communication section of the 
questionnaire revealed that most physicists believe that ‘analogy’ (by their definition) is 
too simplistic, ambiguous and misleading to be used when communicating with experts. It 
is, in their view, most useful when communicating with novices, (i.e. in popular science 
talks) or with intermediates (physics students in secondary and early tertiary level 
education). Use of analogy should, in their view, be inversely proportional to the 
audiences’ physics expertise. O f course this means that those who are least able to evaluate 
the merits of an analogy are the ones most likely to have analogy thrust upon them. 
However, the group most at risk of adopting a naive interpretation are the intermediates. 
Undergraduate and post-graduate students frequently employ models and analogies in 
problem solving. We know from Spiro et al’s research that even when the disanalogies are
118 As Bruce Gregory puts it, “for a physicist, a realistic picture is far too complex to be useful as a tool, and 
physics is all about fashioning tools... the world o f physics is a world o f  hard edges and abstraction, a 
mathematical world as austere and as beautiful as a painting by Mondrian.” (Gregory, 1988, p.3)
119 Phys_89, a 28 year old, male, post doc, whose research interests include: “polymer dynamics, interfacial 
rheology, liquid interfaces, colloidal suspensions.”
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made explicit to students,120 many still hold erroneous assumptions, often misled by 
connotations of non-technical descriptive language. The danger is to confuse the map with 
the territory. As Alfred Korzybski (1933, p.58) noted: “A map is not the territory it 
represents, but, if  correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its 
usefulness.” Use of analogy in science education should not be avoided. As Nersessian 
remarks, students:
“posses the basic cognitive capacities employed in constructive modelling: to make 
analogies, to create mental simulations, to perform idealization and generic 
abstraction, and this fact can be taken advantage of and cultivated in the domain of 
science.” (Nersessian, 1995, p222 & 205)
Although novices and intermediates possess the basic cognitive capacities employed in 
constructive modelling, they often lack the skill to judge the scope or appropriateness of an 
analogy. Thus, physics educators should highlight the limitations of single analogies, and 
make every effort to use multiple analogies (properly selected) to counteract the omissions 
and over-extensions of single analogies.
6.7.1 A new approach to the use of analogy in science education?
Firing positrons from a particle accelerator is often likened to firing little blue balls from a 
gun. To the eyes of a novice, there is significant literal similarity between the source 
domain (little blue balls being fired from a gun) and target domain (positrons being fired 
from an accelerator). Without proper guidance, some novices come to think that positrons 
‘really are’ little blue balls. As mentioned in section 6.7, guidance consists o f giving 
students examples of good analogies and counter-examples or exceptions to illustrate the 
limitations of these analogies.
I believe that original analogies which feature physically possible but implausible 
situations may be less likely to cause novices to adopt a naive interpretation o f an analogy. 
For example, instead of comparing positrons to inanimate objects like little blue balls,
p i
Professor Paul Coleman’s playful explanation of positron surface interactions compares 
positrons to chickens. It is reproduced and abridged below, with Professor Coleman’s kind 
permission.
120 albeit medical students in this case, but presumably sharing similar cognitive capacities.
121 presented at his inaugural lecture: “Probing Matter with Anti-Matter: A Career in Self-Annihilation, ” 
delivered the University of Bath, on 1st May, 2003
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Professor Paul Coleman’s Dazed Chicken Model:
Imagine a ravine. On one side of the ravine is a forest of evenly spaced trees (analogous to 
a crystal lattice). Some of the trees have been up-rooted, leaving holes in the ground 
(analogous to vacancies or defects in the lattice). On the other side of the ravine, chickens 
are fired from a cannon (analogous to positrons fired from a particle accelerator). The 
chickens get propelled across the ravine, smashing into the evenly spaced trees. Some 
stagger around on the ground, completely dazed (analogous to thermal positron diffusion). 
Some fall into holes in the ground (analogous to trapping by vacancies or defects beneath 
the surface). Some fall into the ravine (analogous to surface state trapping). Some, not so 
dazed, fly back across the ravine (analogous to positron re-emission).
/>
DAZED CHICKEN MODEL 
Extensions required •
1 Antichickens hovenng outside the wood waiting to whisk away hapless chickens of the opposite gender 
2 Antichickens lurking in the Dark Wood with even more dastardly intent 
3 Branches in the ravine to catch falling chickens 
4 Someone to operate the chicken cannon
Paul Coleman 1985/2003
Figure 6.9: Paul Coleman’s Dazed Chicken Model. 
© Paul Coleman (University of Bath) 1985/2003
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The entertaining verbal analogy and accompanying sketch are extremely accessible and 
memorable for physics novices (and intermediates and experts). The analogy could 
probably work with just a verbal mode of expression but the visual mode makes it much 
more engaging and memorable. Unlike the standard analogy of little blue balls being fired 
from a gun, this outlandish analogy also contains little literal similarity, thus novices do 
not adopt a naive conception of positrons being literally similar to chickens, or an atomic 
lattice being literally similar to a forest of evenly spaced trees. Although it contains little 
literal similarity, it does contain considerable systematicity: there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the elements of the source and target domains for a hierarchy of 
relations. This ranges from non-literal relations between the source and target on a physical 
or pictorial level (e.g. chickens being like positrons), down to mathematical relations that 
exist on a deeper structural level (e.g. the shape of the ravine could be thought of as a 
mathematical function relating to a potential well in which positrons can be trapped near a 
solid surface). The physical picture attached to the physically possible but implausible 
source can thus be used as a bridge to understand the physics of positron surface 
interactions. The analogy works because it is visually engaging, amusing, memorable and 
actually holds for a hierarchy of relations. However, like all analogies, it does have 
limitations. Professor Coleman was very keen to stress this fact. He said to me during one 
o f our follow-up e-mail exchanges:
“The analogy is far from perfect - the phenomena involved should be described 
quantum mechanically, for example - and chickens are definitely classical 
(Newtonian) creatures - but, with the extensions I noted on the original sketch, most 
areas are covered in some way.” 122 
In response to my queries concerning the origins of the analogy, Prof. Coleman explained 
that he “doodled” the Dazed Chicken Model during a “far from interesting” conference 
talk. He said:
“There was no specific cue; I have always liked absurdist humour... My intent was to 
have some fun and to lighten what was a very boring time. But the sketch has since 
amused many of my colleagues in positron physics, and I am now using it in a short 
presentation to potential students and their parents on UCAS [Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Services] admissions days in the Department.” 123 
This is a perfect example of play and humour being used to good effect by a practicing 
physicist with a flair for communicating with experts and novices. I believe that an 
analysis of the key features of good or successful analogies, drawing on the practical
122 (Prof. Coleman, responding to my e-mail query, 07-12-2005)
123 (Prof. Coleman, responding to my e-mail query, 07-12-2005)
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expertise and communicative skills of physicists like Prof. Coleman would be useful to 
science educators. These would be engaging and memorable but have well-thought out 
hierarchies of relations which are less likely to mislead novices. As will be discussed in 
chapter 9, I may compile such a databank in the future, via an on-line system of data 
retrieval, drawing on the network of physicists I built up in the course of my doctoral work.
6.8 Degree to which the nationality of their target audience 
influences physicists9 use of analogy when communicating physics
The popular science writer J.D. Barrow (1992, p. 21) recounts how:
“One Hungarian physicist once remarked in the course of writing a textbook that 
although he would often be referring to the motions and collisions of billiard balls to 
illustrate the laws of mathematics, he had neither seen nor played this game and his 
knowledge of it was derived entirely from the study of physics books.”
The importance of ensuring that one’s audience is familiar with the analogies one employs 
was highlighted during my pilot studies (Muldoon, 2002) by a physicist from Arizona. He 
said that he always makes a conscious effort to tailor his talks to the background of his 
audience. In his own words:
“The analogies employed vary all the time depending on the physical nature of the 
subject and the real-world experience of the audience. For instance, an analogy we 
like to use for the formation time for the columns in the Eagle Nebula HST [Hubble 
Space Telescope] picture we made is a direct comparison with the formation time of 
the rock columns in Monument Valley here in Arizona. The interesting part is that 
size-wise the columns in the nebula are 3 light-years long, compared to the 100’s of 
feet in Monument Valley. But the timescale for formation is only about 200,000 years 
for the columns in the nebula, and several million years for the columns in Monument 
Valley. That always works well with the general public. But that’s because they all 
have a mental picture and familiarity with Monument Valley. You try and do that in 
Budapest and it wouldn’t fly. ” (Muldoon, 2002, E-mail reply 7, Lines 87- 96)




Degree to which nationality of target audience influences respondents' u se  of analogy
in communication
not at all/1 2 3 4 5 6 7/very much
so
7-point sca le
Figure 6.10: Chart showing the degree to which nationality of target audience 
influences respondents’ use of analogy when communicating physics.
As the quantitative data of figure 6.10 suggests, a large majority of respondents indicted 
that the nationality of target audience did not influence their use of analogy at all. 
However, analysis of verbal responses revealed a striking variety of opinion. The written 
responses were re-coded according to certain themes and their frequencies ascertained.
They are presented below:
(i) Nationality is irrelevant 27.1%
(ii) [Failed to Reply] 24.9%
(iii) Analogy will only work if it is familiar to the culture of that nationality 18.7%
(iv) Must avoid colloquialisms and speak slower 11.6%
(v) Physics is international 6.2%
(vi) Nationality/language barrier makes analogy more important 3.1%
(vii) Have no experience of this 2.7%
(viii) A picture transcends language barriers 0.4%
In their written comments, some respondents echoed the remarks of the physicist from 
Arizona, saying that the nationality of the target audience may have some influence on 
their use o f analogy. For example, Phys_190, (a 44 year old, senior lecturer in physics and 
astronomy) said, it “can occasionally affect choice of analogy (e.g. famous building as size 
reference, national currency seen from distance X as small angle reference, sports 
metaphors). Don't see that it would affect decision to use analogies, unless you are 
working in a second language. ”
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Similarly, Phys_35 (a 33 year old post-doc, involved in solid state physics) replied saying: 
“relating to the audience is important to get their attention. This includes relating to the 
nationality. Example: do not use references to ice-skating with an Irish audience, since 
most people have never done it.” Phys_177 (a 24 year old PhD student involved in 
quantum communication) said that the analogy: “shouldn’t be about traffic on the m6 
around Birmingham if they're from Tehran.”
Respondents who were of the opinion that the nationality o f the target audience was 
a significant factor, (in determining which analogies would be appropriate), appeared to 
have had more experience of communicating with audiences of differing nationalities. 
They had either recently lectured in a foreign country, had foreign colleagues working with 
them in their home country, or were foreigners themselves. Below is a selection of key 
remarks on this issue. (I have underlined key phrases for clarity).
□ “Take care to avoid cultural reference; I have recently lectured in Poland.” (Phys_216, a 45 
year old lecturer involved in quantum information.)
□ “You have to remember that some sayings are hard for a non-english speaking person to
understand and you could confuse them even more. I have experienced many German
speakers who give a literal translation o f something that is well known as a saying in 
German but in English makes no sense at all. The German members o f  the audience still got 
it and laughed but we all looked confused.” (Phys_51, a 28 year old, radiotherapy physicist / 
Medical Physicists with the National Health Service)
□ “Analogies could be quite difficult with an audience o f  different nationalities, I have been in
seminars where my colleagues from other countries have been lost by the speaker who uses 
analogies they don't understand.” (Phys_83, a 27 year old, PDRA, involved in high intensity 
laser science)
□ "...analogy can be misleading, when a linguistic problem takes past [/part?]. An audience
where I know they do not understand every word I am saying would be more grateful with a 
straightforward approach rather than with a analogon they maybe cannot follow. fNote: I am 
foreigner m yself and know this problem from this point o f  view ...V (Phys_77, a 33 year 
old, PDRS involved in astrophysics)
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My case study respondent, Dr. Lawson, also had experience of different nationalities
having different approaches. He said to me in his introductory letter of March 2003:
“In the latter part o f my career I attended numerous workshops on emerging concepts
and ideas, where there was plenty o f controversy and argument; I noted particularly
how those with different backgrounds and different nationalities had different ways o f
thinking about things. (For example ‘why does this effect occur?’ -  1) ‘because the
direction o f  flow has changed’ 2) ‘because the third term in the equation is now larger
than the second’ -  both true but not necessarily clear to all parties!” 124
Also, from the 1970s, Dr. Lawson spent some time collaborating with Maryland
University, helping with their experiments, and doing theoretical work connected with the
experiments. He said he noticed “interesting differences: national differences” during his
time abroad. For example, he noted how Japanese physicists usually refrained from asking
him questions at group meetings, while their American colleagues hit him with question
after question. He got the impression that the Japanese physicists were “scared to say 
1anything” in case they’d make themselves look foolish.
Cultural effects are extremely difficult to unravel. There are at least two other 
possible factors that may have played a part in the cultural difference that Dr. Lawson 
noticed. One - Japanese culture places high regard upon the wisdom of elders. These 
oriental physicists may have regarded Dr. Lawson as an authority figure who should not be 
challenged through questioning. Two -  Japanese culture values/valued a different style of 
address. The anthropologist Sharon Traweek has written extensively on the cultural 
differences between Japanese, American and European physicists based upon her 
observations of the international community of high-energy physicists over a period o f 
thirty years. Regarding differing styles of address, Traweek recounts, how a Japanese 
physicist once explained to her:
“the importance in Japan o f harage, leadership from the force o f  one’s will or, more 
literally, from one’s lower stomach... a good Japanese leader listens and then conveys 
his position powerfully, but nonverbally. He contrasted this to Americans, who lead 
from the mouth by talking all the time.” (Traweek, 1995, p.213)
Traweek observed a noticeable change in the behaviour of some American physicists who 
work with Japanese physicists:
“I have noticed over the five years I have been studying a group led jointly by an 
American and a Japanese that the American is talking in formal meetings less and less; 
he is increasingly regarded as a good leader by the Japanese.” (ibid.)
124 Dr. Lawson, in his March 2003 letter to Ciara Muldoon.
125 Dr. Lawson in conversation with Ciara Muldoon, Jan 2004.
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Drawing on Traweek’s anthropological studies of high energy physicists and my 
survey data it seems reasonable to conclude that one should be alert to possible 
cultural or national differences among one’s target audience when doing and 
presenting physics and one should make every effort to ensure that any analogies 
used actually ‘translate’. Above all, one should try to avoid using slang. This is 
discussed below.
6.8.1 Using journal article English versus an idiosyncratic vernacular.
In a Physics World article of January 2003, Elizabeth Anne (a teacher of English as a 
foreign language at a French university) identified two distinct versions o f the English 
language. According to Anne: “High English is the sort that appears in research papers, 
solicitors’ letters and other formal settings, while low English is what you speak (and hear) 
in everyday life and at physics conferences.” (Anne, 2003, p.60). Anne urged native 
English speakers to resist using local ‘dialects’ when presenting their papers to 
international audiences, because in her view, physicists whose native language is closer to 
the Graeco-Roman side of English find it difficult to understand the “earthy Saxon side of 
the language” (ibid.). As she explained:
“Talk to any non-native English speaker at a physics conference and they will tell you 
that while they have no difficulty in understanding German, Italian or French people 
speaking English, they cannot understand the ‘Anglos’ themselves. They are so used 
to reading journal papers written in formal English that they find it difficult to follow  
the spoken language.” (ibid.)
The anthropologist, Sharon Traweek has also highlighted the issue of cross-cultural 
differences in modes of communication, but from a slightly different perspective. Her 
ethnographic studies of the international community o f high-energy physicists show that 
Japanese physicists often try to use the same slang as their American colleagues, 
presumably to be accepted into the ‘tribe’. In Traweek’s view:
“It is important to understand that the English o f  science is American, not British.
More specifically I would claim that it is an American lower-middle and working- 
class men’s English, replete with the appropriate slang. I found it amusing to hear 
some Japanese (and Koreans and Chinese) from rather higher social classes using this 
idiosyncratic vernacular while giving talks at conferences: certain data points 
displayed by the overhead projectors onto large screen, for example, were 
continuously referred to as ‘these guys’.” (ibid.)
Presumably, this is even more distracting, as both native and non-native English speakers 
in the audience are respectively amused and bemused by the Japanese speakers’ use of
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such slang. To avoid misunderstandings when presenting ones work to international 
audiences, the most logical solution would seem to be to use as little slang as possible, and 
to ensure that any analogies one uses translate across cultural boundaries. Some o f the on­
line questionnaire respondents were aware of the possible problems, surrounding 
physicists’ use of journal article English versus colloquial English. They may well have 
remembered reading Anne’s Physics World article, which had appeared two months 
previously.
For instance, Phys_ 54 (a 40 year old lecturer in theoretical physics) said: “I have 
heard it said that non-English speakers have a hard time understanding talks at conferences 
because native English speakers like myself use formal scientific language in written work, 
but colloquial English in spoken addresses, which for them is difficult. Although I am 
aware of this problem, when I get going in a lecture, I suspect I am just as bad as any other 
native English speaker. Habits like that are hard to break.” Phys_9 (a 32 year old lecturer 
in physics and astronomy) said: “analogies which rely on slang, gestures or particular 
social concepts may fall flat or even cause offence in other countries.” Phys_27 (a 25 year 
old PhD student involved in nanophysics applications) noted that: “Non-native english 
speakers often just have research paper english, which is different to the more colloquial 
phrases normally used in making an analogy.”
These findings on the degree to which nationality affects physicists’ use of 
analogy when communicating with different audiences gave rise to several 
hypotheses regarding my sample of questionnaire respondents. Perhaps one or more 
o f the following factors played a part in the data retrieved:
(a) Many are native English speakers and have had little experience of being lectured to 
in another language;
(b) Many have had little experience of communicating with an international (non- 
native-English speaking) audience, in particular, of giving lectures/public talks 
outside of the UK, Ireland, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.
(c) Many are experienced at communicating with international audiences but it is their 
opinion that their use of analogy is in no way influenced by the nationality of their 
target audience;
(d) Many interpreted the term “analogy” to mean formal, mathematical analogy. 
Consequently the nationality of the audience does not influence their use o f abstract 
analogies which are devoid of geographical, cultural, monetary, sporting references.
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An attempt was made to clarify this issue in follow-up e-mails with a select sample of 
respondents. Several questionnaire respondents who said that nationality had little or no 
affect on their use of analogy were asked the following question:
Q. Have you had much experience o f  giving a lecture or talk to an audience 
comprising different nationalities (who were not native-English speakers) or giving a 
talk on foreign soil where sporting, geographical, monetary or iconographic 
analogies might need to be adapted to suit the audience's background?
Respondents were then supplied with some of the comments of respondents who said 
nationality did affect their use of analogy. For example, Phys_216’s remark: “Take care to 
avoid cultural reference; I have recently lectured in Poland.”
I received only one reply: from Phys_185, a 45 year old, female, research fellow, 
whose research interests include: “Quantum computing, quantum many body physics, 
phase transitions, physics of information.”
In her original reply to the on-line questionnaire, Phys_185 had said that she rarely 
(i.e. 3/7) uses analogy in her research and very rarely (i.e. 2/7) generates original analogies. 
You may recall I quoted her in section 5.1 as saying: “What I use is often stronger than 
analogies, in that the underlying mathematical description is the same or similar in the first 
approximation. For example, harmonic waves appear all over the place in very different 
physical situations.”
She also indicated that she rarely (i.e. 3/7) uses analogy when communicating with 
experts or intermediates and very rarely (i.e. 2/7) uses analogy when communicating with 
novices. However, I reasoned that this might be because she very rarely (i.e. 2/7) 
communicates physics with the general public and rarely (i.e. 3/7) with undergraduates.
Also, when responding initially to the on-line questionnaire, Phys_185 indicated in 
that her use of analogy was somewhat (i.e. 4/7) influenced by the “physics expertise” of 




In response to my follow-up e-mail seeking clarification, Phys_185 said:
“I have given plenty o f  talks to multi-national audiences, in other countries, etc.. Also, a 
significant fraction o f  my colleagues are from other countries. First. I think I interpreted 
‘analogy’ more narrowly than you intended: o f  course I try not to use slang in my talks. I have a 
fairly standard accent so (unlike my Glaswegian colleagues) I am reasonably easy for non­
native speakers to understand. Having lived in other countries m yself and travelled fairly 
widely, I'm used to communicating with non-native English speakers so probably I adapt 
without thinking consciously about it. I adapt to native English speakers from different regions 
o f the UK too, I don't think I make a special effort for some non-native nationalities. I think I try 
to be clear to all audiences, and I have enough experience o f  how to do it (through conversation, 
where feedback on whether someone understood is immediate) that I don't need to think about it 
in advance, or in relation to specific cultures. Well-designed presentations also help, if  the key 
words and concepts are available in words and pictures, the spoken words are easier to follow. I 
cannot think o f  any examples like your other respondents, either from my own talks or other 
people's. I can think o f  many examples o f misunderstandings from ordinary conversation, just 
not from talks. Perhaps in my field we don't use analogy very much to get our ideas across! 
The complaints people make about talks that are hard to understand are usually that the speaker 
mumbles, or speaks too fast: these can happen with native and non-native speakers alike, and 
are much more common than problems with the vocabulary used. The next most common 
complaint about native speakers is their accent, especially i f  not from the UK or US (New  
Zealand and Glaswegian are top o f  the incomprehensible list).”
Several interesting issues arise from Phys_185’s remarks. First, that she interpreted 
analogy “more narrowly” than I intended. This supports my earlier contentions that many 
respondents interpreted analogy more narrowly than intended resulting in their apparent 
wariness of using analogy in their research or when communicating in formal settings with 
experts. Second, that we often sub-consciouslv and spontaneously adapt the style and 
content of our speech, upon receiving immediate feedback from our audience. In Bakhtin’s 
terminology this is the unconscious ‘addressivity’ of our ‘utterances’. Third, that in her 
experience, audiences have more problems with speakers’ unclear diction than with the 
vocabulary they use (including the vocabulary used in drawing analogies). Fourth, that 
perhaps researchers in her field (“Quantum computing, quantum many body physics, phase 
transitions, physics of information”) don't use analogy very much to get their ideas across. 
There were some patterns in the data to suggest that certain branches o f physics made more 
use of analogy -  perhaps because journals in those areas were more open to the inclusion 





6.9.1 Can analogical reasoning provide insights when conceptualising and 
communicating physics?
Yes. Analogies offer insights to experts, intermediates and novices, but they are usually 
different types of insights. The insights novices get through analogy are usually surface 
level insights. They associate a topic from physics with something from their experiences 
in every-day life. Thus, for example, they leam that: "A Tokamak is like a donut, but filled 
with plasma instead of cream." (Phys_189). This is an example of analogy used in the 
context of set A of my venn diagram in section 5.5. Novices can use this visual analogy as 
a framework around which to build a better understanding of accelerator physics should 
they wish to do so at a later date. Intermediates tend to do just that, extending and 
deepening their understanding of the physics concept they are dealing with. Thus, they use 
analogies in the context of sets A and B of my venn diagram. Experts on the other hand, 
have a broader range of insights. They have the same ‘associative insights’ that novices 
and intermediates have, but they also have deeper insights that are the result of the 
mathematical and geometrical intuitions they have acquired through studying the 
underlying physics in considerable depth. Their insights go beyond comparing a concept 
from physics with something from everyday life of popular culture, their insights also often 
involve comparing the underlying mathematical structure of one physical situation with 
that of another. Thus, their insights can involve physical and pictorial components but can 
also be highly abstracted and related to mathematical formalism. This context fits into set 
C and the intersection of sets B and C in my venn diagram. In chapters 7 and 8, we will 
see how one particular physicist-engineer used good analogies throughout his career (from 
the 1940s to the 1980s) as a means of acquiring physical and pictorial insights for himself 
and providing insights to his colleagues.
6.9.2 What are the features of good analogies?
From my analysis of the data presented in chapters 5 & 6 I can suggest that good analogies 
tend to have the following features. Good analogies that appear in set C of my venn 
diagram in section 5.5 are useful heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb) in problem solving and 
generative (i.e. suggesting new avenues to pursue through more rigorous analytical means). 
Good analogies that appear in the sets C and B of my venn diagram hold for a hierarchy of 
relations (from the mathematical equations governing the system to the physical and 
pictorial expression of system features) and are useful tools when exploring a new domain
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or explaining a new concept to a colleague. Good analogies that appear in sets B and A, are 
easy to express (pictorially, verbally, symbolically) and are useful in different contexts 
(formal & informal settings; with experts, intermediates & novices). Analogies which span 
all three sets, A, B and C are usually easy to express, memorable, amusing, and are often 
those whose origins can be traced back to eminent physicists. The same analogous idea can 
be used in different ways in different contexts. For example, as discussed in section 5.6.1, 
an analogous visualisation of loops and weaves is used by Rovelli (2003) to help Physics 
World readers conceptualise these highly abstract entities. However, at a conference of 
experts, Rovelli (2001) uses a humorous sketch of loops being woven into a jumper to 
highlight the fact that the analogous visualisation should not be taken too literally. Thus, 
the composition of the target audience can greatly influence the type of analogy used.
6.9.3 What are the key factors which influence respondents use of analogy when 
communicating with different audiences?
On the next page table 5.2 summarises the forms of analogy employed in different 
contexts. I presented this table in the previous chapter when dealing with the forms of 
analogies used by respondents in their research. However, at that point, I had not presented 
my questionnaire data on the key factors that influence respondents’ use of analogy when 
communicating with different audiences. Having now presented this data, I can conclude 
that the physics expertise o f  the target audience and, to a lesser extent, the tone o f  
discussion are the most significant factors. The nationality of the target audience was 
influential for a minority of respondents.
Even though their target audience may have considerable expertise, when the 
context is informal and physicists are creatively playing with ideas in a relaxed setting, a 
much broader range of analogies are used. This ranges from analogies having well- 
established, underlying mathematical structure, to simple, playful analogies which break 
down if taken beyond surface similarity. When the context is more formal, physicists tend 
to avoid the playful analogies, employing only analogies with a well-established 
underlying mathematical structure - - what Phys_127 termed, “rock solid analogies.” 
Avoidance o f analogy in formal settings is more common amongst young physicists who 
wish to be taken seriously by their peers and superiors, and consequently adopt a formal, 
dignified tone. Those who have already established themselves as noteworthy physicists 
can afford to be more flippant in formal settings because they have nothing to prove. 
However, with a high-ranking position comes a responsibility not to mislead their audience 
by using overly simplistic analogies.
232
Chapter 6
Thus, respondents will either use fewer analogies or more complex analogies as 
their audience’s physics expertise increases, because they do not wish to present an over­
simplified view to those with considerable expertise. As a consequence, it is those who are 
least able to evaluate the merits of an analogy that are most likely to have analogy used on 
them. However, the group most at risk of misunderstanding analogies, adopting a nai've 
interpretation of analogies or failing to see the limits of analogies are secondary and 
tertiary level students. These intermediates are encouraged to use simplified models and 
analogies on a regular basis in their formal education in order to solve specified problems. 
Once assimilated, the models and analogies become part o f their conceptual toolkit. As a 
result of their practicality they are taken by many to be realistic, ‘for all intents and 
purposes’, and may even cease to be regarded as ‘analogies’. We know from Spiro et al’s 
(1989) research that even when the disanalogies are made explicit to medical students, 
many still hold erroneous assumptions, misled by connotations of non-technical descriptive 
language.
I believe that these findings will be of interest to practicing physicists interested in 
the forms of analogies used by their peers to conceptualise and communicate physics in 
different contexts and may also be of practical use to science educators. For example, my 
identification of the features of good analogies could be used in future research projects to 
devise a searchable databank of good analogies. This would will involve collaboration 
between practicing physicists with a flair for communicating with different audiences; 
science educators who have experience of students’ differing learning styles; and 
researchers like myself, who approach the area through the lenses o f history, philosophy 
and psychology of science. Such a resource could then be used to train science students to 
use conceptualisation techniques similar to those used by practicing physicists -  in 
particular, the use of playful analogies, structured so that they hold for a hierarchy of 
relations but are generative and expressed physically, pictorially and mathematically.
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Expressed As Set A: Verbal or Physical or Pictorial Analogies Set B: Physical and Pictorial Analogies Set C: Formal, Mathematical Analogies
Systematicity Low Medium to High High
Definition The analogies are often novel and amusing, relating 
abstract physics concepts to familiar, everyday things 
like dazed chickens, cheese sandwiches, Snickers 
bars, football stadiums, donuts, etc.
The physical picture attached to one situation can be used 
to visualise another. These idealised pictures are usually 
used iteratively: further refined and abstracted through 
rigorous mathematical and experimental testing.
The same mathematics can be used to describe two 
situations. Phenomena in one situation will have a 
counterpart in the second, as the mathematics for the two 
is identical.
Example "A Tokamak is like a donut, but filled with plasma 
instead of cream." phys-189
"Reversal of magnetisation through a magnetic logic 
NOT-gate likened to a car performing a three-point 
turn." PhysJ91
"Cerenkov light is created when a particle passes through 
matter at above the local speed of light. The effect is 
similar to the shock wave created by an airplane flying at 
above the speed of sound." Phys-198
"I quite often use the analogy of cold atoms to try to 
tackle problems in other areas. Cold atoms are a very 
clean and well understood research topic where I have 
experience in, and its results are widely applicable also to 
other areas." phys-35
Often rely on Popular associations; 
Creative imagination;
Geometrical intuition
Kinaesthetic awareness (of macroscopic capacities); 
Tacit knowledge (gained through experimentation);






To make physics accessible, memorable and 
entertaining, in order to enlist support. 
Occasionally used by expert physicists in private 
conceptualisation to play with ideas.
Tools of Exploration;
Provide physical and pictorial insight; 
Mechanisms underlying phenomena in analogous 
systems can be compared & contrasted.
Tools of Exploration;
Allow direct comparison of physical systems to be made 
on an abstract mathematical level.
Basis for computer simulations;
Contexts of Use (1) Private Conceptualisation; (1) Private Conceptualisation; (1) Private Conceptualisation;
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in very informal 
settings;
Often used to entertain an audience of experts or to 
make a point in a lively debate amongst peers;
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in formal & informal 
settings;
Use in journal publications is dependent on norms of 
research area and "in-house style" of journal. Some 
journals object to creative use of language.
(2) Expert-Expert Communication in formal & informal 
settings, including journal publications & presentations to 
conferences of experts;
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in informal 
settings (used to entertain and offer insights);
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in formal and 
informal settings;
(3) Expert-Intermediate Communication in formal and 
informal settings;
(4) Expert to novice communication (to make 
physics accessible and memorable by drawing on 
concepts from everyday life);
(4) Expert to novice communication (in particular to 
visualise the unseen, e.g. atomic physics, nano-physics, 
cosmology and astrophysics,etc.);
(4) Almost never used by physicists to communicate with 
novices as concepts from the source domain would be 
unfamiliar to novices.




An Outline of Dr. Lawson’s Research Background
Figure 7.1: Image of Dr. John Lawson speaking at the 
Symposium on Heavy Ion Fusion at Darmstadt in 1982 
(This photo, courtesy of CERN, appeared in the RAL 
Bulletin no. 5, on 6th April, 1988, announcing Dr. 
Lawson’s election as a Fellow of the Royal Society).
“Widely in demand as a 
consultant, lecturer and writer, 
his book, ‘Physics of Charged 
Particle Beams’ is a classic and 
the phrase ‘talk to John 
Lawson’ has become a 
by-word amongst accelerator 
designers and fusion 
practitioners.” 126
126 An excerpt from the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory Bulletin, (02-November-1987) reporting 




In this chapter I profile Dr. Lawson, an engineer-physicist who frequently took on the role 
of ‘translator’ at physics-engineering workshops and conferences in the 1960s, 70s and 
80s. The data stem from a content analysis of 35 of his scientific papers (1946-1997), his 
book on the physics of charged particle beams (1988, 2nd edition), and personal 
correspondence and semi-structured interviews that we carried out sporadically between 
2003 and 2005 (face-to-face and over the telephone).
Although the conceptualisation and communication techniques used by Dr. Lawson 
may be indicative of his cognitive style I must emphasise that my aim was not to explain 
how he developed his cognitive style. Feist and Gorman’s (1998) Structural Equation 
Model provided a useful theoretical framework and graphical means of highlighting the 
different spheres of influence, but I did not use it to uncover statistically significant 
relations between the biological, developmental, cognitive or social spheres. In general, 
directional influence between personality and scientific behaviour remains an open 
question (cf. Eiduson, 1974; Feist, 1993; Feist & Gorman, 1998). As Barwise & 
Etchemendy (1996, p. 180) remark, efficient reasoning is almost certainly “inescapably 
heterogeneous (or ‘hybrid’) in nature.” Enforcing artificial compartmentalisations in an 
attempt to analyse it, usually leads to erroneous conclusions. However, in the course of our 
interviews, Dr. Lawson frequently mentioned experiences that he believed shaped his way 
of thinking, such as his work habits.
Thus, in this chapter I have provided some background information on Dr. 
Lawson’s education, training, working environment and research interests in order to gain 
a better understanding of the contexts in which he found certain conceptualisation and 
communication tools useful. As discussed in section 2.4.6, a cognitive styles framework 
was used to guide these investigations. It was used to frame questions concerning his 
ability to act as a translator or synthesiser of ideas between sub-branches of physics and 
engineering for example. As can be seen in this chapter and the next, this methodological 
approach proved quite successful and helped to uncover many interesting results. Thus, in 
this chapter I explore Dr. Lawson’s training, research background and working 
environment. I mention his role as a ‘synthesiser’ and ‘translator’ of ideas between sub­
disciplines in his field. In chapter 8 I discuss his use of analogy and synthesis to acquire 
and promote insights when conceptualising & communicating physics to experts and 
intermediates, drawing on examples from his scientific papers and book.
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7.1 Chronological outline of Dr. Lawson’s career.
A chronological outline of Dr. Lawson’s career is provided in appendix 7, section A7.1. 
From this we can see that John Lawson graduated from Cambridge in 1943 with a degree 
in mechanical sciences, which included electrical engineering and radio, as a preparation 
for radiolocation (radar) research.
Immediately after graduation he started his career at the Telecommunications 
Research Establishment (TRE) Malvern: Micro Wave Aerials Group, where he worked on 
airborne radar. Four years later (in 1947) he joined the Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment (AERE) Malvern Branch: Accelerator group. Four years after that he 
transferred to AERE Flarwell: General Physics Division.127 At Harwell he lead the team 
developing the X-band Klystron. In 1952 he and his colleagues made an important 
theoretical contribution to accelerator theory by his identification of resonances in strong 
focussing synchrotrons. In 1955 he turned his attention to fusion power and two years later 
derived the ‘Lawson Criterion’ which relates to the conditions needed for a fusion reactor 
to reach ignition.
He joined the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL) in 1961 and eight years later 
received his Sc.D. Physics (also at Cambridge). In 1985 he received the Thomas Young 
Medal from the Physical Society, given for Optics. He retired from the RAL in 1987. Paul 
Williams, RAL director at the time, said on the occasion of Dr. Lawson’s retirement that: 
“To say he will be missed is the understatement of the year... We have learned to trust and 
respect his council and, so that we do not lose touch, have invited him to become one of 
the RAL’s Honourary Scientists.” (RAL Bulletin, 02-Nov-1987).
His book, The Physics o f  Charged Particle Beams was first published in 1977. The 
2nd edition, with some clarifications, was published in 1988. In the same year he was 
elected a Fellow of the Royal Society (FRS). An RAL bulletin announcing his election as 
an FRS emphasised the usefulness of his book, The Physics o f  Charged Particle Beams, 
describing it as a, “study in depth of problems of high intensity beams with the objective of 
integrating material from widely scattered fields (microwave tubes, electron optics, 
accelerators, plasma physics etc.) and providing a general unified treatment.” (RAL 
bulletin, 06-04-1988). The same bulletin remarked that the book “has since had numerous 
reprints and been translated into Russian and, perhaps the ultimate accolade, into Chinese!”
Dr. Lawson has close to 100 formal journal publications including: Journal of the 
Institute o f Electrical Engineers; Nature; Philosophical Magazine; British Journal of 
Applied Physics; Nucleonics; Journal of Electronics and Control; Journal of Nuclear
127 now HQ o f the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA)
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Energy; Radio and Electrical Engineering; Nuclear Instruments & Methods in Physics; 
American Journal of Physics; Journal of Scientific Instruments; IEEE Transactions on 
Nuclear Science; Physics Letters; Particle Accelerators; Contemporary Physics; Physics 
of Fluids; Plasma Physics; Advanced Electronics and Electron Physics; Annual Review 
of Nuclear Science; European Journal of Physics; Plasma Physics and Controlled Fusion; 
Having provided this overview of John Lawson’s career I will now discuss some key 
factors which will help us understand the contexts in which he came to find certain 
conceptualisation and communication techniques useful.
7.2 Key factors which may shed light on Dr. Lawson’s style of thinking.
7.2.1 His early childhood experiences:
During our telephone conversation of 22-03-2004, Dr. Lawson recounted how as a boy he 
was “always doing experiments and building things” [e.g. a simple galvanometer to 
measure electric current]. He said these experiences: “partly formed my ability to do things 
in an economical way, because I never had any money - - I mean it was a question of 
trying to scrounge things or adapt them.” (ibid.). It is worth noting that experimental 
tinkering during childhood is a common feature in historical case studies of scientists, e.g. 
Faraday, Edison, Bardeen, Krebs, Feynman and Maxwell. My intention is not to place Dr. 
Lawson on a pedestal alongside revolutionary or Nobel prize-winning scientists, however 
as most case studies are of exceptionally gifted scientists one cannot but compare and
1 7Rcontrast with the greats. In their biography, Hoddeson & Daitch tell how John Bardeen 
displayed a flair for experimental work during his childhood years in the 1920s. Captivated 
by the magic of radio, “John built his own crystal set and receiver, ‘from dime store wires, 
oatmeal boxes, little straw suitcases and the crystals.’ Carefully winding copper wire 
around an oatmeal box, he made a tuning coil.” (Hoddeson & Daitch, 2001, p.20-21). 
Similarly, Larry Holmes, in his two volume biography of Hans Krebs,129 notes that when 
Krebs:
“was about ten years old, he constructed, out of cardboard and paper, an elaborate 
device in which a marble placed at one end would roll through a trough, following a
128 Bardeen shared the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1956 with Shockley & Brattain, "for their 
researches on semiconductors and their discovery of the transistor effect," and in 1972 with Cooper 
and Schreiffer, "for their jointly developed theory of superconductivity, usually called the BCS- 
theory".
129 In 1953 Krebs shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine with Fritz Albert Lipmann. 
Krebs received the award "for his discovery of the citric acid cycle," Lipmann "for his discovery of 
co-enzyme A and its importance for intermediary metabolism"
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pathway that went downward and upward, around curves and through spirals, without 
stopping or overshooting. Called the ‘coo coo bahn,’ Hans’s invention made a great 
impression on the family and on others who saw it.” (Holmes, 1991, vol 1, p.47).
Dr. Lawson told me during a telephone conversation (13-01-2005) that he has always had 
“a wide curiosity” adding, “I liked to know about everything.” 130 According to the 
renowned scientist Peter Medawar, capable scientists have a strong desire to comprehend -  
a trait he calls “exploratory impulsion.” (Medawar, 1979, p.7). The above examples are 
intended to show that curiosity, inventiveness and experimental and manipulative skills are 
characteristics shared by many scientists and engineers, including Dr. Lawson.
7.2.2 His formal education:
Dr. Lawson started out in Classics but changed tracks midway, emerging from Cambridge 
in 1943 with an unconventional ‘wartime’ degree in mechanical sciences (with a strong 
engineering component). He believed that his somewhat unorthodox formal education was 
a key factor in the conceptualisation and communication techniques he used in his career. 
For example, in a written response a my follow-up questionnaire he said (04-0ct-2004):
“I did not have a degree in physics. All my formal university training was two years of 
an electrical engineering degree in wartime. Most of my physics was self-taught, and 
is full of short-cuts and unorthodox analogy type connections. By going a strange 
route I often arrived before those that worked in a more formal and orthodox way.”
Going a strange route, often involved using analogical reasoning. Dr. Lawson made this 
point in his introductory letter to me saying:
“my thought patterns were rather different from those of colleagues with a 
conventional physics degree, and looking back at my occasional educational papers I 
realised how many of them are on analogies. The response to them was varied: some 
found them interesting, others not at all, though they often formed popular conference 
papers.” (Lawson, in his first letter to me in March 2003).
Dr. Lawson’s use of analogy could be paralleled with that o f Einstein and Faraday.
This is discussed further in subsequent sections o f this chapter and especially 
sections 8.4 & 8.5 of the next chapter.
130 During our Jan 2004 interview at his residence, Dr. Lawson said his son showed a similar 
interest in building things, saying: “Actually my son also used to do this sort of thing, and he, using 
Mechano, he made a machine to follow a white line and that sort of thing - - Which was the sort of 
thing that I enjoyed doing.”
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7.2.3 His working environment during his formative years:
Detailed accounts from the history of science attest to the importance of working and 
learning environment in the development of methodological practices. For example, as 
Nersessian points out, Maxwell’s training as a mathematical physicist, skilled in 
continuum mechanics, “shaped the nature of the theoretical, experimental, and 
mathematical knowledge and the methodological practices with which he formulated the 
problem and approached its solution.” (Nersessian, 1995, p.212). Maxwell was also 
fortunate in being able to draw upon remarkable intellectual resources in the form of 
Michael Faraday and William Thompson. This is in contrast to continental physicists 
working on electromagnetism at the same time who, as Nersessian points out, “employed 
quite different practices and drew from fundamentally different mathematical and physical 
representational structures.” (ibid.). Again, my aim is not to imply that Dr. Lawson and 
Maxwell were similar -  they differed in many ways, most notably in their formal physics 
training. My aim is to highlight that working environment has been shown by historians of 
science to be an influential factor in shaping methodological practices.
Dr. Lawson’s apprenticeship at the Telecommunications Research Establishment 
(TRE) Malvern (1943-1951) was a particularly formative time in his career. Having had no 
physics education at college and little relevant maths Dr. Lawson learned what he needed 
‘on the job’, working in an environment “surrounded by some of the best physicists in the 
country.” 131 Malvern had a staff of 2000 in 1942 and over 3500 after the war. According 
to Dr. Lawson, Malvern was in some ways like a university, with frequent meetings, 
workshops and lectures given by “really top people from universities who had been sent to 
Malvern.” 132 Many of these scientists were involved in the development of microwave 
radar during world war two, e.g. A.C.B. Lovell and H.W.B. Skinner. The practical 
component of Dr. Lawson’s work at Malvern was of paramount importance. Dr. Lawson’s 
workspace was compact: he had about 6 feet of bench space for himself in a laboratory
1 TTwith 6 other English men. Dr. Lawson’s close-knit environment, characteristic of 
Malvern, was particularly influential to his progress as an engineer-physicist. It enabled 
him to bounce ideas off his colleagues and hone his tacit skills at building equipment. The 
value of collaborative exchanges, teamwork and ‘synergism’ is emphasised by Medawar,
131 Dr. Lawson, in his March 2003 letter to me.
132 Dr. Lawson during our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005
133 During our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005, Dr. Lawson explained that they had: “all 
sorts of backgrounds. Mainly youngish people, many of them had come in straight from university 
like me and had some experience which was relevant in radio or something of that sort. They 
started off everybody by 6 weeks of an induction course, given by the staff. These were very good. 
And they really did give you quite a lot of information.”
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in his Advice to a Young Scientists (Medawar, 1979, p.7). Travis, in his studies of the 
development of microwave radar in Britain and Germany during WWII, makes a similar 
point, noting that:
“the successful [radar development] teams (in terms of quick problem solving) had 
very strong common bonds and worked together in small spaces. This appears to have 
provided the optimum conditions for sharing embodied knowledge in the form of 
practical skills and also in terms of ideas about how to progress. These ideas were 
usually generated by having an intimate knowledge of the apparatus. The ability to 
consult quickly with colleagues who shared this knowledge, or possessed greater 
knowledge, facilitated quick progress.” (Travis,1995, p.87)
It was here, at Malvern, that Dr. Lawson first learned the value of informality when 
communicating science. For example, Dr. Lawson recounted how very senior RAF people 
who wanted to see something would come into the lab and, “chat without going through all 
this formality of senior officer grades and this kind of thing.” 134 This made it easier to 
transfer ideas from person to person because, “the people in the lab could immediately see 
what the other operational people wanted.” (ibid.). Dr. Lawson said, “It crossed barriers 
both on subject and on seniority which was, I think, particularly British - - and probably 
American as well.” (ibid.). Dr. Lawson contrasted the informal Anglo-American approach 
with the formal (highly regulated) approach of the German scientists and military during 
the war, saying it may have been a key factor in the outcome of the war. Supporting 
evidence for Dr. Lawson’s remarks can be found in Travis (1995) and in Radar 
Recollections, an on-line archive compiled by the University of Bournemouth’s Oral 
History Unit in collaboration with The Centre for the History of Defence Electronics 
(CHiDE). From the latter course, we read that:
“Whilst at Worth [the TRE base prior to moving to Malvern] in 1940, A.P. Rowe 
[Chief Superintendent of TRE with overall control of all the research projects in hand] 
conceived the idea of inviting senior military personnel to visit TRE on Sundays to 
meet with the rest of the research engineers and scientists working in the team. These 
gatherings were very informal and even the most junior staff were encouraged to 
contribute their ideas. If an idea was put forward that had merit, it could be adopted 
there and then because all the main decision-makers would be there. Such informality 
(and trust) at such a powerful level was unprecedented. A great sense of purpose was 
thus built up between the researchers and the military decision-makers.” 135
134 Dr. Lawson during our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005
135 Source: http://histru.bouraemouth.ac.uk/Oral_History/Talking A bout Technology/radar research/ 
A ccessed: 25 -09-2005
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As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, mathematical, physical and pictorial analogies are often 
employed in informal exchanges between experts. Such analogies rarely make it into 
published accounts, unless the scientist is (i) an enthusiast for analogy, (i) convinced it can 
provide useful insights to many readers, (iii) is well regarded by his peers. As discussed in 
the next chapter, Dr. Lawson employed analogy to its fullest potential as a means of 
bridging ‘linguistic divides’ between sub-disciplines and providing his colleagues with 
valuable insights. I would argue that Dr. Lawson’s ‘unorthodox’ formal education and 
informal, close-knit working environment during his formative years played an important 
part in encouraging his propensity to reason and communicate via mathematical, physical 
and pictorial analogies.
7.2.4 A “slightly traumatic” event which occurred during Dr. Lawson’s first project.
When Dr. Lawson was in his early 20s he began work on the construction of an electron 
model o f a frequency modulated cyclotron. In order to get going on the project he ordered 
the most expensive part which was going to take a long time to arrive. This would seem 
like a logical course of action in order to make the best use o f the time and funding 
available. In fact Dr. Lawson may have learned this approach from his early childhood 
experiences -  scrounging parts to build home-made instruments. However, by the time the 
mechanical part arrived (and the project was under way) Dr. Lawson realised that he had, 
“missed out a lot of other things, and the whole thing collapsed.” He said it was, “slightly 
traumatic - - 1 suppose I was in my early 20s - - but that was something which of course I 
always remembered {gentle laugh}. It was a teaching - - a learning experience.” 136 The 
psychologist and historian of science, Howard Gruber would call this “slightly traumatic 
experience” an ‘affective transformation’, because it affected the ‘network of enterprise’ 
(Gruber, 1980, p.292) which Dr. Lawson subsequently developed. Firstly, it shaped Dr. 
Lawson’s approach to subsequent projects. For example, in the latter part o f his career, Dr. 
Lawson became renowned for his ability to “assess new concepts which people put 
forward” (ibid.), and by his own (modest) estimation was, “a good critic, really.” (ibid) 
Secondly, it became part of his teaching repertoire. For example Dr. Lawson used the 
humorous sketch (figure 7.2 on the next page) to highlight the dangers of beginning a 
project with insufficient analysis. I believe that this ‘slightly traumatic experience’ must be 
taken into account if  we are to understand the network of enterprise which Dr. Lawson 
subsequently pursued. This is discussed further in 7.2.5 and 7.2.6.
136 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone conversation of 22-March-2004
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Figure 7.2: A sketch supplied by Dr. Lawson, in his March 2003 letter to Ciara Muldoon. Post- 
it note annotation reads: “A useful analogy for people who start projects without adequate 




In our first interview, Dr. Lawson said he was: “rather a timid person... a bit of a ‘loner’
1 *27really. And also I was a bit of a ‘loner’ in my research.” There is considerable evidence 
to suggest that scientists tend to be more independent, introverted and less sociable than 
non-scientists (cf. Feist and Gorman, 1998). This is especially true of creative scientists, 
although creative scientists are apparently more open and flexible in thought or behaviour 
(ibid.). However, considerable uncertainty surrounds the directional influence between 
personality and scientific behaviour. As Feist and Gorman say: “to put it simply, do smart, 
conscientious, introverted, driven, and controlled people become scientists or does science 
create smart, conscientious, introverted, driven and controlled people?” (Feist & 
Gorman, 1998, p. 29). Most probably, there is a mutual influence.
In our third interview, when asked if the freedom to wander through many branches 
of physics was part of his job or as a result of having an interest in something, Dr. Lawson 
said: “I had an interest.” But suggested that his explorations in other branches of physics 
also suited his employers, adding: “I was better working on my own rather than as a team 
member, so I was just allowed to do what I wanted to.” 138 As mentioned in section 7.1, Dr. 
Lawson has close to 100 formal journal publications. His independence is reflected in his 
published work: he is the sole author of a large fraction of his publications. He remarked 
upon this, saying, “compared with most scientists I think that...a bigger fraction of my 
work has got just my name on it.” 139 Larry Holmes’ comments concerning scientists who 
move to new areas of expertise may be relevant here. Holmes remarks that,
“If the skills and experience a scientist accumulates while following an investigative 
pathway become his ‘personal knowledge,’ then to switch to another pathway requires 
more than a different set of experiences. In some deeper sense it involves a new 
personal identity.” (Holmes, 2004, p.xix)
Holmes point may shed some light on Dr. Lawson’s tendency to work independently. A 
timid individual is unlikely to attempt to become fully assimilated into a new community 
of practice without first working independently to bring themselves ‘up to speed’ on the 
conventions, techniques and viewpoints of the new community they are engaging with.
137 Dr. Lawson during, our first interview at his residence, 15-01-2004
138 Dr. Lawson during our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005
139 Dr. Lawson during our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005
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7.2.6 luck. On the occasion of his retirement from the RAL, Dr. Lawson said that luck had 
played a large part in this success as a scientist. The RAL bulletin from that occasion 
reads:
“John thanked everyone for the gift (an elegant wrist-watch) and for the good wishes 
expressed. He believed that luck played a large part in life. It certainly had for him. He 
had, he said been lucky in being in the right place at the right time and in the people he 
had worked with and for. On the whole, his career had been a happy one. ‘This has 
been a wonderful occasion. Thank you all for coming,’ he said.” (RAL Bulletin 02-22- 
1987)
Dr. Lawson’s words are reminiscent of those of the late John Bardeen, recipient o f two 
Nobel prizes in physics. As Hoddeson & Daitch tell us in their biography of Bardeen, he: 
“himself claimed that ‘accomplishments are a good bit of luck -  being in the right 
place at the right time -  and having the right associates.’ He considered himself 
‘lucky’ to have been ‘on the ground floor of solid-state physics.’ But serendipity 
cannot explain why Bardeen so often found himself in the right place at the right time 
to support his creativity.” (Hoddelson, L. & Daitch, 2002, p.328)
The same could be said of Dr. Lawson. As Louis Pasteur famously remarked, fortune 
favours the prepared mind.
7.2.7 Working environment in later years - the freedom to pursue his own research 
interests:
The important connection between scientific innovation and freedom to carry out 
independent research is highlighted by Rappa & Debackere (1993). Larry Holmes remarks 
that:
“some individuals ‘drift’ or ‘migrate’ across speciality boundaries or ‘diversify’ into 
more than one area, but unless scientists are forced to change because of policies 
imposed by the organization within which they work, such movements are typically 
quite gradual transitions rather than abrupt shifts.” (Holmes, 2004, pp. xv-vxi).
In fact according to John Ziman, “Given the freedom to do so, the natural tendency of most 
scientists is to concentrate for years on a few problems in a narrow area of research.” 
(Ziman, 1987, pp. 18). Dr. Lawson acknowledges the key role these institutions played in 
guiding his career path, saying:
“I’ve been fortunate in having a job where I worked on all sorts of different things, 
and I’ve also been in an atmosphere which doesn’t exist so much now of freedom and 
not too much constraints on money and being able to do what one wants.” 140
140 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone conversation of 22-March-2004
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He also noted that, “Funding was not a consideration during the war. You had as much 
money as you wanted.” 141 Such freedom and independence is rare in the current research 
climate. As Brad Wray notes, “Now that ‘big science’ is the norm in many fields, young 
scientists who have access to the equipment required to make significant discoveries are 
usually working under someone else’s direction.” (Wray, 2003, p. 146).
Dr. Lawson was afforded the opportunity (in fact, encouraged) to ‘migrate’ or 
‘drift’ into new research areas first at Harwell (1951-1961) and then, even more so, at the 
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (1961-1987). There he worked free-lance, following what 
seemed to him to be the most interesting developments. As a result, Dr. Lawson gained 
experience in at least five sub-fields of physics during his career. He was heavily involved 
in Applied Optics (his work on particle beams included a lot of optics, and in 1985 he was 
awarded the Thomas Young Medal from the Physical Society, given for Optics); Nuclear 
Physics, Plasma Physics and High Energy Particle Physics (through his work on 
accelerators), and was also, though to a lesser extent, involved in Astrophysics, (when he 
spent some time exploring the possible parallels between cosmic radiation and plasma 
physics & beams, where he became well acquainted with the legendary Dennis Sciama.142 
Dr. Lawson acted as team leader on several projects at Harwell. Both at Harwell and the 
RAL workers were encouraged to disperse, re-educate themselves and remain at the 
cutting edge of research for the benefit of the institutions. Dr. Lawson told me:
“... we had a good group [at Harwell]. The question was often what to do with a group 
once the project is finished. Sometimes people say ‘oh yes, jolly good group, we’ll 
find something else for them to do which will be a challenge.’ But that usually doesn’t 
work. You mustn’t make projects just to employ people. You’ve got to disperse them 
around the projects which are now becoming the latest thing. They’ll have to re­
educate themselves. But you must move them from one challenging job to another and 
not just keep them together if they happen to be a good group... people liked to re­
educate themselves.” (Lawson, during our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005)
Although Dr. Lawson liked the process of re-education and finding new projects, he said it 
could be very challenging at times. He explained (during our first interview at his 
residence, 15-January-2004) that when a project came to an end he had to think of a new 
avenue to explore and, “if you haven’t got an idea, then you can get a bit depressed.” I 
responded to this remark saying: “But then if you have lots of ideas, and you like working
141 Dr. Lawson, during our interview at his residence, 15-January-2004.
142 Sciama received his doctorate from the University of Cambridge in 1953 with Paul Dirac as supervisor.
He himself supervised some 70 PhD students. As Ellis points out this included luminaries such as “Stephen 
Hawking, Brandon Carter (formulator of the Anthropic Principle in cosmology), Sir Martin Rees, Philip 
Candelas, John Barrow and David Deutsch (originator of quantum computing).” (Ellis, 2000, p.722)
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independently, I suppose then it can be an advantage.” Dr. Lawson replied, somewhat 
modestly: “Yes. Yes, well I had some ideas. I’m not sure that I had all that many. A lot of 
my ideas were in showing how things wouldn’t work as they were being claimed, 
especially with new things.” As mentioned in 7.2.4 Dr. Lawson’s renowned abilities to 
critically evaluate new proposals may have stemmed from the ‘affective transformation’ he 
experienced in his 20s. Dr. Lawson’s working environment in later years, where he was 
afforded the freedom to pursue his own research interests was an important factor in 
providing him with a broad view of physics and engineering. In fact, I would argue that 
this enabled him to notice analogies between several fields in physics and engineering and 
to synthesise and unify what was, at the time, a fragmented research area. This hypothesis 
is pursued in 7.2.8.
7.2.8 New views lead to illuminating analogues which continue during a varied 
career:
Many scientists have achieved new views through taking indirect routes. For example, 
Larry Holmes tells us that the 19 century physiologist,
“Claude Bernard likened himself to a runner who chose not to follow the beaten path: 
‘Everyone follows his own path. Some have been trained for a long time and proceed 
by following the track that had been marked out. I myself have reached the scientific 
arena by indirect ways and have been freed from rules by running forth cross-country, 
which others perhaps would not have dared to do. But I believe that in physiology that 
has not been bad, because it has led me to new views’.” (Holmes, 2004, p. xvii)
Case studies from the history of science underscore the creative value o f making advances 
by noticing connections between different paths of enquiry. As mentioned in section 1.0 
the historian and psychologist of science Howard Gruber refers to this as a ‘network of 
enterprise.’ (Gruber, 1980). This process of transferring concepts from one area to another 
involves a form of analogical reasoning. In the following comments, Gooding gives 
examples from the history of science, highlighting the differing levels of abstraction at 
which this process of transferring concepts can occur:
“This can be achieved in several ways at different levels of abstraction. The most 
concrete and intuitive would be ‘direct’ recognition of a similarity at the perceptual 
level, such as Robert Young’s recognition of similarities between the behaviour of 
water waves and ray-diagrams of optical inference (Miller, 1996). This would also 
rely on a fast cognitive processing that is closely coupled to evolved neural structures.
At a more abstract level are similarities whose significance derives from being 
features generated by structural or process models in different domains. Examples are
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Faraday’s recognition of the potential significance of relationships between the 
behaviour of electrical filaments (fig 9.14A), electrostatic lines (Fig 9.1 IE and 9.13) 
and magnetic lines (Fig 9.11C and 9.14). At a still higher lever of abstraction is his 
recognition of the significance of changes in the appearance of high frequency 
processes (e.g. acoustical patterns) with changes such as frequency and the density of 
the ambient medium (e.g. pitch of the sound made by the electric brush). Here...the 
ability to see the significance of similarities that are perceived ‘directly’ depends on 
deliberative kinds of reasoning with and about visual models of inferred or hidden 
processes. Communicating the meaning of these representations involves both 
deliberation and negotiation about them.” (Gooding, 2005, p.210)
Dr. Lawson agreed that pursuing many paths of enquiry over a varied career was a key 
factor in his success as a scientist. He quipped: “I used to say that I was a ‘jack of all trades 
and master of one’.”143 As he put it, “I’ve been a wanderer.”144 Interestingly, on the issue 
of getting mental pictures of the physical processes of his research, he said that being a 
wanderer was advantageous:
“I realise more as I get older, that the mental pictures depend very much on your past 
experience, and what you know about already. And part of my advantage, is having 
been wandering around a lot from one thing to another over the years, I’ve collected a 
fairly broad sort of view point on things.” (ibid.) 145 
(In section 7.3, I address the influence of visual memory on creativity and innovation.) 
Although Dr. Lawson agreed that the sources of much of his scientific inspiration (i.e. the 
material he synthesised and drew analogies from) came from a wide variety of branches of 
physics, he (characteristically) qualified this by saying: “within a limited range - there were 
some branches of physics that I knew nothing about...” 146 On joining Harwell after the 
war, Dr. Lawson encountered nuclear and quantum physics and, “immediately noticed 
striking parallels between wave mechanics and microwave radiation.” He added: 
“Unconventional connections in the form of illuminating analogues came to mind and 
these continued at intervals during a varied career.” 147 (These are discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter). Thagard (2005, p. 165) notes that:
143 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone interview of 22-March-2004.
144 Dr. Lawson, during, our first interview at his residence, 15-January-2004
145 Of course one could argue that collecting a broad viewpoint on things can sometimes create 
confusion rather than lucidity. As mentioned in chapter 3, Richard Feynman alluded to this issue 
when he said: “I have a terrible confusion between the symbols I use to describe the objects and 
the objects themselves. I cannot really make a picture that is even nearly like true waves [ ... ] 
When I talk about the electromagnetic field in space, I see some kind of superposition of all the 
diagrams which I’ve ever seen drawn about them.” (Feynman, 1964. Quoted in Gooding, 1992, 
p. 144)
146 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone conversation of 22-03-2004
147 Dr. Lawson, in his March 2003 letter to me.
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“Many successful scientists do not restrict their reading to the particular areas of 
research on which they are currently focused, but instead read widely, including work 
outside their field. This enables them to grasp analogies between current problems 
they face and established ones that may suggest new solutions. (Dunbar 2001; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Visual representations may facilitate analogical and other 
kinds of inference (Giere, 1999; Nersessian, 1992). Working on multiple projects with 
multiple methods may make possible new approaches to those projects.”
Thus, I would argue that exploring five sub-fields of physics enabled Dr. Lawson to notice 
striking analogies between systems he encountered in different contexts. It may of course 
have been his ability to notice analogies that led him to pursue numerous lines of 
investigation in numerous fields. Whatever the direction of influence, this wider field of 
view, coupled with his excellent skills at analogical reasoning led to him making 
interesting connections - - identifying similarities between these diverse fields - - 
synthesising ideas and thereby providing his colleagues with a more unified view of the 
field. His use of analogies to bridge sub-disciplinary boundaries is discussed in chapter 8.
7.3 The Influence of Visual Memory on Creativity & Innovation
Oppenheimer (1956, p. 130) has remarked that:
“Whether or not we talk of discovery or of invention, analogy’s inevitable in human 
thought, because we come to new things in science with what equipment we have, 
which is how we have learned to think, and above all how we have learned to think 
about the relatedness of things. We cannot, coming into something new, deal with it 
except on the basis of the familiar and the old-fashioned.”
There are many instances from the history of science that underscore Oppenheimer’s 
remarks. For example, Gorman (2005) has shown how Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone 
was based “on the visual and kinaesthetic analogy to the human ear that was unique to his 
experience and expertise (Gorman, 1997).” (Gorman, 2005, p.293). In discussing the 
mechanical representations used by Faraday in his invention o f the first electromagnetic 
motor, Gooding tells us that:
“These mechanical representations can be retained in memory; moreover, they are so 
well understood that their use will be consistent and the implications of their 
properties for other components of a device can readily be worked out.” (Gooding, 
1990b, quoted in Gorman, 1998, p.25)
Dr. Lawson’s visual memory seems to have played an important part in his work. He had 
many visual and analogical resources at his disposal and employed them successfully to 
acquire and promote insight. As mentioned in 7.2.8, Dr. Lawson explained that the
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wandering nature of his career path has been instrumental in equipping him with these 
resources. A scientist’s residual memories can be particularly influential in the early stages 
of their research. To use an analogy, one could compare it to a hysteresis effect in physics, 
where a physical system has a strong history dependence. Eugene Ferguson tells us that in 
the field o f engineering:
“When designers are thinking out their preliminary designs, their visual memories are 
particularly influential. Mark Clark has found significant visual similarities between 
components o f the docking mechanism o f spacecraft and the landing gear o f  airplanes.
The designers o f the docking mechanisms had been recruited from the pool o f  aircraft 
designers who had a great deal o f experience with landing gear. The similarities, often 
subtle, became evident to Clark only as he became familiar with both airplane landing 
gear and docking mechanisms.” (Ferguson, 1992, p. 15 & 16)
I quoted Ferguson in follow-up exchanges with some of my questionnaire respondents. 
Phys_200, a retired engineer with experience in the construction industry, replied saying: 
"Your space docking quote is nothing more than I/one would or should expect. One 
builds on one's experience to solve the next problem. So ‘landing gear’ experience is 
the most recent knowledge base and so is the first stop for ‘off the shelf knowledge 
when looking for solutions for solving the next problem.” (Phys_200b)
Drawing on decades of personal experience in the fields o f physics and engineering he 
added:
“I spent my whole working life cross-fertilising ideas across from one experience 
base/industry/project to another, or from one colleague to another. There is very little 
that is new in this world, just new ways o f adapting known information (knowledge) 
across boundaries to solving the next problem that may or may not be in the same 
application domain. Many people however are so compartmentalised that that cannot 
think out o f  the box. It is then the job o f others to gather this knowledge base and use 
it/disseminate it more widely and so build on to solve the next problem....” 
(Phys_200b)
Dr. Lawson is one such out-of-the-box thinker who, to paraphrase Phys_200, gathers a 
broad knowledge base and then uses it and disseminates it more widely, building on it to 
solve the next problem.
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7.4 Dr. Lawson: The Synthesiser & Translator
Nersessian’s cognitive-historical studies of the work of J.C. Maxwell show him to be a 
synthesiser of extraordinary prowess. According to Nersessian:
“Maxwell derived the field equations through a constructive modelling processes that 
involved synthesizing multiple constraints drawn from the physics of elastic fluids and 
of machine mechanisms, experimental data on electricity and magnetism, Faraday’s 
hypotheses about the lines of force and his models, William Thompson’s hypotheses 
of rotational motion of magnetism and his analogies, and mathematical equations.” 
(Nersessian, 1995, p.212)
The cosmologist Dermis Sciama was also renowned for having “a strong flair for 
synthesis” 148 drawing on his “broad knowledge of physics to make fruitful connections 
among many topics in astronomy and astrophysics.” 149 There is ample evidence from Dr. 
Lawson’s scientific papers and book to support the proposition that synthesis is also a 
prominent feature of Dr. Lawson’s mode of thought. (See tables 8.2a & 8.2b in section 
8.4). When asked (during our telephone conversation o f 22-March-2004) whether he 
would describe himself as “a synthesiser,” he replied, “yes, I would say that.” He is (and 
by his estimation, has always been 15°) skilled at making interesting connections between 
things, and synthesising these viewpoints into a more unified and coherent picture. In 
general, Dr. Lawson synthesised on a phenomenological level, with the aim of acquiring 
and or promoting physical or pictorial insight. For example, comparing ion beams to 
drifting gases or bags filled with water, in order to get a ‘feel’ for how particles behave. In 
this respect his modelling techniques were akin to those of Faraday. As Gooding (1990, 
p.23) tells us: “ ... Faraday needed to use images and words about images to overcome the 
ephemerality of his construals of new experience. His record and the instructions it 
contains become part of the world from which stable, communicable experience emerged.” 
Being a synthesiser was to a certain extent dependent on Dr. Lawson’s profession: His 
working environment (at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) consisted of physicists and 
engineers of differing backgrounds and research interests. An individual who could act as a 
synthesiser and unifier of concepts, jargon, notations, etc. was extremely valuable in such a 
working environment. (In section 8.3 I discuss his ability to act as a ‘translator’ of 
languages, ideas and notations between practitioners his field. I give examples from his
148Quoting CERN Courier.
Source: http://www.cemcourier.eom/main/article/40/4/18/l (Accessed 19-08-2005)
149 Quoting Wikipedia Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis William Sciama (accessed 19-08-2005)
150 “I’d always been able to do that [i.e. see connections between things]. I mean my very first paper which is 
a good example of analogy which is interesting. When I look at that paper I’m surprised how interesting that 
is.” (Dr. Lawson, during our telephone interview of 13-01-2005)
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scientific papers and book, highlighting his use of analogy and synthesis to provide these 
experts and intermediates with physical and pictorial insights). Announcing his election as 
a Fellow of the Royal Society, a Rutherford Appleton Laboratory bulletin said of Dr. 
Lawson:
“Though making significant contributions in many specific areas of accelerator 
physics, perhaps his most notable achievements have resulted from his ability to 
survey, in both breadth and depth, the underlying theoretical principles of the science, 
identify where gaps appear in the theory, and to fill them.” (Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory, Bulletin number 5, 6-April- 1988)
It went on to say that Dr. Lawson’s:
“work on the use of lasers to accelerate particles was described as ‘another example 
of the way in which he can enter a newly developing field of study and single- 
handedly bring order where none existed before’.” (ibid)
This type o f evidence is obviously biased, portraying Dr. Lawson in a positive light only. 
As Dr. Lawson himself quipped, “they always say nice things about you on such 
occasions.” 151 However, like an obituary, it not only provides information on the 
characteristics of the individual in question, it also provides a snapshot of the period, 
indicating which personal characteristics were particularly valued at the time, e.g. the 
ability to unify a diverse field, bringing order where none existed before.152 Such evidence, 
though biased, does help to paint a more vivid picture o f the atmosphere in which Dr. 
Lawson worked. In fact, in response to questioning concerning his particular ability to act 
as a synthesiser, he played down his own abilities, re-directing attention to the atmosphere 
in which he worked, saying:
“... a lot of this depends on the state that the subject is in, if it’s ready for some degree 
of synthesis, because - - before the war, I mean there would have been different fields, 
particle beams which were separate - - and it was time, if you like, for them to come 
together a bit more. So if I hadn’t done it, I suppose other people would have done.
But I was particularly good at it. And I certainly had invitations to go here there and 
everywhere, which is why I did a lot of travelling.” 153 
Dr. Lawson’s synthetic tendencies are particularly evident in his book, The Physics O f 
Charged Particle Beams (1988, 2nd ed.), which provides an extensive overview of the 
physics of charged particle beams. Throughout this 446-page book, Dr. Lawson attempts 
“to bring together and compare all commonly used versions,” of things. (Lawson, 1988,
p. 12).
151 Dr. Lawson during our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005
152 Thanks to Dr. Chris Philippidis for his useful comments on this issue.
153 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone conversation, 12:00-12:30, 22-March-2004
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During our first interview, Dr. Lawson read aloud from the introduction of the book in 
order to emphasise the essence of his synthetic style o f thinking. He read:
“ ‘Charged particle beams are widely used in scientific, industrial and even domestic 
apparatus, i.e. the television. The physical properties of such beams have been studied 
by workers in many different fields, often at different times, in rather different 
contexts... Nevertheless, despite differences in function and superficial appearance, 
beams used in a wide variety of applications will be shown to have to have many 
features in common. This is sometimes obscured by differences of approach or 
notation. In this monograph, the unity of things encountered in different contexts is 
emphasised and classification is in terms of physical features rather than application...
The approach is synthetic, simple examples are considered first, and the complications 
introduced gradually... Nevertheless, it presents a more vivid way of the essential 
physical ideas, which form a set of conceptual building blocks that are useful when 
trying to think about new situations, and to understand their inherent limitations’.”
He elaborated on the quotation from his book, adding:
“So I ’m saying there, that there are examples of people doing quite similar things in 
different contexts, and in some - - one or two papers for instance - - it shows that the 
essential result in one is either identical with or closely related to a well-known result 
in another field. So, if you understand both those general results, then you’ve got a
wider view, and you can go out from that. And it’s especially in the time that new
ideas are being tossed around that you want to be able to do this. But you’ve also got 
to be able to be critical and disregard things, and when you first see something, you’ve 
got to say ‘ok, that’s one thing, but what are the wider - - what other things'... ” 154 
Thus, Dr. Lawson’s book aims to highlight the deep connections between different 
physical ideas in the hope that these “conceptual building blocks” can be used as 
scaffolding when attempting to extend ones understanding in to a new area of interest. (See 
section 5.6 for questionnaire respondents’ remarks on their use of analogy as scaffolding). 
Dr. Lawson’s use of analogy as a ‘bridging’ device between practitioners in the fields of
e.g. microwave tube, accelerator and plasma physics is discussed further in section 8.5. I
discuss Dr. Lawson’s role as a ‘translator’ between different ‘languages o f thought’ among 
‘sub-cultures’ of physicists and engineers in section 8.3, however, as it is a key 
characteristic of his thinking style, and our conversations about his role as a translator 
revealed other personality traits, I will briefly introduce in this chapter.
When I questioned Dr. Lawson on his ability to communicate science effectively, he told 
me: “I was known for my broad insights, often invited to give opening or summing up
154 Dr. Lawson, during our first interview at his residence, 15-Jan-2004
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talks at conferences,” 155 The hope was that he may “spark off new approaches” 156 in the 
field. He was also often asked by journal editors to write introductory articles on emerging 
physics (e.g. Lawson, Dr., (1979), Free Electron Lasers. Nature Vol. 277, p. 262). He said 
he, “spent a lot of time” doing lectures at conferences and attending workshops, adding:
“I was quite - - well, my style was, I think, quite popular, in that I was, you know, 
invited all over the place. I went to various European countries - Poland and Romania 
- Hungary, and I had a special invitation to Russia and to China ... and I spent some 
time in Japan. So these were all just because I seem to have got a reputation for 
putting things in a way that people liked — it must have been I think.” 157 
It is worth noting that the above excerpt contains considerable ‘hedging’. The linguist 
Greg Myers (1991) defines hedges as: “a wide range o f features modifying the strength of 
an assertion or membership in a category with a modal, an advert or adjective, or a 
parenthetical comment.” (Myers, 1991, p.44) Hedging is used in order to reposition 
oneself, to convey politeness, tentativeness, uncertainty, etc. in speech or writing. Dr. 
Lawson’s use of qualifying words such as: “quite”, “well”, “I think”, “you know”, “just”, 
“seem” etc. in this excerpt, reflect what he later termed his, “strange mixture of modesty 
and the opposite.” 159 Thus, Dr. Lawson exhibits the characteristics of a synthesiser and 
translator.
7.5 Dr. Lawson: The Innovator?
In section 5.4 I showed that questionnaire respondents who were enthusiasts for using 
analogy in their research also tended to generate original analogies to a greater extent. 
Thus, in the case-study, I was interested to explore whether or not enthusiasts for analogy 
tended to be particularly innovative: In the sense o f linking apparently unrelated things, 
synthesising ideas and creatively reformulating them, presenting new dimensions to the 
viewer. This hypothesis presupposes a distinction between our ordinary, everyday use of 
analogy and particularly creative ones. The similarities should extend beyond surface 
similarity to deeper, mathematical similarities. In our first interview (13-01-2004) Dr. 
Lawson showed signs of being innovative, saying that: “as a boy, I was always making 
things... usually I had no resources because we weren’t very well off, and it was a question
155 Dr. Lawson, in reply to my questionnaire of 04-10-2004
156 Dr. Lawson, in the conclusion of his “Diversity and unity in sources and beams” paper, delivered at 
Brookhaven in 1971
157 Dr. Lawson, during our first interview at his residence onl5-January-2004
158 Lakoff (1972) first introduced the term ‘hedges’ in his article, "Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and 
the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts."
159 “Well I’m a strange mixture of modesty and the opposite, or so my wife thinks anyway.” (Dr. Lawson 
during our telephone conversation of 13-01-2005)
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of using bits and pieces of anything else, and scrounging... which was very good for me 
really... ” But later in the same interview, while acknowledging that he had “some ideas” 
during his career, he added (perhaps modestly): “I’m not sure that I had all that many. A 
lot of my ideas were in showing how things wouldn’t work as they were being claimed, 
especially with new things.” (ibid.). Again, in a telephone conversation of 22-03-2004 he 
showed innovative tendencies. Firstly, when discussing the tools, techniques and problem 
solving techniques he used in his work, he said: “Often if there’s a complicated problem 
that you don’t quite know how to tackle, the thing is to invent a simpler problem of the 
same class, which you think you can tackle.” (ibid). This fits into Kuhn’s (1962) 
theoretical framework regarding the use of ‘exemplars’ as puzzle-solving devices in 
science. It also reminds of us the joke about assuming one is dealing with a spherical horse 
travelling through in a vacuum (cf. section 8.4). Secondly, when discussing physical 
insight, Dr. Lawson explained that, due to his preference for pictorial rather than 
mathematical thinking: “I have to invent my own way of thinking about particular 
problems. Just seeing how certain problems seem to be related in one way or another.” 
(ibid.) Yet when asked if he would describe himself as innovative he responded: “Not 
particularly. I don’t think I’ve invented any new thing, but I’m a good critic really.” (ibid.) 
Dr. Lawson appears to be follow the conventional view, outlined by Mehus, that:
“...a person who merely solves well-defined problems is not considered as creative, 
even not if one of these problem solutions turns out to be highly innovative. Also, if a 
problem solver arrives at the solution of an ill-defined problem in a non-rational way 
(for instance, by modifying well-founded constraints in an unjustified way), he or she 
is not viewed as creative.” (Mehus, 1999, pp.200-201)
According to Gruber,
“[A creative scientist] has a point of view that is different from others, and it is this 
point of view that permits him to see things in a new way, to see new questions, new 
opportunities, new directions to go in. He is not really a better problem solver than his 
similarly gifted contemporaries, or many of the other experts around him.” (Gruber,
1985, p.178)
I share Gorman’s view that: “Taken together, heuristics, mental models and mechanical 
representations allow us to study and compare the cognitive styles of inventors and 
discovers, by which I mean the manner in which each individual practitioner finds, 
transforms and solves problems.” (Gorman, 1998, p. 125). My methodological and 
theoretical framework was influenced by Gorman’s (1998) five generalisations concerning 
cognition, invention and discovery. That:
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1. Invention depends on establishing that a problem is significant enough to be labelled an 
important achievement.
2. Invention depends on transforming that problem into a form that suggests a promising path 
to solution which includes locating and transforming the necessary mechanical 
representations.
3. Invention depends on a combination of flexibility and stubbornness, depending on the 
cognitive styles and the career trajectories of the inventors involved and on how they 
represent the problem.
4. The act of writing is part of the invention process.
5. Successful inventors often pursue a network of enterprises.
Upon further reflection, it may have been better to use the term “creative” as well as the 
term “innovative” when exploring this issue with Dr. Lawson. The term “innovative” 
may have suggested something tangible, i.e. something that impacts on one’s 
surroundings, as opposed to a private mental construct, used as a problem solving 
strategy in one’s work. As I noted in section 1.5, there are different types of creativity: 
big-C creativity and little-c creativity, personal and socio-cultural. According to an 
infamous marketing slogan: "Creativity is thinking up new things. Innovation is doing new 
things. ” 160 If this view were to be transferred to Dr. Lawson’s domain, designing, building 
and introducing a new piece of equipment to one’s ‘culture’, or developing and 
disseminating a new experimental methodology amongst one’s peers, would be regarded as 
‘innovative’, but creating or inventing alternative ways of reasoning, (e.g. through drawing 
analogies), would not. In my view, however, the slogan cannot be transferred to the 
domain of physics. There is no dichotomy between doing and thinking for physicists and 
engineers: thinking & doing interact e.g. in solving equations, computer modelling, 
designing or modifying equipment, designing or modifying experiments, model building, 
etc. O f course, the degree o f inventiveness will vary. For example with respect to analogy, 
it may depend on whether one is drawing from a stockpile o f tried and tested analogies, or 
generating original analogies. As discussed in chapter 6, generating original analogies is 
almost certainly more common when one is ‘playing’ with ideas: when one is figuring 
things out for oneself (in the early stages of conceptualisation) and also when one is 
communicating ideas in a playful, relaxed setting. When publishing research in a peer 
reviewed journal, one may err on the side of caution, either reverting to well established 
analogues, (e.g. simple harmonic oscillator), or simply omitting the analogues which were 
used as scaffolding in the early stages of conceptualisation.




7.6 When the act of arranging information becomes an act of insight
Dr. Lawson frequently uses a structured, symmetrical form of graphical display in his book 
on the physics o f charged particle beams and his published and unpublished papers. Many 
engineering textbooks employ a similar technique to make material accessible by 
facilitating cross comparison. However, Dr. Lawson’s use of tables seems to go beyond the 
customary textbook use. It may play a key role in his ability to acquire insight and may be 
linked to his ability to reason analogically. As discussed in chapter 1, a large body of 
research suggests that reasoning by analogy involves a type of structure alignment or 
structure-mapping between domains (e.g. Gick and Holyoak 1980; Gentner, 1982, 1983; 
Gentner and Gentner 1983; Gentner and Clement 1988; Holyoak and Thagard 1989; Ross 
1989; Markman and Gentner 1993; Halford 1992;) As Gentner & Gentner explain: “[A] 
structure-mapping analogy asserts that identical operations and relationships hold among 
non-identical things. The relational structure is preserved, but not the objects.” (1983, 
p. 102). Also, there is reason to believe that one’s interpretation and representation of 
problems affects one’s solution strategy, (cf. Kintsch & Greeno, 1985). The observed 
differences in problem solving strategies between experts and novices may result from 
experts possessing superior representations of problems: experts often use higher-order 
categorizations, e.g. conservation laws (cf. Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981). Playing with 
and rearranging data often allows new features to emerge. Michael Faraday, for example, 
used physical models and apparatus to play with possibilities and used matrices to do 
systematic structure or feature mapping. (Gooding, 2005, pl99). By rearranging and 
systematically representing data of two systems (A and B) having similar features, 
additional similarities between A and B may emerge through analogical reasoning (e.g. 
extrapolations involving higher order categorizations). According to Edward Tufte 
(statistician, graphic designer and founder of Graphics Press):
“[C]larity and excellence in thinking is very much like clarity and excellence in the display 
of data. When principles of design replicate principles of thoughts, the act of arranging 
information becomes an act of insight.” (Tufte, 1997, p.9)
I will now present an example from Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers which shows that form, 
pattern and structure when displaying data appear to be key features of his style of 
thinking. (Three more examples are provided in appendix 7, sections A7.3-A7.5). In 
chapter 8 I will elaborate on Dr. Lawson’s use of analogy and synthesis to provide insights 
when conceptualising and communicating physics to experts and intermediates in sub­
fields related to accelerator design.
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7.6.1 Waveguides & Wave Mechanics Some Similarities & Differences (Egl)
The following extract is from an unpublished paper, based on a lecture given on 15th 
December 1950, when Dr. Lawson was 27 years old. In this paper, Dr. Lawson 
highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of drawing “analogies between the fields in a 
waveguide and Schrodinger’s equation in one dimension”. This paper provides a striking 
example of Dr. Lawson’s preference for form, structure and symmetry in the presentation 
of his material. Dr. Lawson constructs a table composed of 15 sketches (see fig.7.3 
overleaf).
□ row 1 shows a physical representation of the waveguides, i.e. material media that 
confine and guide a propagating electromagnetic wave, something which Dr. Lawson 
may have made by hand;
□ row 2 shows a quantum mechanical viewpoint of different particles trapped in a 
potential-wells;
□ row 3 shows a graphical sketch of the wavefunctions;
□ row 4 indicates whether or not they are bound states.
As Dr. Lawson explains in his paper on Waveguides and Wave Mechanics:
“The first two diagrams show a finite number of resonant frequencies (bound levels) 
and a continuum of propagated frequencies (free levels) of higher frequency (energy).
The third diagram shows an unquantised system, which is capable of having any 
values of n, (W). The point where the waveguide decreases below the cut off size 
(classical distance of closest approach) moves nearer to the origin as the frequency 
(energy) increases. The fourth diagram shows two coupled systems. If there is a length 
of cut off waveguide (potential barrier) between the two systems, this results in a 
splitting of the resonant frequencies (energy levels) of the system, considered 
independently. If the connecting waveguide is narrow (potential barrier is large) the 
splitting is slight, and the electromagnetic energy (particle) flows slowly from one 
system to the other and back. At frequencies so high that the connecting waveguide 
no longer cuts off (energies higher than the potential of the barrier between the 
system) the system again behaves as a single resonator (oscillator)... In considering 
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Figure 7.3 -  Matrix of sketches from Dr. Lawson’s paper on ‘W ave Guides and Wave Mechanics: Some Similarities and Differences”. 
These are the figures to which Dr. Lawson is referring in his annotation, when he says, “To me the figures say everything.”
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Dr. Lawson employs this method to highlight the analogy between the fields in a 
waveguide and Schrodinger’s equation in one dimension. He seems to be guided by 
pictorial heuristics and diagrammatic reasoning, much more than by formal mathematical 
analogues. It should be noted that the mathematics for both systems has the same 
underlying structure. A theoretical physicist, who does not share Dr. Lawson’s practically 
orientated education, may not regard this as an analogy, merely different instances of the 
same thing. Thus, this is a telling example of the way in which Dr. Lawson’s educational 
and professional background may have informed his viewpoint.
The table of sketches has a progressive aspect to it, with each column illustrating the 
different outcomes for waveguides of various shapes and forms. The viewer is led step-by- 
step from a simple case to a more complicated case; one might even be left imagining what 
column 6 might look like. In a post-it note annotation to this paper, Dr. Lawson remarked 
that to him, “the figures [i.e. sketches] say everything.” When I pursued this during a 
follow-up conversation he told me he does not make a conscious effort to present material 
in this structured manner. As he put it, “it’s just the way I think.” When I asked him if the 
arrangement of information was a means of acquiring or promoting insight, Dr. Lawson 
responded: “Promoting - 1 chose what seemed to be the simplest and most elegant layout.” 
161 When asked how theory informed his choice and arrangement of diagrams, he 
responded: “I didn’t consider ‘theory’ especially -  just general clarity.” (ibid.) In response 
to the question of who his imagined audience were, Dr. Lawson said:
“During the war I worked on microwaves, afterwards I moved to a field involving 
some nuclear physics. The points of similarity immediately struck me and gave rise to 
this informal lecture to immediate colleagues. This simple comparison is original, and 
is developed in later papers.” (ibid.)
To show “where the analogy ends” in his paper on waveguides and wave mechanics, Dr. 
Lawson uses some mathematical manipulation, (which should be familiar to anyone who 
has studied physics or mathematics at degree level). On page 3 he shows the relation 
between the 'complex' energy and the wavefunction, and graphically parallels the 
frequency spread with the energy spread about the mean. The visual presentation of the 
equations is noteworthy. Dr. Lawson presents them in parallel, with an axis of symmetry 
down the centre (see figures 7.4 and 7.5 on the next page). This is similar to his 
presentation of figures 1 to 5 shown as figure 7.3 above. Bear in mind that this paper was 
type-written in 1950, before word processors made it easy to present data in a symmetrical 
arrangement. The manner in which Dr. Lawson arranges the mathematical equations
161 Dr. Lawson, 04-10-2004, in response to my questionnaire of 15-Aug-2004.
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(presented in parallel, with an axis of symmetry) and the graphical figures (presented in 
parallel, in an ordered table) facilitates cross comparison. It is a technique in widespread 
use in physics textbooks162 although, to the best of my knowledge, few empirical studies 
have been conducted to test the effectiveness of this technique as a means of making 
material accessible to the reader. 163 See appendix 7 for a table outlining some commonly 
used “Interdisciplinary Electrical Analogies.” One could argue that he would not have 
organised his data (equations, graphical figures, visual matrices, etc.) in a structured 
manner if he did not foresee the paper being read by others, i.e. if  he did not have an 
‘addressee’ in mind, (see e.g. Dixon, Deets, & Bangert, 2001, p. 462). Or as the linguist 
Bakhtin would say, Dr. Lawson’s paper was: “addressed to a particular group of readers 
with a particular apperceptive background of responsive understanding.” (Bakhtin, 1986, 
p.96). Having viewed many of Dr. Lawson’s unpublished notes, and spoken to him at 
some length on the topic, I have concluded that he does tend to organise data in this highly 
structured manner, regardless of whether or not it is intended for subsequent publication.
In fact, as Dr. Lawson’s preference for form and structure extends beyond physics 
into the realms of music, art and poetry, suggesting that it may be a key facet of his 
cognitive style. This fact arose in our first interview, when I questioned Dr. Lawson on 
whether he had poetic tendencies. Dr. Lawson said that he particularly enjoyed the sonnets 
o f Keats and Wordsworth that had “form and structure” where “you have to express your 
ideas within a formal framework and that’s a sort of challenge.” When asked if he himself 
wrote any poetry, Dr. Lawson replied (perhaps somewhat bashfully): “Ahm, no I don’t. I 
write doggerel verses on occasions, you know, peoples’ retirement or something of that 
sort. But it’s just doggerel, you know, rhyming couplets, {gentle laugh}.” (ibid.) 164 Dr. 
Lawson went on to say that also within the visual arts and in music, “I enjoy things that are 
structured.” 165 Thus Dr. Lawson has a preference for form and structure that is both visual 
and aural (through rhyme and metre in poetry, and his appreciation for Bach’s music in 
particular). The fact that this preference for structure extends beyond physics strongly 
suggests that it is a prominent feature of his cognitive style and may be influential in his 
analogical reasoning abilities.
162 From Mott & Sneddon’s (1948) Wave Mechanics and it Applications to Serway & Beichner’s (2000, 5th 
Edition), Physics: For Scientists and Engineers.
163 Paul Hewitt’s series of textbooks and interactive learning tools stemming from Conceptual Physics work 
goes some way however. Can be found at URL: http://www.conceptual physics.com/index.shtml (accessed 
on 25-07-2005)
164 Of course the ability to write beautiful and/or satirical verse, which has form and structure, is regarded by 
some as the sign of a ‘true’ poet. As the formalist poet Robert Frost is reputed to have said, “Writing free 
verse is like playing tennis with the net down.”
165 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone conversation, 12:00-12:30, 22-March-2004
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7.7 Conclusions:
In this chapter, I have provided an outline of Dr. Lawson’s research background in order to 
show that several factors must be taken into account when considering the 
conceptualisation and communication techniques he found useful in his work. These are:
(0 His early childhood experiences;
0 0 His formal education;
(iii) His working environment during his formative years;
(iv) A “slightly traumatic” event which occurred during his first project;
(v) His Personality;
(vi) Luck;
(vii) His working environment in later years - the freedom to pursue his own
research interests;
(viii) How new views led to illuminating analogues which continued during a varied
career.
Table 7.1 summarises several characteristics which Dr. Lawson exhibits which are relevant 
to the conceptualisation and communication tools he uses in his work. The background 
information discussed in this chapter provides us with a better understanding of two key 
characteristics displayed by Dr. Lawson: that of a synthesiser and of a translator. His 
training, research background and working environment all contributed to the fact that he 
synthesised ideas from a variety of sub-fields (e.g. applied optics, plasma physics, high- 
energy and particle physics, and astrophysics) and acted as a translator bridging conceptual 
divides between sub-cultures of physicists and engineers. Dr. Lawson often employed 






Characteristic Example from analysis of 30 of his scientific papers, his book 






“I think pictorially and not mathematically.” 166 
“I had a Faraday-type approach where most of my colleagues were 
Maxwell like.” 167 
In his experience, engineers tend to have their “feet on the ground 
a bit more”




Good critic He became renowned for his ability to “assess new concepts which 
people put forward” and by his own (modest) estimation was, “a 
good critic, really.” 168
7.2.7 Independent “I was rather a timid person,...I was a bit of a Toner’ in my 
research.”169
“I was left more or less free lance [at the RAL], and much of the 
work I did was in looking at new ideas which were always coming 




Wanderer “I’ve been a wanderer” meandering through many fields in 
physics;
“having been wandering around a lot from one thing to another 
over the years, I’ve collected a fairly broad sort of view point on 
things.” 171
7.3.8 Generalist “I used to say that I was a ‘jack of all trades and master of one’.”
172
7.4 Synthesizer It is said of Dr. Lawson that: “Though making significant 
contributions in many specific areas of accelerator physics, perhaps 
his most notable achievements have resulted from his ability to 
survey, in both breadth and depth, the underlying theoretical 
principles of the science, identify where gaps appear in the theory, 
and to fill them.” 173
7.4 Translator “... I used to regard myself as a translator...” 174 [between 
different languages, notations, conventions, ideas etc. in physics]
Table 7. 1: Summary of points made throughout this chapter about Dr. Lawson’s thinking 
style.
166 Dr. L aw son, in his March 2003 letter to me.
167 Dr. L aw son, in his 24-F eb-2004 letter to me.
168 Dr. L aw son, during our telephone conversation o f  22-M arch-2004
169 Dr. L aw son, during our interview at his residence, 15-January-2004
170 Dr. L aw son  during our telephone conversation o f  13-01-2005
171 Dr. L aw son, during our interview  at his residence, 15-January-2004
172 Dr. L aw son, during our telephone conversation o f  22-M arch-2004
173 R utherford A ppleton Laboratory, Bulletin number 5, 6-April- 988





Characteristic Example from analysis of 30 of his scientific 
papers, his book and personal correspondence 
we carried out.
7.6





and aural structure 
(in science, art, 
music, poetry etc.)
17S“I enjoy things that are structured.”
This may have facilitated his own noticing of 
analogies and his ability to communicate these 
analogies to others through e.g. visual matrices 
which facilitate mappings between systems.
Briefly in 
7.3-7.5 and in 




Used analogy to create mental pictures, 
illumination, acquire physical insight, pictorial 
insight, etc.
Used analogy to facilitate communications between 
workers in different subdivisions of the field
Table 7.2: Summary of points made during this chapter about Dr. Lawson’s thinking style.
As I have shown in section 7.6, Dr. Lawson often provided his journal readers with clear 
and concise summaries of the similarities between systems by creating ordered tables of 
sketches, mathematical equations etc. I argue that arranging information in this highly 
structured visual manner facilitates cross-comparison between analogous systems. His 
preference for this structured and visual form of representation may indicate a cognitive 
relation to analogical reasoning, since some cognitive scientists’ (e.g. Gentner, 1989) argue 
that analogy involves a type of ‘structure mapping’ between source and target domains on 
a cognitive level. The fact that such ‘analogy tables’ are reasonably common in physics 
and engineering textbooks does not detract from their importance. In fact, I would argue 
that they are popular because they are an effective means of displaying such abstract 
information. The juxtaposition of abstract features and representations allows one to notice 
similarities and explore how far the analogies extend.
O f course analogies are expressed differently depending on their function. For 
example, one could present Prof. Coleman’s Dazed Chicken Model (featured in chapter 6) 
in an ‘analogy table’ rather than a sketch (see table 7.3 on the next page). This structured 
mode of representation communicates all the key concepts o f the Dazed Chicken Model 
and could be used to see how far the analogy extends. However, it does not have the same 
impact from a rhetorical perspective. It is not as memorable, entertaining or witty as Prof. 
Coleman’s highly original, (and admittedly absurd), Dazed Chicken M odel Part o f the 
effectiveness of Prof. Coleman’s sketch may be related to the fact that humans tend to 
assimilate information better from (humorous) pictures and narratives. Memory champions
175 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone conversation, 12:00-12:30, 22-March-2004
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often use the ‘method of loci’ mnemonic, a memory strategy (used by ancient rhetoricians 
and orators) that involves imagining items placed along a route in a conceptual space, 
thereby combining visual and narrative modes of thought.
Table 7.3: An analogy table created from Pro] Coleman’s Dazed Chicken Model sketch.
Imagine a ravine analogous to a potential well in which 
positrons can be trapped near 
a solid surface.
On one side of the ravine is a forest of evenly 
spaced trees
analogous to a crystal lattice
Some of the trees have been up-rooted, leaving 
holes in the ground
analogous to vacancies or defects in the 
lattice
On the other side of the ravine, chickens arc 
fired from a cannon
analogous to positrons fired from a particle 
accelerator
The chickens get propelled across the ravine, 
smashing into the evenly spaced trees.
analogous to Positrons colliding with 
crystal lattice
Some stagger around on the ground, 
completely dazed
analogous to to thermal positron diffusion
Some fall into holes in the ground analogous to trapping by vacancies or 
defects beneath the surface
Some fall into the ravine analogous to surface state trapping
Some, not so dazed, fly back across the ravine analogous to positron re-emission
Thus, the function of an analogy is vitally important: Prof. Coleman’s Dazed Chicken 
sketch is intended to express physics in a playful manner, to entertain, educate or inform. 
Prof. Coleman doodled it to pass the time at a ‘far from interesting’ conference talk. Later, 
when his colleagues found it witty and amusing, he decided to use it to good effect to 
promote positron physics to prospective students and the public. In fact, Prof. Coleman’s 
sketch is somewhat like Dr. Lawson’s sketch regarding a group o f engineers’ attempts to 
reach the moon (see figure 7.2). The primary function of both is to express something in a 
playful, entertaining and memorable way, rather than to juxtapose abstract features or 
representations in order to uncover similarities (as Dr. Lawson does in his waveguides and 
wave mechanics paper). When analogies are properly tailored to the context o f use they 
have the power to educate, inform and entertain audiences o f experts, intermediates and 
novices. As discussed in chapter 6, I strongly believe that a databank of good analogies, 
suggested by scientists with practical experience of actually ‘doing’ science, and a flair for 
communicating with experts and novices (through equations, narratives, sketches, physical 
models etc.) would be useful for science educators. There is a wealth of expertise within 
the physics and engineering community which could be tapped. Dr. Lawson’s effective use 





On bridging conceptual divides between ‘sub-cultures’ of 
physicists and engineers: An historical case study.
“ ...languages and notations differ; people brought up in plasma physics, microwave tube 
and accelerator environments tend to use different descriptions and different groupings of 
fundamental constants...and we suffer from the same problems that trouble the workers on 
that notoriously unsuccessful project, the tower of Babel.” 176
ppaMPCT-'!**:----------------------- .hi-----------  1
Figure 8.1: "The Tower of Babel“ 
by Pieter Brueghal the Elder
176 Dr. Lawson writes on page 1 o f  “D iversity and unity in sources and beams, ” 
published in the proceedings o f  a sym posium  on Ion Sources and formation of Ion 




This chapter explores the techniques used to bridge conceptual divides between scientific 
communities of practice. It is based on an historical case study of Dr. Lawson, a retired 
engineer-physicist who frequently took on the role o f ‘translator’ at physics-engineering 
workshops and conferences in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The data stems from a content 
analysis o f 35 of his scientific papers (1946-1997), his book on the physics of charged 
particle beams (1988, 2nd edition), and personal correspondence and semi-structured 
interviews which we carried out sporadically between 2003 and 2005. I address the 
following research questions:
Visualization:
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson experience difficulties getting a mental picture of 
the physical processes in his research?
□ What reasons were given by Dr. Lawson for having/(not having) difficulties?
The use of Analogy to provide insights when conceptualising and communicating 
physics:
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to acquire and promote (physical and 
pictorial) insight?
□ What does the term “insight” mean to Dr. Lawson?
□ How does physical insight differ from pictorial insight in Dr. Lawson’s view?
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to bridge sub-disciplinary divides?
□ What types of analogies did Dr. Lawson employ in this context? I.e. were they 
physical, pictorial or mathematical, utilising within domain or between domain 
mappings?
In this chapter, I will show that Dr. Lawson employed mathematical, physical and pictorial 
analogies to great effect to provide his colleagues with physical and pictorial insights, 




8.1 Public and Interdisciplinary Communication: Bridging the Gulf
In her book Science as Salvation (1992:2002), the philosopher, Mary Midgley addresses 
the problems surrounding interdisciplinary and public communication. She bemoans the 
fact that, “as in the Tower of Babel, each discipline speaks only in its own tongue.” Yet she 
recognises that “there are bold and clear-headed explainers” who manage to cross the 
‘linguistic’ divides. Midgley argues that such work:
“is surely of first importance, since intellectual enquiries, like nation states, always do 
have outside relations which can matter greatly to them. They all draw concepts, 
presuppositions, and metaphors from outside their borders, items which can deeply 
affect their inner workings.” (Midgley, 1992:2002, p.2).
Renowned “bold and clear-headed explainers” include scientists like Richard Dawkins, 
Stephen Jay Gould, Brian Greene, and Paul Davies. Some o f their books have not only 
become best sellers throughout the world, but have been debated in the public sphere. 
These practicing scientists are part of what John Brockman has termed the ‘Third Culture’. 
In the introduction to The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution, (a 
collection of essays by scientists with a flair for communication with the public) Brockman 
(1995) explains that:
“the Third Culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world 
who, through their work and expository writing, are taking the place of the traditional 
intellectual in rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and 
what we are.”
Brockman’s term ‘Third Culture’ refers back to C.P. Snow’s books The Two Cultures 
(1959) and the Two Cultures: A Second Look (1963). In the first edition, Snow was 
concerned by the “gulf of mutual incomprehension” (Snow, 1959, p.4) that separated 
literary intellectuals and scientists.177 In the second edition, Snow was more optimistic, 
believing that a Third Culture was emerging, consisting of scientists and literary 
intellectuals who were beginning to bridge the gulf o f incomprehension. Brockman’s ‘third 
culture’ differs from the ‘third culture’ predicted by Snow because in Brockman’s third 
culture, scientists communicate directly with the public, not via the literary intellectuals.
While it is widely accepted that ‘gulfs of mutual incomprehension’ can exist between 
scientists and the public, it is less widely known that mini gulfs can also exist between sub­
cultures of specialist scientists. As discussed in previous chapters, there are ‘cultural’ 
differences between engineers, mathematicians, theoretical physicists, experimental
177 Incidentally, Dr. Lawson was interviewed by C.P. Snow during the war, to decide whether he should be 




physicists, computational physicists etc. For example, Bissell and Dillon (practicing 
engineers) tell us that:
“The aims and purposes of engineers are not those of mathematicians. There is a focus 
on explanation and design, in contrast to mathematical structure and rigour... 
[TJraditions of explanations are different in different domains: what counts as an 
acceptable mathematical argument is unlikely to count as an acceptable engineering 
argument... [Different communities of practice lead to different ways of talking and 
doing, even when they are apparently dealing with the ‘same thing’. Tacit skills leamt 
by experience in engineering may not integrate well with the formal skills laid down 
in mathematics courses.” (Bissell & Dillon, 2000, p. 10)
Thus, even within physics, sub-fields such as microwave tube, accelerator or plasma 
physics form ‘sub-cultures’ of physicists who utilise different mathematical notations, 
groupings of fundamental constants, codes (i.e. syntax and jargon) etc. By limiting 
vocabulary & flexibility, these codes transmit culture, designate group solidarity, and 
facilitate communication within ‘sub-cultures’ (cf. Henderson, 1995, p.211-212). This 
specialization is necessary and desirable given the aims of a sub-field. However, when 
attempting to tackle a larger, more complex version of a problem, requiring collaboration 
between subfields, this plurality of ‘languages’can sometimes impede communication of 
ideas between ‘sub-cultures’. 178
Dr. Lawson highlighted the issue of restricted codes during a talk on Ion Sources 
and formation o f  Ion Beams at a symposium in Brookhaven in 1971. He noted that: “ ... 
languages and notations differ; people brought up in plasma physics, microwave tube and 
accelerator environments tend to use different descriptions and different groupings of 
fundamental constants... ” (Lawson, 1971, p .l) .179 Such ‘sub-cultural’ differences can 
inhibit communication on a project requiring collaboration between physicists and 
engineers working in different fields because, as Dr. Lawson explains in the same paper: 
“Particular languages develop, and we suffer from the same problems that trouble the 
workers on that notoriously unsuccessful project, the tower o f Babel” (ibid.). During our 
telephone conversation of 22-03-2004, Dr Lawson was keen to emphasise that: “it’s more
178 This is reminiscent of the biblical story of the Tower of Babel (Genesis chapter 11) which describes how, 
in an attempt to reach the heavens, humanity (united and mono-lingual) began construction on the Tower of 
Babel. To confuse the workers and prevent their project from proceeding, God introduced a plurality of 
languages. The workers, now speaking different languages, could not communicate with one another and the 
project ultimately collapsed.
179 “.. .a plasma physicists naturally thinks of the transverse temperature and pressure of a beam, whereas an 
accelerator physicist sees it in terms of the emittance and focusing strengths. Space charge effects can be 
seen in terms of perveance, Laslett Q-shifts, or a non-zero effective plasma frequency. Beams can be 
characterised by volts and amps, or by number densities, radii and drift velocities” Dr. Lawson, in “Diversity 
and unity in sources and beams,” (Lawson, 1971, p.l)
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than just the ‘language’, it’s the actual formulation of the theory. So it isn’t so obvious 
sometimes that people are talking about the same thing, because they have thought of it 
differently.” I often think that Babel fish180 would be extremely useful at interdisciplinary 
conferences where sub-cultures of physicists and engineers exchange ideas. Unfortunately, 
these biological universal translators are exceedingly difficult to catch (being entirely 
fictitious). So, without the aid of Babel fish, how do physicists dismantle boundaries and 
bridge ‘linguistic’ divides between sub-cultures of the physics community?
8.2 If You Can’t Catch A Babel Fish Try A Using A Pidgin.
As the sociologist of science Peter Galison remarks, when an H-bomb designer, a logician, 
an aero-dynamical engineer, and a statistician sit down together, they do not don head­
phones and communicate through interpreters, League of Nations style. According to 
Galison, “they work out an intermediate language, a pidgin, that serves a local, mediating 
capacity.” (Galison & Stump, 1996, p i4). But how exactly do they do this? What form 
does this new pidgin language take?
Henderson’s ethnographic studies of the visual culture of engineers reveal that, “[t]o 
participate at all in the engineering design process actors must engage one another through 
the visual representation of the conscription device.” (Henderson, 1995, p.214-215). A 
subgroup of inscription devices, conscription devices “enlist group participation and are 
receptacles of knowledge created and adjusted through group interaction with a common 
goal.” (Ibid.). As these conscription devices mean different things to the various actors 
who employ them (e.g. designers and managers) they serve as boundary objects. 
According to Star, “boundary objects” are: “plastic enough to adapt to local needs and 
constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites.” (Star, 1989, p. 298, see also, Bowker & Star, 1999). Gorman (2005, 
p.292) notes that, “boundary objects will be absent from trading zones that are dominated 
by an elite group but are likely to exist in trading zones where the partners are relatively 
equal.” The term trading zone was coined by Galison. According to Galison, the trading 
zone is “the site -  partly symbolic and partly spatial -  at which the local coordination 
between beliefs and action takes place.” (Galison, 1997, p.784)
180 Fans of Douglas Adams’ science fiction classic, “The Hitch Hiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” will know that 
Babel fish are highly improbable biological universal translators. A “small, yellow and leech-like... ” fish 
which “... feeds on the brainwave energy received.. .from those around it... ” So that “... if you stick a Babel 
fish in your ear you can instantly understand anything said to you in any form of language.” (Adams, 
1979:1995, H2G2, p. 52)
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Conscription devices and boundary objects share commonalities with what Gooding refers 
to as “construals”. When negotiating consensus about what they are seeing, Gooding says: 
“Observers construe and reconstrue their own experience in the light of what other 
observers take theirs to be. Construals are a means of interpreting unfamiliar 
experience and communicating one’s trial interpretations. Construals are practical, 
situational and often concrete. They belong to the pre-verbal context of ostensive 
practices.” (Gooding, 1990, p.23)
I would argue that analogies are a type of boundary object: the analogy highlights certain 
features which two systems share which can then be explored in further depth. The core of 
the theory under discussion remains invariant. Analogies are also a type of construal: by 
drawing comparisons to pre-existing experiential and abstract knowledge, experts (and for 
that matter most people) use analogies to shed light on unfamiliar territories. This happens 
in private conceptualisation when scientists are problem solving in solitude but also within 
so-called trading zones, where experts exchange ideas on their respective areas of research. 
According to Gorman: " ... tacit representations are frequent sources of misunderstandings 
in multidisciplinary trading zones.” (Gorman, 2005, p.293). Gorman’s comments are borne 
out by Dr. Lawson’s experiences. In the latter part of his career, Dr. Lawson said he: 
“attended numerous workshops on emerging concepts and ideas, where there was 
plenty of controversy and argument; I noted particularly how those with different 
backgrounds and different nationalities had different ways of thinking about things.
(For example ‘why does this effect occur?’ -  1) ‘because the direction of flow has 
changed’ 2) ‘because the third term in the equation is now larger than the second’ -  
both true but not necessarily clear to all parties!” 181 
I will now discuss the particular techniques employed by Dr. Lawson to conceptualise and 
communicate his research.
181 Dr. Lawson, in his March 2003 letter to Ciara Muldoon.
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8.3 Conceptualisation & Communication Techniques Used by Dr. 
Lawson in his Work.
In a paper entitled, “Telling Tales: Models, Stories and Meanings’ Bissell and Dillon 
(2000, p.6) note that: the engineering emphasis is not on solving the equations at all,
but in gaining insight about the system.” They explain that:
“Over the years, practicing engineers have developed a range of ingenious tools, 
techniques and insights to move them away from having to deal with the mathematics 
directly. While the language of mathematics focuses on ‘solving equations’, 
engineering techniques often focus on interpretative understanding of graphical 
representations of the same information.” (ibid. p. 10)
Dr. Lawson’s first degree was in mechanical sciences. Thus it is not surprising that to gain 
insight, Dr. Lawson frequently used techniques such as simplification, limiting case 
analysis, graphical representations of data and analogical reasoning. For example, during 
our first interview, Dr. Lawson explained his general approach to problem solving, saying: 
“Often, I think, it’s better to go back to the physics, and look at the essentials, and in 
fact, solve a problem that is easier than the one that we want to solve but it’s the same 
nature... I’m not one for emphasising rigour in the early development stages of a 
subject. In fact, I think the more we keep away from rigour, the better it is. And this 
joke about a calculation... ‘assume a spherical elephant’... well, I would approve of 
that...Very often you can see, rather simply, that this is not a profitable way of 
going... ” (Dr. Lawson, during an interview of 15-01-2004).
Such techniques are typical of physicists and engineers. In fact, the ‘assume a spherical 
elephant’ approach to problem solving has become stereotypical o f physicists and 
engineers! This point is made in the following humorous anecdote (attributed to Adam 
Katalsky, New Scientist, 19-26 December 1992) shown on the following page. 182
182It was quoted by David Gooding at a workshop on Cognitive Studies o f Science and Technology that was 
held at the University of Virginia in March 2001, in order to highlight the different disciplinary approaches of 
researchers in this area. It appears in Gorman, Tweney, Gooding, & Kincannon, (eds), 2005, p.2
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A millionaire with a passion for horse racing offered a large prize — enough to buy a 
few Silicon Graphics machines — to anyone who could predict the outcome of any 
horse race. Three scientists took up the challenge, a physiologist, a geneticist and a 
theoretical physicist. One year later the three scientists announced their results. Here's 
what each reported:
The Physiologist: "I have analysed oxygen uptake, power to weight ratios, dietary 
intake and metabolic rates, but there are just too many variables. I am unable to 
predict which horse will win."
The Geneticist: "I have examined blood lines, breeding programs and all the form 
books, but there are just too many uncertainties. I cannot predict who will win any 
race".
The Physicist: "I have developed a theoretical model of the dynamics of horse racing, 
and have used it to write a computer program that will predict the outcome of any 
horse race to 7 decimal places. I claim the prize. But -- there is one proviso. The 
model is only valid for a perfectly spherical horse moving through a vacuum"
Although Dr. Lawson often used problem solving techniques characteristic of physicists 
and engineers, I believe it is necessary to explore the value he placed on using particular 
techniques in particular contexts, e.g. in private conceptualisation and when 
communicating with experts and intermediates.
In his introductory letter to me (of March 2003), Dr. Lawson explained: “I am great 
enthusiast for analogies since I think pictorially and not mathematically.” In our second 
interview, when asked to comment, from his recollections, on the tools, techniques and 
problem solving strategies that he used in his work, Dr. Lawson replied:
“... Often if there’s a complicated problem that you don’t quite know how to tackle, 
the thing is to invent a simpler problem of the same class, which you think you can 
tackle. And then that’ll perhaps give you some insights into the overall problem that 
you can look at it again and decide on your strategy... ” (Dr. Lawson during our 
telephone conversation of 22-03-2204)
Thus, having carried out a detailed analysis of a large faction of Dr. Lawson’s work, I have 
concluded that Dr. Lawson often used analogy to acquire insights in private 
conceptualisation. He also used analogy in a second context: to provide his colleagues with 
insights and thereby facilitate communication between sub-cultures o f physicists and
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engineers. In fact he told me: I used to regard myself as a translator. .. ” 183 of
‘languages’, notations and ideas at physics workshops and conferences. As mentioned in 
chapter 7, Dr. Lawson drew analogies between many sub-fields in order to provide a 
synthesis of perspectives. For example, in the conclusion o f one paper, where he draws 
analogy between an ion beam and a drifting gas, he says:
“A synthesis of viewpoints deriving from optics, thermodynamics and hydrodynamics 
has been demonstrated... Such interdisciplinary viewpoints are valuable, first in 
providing an insight into the essential nature and behaviour of beams, and second, 
particularly in the field of very intense and ring beams, in facilitating communications 
between workers in different subdivisions of this varied and fascinating field.” 
(Lawson, J.D., 1978,p.222)
By providing a synthesis of viewpoints, Dr. Lawson enables researchers to reconcile their 
differing perspectives, and thereby achieve a richer understanding of the nature of the topic 
being investigated. This is analogous to Gruber and Shel’s shadow box experiment. 
(Gruber, 1985). Here observers see a different projection o f an object in a box. One sees a 
triangle, the other a circle. Initially each doubts the accuracy of the other’s observations 
and challenges the other’s competence. After clarifying communications, they reconcile 
their differences through the realisation that the object in the shadow box is in fact a cone: 
the base of the cone is projected as a circle on one side o f the shadow box, while the 
curved side of the cone is projected as a  p la n a r  triangle on the other side of the shadow 
box. The key point is that without the ability to communicate their different perspectives -  
to say, “I see a triangle, what do you see?” “I see a circle. Are you sure it’s a triangle? 
Describe what it looks like” - they would not be able to reach a consensus and deduce that 
their conflicting observations were merely different perspectives. By using analogy and 
synthesis, Dr. Lawson acts as ‘translator’, facilitating communications between workers 
who ‘see’ things from a different perspective.
The concern with presenting scientific material to individuals having different modes 
of thought is not a new thing. In his address to the British Association in September 1870, 
Maxwell remarked upon the contrasting modes of thought amongst his contemporaries. On 
the one hand, he said, there are:
“... men who, when any relation or law, however complex, is put before them in a 
symbolical form, can grasp its full meaning as a relation among abstract quantities.
Such men sometimes treat with indifference the further statement that quantities 
actually exist in nature which fulfil this relation. The mental image of the concrete 
reality seems rather to disturb them.” (Maxwell, 1890, p. 220)
183 Dr. Lawson, during our telephone conversation on 22-March-2004
275
Chapter 8
On the other hand, there are:
others who feel more enjoyment in following geometrical forms, which they draw 
on paper, or build up in the empty space before them. Others again, are not content 
unless they can project their whole physical energies in to the scene which they 
conjure up. They learn at what a rate the planets rush through space, and they 
experience a delightful feeling of exhilaration. They calculate the forces with which 
the heavenly bodies pull at one another and they feel their own muscles straining with 
the effort..” (ibid.)
Maxwell suggested that:
“... for the sake of persons of these different types, scientific truth should be presented 
in different forms, and should be regarded as equally scientific, whether it appears in 
the robust form and the vivid colouring of a physical illustration, or in the tenuity and 
paleness of symbolical expression.” (ibid.)
As mentioned in sections 3.6 and 4.10, the approach proposed by Maxwell is 
frequently adopted by Prof. Berry in his papers, with positive results.
A range of instances in which Dr. Lawson uses analogy and synthesis to 
acquire insight and bridge divides between sub-fields of physics and engineering is 
presented in tables 8.1a, 8.1b, 8.2a and 8.2b. They are derived from analysis of 30 of 
his scientific papers and his book on “The Physics o f  Charged Particle Beams ” and 
presented chronologically, from 1950 to 1989. Highlighted and italicised text is 
derived from post-it note annotations which Dr. Lawson made on papers enclosed in 
his March 2003 letter to me. As tables 8.1a&b, 8.2a&b indicate, Dr. Lawson’s notion 
o f insight has some specific associated concepts: pictorial insight, illumination, 
physical insight, getting a feel for something, physical pictures, physical points of 
view, etc. This issue is discussed further in sections 8.4 and 8.5.
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ID Title of paper Use of analogy to acquire physical insight
1.
Wave Guides and Wave Mechanics: 
Some Similarities and Differences 
(1950)
“An understanding of a simple system may help one to acquire some insight into a more complicated or subtle 
system.”
2.
Cherenkov Radiation ‘Physical’ and 
‘Unphysical’, and its Relation to 
Radiation from an Accelerated 
Electron (1965)
“The value of this treatment lies in the insight which it gives into radiation phenomena; it adds nothing to the 
already adequate techniques for solving specific problems.”
“The physical picture is quite clear, as fin decreases through unity the Cherenkov radiation suddenly becomes 
unphysical, in just the same way as a refracted ray at the critical angle.”
3.
Analogous Behaviour of Elementary 
Particles And Some Simple 
Waveguide and Cavity Systems. 
(1965)
“Although it is not profitable to look for precise parallels to particular systems of elementary particles, some 
physical insight into the behaviour of these particles may nevertheless be obtained.”
“Although these analogies are essentially trivial, they are very striking and enable the non-specialist to get a 
‘feel’ for the way that elementary particles behave, in terms of well-known systems which are completely 
understood.”
“Analogies in which this correspondence is made are more restrictive in some respects but more illuminating in 
others.”
4. Some Attributes of Real and Virtual Photons (1970)
“an attempt is made to discuss some basic properties of photons from a physical point of view...”
“The calculation, which can generally be performed in several different ways, must be viewed as a whole; it is 
not possible in principle to make a measurement which gives a picture of what is ‘actually happening’ in a 
classical sense during the process.”
“with the object of giving a more physical and pictorial insight of the actual classical field structure (in terms 
familiar, for example, to a radio engineer), and further, of removing possible confusion between the two 
pictures.”
Table 8.1a: Excerpts from Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers and book highlighting his use of analogy to provide physical insight to experts in the fields 
of applied optics, plasma physics, nuclear physics, high energy and particle physics and astrophysics.
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ID Title of paper Use of analogy to acquire physical insight
5. The Ion Beam as a Drifting 
Gas (1978)
“A synthesis of viewpoints deriving from optics, thermodynamics and hydrodynamics has been 
demonstrated.. ..Such interdisciplinary viewpoints are valuable, first in providing an insight into the essential nature 
and behaviour of beams, and second, particularly in the field of very intense and ring beams, in facilitating 
communications between workers in different subdivisions of this varied and fascinating field.”
6. Particle-Photon Interactions (1989)
“.. .a consideration of the interaction between particles and fields in terms of photons, which may be virtual or real, 
does provide some interesting insights.”
“.. .a physical description based on the correspondence between energy and frequency, and between momentum and 
wavelength, does yield some interesting insights.”
“This paper is concerned not with presenting techniques for making calculations or solving problems, but rather 
introducing a physical viewpoint which enables the relation between a range of different phenomena to be seen.”
“An important feature has been an attempt to show that a discussion in terms of photons of topics normally treated 
classically can give new and perhaps helpful insights.”
7.
The Physics o f  Charged 
Particle Beams. (1988,2nd 
Ed.)
“Although some of the situations to be analysed are of little direct practical interest, they can be instructive in giving 
insights into the behaviour of more complex realistic systems.” (p. 104)
“the detailed behaviour of diodes and beams can only be studied by experiment and sophisticated computer 
modelling, though, of course, an analysis of idealized and simplified physical situations can often provide valuable 
insights.” (pi 13)
Table 8.1b: Excerpts from Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers and book highlighting his use of analogy to provide physical insight to experts in the 
fields of applied optics, plasma physics, nuclear physics, high energy and particle physics and astrophysics.
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ID Title of paper Use of analogy and synthesis to bridge sub-disciplinary boundaries in physics and engineering.
i
Note on the Angular 
Distribution of Radiation 
from Fairly Thin Targets 
Bombarded by High 
Energy Electrons (1952)
“At least four papers have appeared in recent years in which a calculation is made of the angular distribution of bremsstrahlung 
from targets sufficiently thin that ionisation loss and straggling are negligible but sufficiently thick that multiple scattering of the 
electrons is important.. .In no two of these is the expression obtained for the angular distribution the same, nor have the method of 
derivation and approximations used in the calculations always been clearly stated. This note is intended to clarify the position, by 
showing that there are two essentially different ways of carrying out the analysis, which lead to slightly different results.”
ii
On the classification of 





‘Unphysical’, and its 
Relation to Radiation 
from an Accelerated 
Electron (1965)
“The differences between Cherenkov radiation and bremsstrahlung are often emphasized; the unified treatment in this paper in 
which physical and unphysical phenomena are treated on an equal footing will perhaps be helpful in showing that there is a link 
between them.”
“This type of unification may be applied to other types of phenomena; the industrious reader will soon convince himself for 
example that a proton linear accelerator is an unphysical diffraction grating.”
iv
Diversity and Unity in 
Sources and Beams 
(1971)
“.. .languages and notations differ; people brought up in plasma physics, microwave tube and accelerator environments tend to use 
different descriptions and different groupings of fundamental constants...”
“Particular languages develop, and we suffer from the same problems that trouble the workers on that notoriously unsuccessful 
project, the tower of Babel.”
“our concern is with unification, and we shall quote the equation in what is intended to be its simplest and most universal form.” 
“what I have done is merely to collect together and display as a single exhibit a number of well tried old approaches.”
Table 8.2a: Examples from Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers and book highlighting his use of analogy and synthesis to bridge sub-disciplinary boundaries in 
the fields of applied optics, plasma physics, nuclear physics, high energy and particle physics and astrophysics.
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ID Title of paper Dr. Lawson’s use of analogy and synthesis to bridge sub-disciDlinary boundaries in Dhysics and engineering.
A
Emittance, Entropy And 
Information (1973) “Again concepts in different fields are fundamentally related. ”
B
Optical and hydrodynamical 
approaches to charged particle 
beams (1975)
“not an analogue, but two different view points -  which enable a richer appreciation o f  the fie ld  to be obtained. ”
C
/5
The Ion Beam as a Drifting Gas 
(1978)
“A synthesis of viewpoints deriving from optics, thermodynamics and hydrodynamics has been demonstrated.... Such 
interdisciplinary viewpoints are valuable, first in providing an insight into the essential nature and behaviour of beams, and 
second, particularly in the field of very intense and ring beams, in facilitating communications between workers in different 
subdivisions of this varied and fascinating field.”
D Lasers and Accelerators (1979) “Again — showing common features in two quite different technical devices. ”
E
A synthetic approach to some 
electromagnetic wave 
phenomena (1984)
“In this paper a unified viewpoint is sketched, the object of which is to show how a few underlying physical features are 
common to a number of phenomena which may not appear at first sight to be closely related. The aim is to present unifying 
physical insights rather than methods for solving problems, and to supplement rather than replace existing points of view.”
“Although its value in enabling detailed calculations to be made is limited, it can be of help in conceptual thinking which helps 





“Again a wide range ofphenomena looked at from a simple common viewpoint. (I was challenged to write a similar paper 
with only one equation!... ”
F
n
The Physics of Charged 
Particle Beams (1988,2nd Ed)
“In this monograph, the unity of things encountered in different contexts is emphasised and classification is in terms of physical 
features rather than application. A wide range of topics is surveyed... The approach is synthetic; simple examples are considered 
first, and the complications introduced gradually.”
Table 8.2b: Examples from Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers and book highlighting his use of analogy and synthesis to bridge sub-disciplinary boundaries in the 
fields of applied optics, plasma physics, nuclear physics, high energy and particle physics and astrophysics.
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8.4 Discussion of Examples from Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers and 
book highlighting his use of Analogy & Synthesis to Provide Insights
An example of Dr. Lawson’s use of analogy to provide physical and/or pictorial insight is 
illustrated in my figure 8.2, on the next page. The image, taken from his book on The 
Physics o f  Charged Particle Beams, shows two figures from Dr. Lawson’s book. In his 
figure 2.24 a biased pendulum provides an analogue of phase oscillations; and in his figure 
2.25 he uses a ‘wavy-slope’ analogue of phase motion, with particles being analogous to 
balls. Note that Dr. Lawson’s figures 2.24 and 2.25 are different types of representation: 
figure 2.24 is a depiction (depicting something that Dr. Lawson could have had experience 
of directly observing with the naked eye, and directly manipulating with his hands), while 
figure 2.25 is a symbolic representation of figure 2.24. When questioned in a follow-up 
letter, Dr. Lawson said he drew these figures himself, adding that: “Pictures similar to 2.24 
appear elsewhere. I don’t remember seeing fig 2.25 but it may be somewhere.” Recall from 
section Goodman’s (1976, p. 171) remarks that, “The mere presence or absence of letters 
or figures does not make the difference. What matters with a diagram, as with the face of 
an instrument, is how we are to read it.” Reading diagrams or labelled images involves the 
recognition of certain conventions that are learned as one requires expertise in the field. 
This example of analogy would fit within set C o f my venn diagram (section 5.5). The 
analogies have mathematical, physical and pictorial components. They have considerable 
systematicity, holding for a hierarchy of relations. They are intended to be useful for 
experts and intermediates. Note that intermediates may be third level students who are new 
to the discipline as a whole, or they may be researchers who have expertise in one branch 
of physics or engineering (e.g. optics) but not in another (e.g. plasma physics). In fact, Dr. 
Lawson said in the preface of the first edition of this book that although there exist many 
books which separately cover such subjects as electron optics, microwave tubes, particle 
accelerators, and plasma physics, his work is “perhaps unique in bringing together material 
from all these fields.” (1977, p. vii) His primary goal in his book & scientific papers is to 
bring diverse viewpoints together in order to facilitate cross-fertilisation of ideas. (See 
especially table 8.2a, examples i and iv, and table 8.2b examples C and E).
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Figure 8.2 Example o f analogy from Dr. Lawson’s book, 1989, 2nd Edition, pp. 92-93
In the accompanying text Dr. Lawson goes on to say that:
“An even better analogue is a horizontal modulated surface in a horizontal plane 
accelerated at a rate (27tgH/A.)sincps, where g is the acceleration due to gravity and the 
wavelength A, increases adiabatically during the acceleration. The more important 
characteristics of the motion can be seen immediately from these analogues.” (1988,
P-91)
His use of the term “seen” suggests insight, illumination, clarity, visualizability etc. This 
fits with the popular conception that there is a sudden visual clarity associated with insight. 
When discussing insight we often mention flashes o f insight, mental illumination, 
enlightenment, clarity, lucidity, picturability, seeing the solution in the minds eye, and so 
on. In a sense this very notion of connecting insight with visual clarity is itself an analogy. 
For instance, after studying the infamous scientific insights o f Archimedes, Poincare et al., 
Rene Taton wrote in 1962 that “the study of various types o f invention and discovery has 
shown us that after a long effort of reflection and research a discovery will suddenly flash 
into the mind of the research worker by means of a sudden illumination, the so-called 
Geistesblizt.” (Taton, 1962, p .74). Geistesblist is German for ‘spirit lightning’. In the 
experience of theoretical physicist Fritjof Capra: “During these periods o f relaxation after
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concentrated intellectual activity, the intuitive mind seems to take over and can produce the 
sudden, clarifying insights which give so much joy and delight to scientific research.” 
(Capra, 1992, p.39).
In section 1.6,1 discussed the importance of tacit knowledge in science, particularly 
experimental science which relies on fingertip knowledge when building and testing 
equipment. I asked to what extent does one acquire insights by incorporating culturally 
acquired, tacit, kinaesthetic knowledge into physical analogies. For example, Gooding 
(2004b) has discussed how: “Faraday’s detailed records o f his laboratory work show how 
visualisation works in conjunction with sensorimotor awareness (proprioception or 
kinaesthetic awareness) to produce representations whose cognitive (generative) and social 
(communicative) functions are inextricably linked.” (Gooding, 2004b, p.7) An analysis of 
Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers suggests that experiential, tacit knowledge can be an 
important component of physical insight.
For example of Dr. Laswon’s use of analogy to provide physical and pictorial 
insights appears in a 1965 paper which deals with "Analogous Behaviour o f  Elementary 
Particles And Some Simple Waveguide and Cavity Systems. ” Here, Dr. Lawson et al 
emphasise that: “Although these analogies are essentially trivial, they are very striking and 
enable the non-specialist to get a ‘feel’ for the way that elementary particles behave, in 
terms of well-known systems which are completely understood.” (See table 8.1a, #3). 
Lawson’s comments are in line with Bissell & Dillon’s comments about modelling 
(discussed in section 1.9). According to Bissell & Dillon, “intuition is important -  
successful modellers often have a surprisingly well-developed ‘feel’ for the type of model 
likely to be successful in given circumstances.” (2000, p. 10). One could argue that this 
‘feel’ is not particularly surprising considering that the education of engineers and 
physicists includes training in how to approach problems. Kuhn (1962) said that such 
‘exemplars’ enable scientists to see new puzzles in terms o f familiar puzzles and thereby 
extrapolate possible solutions. In fact, this problem solving technique has become 
stereotypical of the physicist and engineer. As we saw with the “assume a spherical 
horse/cow/elephant” joke in section 8.4, the misuse o f the ‘exemplar’ approach to problem 
solving is often lampooned.
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Another example indicating that tacit knowledge is an important component o f physical 
insight appears in al970 paper, in which Dr. Lawson discusses Some Attributes o f  Real and 
Virtual Photons, (see table 8.1a, #4). Here, he says the objective is to give: “a more 
physical and pictorial insight of the actual classical field structure (in terms familiar, for 
example, to a radio engineer), and further, of removing possible confusion between the two 
pictures.” (1970, p.575). Recall that Dr. Lawson’s early training at TRE Malvern was as a 
radio engineer (see section 7.3.3). He did not have a particularly solid formal education in 
mathematics. He learned what he needed on the job, surrounded by some of the best 
physicists in the country. Although Dr. Lawson is an enthusiast for employing 
mathematical, physical and pictorial analogies to conceptualise and communicate physics, 
he is keen to highlight the limitations of analogical reasoning. In his 1965 paper which 
deals with “Analogous Behaviour o f Elementary Particles And Some Simple Waveguide 
and Cavity Systems” he says:
“When making analogies one must always be careful not to push them too far... It 
should be observed too that there are different ways in which analogies can be drawn.
In this paper there is no correspondence between the spatial coordinates o f  the 
waveguides and the spatial coordinates o f the elementary particles. Analogies in 
which this correspondence is made are more restrictive in some respects but more 
illuminating in others...” (Lawson, 1965, p. 738)
Thus, as discussed in 6.12, when reasoning by analogy one must push the positive 
analogies as far as possible and avoid being misled by the neutral and negative analogies.
The notion of getting “a ‘feel’ for the way that elementary particles behave” is also 
mentioned in Dr. Lawson’s book (1988, p.351). In figure 8.3 on the next page, I show two 
tables from his book: table 6.3 is a symbolic representation o f “transverse filamentary 
waves on a focused beam”; table 6.4 illustrates “transverse filamentary waves in an axial 
magnetic field.” As you can see, Dr. Lawson sketches the rotation o f the particles within a 
classificatory system that includes (a) direction of helix; (b) rotation frequency; (c) wave 
velocity; and (d) type of wave. He then deepens the physical and pictorial insight by 
drawing an analogy to a garden hose, noting: “these synchronous waves are similar to 
those obtainable from a garden hose by rotating the nozzle either in clockwise or anti­
clockwise at constant frequency.” (1988, p351).
Bissell and Dillon (2000, p. 10) tell us that the language used by engineers “is more
than just a handy way of coping with the mathematics” it “indicates a way of thinking
about systems behaviour in which the features of the models are deeply linked to the
systems they are describing.” (ibid.) For example, they say that from the perspective of
many electronic engineers: “the poles effectively cease to be just convenient visualisations
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of mathematical complex variable theory and become system features which are just as 
real as the electronic components from which the system was built.” (ibid) They note that 
this represents a different ontology, where “the system poles are not simply part of 
convenient mathematical model, they are what cause the system to behave as it does, as if 
they had the tangible existence of the physical components and measurable signals present 
in a system.” (ibid.) Thus from an engineering standpoint, “this language is an important 
way not only of representing important aspects of system’s behaviour, but also of 
explaining how that behaviour comes about.” (ibid.)
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Figure 8.3: Example o f  physical analogy from Dr. Lawson’s book, The 
Physics o f  Charged Particle Beams, 1989, 2nd Edition, pp. 350-351
The concept of ‘physical insight’ remains somewhat vague. How does physics insight 
differ from pictorial insight? Does the tangible or tacit facet equate with the ‘physical’ 
while the ‘illumination’ facet equates with the ‘insight’. Does acquiring insight mean 
achieving a ‘clear view’ of something, while acquiring ‘physical insight’ means achieving 
a ‘clear view’ plus a tacit ‘feel’ for something? I will address this issue in section 8.5.
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8.5 How do physical & pictorial insight differ in Dr. Lawson’s view?
After analysing his book and 30 of his scientific papers it was clear that Dr. Lawson 
attaches particular importance to gaining physical and pictorial insights in physics. But 
what does Dr. Lawson mean by insight, physical insight and pictorial insight? How do they 
differ? In what contexts did he seek to acquire only pictorial insight? In what contexts did 
he seek to acquire both pictorial and physical insight? To what extent does it depend on his 
previous experiences: on his theoretical understanding, visual memories and tactile 
experiences? I put these questions to Dr. Lawson in a follow-up questionnaire (on 04-10- 
2004). He provided me with the following definitions:
Insight: “Seeing connections between two situations which are not obviously related.
This helps to form a network of situations which aids new thinking.”
- (This fits the following examples: table 8.1a, #1; table 8.1b, #5, #6)
Physical Insight: “A deeper insight than normal, suggesting relation to other physical 
phenomena that one understands.”
- (This fits the following examples: table 8.1a, #3).
Pictorial Insight: “Pictorial when one visualizes the situation in such a way that there 
is an actual detailed picture in the mind, The two terms overlap slightly.”
- (This fits the following examples: table 8.1a, #4).
So is it possible to have physical insight without a visual representation? David Gooding
believes so. He tells me that it is,
“likely that as our verbal abilities develop, we transfer the representational ‘work’
from models and images onto more abstract forms, or onto language. This is how
Maxwell ceased to rely on the mechanical models of aether, and was happy to ‘think’
just with the mathematics. But I suspect Thomson couldn’t make this shift -  so he
rejected quaternions when Maxwell embraced them.” (Gooding, in private
communication, May 2005)
When I spoke with Dr. Lawson by telephone in March 200 4 ,1 asked him exactly what he
meant by “insight” or “physical insight” in the context o f his Waveguides and Wave
Mechanics paper. Specifically, I asked Dr. Lawson whether it is “possible, to have physical
insight without a visual representation, either internally (inside your head), or externally (in
a sketch or something).” Dr. Lawson responded saying:
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“Yes, well, I don’t know. I suppose in quantum theory - - I’ve always found High 
Energy Physics and these mathematical things which rely on starting off with 
Lagrangians and things of this sort - - which is of course the formal way to do it - - but 
since I never was educated in that direction, I always find this sort of thing difficult 
and so I have to invent my own way of thinking about particular problems. Just seeing 
how certain problems seem to be related in one way or another.” (Dr. Lawson, by 
phone, 22-03-2004).
This refers back to Dr. Lawson’s holistic or big-picture tendencies and his skills at 
synthesising and unifying disparate areas of research and presenting his colleagues with a 
more unified view. From the above examples, one could argue that Dr. Lawson’s 
approach was in some ways similar to Faraday’s: for both men, intelligibility of a process
1 Si •equated with ‘picturability ’ of that process . There is supporting evidence for this 
hypothesis. For example, in his letter to me of 24-02-2004, Dr. Lawson said (unprompted): 
“I had a Faraday-type approach where most of my colleagues were Maxwell like.” When 
Dr. Lawson was asked (during a telephone conversation of 22-03-2004) to elaborate on 
what he meant by having a “Faraday-type approach”, he identified with Faraday’s 
educational background in particular, saying that he was:
“very much a sort of Faraday-style man - - of course Faraday had very little - - well 
he sort of worked up from a lowly position and educated himself on the way didn’t 
he?
Ciara: Yeah, as a book-binder.
Dr. Lawson: I wasn’t quite like that, but I certainly didn’t have a degree in physics to 
start with. I did a degree in engineering... you have your feet on the ground a bit more 
if you’re an engineer... ”
When asked, in a subsequent questionnaire (04-10-2005), to what extent his ability to 
acquire physical or pictorial insight depended on his previous experiences: on his 
theoretical understanding, visual memories, fingertip/tacit knowledge, Dr. Lawson said: 
“most of my physics was self-taught, and is full of short-cuts and unorthodox analogy 
type connections. By going a strange route I often arrived before those that worked in 
a more formal and orthodox way (cf. Faraday and others?)... ”
As mentioned in section 1.1, Faraday’s motto was: “IIfau t savoir de manipuler, ” i.e. “It is 
necessary to know how to handle/manipulate, "(cf. Tweney, 1985, p. 196; Gooding, 
forthcoming in 2006, p. 5 of 24). The data thus suggests that, like Faraday, not only does 
Dr. Lawson seek a clear view of things, i.e. picturability or visualizability, he also seeks
184Gooding’s studies on the work o f  Michael Faraday lead him to conclude that: “To Faraday, the 
intelligibility o f  a process often depended on achieving a ‘clear v iew ’ o f  it. Thus, intelligibility meant 
picturability.” (Gooding, 1992, p. 143).
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tactility or tangibility, i.e. getting a ‘feel’ for what he is dealing with. This is almost 
certainly on account of Dr. Lawson’s training as a radio engineer: a 'backroom boy ’ who
IOC
has experience of (physically) tinkering with equipment and had his “feet on the ground 
a bit more,” as Dr. Lawson put it.
Bissell & Dillon tell us that: “simple... non-mathematical models... have led to 
engineers talking a language very different from that o f conventional mathematics: a 
remarkably concrete language.” (2000, p. 10) In the case o f Dr. Lawson, this is a language 
built upon physical and pictorial insights gained through analogical reasoning. He is a 
visualiser who uses sense-based concepts, not a producer o f visualisable (math-based) 
representations as some questionnaire respondents quoted in section 3.5 were. For 
example, Phys_160, Phys_214 and Phys_198, who all raise concepts to a higher level of 
abstraction so that they visualise the mathematical structure not the physical entities to 
which they supposedly refer.
8.6 Conclusions
As we saw in chapter 7, Dr. Lawson had little formal physics education. He had an 
unconventional (2-year) wartime degree in the mechanical sciences with a strong 
engineering component. In particular he studied electrical engineering and radio, as a 
preparation for radiolocation (radar) research. He said he learned what he needed on the 
job surrounded by some of the best physicists and engineers in the country: first at TRE 
Malvern in the 1940s, then at Harwell in the 1950s, then at the Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory in the 60s, 70s and 80s. Informal communication methods were encouraged at 
TRE in particular in order to facilitate quick problem solving (a matter of life and death 
during wartime). Because of this particular educational and research background Dr. 
Lawson often used unorthodox ‘short-cuts’ when problem solving. He found analogical 
reasoning to be a particularly useful conceptualisation and communication technique. Dr. 
Lawson employed: (i) physical and mathematical analogies with medium to high level 
systematicity, drawn from within the field of engineering (e.g. a biased pendulum provides 
an analogue of phase oscillations); (ii) pictorial and physical analogues with medium level 
systematicity, not confined to the field of engineering (e.g. water bag analogy to explain 
diffusion of a gas; cocktail mixing analogy to explain entropy). He employed these forms 
of analogy to good effect in his private conceptualisations to acquire physical and pictorial
185 Dr. Lawson told me during a telephone conversation of 13-01-2005, “.. .1 was working partly outside - - 




insights for himself and when communicating with his peers in formal and informal setting 
to provide them with the same insights.
It would seem that for Dr. Lawson, acquiring pictorial insight means achieving a 
‘clear view’ of something (as in Faraday’s case), while acquiring ‘physical insight’ means 
achieving a ‘clear view’ plus a tacit ‘feel’ for something. This focus on tacit or kinaesthetic 
knowledge is almost certainly derived from Dr. Lawson’s practically orientated research 
background. He said that the engineering component of his research background kept his 
feet firmly on the ground. As a result of his early experiences at TRE Malvern and Harwell 
he was acutely aware of the practical limitations when designing and building accelerators. 
In fact he became extremely well-renowned for his ability to critically assess concepts that 
people put forward and offer practical advice in the area of accelerator design.
The sociologist of science, Peter Galison (1997, p.781) contends that it is 
precisely the disunification of science that brings strength and stability.” I agree that 
specialisation is vital for in-depth explorations in any domain. It allows sub-cultures of 
scientists to form, which have common languages of thought. Diverse specialisms bring 
strength and stability because they allow researchers in respective sub-disciplines to 
develop distinctive methodologies and terminologies: specialised and efficient ways of 
doing and presenting their research. My own studies also support Galison’s (1997) view 
that sub-cultures of physicists and engineers communicate through developing ‘contact 
languages’. I argue that analogy and synthesis are important components of these ‘contact 
languages’. I support this claim through the case study of an engineer-physicist who 
employs analogy, firstly as a problem solving tool in his own work -  to acquire insight for 
himself, and secondly to facilitate communications between sub-cultures of physicists 
involved in particle physics during the 60s, 70s and 80s. Analogy acts as a bridge between 
knowledge bases. The visual and kinaesthetic dimensions o f analogy provide researchers in 
these different sub-fields with physical and pictorial insight. In this way Dr. Lawson acts as 
a translator, crossing boarders and bridging conceptual (or ‘linguistic’) divides between 
sub-cultures of physicists and engineers.
Dr. Lawson’s unique research background was a vital component in his ability to 
act as a translator. The nature of his work meant that he was encouraged to explore four or 
five separate sub-fields o f physics and engineering (applied optics, nuclear physics, plasma 
physics, high energy particle physics, and to a lesser extent astrophysics). This gave him a 
very broad viewpoint. These different perspectives enabled him to draw analogies between 
the underlying physics of these sub-fields, allowing for a cross-fertilisation of ideas. So, 
although he has always found it hard to get a mental picture o f the physical processes
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involved in his research, his experiences in a range o f sub-disciplines has allowed him to 
develop a richer, fuller picture over time. I believe that translators like Dr. Lawson play an 
important role in enabling sub-cultures of physicists and engineers to communicate and 
‘spark off new ideas’. From my Venn diagram in figure 5.3, the analogies used by Dr. 
Lawson fall within sets B and C. One could even sub-divide set C into sub-sets o f experts. 
I suggest the skills of ‘translators’ like Dr. Lawson (e.g. their experience of using physical 
and pictorial analogies to offer insights to their peers) could be drawn upon by science 
communicators and science educationalists when ‘translating’ science to intermediates and 
novices too. They could use the skills o f ‘translator’ physicists to generate ‘good analogies’ 
for use in set A as well as sets B and C. As I discuss in chapter 9, my research findings 
provide a good foundation for such a collaborative project.
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9.0 Findings, Implications and Suggested Future Projects
In this final chapter I will recap on the four groups of research questions set out in chapter 
1. As I have addressed each of these research questions in chapters 3-8, in this chapter I 
will focus on the most interesting findings and show that they fill several knowledge gaps 
in the literature. I believe that my findings have implications for several groups interested 
in conceptualisation and communication, including practicing physicists, science 
communicators, science educationalists, cognitive scientists and philosophers interested in 
abduction and model-based reasoning. I also suggest some in-depth follow-up studies 
which could be carried out by building upon my initial broad-ranging research findings.
9.1 Group 1 Research Questions: Visualisation.
As I discussed in chapter 1, detailed case-studies by researchers in the fields of history, 
philosophy and psychology of science (e.g. Gooding, Gorman, Gruber, Miller, Nersessian, 
Tweney etc.) have investigated scientists’ personal difficulties in visualising aspects of 
their work, and personal techniques to over-come their visualisation difficulties. However, 
I found no broad-ranging quantitative accounts in the literature of the degree to which 
contemporary physicists find it difficult to get a mental picture o f the physical processes 
involved in their research, nor of the types of techniques they report using to overcome 
difficulties they may have. Thus, 1 used the on-line questionnaire, follow-up e-mail 
exchanges and semi-structured interview with Prof. Berry to investigate the following 
research questions:
■ To what extent do a sample o f  physicists experience difficulties getting a mental 
picture o f  the physical processes involved in their research?
■ What reasons do they give fo r  having/not having these difficulties?
■ Where physicists do have difficulty visualizing the physical processes involved in 
their research, how do they overcome this?
9.1.1 Visualisation Difficulties
Although 3.6% of questionnaire respondents indicated that they have difficulty getting a 
mental picture of the physical processes involved in their research “7/all the time” (mostly 
on account of the highly abstract nature of their subject matter), a majority of the 225 
physicists who responded to my on-line questionnaire were successful at overcoming their 
visualization difficulties through personal or communal strategies. Respondents mentioned 
using computer simulations, sketches, physical models that they can manipulate in their
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hands, mathematical analogies, physical analogies and pictorial analogies, or constructing 
mental pictures of mathematical structures rather than visualising the physical entities to 
which they supposedly refer. As I discussed in section 3.3, my findings on the techniques 
used by practicing physicists to overcome their visualisation difficulties have parallels with 
the findings o f cognitive scientists such as Goel (1995) and Suwa, Gero, and Purcell (1999) 
on the visualisation techniques used by designers. Both groups use freehand sketches as a 
means of exploring newly formed conceptions. This process of externalising vague 
conceptions and playing with their spatial arrangements often offers clues on how to 
proceed. Similarly, my findings are in line with other studies in the field of cognitive 
psychology that suggest that peer collaboration is important to problem solving and that 
verbalising one’s thoughts enhances one’s problem solving abilities (e.g. Vygotsky, 1934, 
Chi, 1996).
9.1.2 Visual and Kinaesthetic Thinking in Science: Past and Present
I noted, in section 1.1, that Root-Bemstein (1985) posed an interesting question: “to what 
extent visual imagination is dependent or independent of the kinaesthetic skills of drawing 
or modelling.” (p.63) I remarked that Gregory’s (2001) work on the design of interactive 
science centre exhibits highlights the importance of kinaesthetic skills and active touch 
exploration in Teaming to see’, and Gooding’s (1992b, 1994, 2006) historical case study 
of Faraday’s laboratory notebooks showed that fingertip knowledge gained through sheer 
persistence was instrumental in helping Faraday leam about the world. Several respondents 
who replied to the on-line questionnaire indicated that kinaesthetic skills of drawing and 
modeling were important facets of their visualization techniques. As discussed in section 
3.8, I pursued this line of investigation in follow up e-mail correspondence with Phys_2, 
Phys_27, and Phys_91. These exchanges showed that the kinaesthetic skills of drawing 
and modelling - constructing physical models that one can see and touch and rotate in 
one’s hands - were an important part of these physicists’ visualization techniques. It is 
unclear to what extent these important skills are formally taught to physicists. Some 
physicists appear to develop these skills themselves prior to or in conjunction with their 
formal physics education. I suggest that all physics students should be formally taught to 
generate analogies, build mental and physical models and leam some basic drawing and 
drafting techniques (like those learned by some physics students and most engineering and 
architectural students) to strengthen their tacit and visual skills.
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9.1.3 Visualisation Versus Visualizability: Past and Present
In section 1.1 I discussed visual thinking in science, drawing on key cases from the history 
of science. I noted that Einstein was a particularly visual thinker and that the visual images 
in his thought experiments were often drawn from the world of sense perceptions. I 
contrasted this with the approach of Heisenberg who sought “visualizability (visual images 
generated from scientific theories) and not visualization (visual images abstracted from 
phenomena we have witnessed in the world of perceptions.” (Miller, 2000, p. 310). My 
questionnaire data revealed that in areas where classical physics predominates, many 
contemporary physicists adopt Einstein’s characteristic mode o f thought, based on visual 
images abstracted from phenomena that they have witnessed in the world of perceptions. 
They gain insights by employing mathematical, physical and pictorial analogies and 
performing thought experiments. For example, in section 3.7 I quote Phys_54 as saying 
that: “In trying to do something really new, I go for that old method of Einstein, the 
Gedankenexperiment. I try to picture something visually in terms of things I believe 
correspond to measurements, and then think my way through it.” In contrast, in highly 
theoretical areas, at the forefront of research, many respondents said that they often 
abandon attempts to form mental pictures of the physical processes involved in their 
research and instead raise concepts to higher levels of abstraction and visualise the form of 
the equations representing the objects under investigation. For example, Phys_214, (a 24 
year old, male PhD student) finds it quite difficult to get a mental picture of the physical 
processes involved in his research, because he deals with “quantum phenomena that do not 
always have classical counterparts.” To overcome these difficulties he says he must: 
“Raise concepts to a higher level of abstraction so that I visualise the form of the theory 
rather than the form of the objects involved.” Certain areas like high-energy physics have 
developed a very powerful graphical language that fuses mathematical intuition with visual 
imagery. Many physicists said that this helps them create the mental picture of the physical 
processes involved. Thus, my broad-ranging findings on the visualisation techniques used 
by contemporary physicists have parallels with accounts from the history of science, e.g. 
Holton (1978), Miller (1984, 2000).
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9.2 Group 2 Research Questions: Computer Simulations
As discussed in sections 1.9 and 1.10 although Morgan and Morrison (1999), Hughes 
(1999), Winsberg (1999) et al discuss the use of computer simulations in science, there are 
few quantitative studies indicating the extent to which physicists, o f different backgrounds, 
use computer simulations as visualisation tools. Thus, I devised several research questions 
which would go some way towards filling knowledge gaps in this area. I used the on-line 
questionnaire, follow-up e-mail exchanges with 13 questionnaire respondents, and 
interview with Prof. Berry to investigate the following novel research questions:
■ To what extent do these physicists employ computer simulations to help them 
visualise things?
■ In what contexts do these physicists employ computer simulations?
■ What reasons do these physicists provide fo r not using computer simulations in their 
research?
■ Do these physicists believe that computer simulations have strengthened physicists ’ 
visualization capabilities (a) in their own research area? (b) in physics in general?
■ What do these physicists believe are the possible disadvantages o f  employing 
computer simulations in research?
■ Can computer simulations provide physicists with insights when conceptualising and 
communicating physics?
9.2.1 The Contexts in which Respondents Find Computer Simulations Useful.
As I showed in section 4.1, there was a skew towards using computer simulations as 
visualization tools, with 48.2% of the sample selecting between “5” and “7/all the time” 
on the 7-point scale which ran from “never/1 -  2 -  3 -  4 — 5 - 6  -  7/all the time”. In 
section 4.2 I presented examples offered by questionnaire respondents which ranged from 
visualizing complex geometries and interactions on nano-scales to those on giga-scales. 
For example, Phys_201 said: “I use visualisation software to look at the atomic 
arrangements within crystal structures” while Phys_21 said he simulates: “jets of gas from 
young stars - this helps enormously in understanding, particularly when coupled with 
animations of the results.” Simulations are particularly useful when dealing with things 
that are difficult or impossible to physically manipulate. Thus, they are also used to design 
equipment and to explore the evolution of systems when subjected to a variety of boundary 
conditions. The broad range of contexts in which contemporary physicists find computer 
simulations useful was quite surprising. Examples o f scientists’ use of computer 
simulations to ‘model reality’ have been given by others. For example, in his paper,
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“Modelling Reality with Supercomputers” Catlow (1996) includes 28 snapshots showing 
the visual outputs generated by computer simulations, primarily in the field of atomic 
physics. However, my survey is unique in gathering quantitative data from practicing 
physicists on the extent to which they use computer simulations to help them visualise 
things, and qualitative data providing a range of contexts in which practicing physicists 
find computer simulations useful in their research.
9.2.2 Computer Simulations: Strengthening Physicists Visualisation Capabilities?
In section 1.10 I noted that the mathematician and educator Walter Whiteley (1992, web 
ref) has written on the importance of teaching students to see like a mathematician and 
underscores the value of computer software packages in this endeavour. Computer scientist 
and educational psychologist Barbara White (1993) and her ThinkerTools Research group 
also believe that computer simulations have their place in the classroom in helping students 
to conceptualise force and motion. According to artificial intelligence researchers 
Chandrasekran & Narayanan (1992, p.30): “Prior exposure [to diagrams and other kinds of 
images] can lead to perceptual fluency in recognition and classification.” As a result of 
such findings, I was interested to survey practicing physicists to discover if they believed 
that computer simulations have strengthened physicists’ visualisation capabilities. I 
believed that my questionnaire respondents would have a unique perspective as student, 
teacher and researcher, as many lecture or tutor at university level and all have all been 
students at some point. As I showed in section 4.1, a majority of questionnaire respondents 
felt that computer simulations “definitely have” helped strengthen physicists’ visualization 
capabilities both in their own research area (51.6%) and in physics in general (52.5%). 
In their experience computer simulations are particularly useful for: (i) producing visual 
representations of complex geometries, which would be extremely difficult to mentally 
visualize; (ii) following the time evolution of complex systems; (iii) visualising the 
solutions of complex equations in graphical form.
The comments and examples presented in section 4.7 suggest that computer 
simulations do provide many physicists with useful insights even when their configurations 
may be unlikely. For example in a cosmological seeing, simulations are used to build 
simpler analytic models that are useful in making quantitative predictions about the 
implications of e.g. cosmic strings. When used in conjunction with formal mathematical 
analysis, computer simulations can provide physicists with insights which deepen their 
theoretical understanding. For example, Prof. Berry often made use o f the generative 
power of computer simulations and used them to fine tune his geometrical intuition to a
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point where he had achieved conceptual fluency in navigating through abstract spaces 
constructed in his mind. However, many respondents were keen to emphasise that 
computer simulations offer little or no physical or theoretical insight if  they are used as 
‘black boxes’ where the user has little knowledge of the internal predictability of the model 
or the mathematical foundations upon which the model is built. I believe that my survey 
findings should be of interest to practicing physicists, and science educators who conduct 
work on the usefulness of computer simulations in ‘teaching to see’.
Computer simulations are also particularly useful as a means of marketing physics: 
enlisting support from funding bodies, peers, and the general public by making good 
science look good. As we saw in chapter 4, Prof. Sir Michael Berry is acutely aware of the 
communicative power o f his colourful pictures from the quantum world. He uses them to 
good effect when disseminating his work to audiences o f experts, intermediates and 
novices. However he is also aware that the immediacy of his pictures may lead some non­
experts to think that the pictures of abstract mathematical things are un-adulterated pictures 
of phenomena that exist in the physical world. Prof. Berry therefore uses artificial colours 
to prevent people from interpreting his pictures literally. Thus, my research has highlighted 
the fact that computer simulations are powerful discovery tools which must be used 
cautiously, informed by studies of this kind that draw on practitioners’ own experiences of 
what works and what doesn’t work.
9.2.3 The possible disadvantages of using computer simulations reveals 
interesting philosophical stances amongst respondents.
When pressed for the disadvantages of employing computer simulations in research 18 
questionnaire respondents drew attention to the reality status o f computer simulations. 
Respondents said that the models underlying the computer simulations should constantly 
be matched with experimental data. The experimental data in turn should be tailored to the 
computer models in order to test their internal predictive ability. However, on the whole, 
the majority of physicists seemed to be concerned with speed, efficiency, usability, 
empirical reliability and empirical adequacy. As I discussed in section 4.6.4, my survey 
data fit with the views expressed by Morgan and Morrison (1999) and Koponen (2006) -  
that most physicists are concerned with empirical reliability and predictive power of 
computer models and simulations rather than whether they accurately map onto reality.
As I discussed in section 4.5.4 many respondents remarked that it was in fact very 
difficult to distinguish between the use of computer simulations to solve problems and the 
use of computer simulations for the purpose of visualisation. For example, Phys_160, a
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Reader in Theoretical Physics, said that, “it is probably impossible to distinguish 
meaningfully between (a) computations which produce the desired answers, conveniently 
presented in a visual format, and (b) the use of computer graphics to aid visualization. I 
think the two things are inextricably linked.” My review of literature in the fields of 
history, philosophy, psychology or sociology of science suggests that there are no broad- 
ranging accounts of practicing physicists’ views on the use of computer simulations as 
visualisation tools and/or tools of brute force calculation and the philosophical implications 
of this. Thus, I hope that philosophers of science will use my data as a starting point and 
explore these issues in more depth than was practicable within the scope and time of my 
project.
9.3 Group 3 Research Questions: Analogy
The second group of research questions I focused on related to physicists’ use of analogy 
to conceptualise and communicate physics. Using the large-scale on-line survey and 
follow-up e-mail exchanges with a select sample of these respondents, I addressed the 
following research questions:
□ To what extent these physicists employ analogy in their research?
□ What reasons do these physicists give fo r  not employing analogy in their research?
□ To what extent do these physicists generate original analogies in their research?
□ To what extent do physicists use analogy when communicating with different 
audiences?
□ What forms o f  analogy do they use in different contexts?
□ What are the characteristics o f a good analogy?
9.3.1 To what extent these physicists employ analogy in their research?
The use o f analogy in research was widespread among the physicists who responded to the 
on-line questionnaire. 52 respondents (23.1% of the sample) indicated that they use 
analogy “7/all the time” in their research. This is over three times as many as those that 
claimed to “never/1” use analogy in research. However, my research has shown that there 
are numerous and complex factors at play in physicists’ use of analogy in scientific 
research.
A particularly interesting finding was that there was no unanimous definition of 
what constitutes analogy. Some physicists appeared to hold a narrow interpretation of 
analogy, which excluded formal mathematical analogies. This may be because the term 
“analogy” is usually associated with textbook physics or popular science books. (In fact the
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term metaphor was specifically avoided as it had poetic associations for many pilot study 
respondents). Phys_185 said: “What I use is often stronger than analogies, in that the 
underlying mathematical description is the same or similar in the first approximation. For 
example, harmonic waves appear all over the place in very different physical situations.” 
However, many other physicists referred to harmonic waves and LCR circuits as 
exemplary analogies. I found these results somewhat surprising, as e.g. cognitive 
scientists’ research on analogy has not emphasised this ambiguity of meaning amongst 
scientific experts who employ analogy on a daily basis. Acknowledging the ambiguity in 
the way expert physicists interpret the term ‘analogy’ may go some way towards 
understanding why some physicists are enthusiastic about the use of analogy to 
conceptualise and communicate physics while others disapprove of it.
The reasons given by respondents for not using analogy in research fell into four 
main categories: (i) they didn’t need to use analogy because their work was already easy to 
visualise, (ii) analogies were too difficult to formulate because their subject matter was 
highly abstract, (iii) analogies only seem appropriate for non-specialist audiences, (iv) 
analogies are overly simplistic and can be misleading. Although analogies can be 
particularly useful when dealing with concepts far beyond perceptual experience, such 
analogies can be misleading if taken too far. Therefore it is not surprising that some 
questionnaire respondents were overtly wary of analogy, saying it was overly simplistic 
and misleading to be o f use to them. However, one should consider the possibility that 
these physicists may not have been thinking of analogy in the sense of abstract 
mathematical analogies that other respondents mentioned using in their research. Instead 
they may have been thinking of analogy in a simplistic sense, as it is often used in popular 
science books for example.
9.3.2 To what extent do these physicists generate original analogies in their research?
As I mentioned in section 0.1, the scientific enterprise requires physicists to retrospectively 
reconstruct events to convey a logical, deductive approach to problem solving and 
experimentation. As a result, analogies which may have been useful tools of 
conceptualisation in the early stages of theory building rarely appear in scientific papers. 
Thus, I was interested to survey physicists on the extent to which they generate original 
analogies in private conceptualisation and informal communication with peers. As 
discussed in section 5.4, 61.8% of respondents selected in the 5-7 range regarding the 
degree to which they use analogy in research. However, regarding the degree to which they 
generate original analogies, almost the same percentage o f respondents selected from the
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opposite end of the 7-point scale, with 60.8% selecting in the 1-3 range (and 82.2% 
selected between 1 and 4). This suggests that a majority o f respondents are aware that they 
mostly use an existing stockpile of tried and tested analogies rather than generating 
original ones. As mentioned in section 5.4, this finding fits with research by cognitive 
scientists such as Holyoak and Thagard (1995) and historians of science such as Nersessian 
(1995) who suggest that constructing analogies is cognitively more complex than using 
analogies.
A particularly novel finding related to the use of original analogies in research was 
the apparent censorship of creative language by some American Institute of Physics 
journals. This is related to the issue of reasoning by analogy because it is a consequence of 
journals requiring physicists to retrospectively present their work in a logical, deductive 
manner, editing out the creative insights and playful associations which led them to their 
discoveries. For example, as discussed in chapter 5, Prof. Sir Michael Berry coined the 
term “diabolical po in t” and used it to good effect in the titles of his public lectures to 
pique the listeners’ curiosity and make the topic more memorable. The term “diabolical 
p o in t” has been embraced by his peers, however the rules and conventions of Physical 
Review Letters prevent him from using the same creative language when communicating 
with his peers in this journal. It seems unfortunate that Prof. Berry’s attempts to 
disseminate his ideas in an engaging and enlightening manner are thwarted by some 
physics journals with misguided notions of conceptual and linguistic purity. I believe that 
some physics journals should to be more open to the creative use of language (including 
analogies) in order to make for more engaging reading.
9.3.3 On the forms of analogy used in different contexts.
A remarkable 147 examples of analogies were provided by questionnaire respondents. 
From analysis of the on-line questionnaire data, the follow-up e-mail exchanges and 
interviews I can conclude that the complexities of analogies varies according to the context 
o f use. Analogies on the simple end of the scale are common in (i) popularisations of 
science (e.g. one physicist compared quanta of energy in a quantum mechanical system to 
cents of euro in a monetary system in order to convey the quantization of energy to 
novices), and (ii) playful exploration of new ideas (e.g. Phys_134’s mental image of a 
stadium helped him describe properties of DO-branes interactions). Analogies on the 
complex end of the scale are too sophisticated for physics novices to understand but are 
used by many physicists in their journal articles and conference talks. They are formal, 
mathematical analogies containing a high degree o f isomorphism, i.e. there is a one-to-one
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correspondence between the structures at a certain level o f abstraction (e.g. “to regard the 
exact renormalization group as a continuum analogue of blocking on a lattice.” Phys_170). 
In the middle of the scale are analogies that combine aspects of both simple and complex 
analogies. They are highly idealised, have a certain degree of isomorphism, and have 
pictorial and/or physical features. They have a heuristic function and are used by experts 
and intermediates to extend existing knowledge into a new domain. The historical analogy 
between the flow of heat and the flow of electric charge is one such analogy. It has 
physical and pictorial components: both systems can be visualized as incompressible fluids 
flowing within channels. Consequently the mechanisms which bring about the phenomena 
in the analogous systems can be compared and contrasted. It also has a certain degree of 
systematicity -  as the analogy does not break down when taken beyond surface similarity. 
My findings are in line with those of Dunbar (1999) and Comelis (2000) in that analogies 
can be used to solve problems (design and fix experiments and formulate hypotheses) by 
transferring methodological approaches or comparing relational features between theories. 
Comelis (2000) suggests a distinctive role for inter-disciplinary analogies as problem 
solvers and intra-disciplinary analogies as corollary generators in physics. I noted in 
chapter 1 that this distinction does not appear to be reflected in Dunbar’s (1999) studies in 
the field of biology. I can conclude here that Comelis’ distinction is not clearly apparent in 
my data either. However, my research does provide supporting evidence for Nersessian’s 
assertion that: “ ... analogies are not ‘merely’ guides to thinking, with logical inferencing 
actually solving the problem, but analogies themselves do the inferential work and 
generate the problem solution.” (1992a, p.20, italics in the original).
9.3.4 Factors which influence physicists’ use of analogy when communicating with 
different audiences.
In section 6.2 I noted that the Bakthinian notion of ‘addressivity’ (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 95- 
96) was a useful theoretical lens through which to view my data. I discovered that the 
majority of respondents attempt to take into account the “apperceptive background” of 
their audience in order to make their topic ‘accessible’. The two most significant factors to 
influence respondents’ use of analogy when communicating with different groups were the 
physics expertise o f  their target audience and tone o f  the discussion. Even though their 
target audience may have considerable expertise, when the context is informal and 
physicists are creatively playing with ideas in a relaxed setting, a much broader range of 
analogies are used. This ranges from analogies having well-established, underlying 
mathematical structure, to simple, playful analogies which break down if  taken beyond
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surface similarity. When the context is more formal, physicists tend to avoid the playful 
analogies, employing only analogies with a well-established underlying mathematical 
structure; what Phys_127 termed, “rock solid analogies.” Avoidance o f analogy in formal 
settings is more common amongst young physicists who wish to be taken seriously by 
their peers and superiors, and consequently adopt a formal, dignified tone. Those who have 
already established themselves as noteworthy physicists can afford to be more flippant in 
formal settings because they have nothing to prove. However, with a high-ranking position 
comes a responsibility not to mislead their audience by using overly simplistic analogies. 
Thus, respondents will either use fewer analogies or more complex analogies as their 
audience’s physics expertise increases, because they do not wish to present an over­
simplified view to those with considerable expertise. As a consequence, it is those who are 
least able to evaluate the merits of an analogy that are most likely to have analogy used on 
them. However, I argue in section 6.7 the group most at risk o f misunderstanding 
analogies, adopting a naive interpretation of analogies or failing to see the limits of 
analogies are secondary and tertiary level students. These intermediates are encouraged 
to use simplified models and analogies on a regular basis in their formal education in order 
to solve specified problems. Once assimilated, the models and analogies become part of 
their conceptual toolkit. As a result of their practicality they are taken by many to be 
realistic, ‘for all intents and purposes’, and may even cease to be regarded as ‘analogies’. 
We know from Spiro et al’s (1989) research that even when the disanalogies are made 
explicit to medical students, many still hold erroneous assumptions, misled by 
connotations of non-technical descriptive language.
9.3.5 Mapping from a commonplace source to a specialised target
A finding which I believe will be of particular interest to science educationalists, was on
the issue of ‘mapping’. The examples of original analogies offered by Phys_63 and 
Phys_193 in section 5.4.1 are similar to what Dunbar (2001) would call long-distance 
analogies, where the scientist maps from a commonplace source domain (a snickers bar or 
a cheese sandwich) to a more specialised target domain (a bar-shaped galaxy or a parallel 
plate resonator). This kind of mapping allows one to remember a key point in a very 
simple way. It acts a scaffolding or framework with which to build one’s theory or explain 
one’s concept. I believe that original analogies which feature physically possible but 
implausible situations may be less likely to mislead novices. For example, firing positrons 
from a particle accelerator is often likened to firing little blue balls from a gun. To the eyes 
of a novice, there is significant literal similarity between the source domain (little blue
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balls being fired from a gun) and target domain (positrons being fired from an accelerator). 
Without proper guidance, some novices are misled into thinking that positrons ‘really are’ 
little blue balls. Instead of comparing positrons to inanimate objects like little blue balls, 
Professor Paul Coleman’s playful explanation of positron surface interactions compares 
positrons to chickens. In follow-up e-mails, Prof. Coleman explained that he “doodled” the 
Dazed Chicken Model during a “far from interesting” conference talk. He said:
“My intent was to have some fun and to lighten what was a very boring time. But the 
sketch has since amused many of my colleagues in positron physics, and I am now 
using it in a short presentation to potential students and their parents on UCAS 
admissions days in the Department.”
The entertaining verbal analogy and accompanying sketch are easily visualised and 
extremely accessible for physics novices. Professor Coleman’s analogy also contains little 
literal similarity (thus novices are not misled into thinking that positrons are literally 
similar to chickens, or that an atomic lattice is literally similar to a forest of evenly spaced 
trees) but contains considerable systematicity: There is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the elements of the source and target domains for a hierarchy of relations. This 
ranges from non-literal relations between the source and target on a physical or pictorial 
level (e.g. chickens being like positrons), down to mathematical relations that exist on a 
deeper structural level (e.g. the shape of the ravine could be thought of as a mathematical 
function relating to a potential well in which positrons can be trapped near a solid surface). 
The physical picture attached to the physically possible but implausible source can thus be 
used as a bridge to understand the physics of positron surface interactions.
From my analysis o f the data presented in chapters 5 & 6 I can suggest that good 
analogies tend to have the following features: Good analogies that appear in set C of my 
venn diagram in section 5.5 are useful heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb) in problem solving 
and generative (i.e. suggesting new avenues to pursue through more rigorous analytical 
means). Good analogies that appear in the sets C and B o f my venn diagram hold for a 
hierarchy of relations (from the mathematical equations governing the system to the 
physical and pictorial expression of system features). Good analogies that appear in sets B 
and A, are easy to express (pictorially, verbally, symbolically) and are useful in different 
contexts (formal & informal settings; with experts, intermediates & novices). Analogies 
which span all three sets, A, B and C are often those whose origins can be traced back to 
eminent physicists. The same analogous idea can be used in different ways in different 
contexts. For example, as discussed in section 5.6.1, an analogous visualisation of loops 
and weaves is used by Rovelli (2003) to help Physics World readers conceptualise these
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highly abstract entities. However, at a conference of experts, Rovelli (2000) uses a 
humorous sketch of loops being woven into a jumper to highlight the fact that the 
analogous visualisation should not be taken too literally. The appropriateness of an 
analogy is highly dependent on the context of use: the formality of the occasion, the 
expertise of the audience and the main goals of the individual employing the analogy.
I believe that these findings will be of interest to practicing physicists interested in 
the forms of analogies used by their peers to conceptualise and communicate physics in 
different contexts and may also be of practical use to science educators. For example, my 
identification of the features of good analogies could be used in future research projects to 
devise a searchable databank of good analogies (see next section). This would will involve 
collaboration between practicing physicists with a flair for communicating with different 
audiences; science educators who have experience of students’ differing learning styles; 
and researchers like myself, who approach the area through the lenses of history, 
philosophy and psychology of science. Such a resource could then be used to train science 
students to use conceptualisation techniques similar to those used by practicing physicists -  
in particular, the use of playful analogies, structured so that they hold for a hierarchy of 
relations but are generative and expressed physically, pictorially and mathematically.
9.3.6 Possible Future Project: 50 Of The Best Models and Analogy for Use in 
Science Education
As mentioned at the outset, this project could be classified as ‘action research’. It is my 
hope that my research will be of use to practicing physicists and science educators 
interested in issues surrounding conceptualisation and communication in physics. I will 
make my thesis available to download on-line, via the website o f the Science Studies 
Centre, Department of Psychology, University of Bath and write a brief summary of the 
main findings of my research. I will put this summary on my website and broadcast it in 
the same way I broadcast my on-line questionnaire: via popular science magazines such as 
Physics World (with whom I have worked in the past) and by e-mailing the 3,200 
physicists based at universities in the UK whose e-mail addresses are stored in a mailing 
list I constructed in 2003. I will also create a new mailing list containing physicists 
specifically involved with the science education branch of the Institute o f Physics.
I will encourage debate on my main findings and ask physicists to e-mail me with 
their favourite models and analogies for use with students in secondary and tertiary levels 
of education. Over the following year, I will compile these models and analogies and 
devise a methodology by which to evaluate their effectiveness. This methodology will
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involve collaboration between practicing physicists, science educators and science 
students. Funding permitting, I will carry out this research and produce a searchable on­
line database of 50 of the best models and analogies for use in science education. This will 
be searchable by keywords such as “electrostatics”, “magnetism”, “nuclear”, etc. It is my 
hope that this resource will be valuable to science educators around the world. To avoid 
copyright infringement, I will give credit to the physicists who provided me with their 
descriptions of these models and analogies, and set up a research fund to which people may 
voluntarily contribute if they find the resource useful.
9.4 Group 4 Research Questions: Case Study of a Physicist-Engineer
I used the findings of the large-scale survey to guide my case-study investigations. I 
addressed the following research questions:
□ To what extent did the case study respondent (Dr. Lawson) experience difficulties 
getting a mental picture o f  the physical processes in his research?
□ What reasons were given by Dr. Lawson fo r  having/not having difficulty?
□ How did educational, professional, cultural, historical, etc. aspects impact on Dr. 
Lawson’s approach to problem solving?
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to acquire and promote insight?
□ How does physical insight differ from pictorial insight in Dr. Lawson’s view?
□ To what extent did Dr. Lawson use analogy to bridge sub-disciplinary boundaries?
□ What types o f  analogies did Dr. Lawson employ in this context? I.e. were they 
within domain or between mappings, physical, pictorial, mathematical etc.
9.4.1 The Use of Analogy To Provide Physical and Pictorial Insights
My own studies support Galison’s (1997) view that sub-cultures o f physicists and 
engineers communicate through developing ‘contact languages’. I argue that analogy and 
synthesis are important components of these ‘contact languages’. I support this claim with 
the findings o f my survey of 225 physicists from across the physics community and 
particularly with the findings of my case study of Dr. J.D. Lawson, a retired engineer- 
physicist who employed analogy: (i) as a problem solving tool in his own work -  to 
acquire insight for himself; and (ii) to facilitate communications between sub-cultures of 
physicists involved in the physics of charged particle beams during the 50s, 60s, 70s and 
80s. I argue that analogy acts as a bridge between knowledge bases. The visual and 
kinaesthetic dimensions of analogy provide researchers in these different sub-fields with 
physical and pictorial insight. This can be: (a) pictorial insight, i.e. creating mental pictures
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of physical phenomena or of mathematical structures; (b) physical insight, i.e. helping one 
to get a ‘feel’ for how a system behaves by giving it a tacit, kinaesthetic component. The 
research backgrounds of physicists who employ analogy in this way can be an important 
factor. Certain branches of physics appear to be more open to analogical reasoning than 
others. For example, J.D. Lawson’s unique research background was a vital component in 
his ability to act as a translator. His penchant for analogical reasoning was almost certainly 
a result of his working environment at Malvern, Harwell and the Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory. The nature o f his work meant that he had the opportunity to explore five 
separate sub-fields of physics, giving him a particularly broad viewpoint. These different 
perspectives enabled him to draw analogies between these sub-fields, allowing for a cross- 
fertilisation of ideas and techniques. He was often invited to give the opening or summing 
up talk at conferences in the hope that his ability to bring together the disparate sub­
branches would spark off new approaches.
In conclusion, my research clearly shows that analogical reasoning is an important 
model-based reasoning technique used by many physicists to (i) bridge conceptual divides 
between, experts and novices, scientists from different disciplines, and even specialists 
within the physics community; (ii) ‘promote’ their research, i.e. to make their research 
accessible and memorable to peers, funding bodies, prospective students, and the general 
public, thereby enlisting support.
9.5 Inadequate Operationalization or Genuine Sub-Cultural 
Differences?
One of the first interesting elements to emerge from the on-line questionnaire data was the 
fact that respondents’ had different interpretations o f terms such as analogy, visualization, 
and computer simulation. As discussed in chapter 2, although this usually indicates 
inadequate operationalization186 in the design of a questionnaire, it was in fact a conscious 
decision to give no definitions of these terms. I reasoned that allowing physicists to 
interpret the terms for themselves, to discover what e.g. computer simulation means to 
them, might highlight trends in interpretation across the physics community. At the very 
least it would help to develop a nuanced classification o f the terms. This method proved 
quite successful. The initial discoveries from the on-line questionnaire could be taken on 
board and pursued further in the other strands of the project (e.g. the follow-up e-mail
186 “Operationalization refers to the rules we use to link the language of theory (concepts) to the language of 
research (indicators).” Rose, D. & Sullivan, O. (1996) “Introducing Data Analysis for Social Scientists”
2nd edition. Open University Press, p. 13
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exchanges, in-depth interviews and the case study) and the distinctions and subtleties 
teased out. Thus, this issue highlighted the strength of the overall design of the project. By 
moving between large-scale survey data and small-scale case study data, a more detailed 
and colourful map of the territories under investigation could be drawn.
Differences o f interpretation of terms like ‘analogy’ and ‘computer simulation’ 
revealed some physicists’ hidden preferences for one way of reasoning and dislike for 
other, “simplistic”, ways of reasoning. These differences o f interpretation also revealed 
‘sub-cultural’ differences: while there are no definite boundaries between experimental 
physics, theoretical physics, computational physics, and mathematical physics, with many 
physicists frequently moving between these domains, some physicists saw significant 
differences between so-called ‘experimentalists’ and ‘theorists’. For example, when asked: 
“Q4. In your research, do you ever use computer simulations to help you visualise 
things?” Phys_19, a Professor of Theoretical Physics, selected ((7/All the tim e” from the 
7-point scale which ranged from ”1/never” to “7/All the tim e” and when asked in Q4b to 
supply an example, he replied animatedly:
“I detest the word 'simulation': this is an experimentalist's derogatory description of 
modelling, algebra, analysis, numerical analysis, computational physics, computer 
programming, checking, testing etc etc. I effect theoretical and computational physics
187calculations as a large part of my research job (Personal Chair)”
In the Additional Comments section of the questionnaire he further stressed the apparent 
divide between experimentalists and theorists saying that:
“The average Experimental Physicist, in my experience knows very little mathematics.
On the other hand, it is sufficient that I understand the import and the limitations of 
experiments.” (Phys_19)
Meanwhile, a physicist near the other side of the divide, Phys_9, a lecturer in Physics & 
Astronomy, explained that the visualization difficulties he occasionally experiences are 
mainly due to the fact that:
“Theoreticians generally don't present their work in a suitably ‘visual’ sense. It can be 
hard to visualise equations into their physical meaning without adequate diagrams 
etc.” (Phys_9)188
The comments of Phys_165,759 an advanced research fellow, involved in particle physics, 
touched on several the sub-disciplinary or sub-cultural differences in the field of physics.
187 Phys_19: A 60 year old, male, Professor of Theoretical Physics, whose research interests include, 
“Atomic,molecular and optical and condensed-matter physics,occasionally nuclear. Notablyihevy-particle 
collision theory,Wannier above & below theshold phenomena and ferromagnetism,including fractals.”
188 Phys_9, a 32 year old, male, Contract Lecturer in Physics and Astronomy, whose research interests 
include: Astrophysics; Image Processing; Imaging Instrumentation; and Data Mining,
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He said it was important to recognise that there was a distinction between pure science and 
applied science; between experimentalists and theorists; between mathematical analogies 
and physical analogies; between internal, mental visualizations and external visualizations, 
generated by computers or when sketching by hand; and lastly between visualization and 
simulation. Consequently, the questions were likely to be interpreted differently depending 
on the physicists’ research background, training, research interests etc. He wrote:
“It is hard to formulate the same questions when dealing with applied and pure 
science, with theoretical and experimental studies. Maybe one should have different 
sets of questions for these target groups. For instance I do many 
‘Gedankenexperimente’ and also ‘computer experiments’ (i.e. simulation) but 
experimentalists mean quite different things when they use this word. So I found some 
questions hard to answer. Analogy and visualisation are also two completely different 
things. Working in theory I always see analogy because the mathematics is the same 
even when physics might look differently. Then there is visualisation which can either 
be mental (I tend to think very graphically, others more algebraically etc), computer 
visualisation or just sketching pictures. Last the use of computers in ‘visualisation’ 
and ‘simulation’ should probably be seen as quite separate hats.” (Phys_165)
The discovery of these subtle sub-cultural perspectives is very interesting and worthy of 
further investigation.
9.5.1 Possible Future Project: Exploring the preferred modes of communication of 
sub-cultures of physicists.
To further explore the sub-cultural differences which emerged in my PhD work, one could 
select a sample of 100 physicists, representing different ‘sub-cultures’ of physics. The 
database of 225 respondents of the on-line questionnaire could prove useful for selecting 
these physicists. The group would be given a selection of scientific papers and popular 
science articles spanning a 100-year period. These papers would use graphical 
representations, mathematical analogies, physical analogies, pictorial analogies, and 
creative language to varying degrees. The group would be asked to comment, for example, 
on the papers’ intelligibility and rigour, as well as the stylistic features they particularly 
liked or disliked. The comments would be both qualitative and quantitative. For example, 
they could quantitatively select from a 5-point scale, ranging from “extremely 
unintelligible” to “extremely intelligible” and then explain their selection qualitatively by 
giving a textual reply via e-mail, or a verbal reply via telephone or in person. There would 
be a policy of anonymity or confidentiality with regard to specific responses, but
189 Phys_165, a 36 year old, male, advanced research fellow, whose research interests include, Particle 
Physics, Computational Physics, Hadron Physics, Lattice Gauge Theories, QCD.
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permission would be sought to acknowledge all respondents in aggregate, by a listing of 
their names and institutions. These physicists would know that their peer reviews would 
not be passed onto the editor of a specific journal with characteristic conventions and 
norms. Thus, they could give a more frank account of what they themselves think about the 
papers. This would give a better understanding of the characteristics that are valued across 
sub-cultures of physics (e.g. proof through rigorous, abstract mathematical content; 
exemplification or comparison through use of pictorial or physical expressions). One could 
explore whether papers which cut across disciplinary boundaries rely on pictorial and 
physical modes o f expression to a greater extent than papers which deal with subject matter 
which is confined to a single branch of research. This study would provide a better 
understanding of the modes of communication preferred by sub-cultures of physicists.
9.5.2 Possible Future Project: Observation of Photonics Crystal Fibre Team
Much of a physicist’s knowledge is tacit and therefore difficult to elicit through 
questionnaires or interviews (See Collins, 1982). Utilising the approach o f psychologists 
such as Dunbar (1995) and Klahr (2002) and of sociologists and anthropologists such as 
Latour (1987), Traweek (1988) and Forsythe (1993), one could observe physicists in 
action. This would involve sitting in on lab meetings, and recording discussions between 
physicists to obtain observational evidence of the use of analogies and visualization in 
intra-group communication. In their studies of changes in the representation of visual 
scientific data, Trickett, Fu, Schunn & Trafton (2000, p.959) focused on pairs of scientists 
rather than an individual scientists because in their view:
“dyads produce speech naturally as part of their data analysis activities. By contrast, 
focusing on an individual scientist to give think-aloud protocol may change the very 
representation that we seek to study. For example, the individual scientist may change 
her focus to aspects of the data that are more easily verbalized, or she may change her 
representations from visio-spatial representations to more verbal representations.”
Key members o f the Photonics Crystal Fibre (PCF) team, an innovative group working 
within the University of Bath’s Physics Department, could be taken as a case study. For 
example, one could focus in particular on Prof. Jonathan Knight and Prof. Philip Russell. 
The PCF team work in both an academic and an industrial environment, which would 
provide a useful contrast and comparison to the case study.190
190 Incidentally, Phillip Russell and J.D. Lawson have both, independently, been awarded the 
Thomas Young Medal from the Physical Society for the work they have done in optics, Russell in 
2004 and Lawson in 1985.
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9.6 Implications of Main Findings And Concluding Comments.
As I have mentioned on several occasions in this chapter, the insights gained from my 
research should be of interest to practicing physicists interested in the way their peers 
conceptualise and communicate physics, cognitive scientists and philosophers of science 
interested in model-based reasoning in science, and educators wishing to promote similar 
model-based reasoning skills among physics students (particularly at secondary and 
tertiary levels of education). In particular, I hope that my findings regarding the features of 
‘good’ analogies may be useful to science educators when devising or evaluating the likely 
efficacy of an analogy.
As Feist and Gorman’s (1998) Structural Equation Model (shown in fig. 1.1) indicates, 
innumerable factors influence scientific thinking. One may look at it from a number of 
perspectives: developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, social psychology, etc. My 
interdisciplinary research project was not intended to make law-like generalisations about 
scientific thinking (as psychologists often do), nor to give strict definitions of terms like 
analogy, visualisation or computer simulation (as philosophers often do). My main aims 
were:
(i) to identify knowledge gaps by surveying literature in diverse but (to my mind) 
inter-related fields like history & philosophy of science, cognitive science, 
sociology of science, science education, literary theory, design studies, etc.
(ii) to explore these novel questions using innovative data gathering methods which 
combine some of the most useful methodological approaches from these diverse 
but inter-related fields, given the time and funding available;
(iii) to produce interesting findings which go some way towards filling these 
knowledge gaps and which spark off further studies by researchers in a variety 
of related fields.
The positive feedback I have received from historians of science, philosophers of science, 
cognitive scientists and science educationalists, after presenting my data at 
interdisciplinary conferences in the UK and abroad, suggests to me that I have achieved 
these main aims. I am confident that this broad-ranging, interdisciplinary study will 
catalyse further, more in-depth studies in future, and have a useful impact in fields 
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T ye, 1984; 
B lock , 1981; 
Dennett, 1981; 
R ollins, 1989; 
M otzkin, 2002;
“The issues for representation are then two: first, the prim acy o f  perception in form ing  
representations, and second the question o f  the existence o f  m ental im ages. O ne can have a 
perceptual theory o f  representation w ithout having an im agistic one, one can have a non- 
perceptual theory o f  representation, but it is not clear that one can have an im agistic theory o f  
representation w ithout having a perceptual one.” (M otzkin, 2002. p .206)
P sycholog ica l data
Shepherd and M etzler, 1971; 
M etzler and Shepard, 1974; 
Paivio, 1977;
K osslyn , 1980, 1981, 1983; 
K osslyn  and Pomerantz, 
1981;
Pylyshyn, 1981;
Finke and Pinker, 1982; 
Shepard, 1982;
Shepard and Cooper, 1982; 
K olers & Brown, 1984; 
Finke, Pinker & Farah, 1989;
Reference: H ow  does an im age refer to the im aged object?
Cognitive Architecture: D o there exist cogn itive structures and processes dedicated to 
processing visual information? Or are such processing handled by general purpose structures 
and procedures?
“This question seem s to be the primary focus o f  the picture/word processing literature (Kroll 
and Potter, 1984; Paivio, 1977; Potter, So, Eckart, and Feldm an, 1984; Snodgrass, 1984; 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980; Vanderwart, 1984). I think there are som e conceptual 
problem s w ith this literature and refer the reader to K olers and B row n (1984) for an 
interesting critique.” (G oel, 1995, p. 183)
Format: D oes the processing o f  im ages involve:
(1) “ computations defined over geom etric data structures specified  in terms o f  points, 
vectors, surfaces, or volum es, w hich can support geom etric operations, such as rotation, 
translation, zoom ing, perspective transformations, and the like, or
(2) relational structural descriptions o f  som e kind (e.g . under [ball, table]), w hich  support 
log ica l inferences.” (G oel, 1995, p. 184)
N  europsychological 
data
Farah, 1989;
K osslyn , Alpert, Thom pson, 
M aljkovic, W eise, et al., 1993 
K osslyn , Thom pson, &  
Alpert, 1997;
Cognitive Architecture: D oes im agery utilize the sam e cognitive structures and processes, 
possib ly  even the sam e neural pathw ays, as the visual-perception system ?
(Finke and Shepherd, 1986; K osslyn  et al., 1993)
Computational
M odels
Schwartz and K osslyn , 1982; 
Funt, 1983;
G lasgow  and Papadias, 1992;
“Computational im agery involves tools and techniques for visual-spatial reasoning, where 
im ages are generated or recalled from long-term  m em ory and then manipulated, transformed, 
scanned associated w ith similar form s (constructing spatial analogies), pattern matched, 
increased or reduced in size, distorted, etc. A  primary goal o f  our approach to com putational 
imagery is to facilitate the retrieval o f  visual and spatial inform ation that w as not explicitly  
stored in long-term  mem ory. The im ages generated to retrieve this information may  
correspond to representations o f  real physical scenes or they m ay be abstract concepts that are 
manipulated in w ays similar to v isual form s.” (G lasgow  & Papadias 1992, p .356)
Table A l.l:  Brief Overview if literature related to Visual Imagery and Representation
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Topic Key Issue Specific Findings Author(s)
Representation Diagramm atic
R easoning
A ll necessary reasoning is diagrammatic Peirce, 1906, p. 314
In ternal: External D o  scientists “tend to think o f  their data in formal, d iscip line-specific terms, or do 
they rely on more informal and sim ple perceptual terms?”
Trickett, Fu„ Schunn & Trafton, 2000 , 
p.959
F o rm a l: Informal “The scientists initially represented expected findings in formal, scientific terms, 
w hereas they represented anom alies in informal terms. Over tim e, these 
representations shifted from informal to formal. W e propose that this shift in 
representation is the result o f  an increased understanding o f  the individual 
phenom ena, rather than o f  greater understanding o f  the data at a global leve l.”
Perceptual
fluency
“Prior exposure can lead to perceptual fluency in recognition and classification .” Chandrasekran & Narayanan, 1992;
sketching “Schon and W iggins (1992) argue that sketching plays an essential role in the 
conceptual design  process by evoking unexpected discoveries and through a process 
o f  reinterpretation. D esigners do not necessarily interpret design  sketches w ith the 
sam e m eanings, but reinterpret them  w ith new  m eanings. G oldschm idt (1991) calls  
this reinterpretation process a ‘seeing-as’ activity, w hile G oel (1995) calls it ‘lateral 
transformation’.” (K avakli, Suwa, Gero and Purcell, 1999, w eb ref.)
K avakli, Suwa, Gero and Purcell, 1999, 
w eb ref,
“drawing free hand sketches during conceptual design plays a crucial role in the birth 
o f  creative ideas. D esign  sketches serve as a m edium  through w hich  a designer m akes 
visual/spatial reasoning; a designer externalises n ew ly  form ed but still vague ideas in  
the form  o f  less rigid and ambiguous depictions on paper. B y  inspecting those  
externalised ideas, the designer finds useful clues to refm e them, w hich m otivates him  
or her to draw again. In Schon’s term inology, the designer is having a "reflective 
conversation w ith his or her idea" (1983).” Suwa, Gero, and Purcell, 1999;
Robbins, 1994;
Schon, 1983;
Banerji and Elmitt, 1994; 
G oel, 1995
Suw a, Gero and Purcell, 1999
Conceptualisation  
: C om m unication
The external representations that are best for d iscovery are not necessarily best for 
com m unication o f  the d iscovery to others.
Trickett, Schunn & Trafton, 2000 , p .959
Explanations in science &  
science education
Provide a typology o f  explanations, focusing on the notion o f  “appropriateness”; Gilbert & Boulter, 1998a, 1988b;
Speech Genres: A ddressivity - taking into account the apperceptive background o f  
o n e’s audience, i.e. the scope o f  the addressee’s specialised  know ledge.
F leck, 1935; 
Bakhtin, 1986; 
Harre, 1990;
B uilding on M artin’s (1972) system  o f  classification, Gilbert and Boulter (1988a) set 
out 5 m eanings for the term “an explanation” in science and science education:
(1) Intentional; (2 ) D escriptive: (3 ) Interpretive; (4 ) Causative; (5 ) Predictive.
Martin, 1972;
Gilbert & Boulter, 1998a, 1988b;
Table A1.2: Brief Overview of Literature relating to Representations and Explanations
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Topic Key Issue Specific Findings Author(s)
M odel-based  
reasoning  
researchers’ 
studies o f  
contemporary 
experts’ and 




em ploying  
metaphor and 
analogy
Creating and using analogies facilitates insight and scientific discovery; Clem ent, 1982;
Carbonell, 1983, 1986;
N ersessian, 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 2002 , 2003  
Gentner & Jeziorski, 1989;
V osniadou and Ortony, 1989;
Dunbar, 1995;
Bailer-Jones, 1999, 2002;
C om elis, 1999;
Dunbar & B lanchette, 2001;
show n that 
there are
The m ost successfu l labs make use o f  local, dom ain-specific analogies and 
heuristics
D u n b a r ,1995, 1 9 9 7 ,1 9 9 9 ;
“A  single metaphor is alw ays im perfect, but a set o f  metaphors all alm ost 
converging on the sam e target do illum inate and define it (Bergson, H., 
1912, p. 20 -2 1 ).” (Gruber, 1995, p .402)
Gruber, 1995
dow nsides to 
em ploying  
metaphor and 
analogy
People do not have the option to ignore the non-literal m eanings o f  
sentences. Instead, people seem  to process both the non-literal and the literal 
m eanings o f  sentences in the sam e way, and at the sam e time.
Glucksberg, G ileda & B ookin , 1982
It is better to provide people with descriptions o f  the m echanism s involved  
in a system  rather than analogies because p eop le tend to make wrong 
m appings m ore often than right mappings.
H alasz & Moran, 1982;
Sim ple analogies that help novices gain a preliminary grasp o f  difficult, 
com plex concepts m ay later becom e serious impediments to fuller and more 
correct understanding.
Spiro, F eltovich , C oulson, & A nderson, 1989;
Baroque tow er on a gothic base B lanco an d N iaz , 1998
“The creation o f  a profound analogy is unlikely to depend in preexisting  
rules that establish m appings betw een the source and target dom ains. The 
innovation indeed depends on the invention o f  such rules.” (Johnson-Laird, 
1989, p .327)
Johnson-Laird, 1989
Table A1.3: Brief Overview of Literature related to the use of metaphor and analogy in science
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D ifference betw een  
strong and w eak  
analogies
“The acceptance o f  a solution fo llow ing from a w eak analogy alw ays 
hinges on considerations that are independent from the a n a logy .. .[W hile] 
a solution obtained on the basis o f  a strong analogy m ay be justified  by  
sim ply referring to the corresponding fact in the source dom ain.” 
(M eheus, 2000 , p .26)
. .the com bination o f  am pliative and deductive steps may cause the 
reasoning process to be dynamical ” (M eheus, 2000 , p. 27)
M eheus, 2000;
Historical case  
studies are not 
intended to support 
general, cognitive  
theories about the 
processes at work. 
Instead they have  
shown:
inventors search in 
dual space
W right brothers made use o f  dual space Bradshaw, 1992
B ell made use o f  mental m odels and heuristics in the invention o f  the 
telephone
Gorman, 1995
importance o f  tacit 
knowledge
Faraday used a large repertoire o f  hands-on procedures, w hich  influenced  
his mental m odels
G ooding, 1985, 1990
Perceptionally based  
propositionally based
In physics, im agery and m etaphor have changed from being  
perceptionally based to being propositionally based A.I. M iller, 1989
U psides and 
dow nsides o f  
metaphor & analogy
U se o f  metaphor and analogy is critical to creation o f  scientific  
know ledge;
Dreistadt, 1968;
N ersessian, 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 2002 , 2003  
D eM ay, 1989;
Conceptual schem es can greatly inhibit the creation o f  new  know ledge. D eM ay, 1989;
C ognitive
N euroscientists’
studies o f  analogy  
indicate that certain  
areas o f  the brain are 
hardwired for 
analogical reasoning
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) m ay be specialized  for 
binding arguments to com plex mental representations.
Grafrnan, 1995;
Fuster, 1995;
R obin & H olyoak, 1995
A nalogical m apping m ay be an emergent special case o f  this general 
property o f  the DLPFC
Wharton, Grafrnan, Flitman, H anses, Bruner, 
Marks, & Honda, 2000;The left angular gyrus m ay be hardwired for analogical reasoning
A nalogical m apping is mediated by the left prefrontal and inferior parietal 
cortices
Table A1.4: Brief Overview of Literature relating to analogy
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A2.1 The following 9 pages contain a print out of my on-line 
questionnaire: http://www.bath.ac.uk/psvchology/research/phvsics.cfm 
Conceptualisation and communication in contemporary physics 
Introduction:
My name is Ciara Muldoon. I'm a PhD student at the Science Studies Centre, University of Bath, 
UK. I have a BSc in Experimental Physics and an MSc in Science Communication. I'm currently 
researching conceptualisation and communication in contemporary physics. Exploring this topic is 
extremely important, because as physics becomes increasingly specialised, the free flow of ideas, 
both across and within disciplines, needs to be actively maintained. Likewise, the bridge between 
researchers and the public must remain intact for physics to be appreciated.
UPDATE: 23 Jan 2004Many thanks to everyone who responded to this questionnaire between 
February
and June 2003. Some very interesting material has resulted from your comments and suggestions.
Preliminary analysis has revealed some interesting trends, but no conclusions can be drawn until
further, in-depth case-studies are performed. These are
currently underway and I hope to be able to provide you with some detailed
feedback in Spring/Summer 2006.
Best Wishes,
Ciara Muldoon






By taking the time (about 15 mins) to complete this questionnaire, you will be providing 
valuable insight into scientific reasoning and communication. Your contribution will, of course, 
be anonymised. The findings of my research should benefit the entire physics community as I 
aim to publish them in Physics World, New Scientist or similar publications.
If you would like confirmation of my aims, you may contact my supervisor Prof. David Gooding 
E-mail address: d.c.gooding@bath.ac.uk 
Home page: http://staff.bath.ac.uk/hssdcg
NB: you can use the Tab key to move from one field to the next. Shift + Tab will take you back 
to the previous field.
If you are on a modem connection, you can download a Word version of the form. (If you do 
not have Word you may require a Word document reader to open this file: Open Office - 
download, or Word viewer are available)
Appendix 2
Q. Would you like to receive feedback on the findings of this study?
1. Research Background.
Ql. What 3rd level qualifications do you hold?
Select one
Diploma: | Select onei 3
BSc: Select one 3
BEng: Select one 3
MSc. Select one 3




Other (Please state): Select one 3
Subject area (e.g. BSc in Experimental Physics, MSc 
in Opto-electronics, PhD in Astrophysics):
LdJ
Qla. With which of the following groups would you associate yourself?
Applied Optics:
Select one
Chemical Physics: Select one 3 3
Computational Physics: Select one








Condensed Matter and Materials Physics: 1
Select one 3
High Energy Particle Physics: 1
Select one
3 .









Other - please state here:
<1 1 3 ^
Q lb. What is your present job title, occupation or course of study?
JJ 3 d
^ . j Select one ▼
Qlc. Gender: ? — »
Q ld. Age: — I— I
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Qle. What are your present research interests? (Brief explanation; please include keywords, 
e.g. plasma, acoustics, opto-electronics, etc.)
2. Visualisation.
Q2. Do you ever find it difficult to get a mental picture of the various kinds of physical 
processes involved in your research?
The drop-down box contains a scale ranging from "never" to "all the time". Please select the
Select one ▼1
number that best suits your response. I —1
Q2b. Why do you think this is?
iJJ
Q2c. Where you do have difficulty, how do you overcome this?
fll
Q2d. How often do you visualise experiments which are:
(i) then physically performed
Select one
Select one
(ii) too expensive or technically difficult to physically perform
(iii) physically performable, but doing so would offer no further insight






Some physicists use analogy in their research.
- e.g. using a billiard ball model when considering the movement of charge through a solid;
- e.g. comparing ultrasonic transmission down a rod, to an electrical transmission line;
- e.g. comparing the vibrations of a 'cosmic string' to the vibrations of a guitar string;
- e.g. Schrodinger's equation is derived by using Hamilton's mathematically unified treatment of 
geometrical optics and analytical mechanics;
- e.g. Sheldon Glashow has remarked that he "was led to the group SU(2) x U(l) by analogy 
with the approximate isospin hypercharge group which characterises strong interactions".
Q3. Do you use analogies in your research? 1 —J
Q3b. If you do use analogies in your research, how often do you generate original
analogies? !
Q3c. If possible, can you offer an example of an analogy you use / have used in your 
research?






Q4. In your research, do you ever use computer simulations to help you visualize things?
Select one
Q4b. If so, can you please offer an example?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3




Q4d. Do you think that computer simulations have strengthened physicists' visualization 
capabilities:
In your own research area?
Select one
Select one
In physics in general?
Q4e. Can you please elaborate on your choice in Q4d above?
3!






Q5a. How often do you communicate physics to the following groups?
Colleagues (in your own research group)
Peers (from a competing research group)
matter physicist)
Scientists from a different discipline (e.g. biology, chemistry, geology, etc.)
Post-graduate students.
Graduate students who are considering doing a PhD in your research area.
Undergraduate students. 
The general public.
j Select one d
j Select one d
ng with a condensed
J Select one d
j Select one d
J Select one d
j Select one d
j Select one d
Select one ▼ j
Other: please state: 
Select one
Q5b. Do you ever use analogies when communicating physics with the following groups?
Colleagues (in your own research group)
Select one
Select one !]Peers (from a competing research group)
Physicists from a different branch (e.g. an astrophysicist communicating with a condensed
. . . .  Select one matter physicist)










Physics expertise of target audience.
Prestige of occasion. 
Nationality of (majority of) target audience.
J elect one d
J Select one d
J Select one d
j Select one d
Other: please state:
| Select one d
inicating with your
J Select one d
MSelect one d
j Select one d
Other: please state:
Select one
Q5d. Could you please elaborate on your responses to Q5c above?
Please type your brief elaboration in the cells below.
Physics expertise of target audience. 2 T
Prestige of occasion.




Q6. Would you be willing to offer additional insight on this topic, by corresponding with me
/• , ^ | Select one ▼ j(just on one or two occasions) in the future?» —*
Preferred method of communication: 
Contact details
Select one
Email address: I ?
Q7. Any additional comments are very welcome.
Additional comments (if any):
Thank you very much for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. Your kindness and 
patience are very much appreciated.
I will store contact details of all respondents, but anonymity will, of course, be guaranteed in the 
presentation of my findings.
Send email
Thank you again. ..................
End o f  Questionnaire.
A2.2 Summary of My Contact With Dr. John Lawson.
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2003: Dr. Lawson wrote to me on 25-03-2003 after seeing my ‘Letter to the Editor’ in 
Physics World (Vol. p. ). He enclosed 10 of his scientific papers (dating from 1950 to 
1989) with post-it note annotations regarding his use of analogy, and remarked that he had 
noticed, in the course of his long and varied career, how research background and 
nationality affected physicists’ use of analogy.
2003: I replied to Dr. Lawson on 04-04-2003, thanking him for his input. I explained that I 
was, at the time, in the process of analysing a large amount of questionnaire data and 
would like to carry out a case study of his work as a follow-up to this large-scale survey.
2004: On 15-01-2004 I visited Dr. Lawson at his residence. We carried out a 30-minute 
semi-structured interview and looked at his archive of published and unpublished notes.
2004: Dr. Lawson wrote to me concerning the issues surrounding Maxwell and Faraday’s 
differing backgrounds as detailed in John Gribbin’s book, Science: A History. He enclosed 
a photo-copy of the relevant passages.
2004: Having analysed Dr. Lawson’s scientific papers, book and the transcript of our first 
interview, I formulated a list o f pertinent questions and on 22-03-2004 conducted a 30- 
minute semi-structured telephone interview with Dr. Lawson in order to explore my 
hypotheses concerning the techniques he used to conceptualise and communicate physics.
2004: On 04-10-2004 Dr. Lawson returned a completed questionnaire sent by me on 15- 
08-2004. It details what he means by the term ‘insight’.
2004: I sent Dr. Lawson a questionnaire on 14-11-2004 concerning the contexts in which 
he found certain conceptualisation and communication tools useful and the atmosphere in 
which he worked. I ask that he give me his responses by telephone at some point.
2005: We carried out a semi-structured interview by telephone on 13-01-2005 exploring 
the issues raised in the questionnaire of 14-11-2004.
2006: On 07-Jan-2006 I sent Dr. Lawson 3 draft chapters based on his work. After a 
cursory glance of the content of these chapters he agreed to waive his right to anonymity.
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A3.1: Extract from my excel data-sheet, regarding questionnaire respondents comments on visualisation.
Respondent
ID




course o f  
study?
Q lc. 
Gender ? Q ld. Age ? Q le. What are you present research interests?
Q2. Do you ever 
find it difficult to 
get a mental picture 
o f the physical 
processes involved 
in your research?
Q2b. Why do you 
think this is?
Q2c. Where you do 
have difficulty, how 







Physics o f Molecular Materials - nonlinear 
optics/electronics -organic polymers, fullerenes, carbon 
nanotubes - applications o f spectroscopy.
3 Not great with symmetry
Overcome by using 
models - trying to 







Cirrus and thunderstorm clouds; Atmospheric flows; 
Aircraft observations o f high altitude atmospehric 
processes; Surface Atmosphere Exchange o f  Gases and 
Aerosols; Cloud Aerosol Interactions; Cloud Microphysical 
Instrumentation; Micrometeorological Measurement 
Techniques Forest atmosphere exchange; Urban 






me a tangent and I 
will o ff on it
I focus
Phys_14 Professor o f  
Physics Male 53
Physics and chemistry o f thin film materials for electronics 
and photonics; compound semiconductors;epitaxial films; 
photoluminescence spectroscopy; copper metallization; 
electrodeposition; physical electrochemistry.
2
I believe that I have 






For complex 3- 
dimensional situations, 
3-D models can be 
useful
Phys_19









Atomic,molecular and optical and condensed-matter 
physics,occasionally nuclear. Notably:hevy-particle 
collision theory,Wannier above & below theshold 




T able A 3.1: A selection  o f  respondent com m ents regard ing the degree to w hich they find it d ifficu lt to get a m ental p icture o f  the physical processes involved in their  
research , the reasons w hy, and the techniques they use to overcom e their difficulties.
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A3.2 Examples of Thought Experiments published in the areas of 
cosmology, general relativity and quantum gravity.
Suggested and explained by Phys_54 during follow-up e-mail exchanges in Jan 2006.
Let me give a couple of examples of though experiments in the literature:
1. The tethered galaxy problem.
One thought experiment (explored in E.R. Harrison, 1995, Astrophysical Journal 446, 63- 
66,"Mining energy in an expanding universe") is the question: Suppose I had a string 
(sufficiently long) stretched between two galaxies which are flying away from each other 
with the Hubble flow, i.e., with the expansion of the universe. If  I held onto the string 
giving friction and heat, could I thereby extract energy from the expansion o f the Universe, 
presumably thereby also slowing down the expansion of the Universe ever so slightly?
This is an important conceptual problem, and thinking about it carefully helps one to 
understand the subtleties in the definition of energy in an expanding universe, even though 
the experiment itself is physically impossible. [Harrison is a well-known cosmologist, 
associated with the Harrison-Zeldovich spectmm of scale free primordial perturbations, 
which are believed to be those actually produced by cosmic inflation.]
2. Boxes of radiation lowered into black holes.
This thought experiment was introduced by Jakob Bekenstein in 1973, leading to a 
problem with a generalized version of the second law of thermodynamics, which was 
resolved by Bill Unruh and Bob Wald in W.G. Unruh and R.M. Wald, 1982, Physical 
Review D 25, 942-958, "Acceleration radiation and the generalized second law of 
thermodynamics" [The earlier references of Bekenstein are also in Physicsl Review D: J.D. 
Bekenstein Phys. Rev. D 7 (1973) 2333; D 9 (1974) 3292.]
The basic idea is that it is possible to lower a box on a string containing some radiation 
with a certain energy and entropy into a black hole. Once the box gets close to the black 
hole a shutter opens, and the energy and entropy of the radiation are absorbed by the black 
hole. After the entropy of the radiation is absorbed, the entropy of the system is just that of 
the black hole. It can be arranged that the increase in the entropy o f the black hole is less 
than the entropy of the radiation that went in, seeming to give a violation of the generalized 
second law of thermodynamics. Together with the Hawking effect it would seem possible 
theoretically to create a perpetual motion machine. Bekenstein tried to resolve this by 
suggesting that there were physical limits on the amounts o f energy and entropy you could 
dump into a black hole this way. However, the arguments were not satisfactory, as there 
were ways around it. Things can be resolved once the Hawking effect is taken into account 
properly since the pressure of the Hawking radiation emitted by the black hole gives an 
extra buoyancy force on the box, much like the buoyancy force of water on a submerged 
object which is the basis of Archimedes principle (and is taught in first year physics). Once 
you take this buoyancy force into account, then the work done in lowering the string is 
less, and the calculations are different in such a way that the generalized second law of 
thermodynamics still holds.”
(Phys_54e. In an e-mail exchange with Ciara Muldoon, 17-01-2006)
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A3.3 Four charts showing the extent to which respondents said they visualise different kinds of experiments
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Missing Data never/1 7/all the time
Physicists were asked to select from a 7-point scale which ran from "never/1" to "7/all the time'
Figure A3.1: Degree to which respondents visualise experiments which are then physically performed, from Q2d of on-line questionnaire.
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Missing Data never/1 2 3 4 5 6 7/all the time
Physicists were asked to select from a 7-point scale which ran from "never/1" to "7/all the time"
Figure A3.2: Degree to which respondents’ visualise experiments which are impossible to physically perform, from Q2d of on-line questionnaire.
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Q2d. How often to you visualise experiments which are 
(iii) physically performable but doing so would offer no firther insight






Missing Data never/1 2 3 4 5 6 7/all the time
Physicists were asked to select from a 7-point scale whcih ran from "never/1" to "7/all the time"
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Missing Data never/1 2 3 4 5 6
Selections from a 7 point scale, ranging from "never/1" to "7/all the time'
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A4.1 Have computer simulations strengthened physicists’ visualization 
capabilities (i) in their own research area & (ii) in physics in general? 
(Related to chapter 4, section 4.5)
In Q4d respondents were asked: “Do you think that computer simulations have strengthened 
physicists ’ visualization capabilities (i) in your own research area (ii) in physics in general? ” 
Respondents were then asked in question 4e of the on-line questionnaire: “Can you please 
elaborate on your choice in Q4d above?”
A4.1.1 Selection of respondents who said that computer simulations “definitely have” 
strengthened physicists visualisation capabilities both in their own research area and in 
physics in general.
□ [7 & 7]1 “It is impossible to probe certain functions systematically without computers (this is not 
necessarily 'simulation' in the sense used by some physicists, but is definitely visualisation). Much 
of my research in fundamental physics (eg classical crystal optics, statistical geometry of 
stochastic functions) would have been impossible without computer visualisation techniques.” 
Phys_74
□ [7 & 7] “Modem visualisation tools allow us to interpret complex physical phenomena in a much 
more intuitive way as we don't first have to construct some plausible scenario in our mind first.” 
Phys_21
□ [7 & 7] “some of the work I do it on stars with nebulae around them - mass that is lost from a star, 
but not evenly all around it, rather directed along the magnetic north and south poles, or around 
some other axis, simulations from theoretical models of these outflows are extremely helpful in 
then producing from the modeled 3D shapes, the 2D shapes that would be observed(since when we 
look at something we only really see it in 2D), which are then compared with the images of these 
objects we gather with telescopes. D= dimensions.” Phys_22
□ [7 & 7] “In my own field we realised that some of our plasmas emitted x-rays longer when hit by 
a more intense laser, not becasue [sic] of the reduction sic] in recombination rate which intuition 
told us was the answer but because of a sustained collisional ionisation rate as revealed by 
simulation. This latter is a rather technical example.” Phys_25
□ [7 & 7] “In my field, computer simulations can be used to show the effect of relativistic motion of 
an astrophysical source of radiation, and to predict what would actually be observed. It is often not 
easy to predict what should be observed in any detail without some computer simulation work.” 
Phys_41
□ [7 & 7] “I can comment about our research area: we are dealing with extremely complex, multi­
body systems, for which analytical solutions or treatment are of limited use. On the other hand 
computational codes (thanks to the ever increasing computer performances) can deal with 
demanding numerical calculations and provide visual outputs. In particular, in codes it is possible 
to switch on and off particular phenomena or effects and see their impact on the final results 
(which is not possible in experiments in most cases).” Phys_43
□ [7 & 7] “Theoreticians have used simulations to visualize atomic-scale phenomena inaccessible 
directly- for example, the trapping of positrons in atom-sized open-volume defects in solids.” 
Phys_62
□ [7 & 7] “In astronomy, lots of data have more than two dimensions. Computers give the insight 
e.g. in the 3d-structure of a cluster, the velocity field of a galaxy or the time dependence of the 
galactic structures (formation/interaction)” Phys_77
□ [7 & 7] “Spatio-temporal chaos and the formation of patterns; molecular structures; velocity fields
in hemodynamics; optical interference patterns; atomic orbitals. The list is simply phenomenal.” 
Phys_99
□ [7 & 7] “I believe it is obvious. ” Phys_101
□ [7 & 7] “In magnetism it is very hard to argue otherwise.” Phys_113
□ [7 & 7] “Allowing other disciplines to understand/visualise concepts. All branches of science
interweave at some level. Communication and discussion is crucial to good science.” Phys_132
1 Numbers in square brackets indicate selections from the 7-point scale, from “no, they definitely have not/1” 
to “7/yes, they definitely have.”
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□ [7 & 7] “Visualisation can make abstract mathematical models come alive. You perceive the 
mathematical solution in a way that taps into the very fundamental sense of sight and therefore 
perhaps utilise a large sub-conscious processing power that is not available from the purely 
abstract.” Phys_149
□ [7 & 7] “in complex systems our brains seem too small to be able to interpret big ugly equations 
into physical scenarios, to calculate specific examples is time consuming, computers can do 
calculations very fast and not hurt our heads. Seeing equations in action helps us understand their 
consequences better. Examples - nonlinear physics, chaos, helps see patterns ...” Phys_177
A4.1.2 Selection of responses suggesting that computer simulations have not 
strengthened physicists’ visualisation capabilities in respondents’ own research area and 
may or m aj not have in physics in general.
□ [ l & l ] 2 “Visualisation is just a very nice marketing tool for physics. It came as well fitted to the 
visualisation of complex systems fractals and old classical physics recently extending into chaos 
theories (e.g. the celebrated Mandelbrot pictures) but visualisation is meaningless for n- 
dimensional spaces, Lie algebras in QM etc...” Phys_79
□ [1 & 7]. “[blank]” Phys_105
□ [ l & l ]  “The computer is a nice instrument but cannot replace human ingenuity. We have 
however to distinguish between ‘visualisation’ where the advent of computers has not changed 
much and ‘simulation’. I do think that simulating complicated physical system is a genuinely new 
tool of scientific discovery.” Phys_165
□ [1 & -] “The ability however to plot or compute areas of the problem using packages, e.g. 
Mathematica, Maple, FORM, certainly have helped, otherwise see Q4c.A lot of work is done on 
lattice field theory, where one aims to compute results directly by simulating the fluctuating 
quantum fields. This does not contribute to visualization, but is beginning to make a serious 
contribution to getting numerical answers.” Phys 170
□ [1 & 3 ] “The reactions I carry out are fairly simple - no need to use a computer to visualise.” 
Phys_5
□ [1 & 7 ] “Mine is a simple concept, whereas some physics is not easily explained without 
simulations.” Phys_45
□ [1 & 4] “They have not benefited me because i have not used them. For Physics in general i just 
trust Simulation and Modelling as a useful aid.” Phys_225
□ [2 & 71 “Vision is only one of the ways in which we know the world. Its dominance at present is 
pedagological rather that fundamental.” Phys_115
A4.2 Selection of Questionnaire Respondents’ Written Responses 
Regarding The Reality Status of Computer Simulations.
(Related to chapter 4, section 4.6.4)
□ [1] “Computer simulations can only suggest what *might* happen, this still has to be shown by 
experimentation. So long as people don't confuse a computer model and reality, there is no 
problem. Computer simulations are frequently just a more advanced, ie faster and more complex, 
analytical solution.” Phys_86
□ [1] “Promotion of a cartoon view of reality.” Phys_115
□ [I] “I think that scientist can forget that it's their job to understand what happens in nature. They 
do not make it happen, although they might contrive the conditions. Computers are powerful 
enough to disconnect the user from the real world.” Phys_132
□ [1] “It is hard to know to what extent they accurately reflect reality, and there is the possibility of 
being fooled by them.” Phys_162
□ [1] “I do not believe that modelling is sufficiently near to reality to be of value. It is only as good 
as the model used and most real life physical systems are much more complex than the model can
2 The numbers inside the square brackets indicate respondents’ selections from the 7-point scale on 
whether computer simulations have strengthened physicists visualisation capabilities (i) in their own 
research area & (ii) in physics in general.
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handle in a reasonable amount of time. In my experience, the (mathematical) modellers have 
followed what I/we have done and not lead us.” Phys_200
□ [2] “Care needed in setting up the simulation to make it represent reality. Experimental checks are 
needed” Phys_121
□ [3] “the fact that the computer can only simulate based on what you tell it, and you don't 
necessarily know enough to make the model have any basis in reality” Phys_164
□ [3] “In general - substitution of the real world by a virtual reality. It is very easy to lose the link 
with the real experimental results...” Phys_168
□ 4] “Treating data from simulations as real. Unphysical approximations or mathematical fiddles 
being used to make the simulation 'fit' the data rather than understanding the physics behind what 
is going on.” Phys_88
□ [4]“ Some things which could happen in reality may be too complex to easily code.” Phys_146
□ [4] “Disadvantage - to mistake the model for the 'truth'. This has always been a danger of any 
model (ie any approximation), including Newton's mechanics and Einstein's special relativity.” 
Phys_217
□ [5] “You have to remember it is only a model or simulation and that reality probably is different.” 
Phys_167
□ [5] “neglect of real world factors. It's all too clean and there's never any noise effects, random 
errors etc. My modelled radiative transfer always looks clean and noise free, whereas real 
measurements are noisy and have offsets, instrumental effects and interferences and bad hair 
days!” Phys_211
□ [6] “Lose contact with reality and with what is actually do-able.” Phys_138
□ [7] “Too much reliance on them will remove people from the reality.” Phys_98
□ [7] “That you start to believe the simulations are 'real'.” Phys_135
□ [7] “It's not 'real' physics. You must always be careful to make it as physically realistic as
possible.” Phys_136
□ [7] “A computer simulation can only be an approximation to the real world so it is important to 
really know what the quantitative effects of the approximations are.” Phys_212
A4.3 Selection of Questionnaire Respondents’ Written Comments 
Regarding The importance of establishing of the empirical reliability of 
models in a methodologically accepted way. (Related to section 4.6.4)
□ “Getting your simulation to match with the experimental results! You have to fold in the 
uncertainties and this often requires estimations or fitting to data. You don't always understand 
why you need the correction you do.” Phys_51
□ “The real world is always right, only the interpretation of results can be wrong. In a simulation the 
virtual world can easily be wrong. In the end real experiments are always necessary.” Phys_53
□ “do you believe the model? - it has to be tested against experiment.” Phys_58
□ “Over-emphasis: lack of linkage between simulation and experiment.” Phys_62
□ “It is too tempting to use simulation instead of real experiments for teaching. My feelings say that 
it is very important for a physicist to have experience with nature directly rather than using 
simulations, which deliver an idealized view of the things.” Phys_77
□ “It is highly dependant on experimental results and also on how the experiment was conducted. A 
good calculation needs to be coordinated with experimentalists but unfortunately most 
experimentalists don't understand the computation methods well enough probably because they are 
convinced they can do without computations.” Phys_105
□ “Care needed in setting up the simulation to make it represent reality. Experimental checks are 
needed” Phys_121
□ “They can become so detailed, trying to include all the warts and wrinkles, that the essential 
elements become lost in the details. Also, how do we test some of these models? That is an 
important element. Computer models are NOT ''experiments" as some have described them, and 
the results are NOT "data".” Phys_202
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A5.1: Examples of analogy provided by questionnaire respondents who 
indicated that they use analogy “7/all the time” in their research. 
(With Reference to Chapter 5, Section 5.2)
Of the 52 physicists that claimed to use analogy “all the time” in their research, 40 physicists provided
exemplary analogies. These are listed below.
■ “Polarisation flipping in lasers describes using potential wells similar to ball on a hill.” Phys_2
■ “I used analogies for explaining thermal stress generation generated by laser beams with the
equivalent size of a mechanical object striking a surface. For example if lOOw of laser light is 
foussed to a very small spot size, it imparts a high thermal stress to the surface, as the power 
density (power per unit area) is high. Equally if a very sharp and fine object is projected at high 
velocity at a surface it will impart a high stress. The same analogy holds for a large spot laser 
beam and a large blunt mechanical object imparting a lower stress on a surface which it is 
striking.” Phys_4
■ “particle sliding on the surface of a tapering cone so that the azimuthal angle is arbitrary for 
forward scattering” Phys_19
■ “football formations (e.g. 4-4-2) and levels and states in atoms” Phys_24
■ “Quanta of energy in quantum mechanics as a cent of euro in monetary system” Phys_28
■ “Thinking of waves like water” Phys_31
■ “I develop analogies through mathematics and not from visual experiments” Phys_37
■ “Analogy of a financial market with molecules in a gas” Phys_40
■ “various in the areas of electricity and radioactivity.” Phys_46
■ “current as analogous to water flow” Phys_49
■ “A dislocation in a crystal is like an elastic band in free space.” Phys_50
■ “Curvature of spacetime in terms of masses stretching a rubber sheet, and motions of test particles
on such a sheet is a standard analogy which is useful for thinking about geometry near black holes, 
and one which I use a lot in lectures.” Phys_54
■ “Pipe resonances and the geometry of bays behind breakwaters” Phys_57
■ “trapping of ions in potential wells” Phys_57
■ “Modelling electron transport through nanocrystalline Ti02 as 'hoppers' walking randomly 
through a cubic lattice” Phys_69
■ “strongly correlated electrons as localised particles” Phys_71
■ “Optical phase singularity = singularity of time zone at the north pole = singularity on lattice in 
crystal dislocation” Phys_74
■ “Electric current <—> Flux of fluid; CCD detector array <--> Array of buckets collecting rain; 
Optical wavefront <—> Pressure wave (becomes e.g. compressed when moving to higher index 
medium)” Phys_77
■ “The comparison of the generalized Ramsauer-Townsend effect with Fresnel scattering of optics” 
Phys_78
■ “quantum vacuum fluctuations impinging on a moving reflective surface are like walking through 
the rain - one picks up much more rain on one's front than on one's back” Phys_81
■ “Looking at a system through some number of slits in order to gain some course grained 
resolution and in order to make measurements on that system in such a way as to not cause it to 
collapse into one particular state. Sorry - this is slightly vague - basically a way to perform more 
subtle quantum measurements.” Phys_96
■ “Seabed volcanoes are pustules on the Earth's skin ?” Phys_98
■ “magnetically ordered parts of the globally disordered system under study behaved similarly to the 
solid pieces (islands) in a liquid.” Phys_113
■ “Classical localisation of excitons in disordered solids. ” Phys_115
■ “phonon - coupled electric oscillators” Phys_116
■ “It is well known that polar organic material on water surfaces often acts as a surfactant, 
conversely an organic particle may be processed by oxidation in the atmosphere to allow it to take 
up water and so act as a cloud condensation nucleus. This is potentially important but has not yet 
been shown to be important in the atmosphere. A resistance analogy for the uptake of gases and 
particles by plant canopies” Phys_117
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■ “Well, I always deal with electromagnetic fields by thinking about field lines as bits of thick 
rubbery stuff -- resist being stretched, and are mutually repulsive.” Phys_119
■ “The analogy of the gravitational mass quadrupole moment of a body, and its tensor of inertia.” 
Phys_120
■ “Modelling colloidal particles as point like massive particles which diffuse. Model reaction- 
diffusion systems by point size particles which diffuse, multiply and die” Phys_124
■ “The black hole resembles a space-time river racing towards a water fall, Singularity Falls. 
Picture a river with fish that have a maximal velocity, say c. If the river flows faster than c the 
fish are swept away.” Phys_128
■ “That photons can behave as either 'particles' or 'waves'” Phys_135
■ “Electrical circuitry to understand heat flow. “Domestic” Water supply to explain an electrical 
circuit. Stretched rubber sheet as analogue of Poisson/Laplace’s equations.” Phys_150
■ “The expansion of the universe like a ball thrown in a gravitational field” Phys_152
■ “Quantum Hall Effect for AC current could (I am not sure, it is unpublished) be explained in 
terms of a charge wave motion with a constant (rather low) speed along the edge of the sample 
(as usually it is Hall bar) from one contact to another clockwise or anticlockwise depending on 
the direction of magnetic field.” Phys_168
■ “They're too numerous and not often very pictorial. Thus often the research progresses by 
noticing that the problem "is like" another problem in some respects and thus the outcome 
might be expected to be similar. If you can draw enough such analogies you can often have a 
good idea about what to expect even if the problem is not yet well defined or the calculation 
started. In other words, the analogies, for me at any rate, are typical of the Sheldon Glashow 
quote you give above rather than the more easily graspable earlier ones. Two I use at the 
moment: to regard the exact renormalization group as a continuum analogue of blocking on a 
lattice; to regard exact renormalization group as a form of reparametrization of an integral (the 
partition function integral). I would not be surprised if that means little to almost everyone! 
Feynman said that a good theoretical physicist should have at least three ways of looking at (or 
was it deriving?) something, on the grounds that just one of these might suggest a new 
approach. That is, more or less, what I strive for.” Phys_170
■ “The short distance structure of a photon which is due to vacuum fluctuations involving quarks 
and anti-quarks, and a similar approach for colour singlet exchange in bulk hadron physics” 
Phys_174
■ “In quantum information we value entanglement between two seperate parties as a commodity 
- in some sense it is entanglement (particuliar to quamtum mechanics) that offers quantum 
computation and communication its power over classical analogies, given a pair of particles, 
we then would like to know how much entanglement they poses. This is a very tricky thing to 
define. One way to define such a measure is to see how much "maximal entanglment" (which 
we can easily define) it takes to create the pair. This is called entanglement of formation. 
Another measurement is defined by imagining we have an infinite supply of these particles and 
asking how much maximal entanglement it takes per particle pair ON AVERAGE. This is 
called the entanglement cost - or assymptotic entanglement of formation. The assymptotic 
measurement can in principle be lower that the one off measurement. The assymptotic measure 
is analogous to the whole sale price for purchasing, for example cars, which can give a lower 
cost per car than if one where to buy one alone. This analogy seems to help people understand 
the diffemece...” Phys_177
■ “Electron flow through a gated HFET device - constricted water-pipe analogy” Phys_187
■ “Magnetic fields in fluids can be visualised as strings moving with the fluid” Phys_196
■ “optics and quantum mechanical superposition” Phys_197
■ “Traversal of a light beam around a laser cavity as a billiard ball around similar shaped 
cavity/table.” Phys_215
■ “One analogy I constantly use is the analogy of a superconducting island with a large, finite 
quantum spin. The phrase 'analogy' may not be quite right: In this case, the analogy is not of 
the form 'this is quite similar to' but rather of the form 'The maths of this situation is exactly the 
same as this situation; therefore physical intuition or visualisation of one situation maps 
directly to the other situation'” Phys_221
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Respondents were asked to say with which 
of the 12 IoP groups (listed below) they 
would associate themselves.
Part 1: Shows # of physicists who associated 
themselves with this # of IoP group/branch. 
(Respondents selected a minimum of 1 group and 
maximum of 8 groups)





Part 3: Shows # of physicists who associate themselves 
with this # of the 12 IoP groups/branches as a % of the 
total number who associated themselves with this IoP 
group, (i.e. figures in part 1 divided by figures in part 2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I
Applied Optics 4 8 13 8 4 4 2 0 43 9.3 18.6 30.2 18.6 9.3 9.3 4.7 0.0
Chemical Physics 0 4 8 8 5 2 1 0 28 0.0 14.3 28.6 28.6 17.9 7.1 3.6 0.0
Computational Physics 0 5 23 14 8 3 1 1 55 0.0 9.1 41.8 25.5 14.5 5.5 1.8 1.8
Surface Science & Technology
1
1 5 5 4 2 1 1 20 5.0 5.0 25.0 25.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 5.0
Nuclear Physics 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 18 22.2 16.7 22.2 16.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
Plasma Physics 2 1 9 9 1 1 0 1 24 8.3 4.2 37.5 37.5 4.2 4.2 0.0 4.2
Condensed Matter & Material Physics 11 11 18 14 7 4 2 1 68 16.2 16.2. 26.5 20.6 10.3 5.9 2.9 1.5
High Energy & Particle Physics 11 11 7 3 1 2 1 1 37 29.7 29.7 18.9 8.1 2.7 5.4 2.7 2.7
Mathematical & Theoretical Physics 6 13 20 15 6 3 1 1 65 9.2 20.0 30.8 23.1 9.2 4.6 1.5 1.5
Spectroscopy 1 5 11 8 8 3 1 0 37 2.7 13.5 29.7 21.6 21.6 8.1 2.7 0.0
Quantum Electronics & Photonics 3 5 9 11 7 2 2 1 40 7.5 12.5 22.5 27.5 17.5 5.0 5.0 2.5
Astrophysics 21 10 16 6 5 2 0 0 60 35.0 16.7 26.7 10.0 8.3 3.3 0.0 0.0
Table A5.1: Quantitative data regarding the number of groups with which respondents associated themselves. See for example, that of the 60 respondents who associated
themselves with Astrophysics, 35% associated themselves with no other group.
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A6.1 Degree to which academic status or prestige of occasion 
influences respondents’ use of analogy. (Relevant to section, 6.6).
Tables A6.1 -  A6.5 on the following pages contain noteworthy responses regarding the 
degree to which respondents’ use of analogy is influenced by the academic status of their 
audience or the prestige of the occasion. For the first 50 responses, the question read: “Does 
academic status influence your use of analogy when communicating with your target 
audience?” The notion of academic status was seen to be identical to expertise for some 
respondents, so in an attempt to clarify matters, from response 50 to 225 the question read: 
“Does prestige of occasion influence your use of analogy when communicating with your 
target audience?” This turned out to be just as confusing for many physicists. However some 
respondents did suggest that they would use better analogies on more prestigious occasion. 
This is shown in Table A6.1 below.
Table A6.1: Shows 
same extent or ma
that on prestigious occasions some physicists would use analogy to the 
ce an effort to generate good analogies.




your use of 
analogy when 
communicating 
with your target 
audience?
(l=not at all;
7 = very much so)
Q5d. Could you please elaborate on you choice in 
Q5c above?
Phys_55 24 3
“In a more prestigious situation, I would be more 
tempted to use analogy, to demonstrate by ability at 
coming up with analogies!”
Phys_68 44 1
“I find that even amongst distinguished colleagues it 
is better to give a picture that everyone can 
understand. I have seen this done by the most 
eminent in the field, and everyone appreciates that 
they can understand what is going on.”
Phys_114 59 4 “A prestigious occasion makes me work harder to try to think of an analogy.”
Phys_160 52 1
“Regardless of the prestige of an occasion, I think 
that I will make the most useful and favourable 
impression on an audience by explaining myself 
clearly. What counts is (my perception of) the 
background and expertise of the audience. In my 
experience, no audience feels patronized by the 
substitution of an appropriate analogy for the ‘real 
thing’.”
Phys_165 36 2
“Might have a small effect. People tell me that the 
most silly jokes should be omitted in more 
prestigious occasions and that the pictures should 
look more fancy.”
Phys_198 32 2 “come up with good analogies for a more prestigious occasion.”
Phys_207 25 6 “If at a major conference or occasion, a new analogy is often preferred to repeating a ‘classic’ analogy.”
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A7.1 Outline of J.D. Lawson’s Career:
Appendix 7
04-April-1923: Date of birth.
1920s-1930s: John Lawson’s abilities as an “engineer stroke physicist” were evident from an 
early age. He told me in our first interview:
“I regard myself as a sort of engineer stroke physicist, I think. I mean as a boy, I was 
always making things,.. .usually I had no resources, because we weren’t very well off and 
it was a question of using bits and pieces of anything else, and scrounging...which was 
very good for me really...” 3
1943: Emerged from Cambridge with a ‘wartime’ degree in mechanical sciences, which 
included electrical engineering and radio, as a preparation for radiolocation (radar) research.
1943: Started his career at Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) Malvern: 
Micro Wave Aerials Group, where he worked on airborne radar.
1947: Joined Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) Malvern Branch: Accelerator 
group.
1951: Transferred to AERE Harwell General Physics Division [HQ of the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA)]
1951: Was at Harwell, leading the team developing the X-band Klystron.
1952: Made an important theoretical contribution to accelerator theory by his identification of 
resonances in strong focussing synchrotrons. As he explained to me:
“[A]s the alternating gradient strong focusing machine was first presented, they’d not 
taken into account the possibility of orbital resonances, which make it very much more 
critical. And we [Dr. Lawson plus two colleagues] wrote a paper...” 4
1955: Dr. Lawson turned his attention to fusion power.
“The survey in to the problem of fusion power which he undertook in 1955 whilst at 
Harwell produced the now famous ‘Lawson Criterion’ governing energy ‘breakeven’ in 
thermonuclear power generation.” 5
1957: Derived the Lawson Criterion6
1961: Joined Rutherford Laboratory;
3 Dr. Lawson, speaking during our first interview at his residence, 14:30-15:00, 15-January-2004
4 Dr. Lawson, speaking during our first interview at his residence, 14:30-15:00, 15-January-2004
5 Rutherford Appleton Laboratory Bulletin, number 5, 6-Apil-1988, on the occasion of Dr. Lawson’s 
election as an FRS.
6 Wikipedia, the free on-line dictionary, has an entry for this term. It says: “In nuclear fusion research, the 
Lawson criterion, first derived by John D. Lawson in 1957, is an important general measure of a system that 
defines the conditions needed for a fusion reactor to reach ignition, that is, that the heating of the plasma by the 
products of the fusion reactions is sufficient to maintain the temperature of the plasma against all losses without 
external power input. As originally formulated the Lawson criterion gives a minimum required value for the 
product of the plasma (electron) density ne and the "energy confinement time" xE. Later analyses suggested that a 
more useful figure of merit is the "triple product" of density, confinement time, and plasma temperature T. The 
triple product also has a minimum required value, and the name "Lawson criterion" often refers to this 
inequality.”
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawson criterion Accessed 23-01-2006)
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1969: Received his Sc.D. Physics (also at Cambridge);
1971: Elected fellow of the Institute of Physics;
1975:
“In 1975 because of his “rather unique” understanding of the physics of plasmas, his 
services were sought by Culham Laboratory where he spent two years on a design study 
of a conceptual fusion power reactor based on the ‘reverse field pinch’ principle, a 
development arising from the original ZETA experiment, establishing firmly where the 
limitations in current understanding of the underlying physics lay and providing 
guidelines for future strategies in this field.” 7
Dr. Lawson said to me that:
“A lot of my ideas were in showing how things wouldn’t work as they were being 
claimed, especially with new things.” 8
1977: Publication of first edition of his book, “The Physics of Charged Particle Beams,” 
part o f an International Series of Monograph in Physics, Oxford.
“A study in depth of problems of high intensity beams with the objective of integrating 
material from widely scattered fields (microwave tubes, electron optics, accelerators, 
plasma physics etc.) and providing a general unified treatment, was published in 1977 as 
an ‘International Monograph in Physics’ by the Clarendon Press. ‘The Physics of 
Charged Particle Beams’ has since had numerous reprints and been translated into 
Russian and, perhaps the ultimate accolade, into Chinese!” 9
1985: Received Thomas Young Medal from the Physical Society, given for Optics.
1987: Retired from the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory. The RAL director, Paul Williams, 
said in an RAL Bulletin describing the occasion:
“To say he will be missed is the understatement of the year...We have learned to trust 
and respect his council and, so that we do not lose touch, have invited him to become one 
of the RAL’s Honorary Scientists.” (RAL Bulletin, 02-Nov-1987)
1988: Elected a Fellow of the Royal Society;
1988: Publication of the 2nd edition of his book The Physics o f  Charged Particle Beams.
1946-1997: Dr. Lawson has close to 100 formal journal publications including:
Journal o f the Institute of Electrical Engineers; Nature; Philosophical Magazine; British 
Journal o f Applied Physics; Nucleonics; Journal of Electronics and Control; Journal of 
Nuclear Energy; Radio and Electrical Engineering; Nuclear Instruments & Methods in 
Physics; American Journal of Physics; Journal of Scientific Instruments; IEEE Transactions 
on Nuclear Science; Physics Letters; Particle Accelerators; Contemporary Physics; Physics 
of Fluids; Plasma Physics; Advanced Electronics and Electron Physics; Annual Review of 
Nuclear Science; European Journal of Physics; Plasma Physics and Controlled Fusion;
7 Rutherford Appleton Laboratory Bulletin, number 5, 6-April-1988, on the occasion of Dr. Lawson’s 
election as an FRS
8 Dr. Lawson, speaking during our first interview at his residence, 15-Jan-2004
9 Rutherford Appleton Laboratory Bulletin, number 5, 6-April-1988, on the occasion of Dr. Lawson’s 
election as an FRS
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Appendix 7
A7.2 Interdisciplinary Electrical Analogies:
General Electrical Mechanical Translational / Rotational
Hydraulic
(Acoustic) Thermal
F low  V ariable  
(through variable)
Current, /  =  dq/dt [A m ps] F orce, F  [N ew tons] Torque, T [N ew ton  m eters] V olu m e (flu id ) flo w , G [m 3/s] H eat flo w , q [Joules/sec]
Potential V ariable  
(across variable)
V oltage , V [V olts] V e lo c ity , v [m /sec] A ngular v e lo c ity , CO 
[radians/sec]
Pressure drop, p  [P ascals] Tem perature d ifference, T [°C]
Integrating E lem ent 
(D e la y  C om ponent)
Inductance, L [H enrys] 
Faraday's Law:
I = ^ V 6 i / L
E lasticity  
H ooke's Law:
F = k ^ v d t
k =  spring constant (stiffness)
E lasticity  (e.g., torsion bar or 
co il spring) 
f
T = k J iDdt
k =  torsional spring constant
Inertance, M  
f
G =  p  dt / M  
e.g., for pipe: 
M =  PL/A
N ot A p plicab le




R = PL/A [O hm s] 
Ohm 's Law:
/  = VIR
V isco u s friction (e.g., dashpot or  
dam per)
F = B v
B = dam ping constant
V iscou s friction  
T = D w
D  = dam ping factor
Fluid resistance, R 
G = p / R
H eat transfer resistance, R 
q = T / R
Rconvect — 1 !(h A)
D ifferentiating E lem ent
(A ccu m ulative
C om ponent)
Capacitance,
C  = zA/d [Farads] 
1 = C  dV/dt
M ass (i.e., inertia), m [kg] 
N ew ton 's Second  Law o f  M otio  n 
F —m dv/dt
Polar M om ent o f  Inertia, J  
7 W d c o /d /
F lu id  capacitance, C 
G = C dp/dt
Therm al heat capacity, m cp 
q = m cp dr/d/
Other V ariables
f
Charge, q = J I dt 
[C ou lom bs]
f
D isp lacem en t, x =  v dt
f
A n gle , 13 = cod/
F lo w  v e lo c ity , u — G/A [m /s] 
f
V olum e, V =  J G dt [m 3]
r
H eat, Q = J q dt [Joules]
Junction /N ode L aw  
E ( F lo w )  =  0
K irch h o ff s Current L aw
E / = 0
d'Alem bert's Principle
E f = o
Second  L aw  o f  Rotational 
M echanical System s
E r = o
M Cl ii o
oII
C lo sed  L oop L aw  
E (P o te n t ia l)  =  0
K irch h o ff s V o ltage  L aw
E l = o
C ontinuity o f  Space Law
E v  ■ 0
E c o =  0 11 o
oIIK
w
P ow er -
(P oten tia l)(F low )
P = I V  [W atts] >ll
0, P = T  CO P = G p P = T q  [W atts °C]
K inetic E nergy Ek = V i L P [  Joules] Ek = '/2 m v 2 Ek = y2j  co2 Ek = l/2 M G 2 N o t applicable
P otential E nergy Ep = V2 q2!C [Joules] Ep = y2kx2 e p = y2 k 62 Ep = y2 /  G dtY / c N o t applicable
Table A7.1: Electrical circuit analogies for several engineering disciplines have been developed over time. These are summarized in the table below prepared by Dr. Holbert. 
(Source: http://www.eas.asu.edu/~holbert/analogy.htm l; Accessed: 26-01-2006).
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Appendix 7
A7.3 Dr. Lawson’s preference for form, pattern and structure: Eg 2
Particle-Photon Interactions
Dr. Lawson.
CERN Accelerator School ‘Synchrotron Radiation and Free Electron Lasers’, Chester,
April 1989.
Published in CERN 90-63, 237, 1990.
“This paper is concerned not with presenting techniques for making calculations or 
solving problems, but rather introducing a physical viewpoint which enables the 
relation between a range of different phenomena to be seen. In neighbouring fields of 
physics many different points of view and modes of description have evolved. 
Discussion of new developments and evaluation of new suggestions is greatly 
facilitated if one is familiar with different perspectives, different ways of thinking, and 
the relation between them.”
“Again a wide range of phenomena looked at from a simple common viewpoint. (I 
was challenged to write a similar paper with only one equation! See European Jnl o f 
Physics 5pl04 1984) ” 10
This is another instance where Dr. Lawson attempts to acquire or promote physical insight through 
utilising a table to facilitate cross comparison between “perspectives”. A physicist with expertise in 
particle physics or astrophysics would be able to compare the plots and see that “clearly 
bremsstrahlung and Cherenkov radiation cannot be disentangled.” 11
Fig l  K.iilialion of .1 single frequency component from a highly 
rclativistic panicle moving along a straight trajectory for various 
situations The first column illustrates the current distribution 
associated with frequency wf). The second shows the spectrum of 
values of cos6, this is a ^-function for an infinite path, but has 
finite width when the track is of finite length, corresponding to 
an electron which suddenly starts or stops. The third column 
shows the angular distribution of radiation observed at a great 
distance from the track. H corresponds simply to the radiation 
intensity, given by the square of the product of the distribution 
in the second column multiplied by sin 0 . This is a polar plot, 
showing only real values of 0.
The first line corresponds to Cherenkov radiation from 
an infinite path in a dielectric medium, and the second to the 
TtnphyslcaT radiation consisting of virtual photons only from 
an electron in free space. The third example is the spectrum 
corresponding to an electron traversing a iong track which is 
suddenly stopped. Strictly the second curve is the envelope of a 
very rapidly varying fsin*)/<r function. The third and fourth 
curves correspond to electrons moving along a track of length L. 
corresponding to N * oq  L jlz fb : wavelengths, and the shape can 
be considered as being determined by interference of the 
radiation from the two ends. The interesting point here is that 
there is clearly no sharp distinction between the first example in 
a dielectric where tt/I > t and the second, which could bo in a 
dielectric or free space where n fi < 1. Clearly bremsstrahlung and 
Cherenkov radiation cannot be disentangled. The final curves 
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Figure A7.2: Lawson, Dr. (1989), Particle-Photon Interactions, p.14. 
______________________ Appeared in CERN 90-63, 237, 1990.
10 Dr. L aw son , annotation to paper, enclosed  in w ith M arch 20 0 3  letter to C iara M uldoon
11 N ote: B rem sstrahlung radiation (German for “braking radiation”), is e lectrom agnetic  radiation produced  
w hen charged particles decelerate w h ile passing through matter. C herenkov radiation is electrom agnetic  
radiation em itted  w h en  particles pass through a m edium  at a sp eed  in e x c e ss  o f  the sp eed  o f  light in that 
m edium . C herenkov radiation produces the characteristic blue g lo w  in nuclear reactors. P avel A lek sey ev ich  
C herenkov, w inner o f  the 1958 N ob el Prize w as the first to study it in detail and thereby gave  his nam e to it.
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Appendix 7
A7.4: Dr. Lawson’s preference for form, pattern and structure: Eg. 3 
Some calculations on the pumping of trapped volumes.
J D Lawson, Rutherford High Energy Laboratory, Chilton, Berks
Received 16 December 1965. Published in J. Sci. Instrum. 43 (August 1966) 565-568
Abstract. Calculations are made o f the pressure variation in, and mass flow out of, cavities containing 
air which are connected by low conductance leaks to an evacuated vessel. For a simple system, 
consisting o f one cavity, both viscous and molecular flow are considered, but for more complicated 
configurations attention is confined to molecular flow. Values of leak conductance which give the 
highest flow rate after a fixed pumping time are calculated for both molecular and viscous flow for the 
simple single cavity configuration. The principal results are tabulated as a set o f formulae, judicious 
use o f which should enable order o f magnitude calculations to be made over a useful range o f 
configurations.
Introduction:
“...The approach in this paper is purely phenomenological. Since a precise application o f the results is 
unlikely, simplifications o f the basic formulae are made; the gain in clarity thus obtained for 
outweighs the loss o f accuracy o f some 25% which results..
Again, Dr. Lawson employs a tabular format to compare leak rates with different cavity 
configurations, i.e. different physical situations. This is intended to provide the reader with (physical) 
insights. Dr. Lawson defends this approach saying that, “the gain in clarity thus obtained for 
outweighs the loss o f accuracy...”
J. D. Lawson 
Table 2. Summary of principal results (molecular flow) 
Leak raw
t=0 I jd*0
Leak rale, / — 00
/-eCexp^-p?) P o C e x p ( - £ ' j
I m fl vu [(5 -  V 5) exp / -







- A / - ®
w a p *  o
-A /*0
-Af“®
-  t e C Z c & ^ p  { _  -  ZpoCexp ( -  2 - 5 * )
- pt,C| l  +  2 E  cos ( t j ' j exp (  ~  y ' j j  - poC
- /* c { l  + 1 S(-l)'eo!^ r i.)exp ( -  ^ 2^ ) }  - Poc
Figure A7.3: Lawson, Dr., (1965), Some calculations on the pumping of trapped 
volumes, p. 568 In J. Sci. Instrum. 43 (August 1966) 565-568 XXXII
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A7.5 Dr. Lawson’s preference for form, pattern and structure: E.g. 4
Optical and Hydrodynamical approaches to charged particle beams.
Dr. Lawson, Rutherford Lab., Chilton, UK
Published in Plasma Phys. 17 (July 1975) 567-582 
Abstract.
“The optical paraxial ray equation for charged particles, including the effects of self fields, is 
discussed in both the laboratory and rotating Larmor frames. The corresponding beam envelope 
equation is derived, in the first instance for laminar flow but later for some non-laminar distributions. 
The equivalence between optical and hydrodynamical viewpoints is discussed in some detail, and the 
relation between pressure and emittance is explored. Finally, some of the characteristics of 
longitudinal energy spread in the beam are investigated.”
574 J. D. Lawson
The last two terms only o f  equation (25) represent a beam in which the self force 
balances the centrifugal force. This can only happen when K  is negative so that 
the inward magnetic force dominates. For a completely neutralized beam A" — —2v/y; 
writing p Ba =  ji± ym 0c the last term becomes (/?A//9)S, and the equilibrium condition  
is the familiar relation
(27)
Sketches o f  the solutions corresponding to the various com binations o f  terms in 
equation (25), with ?. independent o f z, are shown in Fig. 2. Som e, but not all, o f  
these have been already discussed.
Enveiope.ond orbits In 
Lormof frcn« (dotted)
2,3
F ig . 2.—These curves represent solutions of the envelope equation (25) in which only 
two of the four terms are present. The dctted lines represent projections of typical 
trajectories in the Larm cr frame.
In  the discussion so far we have been concerned only with lam inar beams. There 
is no  distinction between an orbit model and a hydrodynam ic m odel, the force per 
unit volum e is just the number density times the force on a single particle. The beam  
is cold, and exerts n o  pressure.
Beams with finite pressure and temperature will now  be described.
Figure A7.4:Optical & H ydrodynam ical approaches to charged particle beam s, p. 574
In his accompanying post-it note annotation (March 2003) Dr. Lawson says this is: not an analogue, 




Quotations are from papers or post-it 
notes or replies to my queries
Visual Matrix
Eg. 1 12 “I chose what seemed to be the 
simplest and most elegant layout.”
(Dr. Lawson, replying to my 
questionnaire of 04-10-2004)
4x5 matrix
Rowl: Physical representation of waves; 
Row2: quantum mechanical viewpoint; 
Row3: graphical sketch of wavefunctions;
Row4: whether or not they are bound states
Eg. 2 13 To introduce a “physical viewpoint 
which enables a range of different 
phenomena to be seen.”
The main aim is to bridge the 
conceptual divides between 
“neighbouring fields of physics.”
6x3 matrix
Column 1 gives current distribution; 
Column 2 gives spectrum of values of cosG;
Column 3 gives the angular distribution of 
radiation observed at a great distance from 
the track
Eg. 3 14 “The principal results are tabulated as a 
set of formulae, judicious use of which 
should enable order of magnitude 
calculations to be made over a useful 
range of configurations.”
5x3 matrix.
Column 1 gives a physical representation of 
5 different cavity configurations;
Column 2 gives the mathematical equations 
governing the leak rates.
Column 3 gives the mathematical equations 
governing the leak rates as the time tends to 
infinity
Eg. 4 15 “not an analogue, but two different 
viewpoints -  which enable a richer 
appreciation o f the field to be 
obtained. ”
(Post-it note annotation, March 2003)
7x3 matrix
Column 1 consists of 7 curves representing 
solutions of an envelope equation;
Column 2 shows which two of the four 
terms of the envelope equation are present;
Column 3 provides a reference to the 
relevant equation in the text of the paper.
12 Dr. Lawson, 1950, “Waveguides and wave mechanics: Some Similarities and differences.” Unpublished 
paper.
3 Dr. Lawson, 1989, “Particle-Photon Interactions.” Published in CERN, 1990.
14 Dr. Lawson, 1965, “Some calculations on the pumping of trapped volumes.” Published in J. Of Sci Instrum, 
1966.




A8.1 A Humorous Way of Highlighting The Sub-Cultures of Physics 
Problem: To Catch a Lion in the Sahara Desert
Hunting lions in Africa was originally published as "A contribution to the mathematical theory of big 
game hunting" in the American Mathematical Monthly in 1938 by "H. Petard, of Princeton NJ" 
[actually the late Ralph Boas]. It has become a classic physics joke and can be found in numerous 
locations on-line.16
Theoretical Physics Methods
1) The Dirac method: We assert that wild lions can ipso facto not be observed in the Sahara desert. 
Therefore, if there are any lions at all in the desert, they are tame. We leave catching a tame lion as an 
exercise to the reader.
2) The Schrodinger method: At every instant there is a non-zero probability of the lion being in the 
cage. Sit and wait.
3) The Quantum Measurement Method: We assume that the sex of the lion is _ab initio_ 
indeterminate. The wave function for the lion is hence a superposition of the gender eigenstate for a 
lion and that for a lioness. We lay these eigenstates out flat on the ground and orthogonal to each 
other. Since the (male) lion has a distinctive mane, the measurement of sex can safely be made from a 
distance, using binoculars. The lion then collapses into one of the eigenstates, which is rolled up and 
placed inside the cage.
4) The nuclear physics method: Insert a tame lion into the cage and apply a Majorana exchange 
operator on it and a wild lion. As a variant let us assume that we would like to catch (for argument's 
sake) a male lion. We insert a tame female lion into the cage and apply the Heisenberg exchange 
operator, exchanging spins.
5) The Newton method: Cage and lion attract each other with the gravitation force. We neglect the 
friction. This way the lion will arrive sooner or later in the cage.
6) The Special relativistic method: One moves over the desert with light velocity. The relativistic 
length contraction makes the lion flat as paper. One takes it, rolls it up and puts a rubber band around 
the lion.
7) The general relativistic method: All over the desert we distribute lion bait containing large 
amounts of the companion star of Sirius. After enough of the bait has been eaten we send a beam of 
light through the desert. This will curl around the lion so it gets all confused and can be approached 
without danger.
8) The Heisenberg method: Position and Velocity from a moving lion cannot be measure at the same 
time. As moving lions have no physical meaningful position in the desert, one cannot catch them. The 
lion hunt can therefore be limited to resting lions. The catching of a resting, not moving lion is left as 
an exercise for the reader.
Experimental Physics Methods
1) The thermodynamics method: We construct a semi-permeable membrane which lets everything 
but lions pass through. This we drag across the desert.
2) The atomic fission method
We irradiate the desert with slow neutrons. The lion becomes radioactive and starts to disintegrate. 
Once the disintegration process is progressed far enough the lion will be unable to resist.
3) The magneto-optical method: We plant a large, lens shaped field with cat mint (nepeta cataria) 
such that its axis is parallel to the direction of the horizontal component of the earth's magnetic field. 
We put the cage in one of the field's foci. Throughout the desert we distribute large amounts of 
magnetized spinach (spinacia oleracea) which has, as everybody knows, a high iron content. The 
spinach is eaten by vegetarian desert inhabitants which in turn are eaten by the lions. Afterwards the 
lions are oriented parallel to the earth's magnetic field and the resulting lion beam is focussed on the 
cage by the cat mint lens.
16 For example, on the home page of Prof. Reinhard Schumacher, Department of Physics, Carnegie Mellon 
University: http://www-meg.phvs.cmu.edu/phvsics 33211/Relativitv gags.txt (Accessed 26-01-2006)
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